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--(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

3 September 1974


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PLUMMER


SUBJECT: Omnibus NSCID

General Graham's memos constitute a regrouping of the IC Staff with respect to the preparation of an omnibus NSCID for the NSCIC approval, and asks for our participation. At last weeks NSCIC meeting, Dr. Kissinger apparently directed that the appropriate agencies review the draft NSCID prepared unilaterally by the IC Staff. General Graham's memoranda energizes the USIB mechanism to develop a coordinated document. We understand that Mr. Clements suggested that an NSCID should reflect the current roles and missions of the various intelligence entities and that this suggestion was approved by Dr. Kissinger.

I suggest the following approach for NRO inputs to the task group:

- a. It appears that we are in a relative position of strength with respect to our participation. The thrust of the omnibus NSCID is the President's intelligence reorganization directive. That document also directed the retention of the existing management structure of the NRO. Also, as a reflection of current basic roles and missions, our 1965 charter remains valid as a constitution of a nationally oriented NRP which is implemented by an NRO.
- b. We have reconsidered the advantages of an NSCID over some other form of charter and we have concluded that, since the NRO is not a full fledged intelligence entity but a management structure, perhaps an NSCID as an NRO charter is not entirely appropriate.





- c. We believe that our input to the omnibus NSCID should be relatively short in length. It would specify an NRP, an ExCom, an NRO and a streamlined management philosophy. The NRO would be chartered by appropriate other national directives and agreements. We think that this approach would serve to preclude a pre-emption of the PFIAB study with the promulgation of a very specific NSCID on the overall functioning of the NRO. It would also clearly recognize that the NRO is not an intelligence entity per se but a streamlined management entity providing a service to the intelligence community under the overall aegis of the Secretary of Defense.
- d. Finally, we think that basic security of the NRP and NRO should not be compromised under the guise of a requirement for a SECRET omnibus paper.

The following input to a properly classified omnibus NSCID satisfies the above approach and does reflect current roles and missions of the community vis-a-vis the NRP. Since the role of the Secretary of Defense is defined in the 1965 Agreement the references above and below (underlined in yellow) could be deleted to make it more acceptable and to allow more flexibility in adjusting to PFIAB suggestions.

"National Reconnaissance Activities

- (1) <u>Satellite Recommaissance</u>. A single satellite reconnaissance program, the National Reconnaissance Program, will develop, manage, control and operate all space platforms used for the collection of intelligence. The Secretary of Defense will be the executive agent for the conduct of the NRP through a National Reconnaissance Office. An Executive Committee, chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence, with membership including a representative of the Secretary of Defense, will formulate and guide the NRP. The National Reconnaissance Office will implement the NRP.
- (a) The Director, National Reconnaissance Office will be responsible for the streamlined management and the








execution of the NRP in fulfillment of the requirements and tasking authorities established by the USIB.

(b) The National Recommaissance Program and National Recommaissance Office will be organized and managed in accordance with other national directives and agreements."

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JOHN E. KULPA, JR. Brigadier General, USAB Director





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8 October 1964 (Continued) (2) the Deputy Secretary of Defense also directed the (S) DNRO to evaluate establishing a launch facility at Eastern Test Range from which orbits could be flown to traverse the length rather than the width - of Cuba. (Tab No. 8)

8 October 1964

AFXOP-R provided a paper showing existing capabilities for conducting peripheral oblique photographs of Cuba. (Tab No. 9)

9 October 1964

The (S) NRO produced a draft booklet entitled "Planning Facts - NSAM 311." (Tab No. 10)

13 October 1964

The (S) NRO requested the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) to define the specific informational content required by a P. I. to detect and identifywith assurance - IRBM or MRBM associated targets. Definition to include photographs from satellites, aircraft, drones and balloons. (Tab No. 11)

15 October 1964

A revised draft of "Planning Facts - NSAM 311" was completed by the (S) NRO Staff for Mr. Friedman.

15 October 1964

A NSAM 311 "briefing kit" was provided Dr. McMillan in anticipation of his meeting with Mr. Friedman to discuss this subject. (Tab No. 12)


19 October 1964

General Greer was requested to study the feasibility of flying an "8-day equally spaced" orbit against Cuba and to provide a plan for establishing a KH-4 capability at AMR. (Tab No. 13)

21 October 1964

Copies of the final edition of "Planning Facts - NSAM 311" were forwarded to Mr. Friedman together with a cover memorandum signed by Dr. McMillan. Copies were subsequently furnished State, CIA, JCS, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

N. B.: This document, while useful as an educational aid on types and capabilities of various reconnaissance systems which could be applied against Cuba, was sub-



21 October 1964 (Continued) sequently refined by the introduction of more accurate and precise climatological data than was available for this edition of the Planning Facts book. Particularly, it was discovered that the climatology first used (while applicable to balloons) was not adequate for other types of sensors. (Tab No. 14)

