


(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C.



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

30 Jan 75 3

MEMORANDUM FOR LT GENERAL WILSON, IC STAFF

SUBJECT: Senate Review of the Intelligence Community

In preparation for Mr. Colby's testimony to the Senate Select Committee investigating intelligence community activities, the following information pertaining to the National Reconnaissance Program is offered. Attachment 1 contains ground rules and other criteria which will be necessary to provide the required security protection for the NRP information likely to be discussed. Suggested NRP related topics for inclusion in Mr. Colby's opening statement to the Committee are given in Attachment 2. A description of the NRO/Intelligence Community interface is shown in Attachment 3. A copy of the NRP Charter which was also provided to the NSC for the Presidential Commission Study is included in Attachment 4.

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J. W. Plummer

4 Attachments


1. Ground Rules for NRP


2. Topics for Mr. Colby's

Opening Statement


3. The Relationship of the NRO to the Intelligence Community


4. NRP Charter





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






GROUND RULES

In order to provide the necessary protection for the sensitive National Reconnaissance Program information which will be provided to the Senate Select Committee, it is requested that the following ground rules be established with the Committee:

- -- Information relating to recommaissance satellite activities presented only in closed session and off the record when specific details are discussed.
- -- Provide for NRO security review of any NRP related testimony prior to printing in the Congressional Record.
- -- No discussion or confirmation of any news media stories quoting unnamed sources or speculating on reconnaissance satellite or NRO activities. Curity can be selfhealing providing there is no orrical confirmation when leaks occur.
- -- The Committee members must be cautioned on the sensitivity of the information and the international consequences of public statements regarding satellite reconnaissance operations. Countermeasures or other information-denial techniques could be easily employed against NRP systems should US officials openly discuss and cause public attention to be focused upon reconnaissance satellite operational details.
- -- Specific information concerning the National Reconnaissance Office And its role with regard to satellite reconnaissance not be initially discussed with the Senate Select Committee.










OPENING STATEMENT TOPICS


The following topics regarding NRO related matters would be appropriate for Mr. Colby to include in his opening statement to the Senate Select Committee:

- -- Reconnaissance satellites have been credited as being the most effective source of intelligence information for the United States.
- -- Reconnaissance satellite operations do not conflict with present concepts of international law and actually contribute to the reduction of international tensions.
- -- Intelligence collection from space has not been challenged by other governments mainly because it is perceived as a benign activity and it is not acknowledged officially by our government.
- -- Reconnaissance satellites are an important factor during the SALT verification process.
- -- Reconnaissance satellite capabilities and operations are well known through the Executive Branch.
- -- Plans for all reconnaissance satellite operations are given to the National Security Council's 40 Committee.
- -- Close attention to security detail is required for successful operations of recommaissance satellites.
- -- Satellité developments and operations are within the bounds of public law with maximum possible coordination within the government.
- -- Strong Congressional oversight of reconnaissance satellite activities has been maintained over the years.









THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE NRO TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY


The Director, National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO) executes the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) through the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in accordance with an August 11, 1965, Agreement between the DOD and CIA. The NRP is operated within special security controls and under streamlined management procedures in order to provide space reconnaissance systems which collect needed imagery and signals intelligence information from denied areas. The NRP is a significant and separate segment of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP).


The NRO is a covert and separate operating agency within the DOD which conducts a program that is national in character, in that it consists of elements from CIA, NSA, USAF, USN and USA.

The basis for the organization of the NRO was the necessity for DOD and CIA to accomplish close and continuing collaboration between the two organizations in the national reconnaissance area. This arrangement also insured recognition of the intelligence needs of the military services.

As a collector of intelligence information by space systems the NRP is responsive solely to USIB requirements and priorities. Resource allocations are provided to the NRP by the ExCom (DCI Chairman; ASD(I) is the SecDef's representative). The DNRO is charged with preparing the NRP budget for ExCom consideration. He is the executive agent for the SecDef regarding the NRP's development, management, operation and conduct of the NRP space systems.

The NRO is, in a sense, a quasi member of the intelligence community in that it performs only collection of intelligence information. The NRO does not produce, interpret, analyze or disseminate the intelligence collected. As such it is not a member of the USIB (also because of special security and covert status), but does participate when NRP matters are discussed.









The NRO is represented by the Director on the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee's (IRAC) R&D Council; and IRAC Information Working Group.

NRO interfaces with NSA in two ways. In accordance with NSCID 6, NSA has technical and operational control of SIGINT payloads on NRP vehicles and provides such information to aid the DNRO in his development, management, conduct and operation of the NRP's space systems. Secondly, NSA processes SIGINT data collected from NRP satellites.

The NRP's management is subject to various high level reviews and is accorded specially handled reviews internally within the DOD. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has periodically reviewed the conduct of the NRO's management. Key Congressional members provide periodic intelligence oversight and budget review of the Program. The NRP works directly with the 40 Committee regarding operations. Thus, the 40 Committee provides operational oversight.