21 October 1964

Mr. Friedman sent to Ambassador Thompson a copy of the "Planning Facts - NSAM 311" and, drawing upon information contained in the study, proposed a revision to a draft State Department position paper (dated 12 Oct 64) on NSAM 311. (Tab 15)

21 October 1964

NPIC provided an evaluation of the capability of satellite reconnaissance systems (KH-4 connaissance requirements. This was the first such paper published which was applied to the use of satellites over Cuba. (Tab No. 16)

22 October 1964

COMOR addressed the problem of Cuban reconnaissance from satellites. Summary: KH-4 not much help

22 October 1964

Mr. Friedman requested DIA to analyze whether a reconnaissance "package" composed of a "mix" of aircraft, drones, balloons and satellites could satisfy Cuban reconnaissance requirements. (Tab No. 18)

22 October 1964

The first satellite photographs of Cuba, taken specifically as a result of NSAM 311 (resulting from an arrangement made by Colonel Worthman through DIA and thence to USIB), were received by (S) NRO. Photographs (mission 1011-1) were 90% degraded by clouds. (Tab No. 19)

26 October 1964

A draft memorandum for record, prepared by Mr. Friedman of ISA, indicated he had been informed by Mr. McCone that he (McCone) was very exercised over inclusion of OXCART data in the NSAM 311 Planning Facts study. (Tab No. 20)

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26 October 1964

At request of Mr. Friedman, Mr. Augenstein of DDR&E prepared a paper on "Additional Reconnaissance Capabilities of Interest in Future Surveillance Missions." (Tab No. 21)

26 October 1964

A draft Department of Defense paper, Subject: "NSAM 311 Possible Courses of Action" was prepared by ISA, working in conjunction with the (S) NRO Staff. This paper analyzed existing Cuban reconnaissance requirements and evaluated the capabilities of various individual sensors, or combinations of reconnaissance sensors, to reconnoiter Cuba. (Tab No. 22)

26 October 1964

A first attempt was made at estimating the amounts (percentages) of Cuban real estate which would be cloud covered during each month of the year. (Tab No. 23)

28 October 1964

A paper was prepared by the (S) NRO for ISA which analyzed costs and other relevant factors of an "Integrated Reconnaissance Package." This was a theoretical approach to the practical matter of conducting Cuban reconnaissance with a "mixture" of alternative reconnaissance sensors. (Tab No. 24)

3 November 1964

COMOR defined its estimate of what satellite reconnaissance could contribute to Cuban reconnaissance requirement. This was an extremely pessimistic paper; dealt
mainly with the problems involved in satellite reconnaissance and studiously avoided a direct consideration of
the problem: i.e. "If we could not use U-2's, what else
do we have in the reconnaissance inventory which could
be used to contribute to a solution to the problem?"
(Tab No. 25)

3 November 1964

Primarily as a result of the foregoing reference, the (S) NRO published a more objective and realistic estimate of the capabilities of satellite systems (KH-4) to cover Cuba. (Tab No. 26)

4 November 1964

United States Intelligence Board considered the COMOR and (S) NRO papers (Tabs 25 and 26). The Board was briefed by the (S) DNRO that he considered the COMOR



4 November 1964 (Continued)

appraisal to be inconsistent with actual experience. The Board then remanded the offending document (Tab 25) to COMOR for rewrite. (Tab No. 27)

12 November 1964

Lt Colonel Quiggins provided ISA (Mr. Friedman) with a resume of Department of Defense actions which had been initiated to date in response to NSAM 311. (Tab No. 28)

12 November 1964

(S) DNRO asked for an analysis of best MIG/Fighter capability known to be available to Cubans. AOB estimate showed 40 MIG-21's. (Tab No. 29)

18 November 1964

In preparation for a meeting of the "Thompson Committee" Messrs McNaughton and Friedman of ISA, working with Colonel Worthman, prepared two briefing papers - one considering the reasons why Cuban reconnaissance is necessary - the other directed at what we must see and how well various reconnaissance systems are adapted to the problem. (Tab No. 30)

18 November 1964

The Thompson Committee met to consider NSAM 311.

Three primary areas discussed: (1) capabilities of satellite reconnaissance to assist in solution; (2) what can the "advanced aircraft" contribute; and (3) a "scenario" to use in dispelling concern (mostly Cuban concern) over continuation of U. S. overflight operations. (Tab No. 31)

18 November 1964

A final draft of the Thompson Committee response to NSAM 311 was received by Department of Defense. It was reviewed and annotated by the (S) NRO and subsequently by Secretary of Defense. (Tab No. 32)

19 November 1964

A CIA input to the final draft of the NSAM 311 paper was (belatedly) received which dealt in cursory fashion with what OXCART could contribute to the Cuban reconnaissance problem. Summary: "It is possible to use," but "We are unable to make a firm estimate of its capability." This latter reference applied primarily to vulnerability of the SR-71 to Cuban air defense. (Tab No. 33)

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19 November 1964 The (S) NRO produced a paper showing the percentage of Cuban coverage (useful photo) versus number of flights for various reconnaissance systems. These data were subsequently found to be erroneous in several regards, but particularly as applied to satellites, since we had considered only a one bucket, rather than dual bucket, KH-4 capability. Embarrassing - but discovered prior to distribution and corrected in a later edition.

(Tab No. 34)

19 November 1964 (S) DNRO sent to Secretary of Defense the corrected coverage tables referred to above. (Tab No. 35)

19 November 1964 The DCI, before the USIB, stated that the draft COMOR rewrite of the "satellite contribution paper" (Tab 27) did not deal sufficiently with the operational delays which might be encountered with satellites in a crisis management situation. (Tab No. 36)

19 November 1964 Handwritten notes by Mr. McNamara on coverage tables shown as Tab 35. (Tab No. 37)

20 November 1964 Request for Cuban climatology study. (Tab No. 38)

20 November 1964 Cuban Climatology Study prepared by Captain Forsythe of the (S) NRO Staff. (Tab No. 39)

20 November 1964 COMOR passed a message (TWX) request to members asking for review of a new statement of requirements for Cuban reconnaissance. (Tab No. 40)

24 November 1964 NPIC responded to request of 13 October for an Assessment of Photo Interpretation Capabilities to Detect any Re-Introduction of Offensive Missiles into Cuba.

(Tab No. 41)

27 November 1964 The USIB approved, with amendments, Cuban requirement paper prepared by COMOR. (Tab No. 42)



30 November 1964

A near final draft of the Thompson Committee's report on NSAM 311 was reviewed by Colonels Worthman of (S) NRO Staff and Sanders of ISA. Marginalia show recommended changes to draft. A covering memorandum indicates that Presidential approval of the final product of the committee is not required - that a description of the problem and a recommended (alternative) course of action is sufficient. (Tab No. 43)

4 December 1964

The COMOR examined results of Mission 1014-J - the first ten-day synchronous/nine-day equally spaced orbit flown by a satellite reconnaissance vehicle. This orbit (in lieu of the fifth day synchronous usually flown) was used because it was expected to provide full cover of Cuba in a four-day period - with little or no degradation of Soviet coverage. Mission 1014-J photo was also compared with U-2 photo of Cuba flown on same day. COMOR concluded that: (a) the "equally spaced" orbit had no significant adverse effect on Sino-Soviet coverage and (b) that there were certain advantages for carefully selected use of this orbit in the future. (Tab No. 44)

5 December 1964

The (S) DNRO, Mr. Friedman and Colonel Worthman conferred on DOD comments to the NSAM 311 draft dated 27 November. Agreement was reached on a response to State. (Tab No. 45)

7 December 1964

Department of Defense comments on State Department NSAM 311 Draft of 27 November 1964. (Tab No. 46)

7 December 1964

The Photo Working Group of COMOR compiled a tabulation showing coverage of buckets 1 and 2 of 1014-J over the Sino-Soviet bloc. (Tab No. 47)

9 December 1964

Another Cuban climatology study, directed toward the USIB's requirement for "interpretable" photo (i.e., defined as 25% cloud cover or less) was completed by the (S) NRO Staff. (Tab No. 48)



10 December 1964

A DOD footnote to NSAM 311 final response was prepared to express the ease with which orbital mechanics could be converted for optimization of Cuban reconnaissance. (Tab No. 49)

10 December 1964

The CIA challenged the DOD statement that reconnaissance drones could be flown effectively against Cuba. The DOD position, based on factual experience with drones in South East Asia and over China, was verified by a detailed examination of past experience. (Tab No. 50)

10 December 1964

A study indicated numbers of HPL targets in Sino-Soviet

ll December 1964

Last minute changes to Department of Defense comments sent to State Department involved primarily use of balloons and drones as an alternative Cuban reconnaissance resource. CIA not enthusiastic about this proposal. (Tab No. 52)

11 December 1964

The State Department published a recommended response to the Principals concerned with NSAM 311. (Tab No. 53)

14 December 1964

The (S) NRO Satellite Operations Center published a post mortem report on Mission 1014-J showing intended versus actual orbital characteristics and results. This report also confirmed that there was no degradation of Sino-Soviet coverage on this mission. (Tab No. 54)

15 December 1964

Mr. Friedman sent to the Secretary of Defense a brochure containing (a) the final draft of the Thompson Committee report on NSAM 311; (b) a commentary on inadequacies of the paper; (c) a draft transmittal in the event Secretary of Defense should decide to have the JCS review the final NSAM 311 draft and (d) a memorandum containing minutes of the 18 November committee meeting. (Tab No. 55)

16 December 1964

To preclude out-of-context use of the NSAM 311 Planning Facts book, all copies (except Copy No. 1 held by Mr. Friedman of ISA) were withdrawn. (Tab No. 56)

