

Declassified and Released by the NRO

In Accordance with E. O. 12958

NOV 26 1997

MAIL ROOM ONLY



27 August 1964


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting of 26 August

1. Present were Secretary Vance, myself, Dr. Fubini, and Mr. Kiefer. Both Fubini and Vance had left a speech-writing meeting in order to hold the NRO ExCom meeting which lasted one hour.

2. Vance asked me if there was any unfinished business that we needed to discuss other than the FY '65 and '66 budgets. He stated his agreement that the [redacted] program was all agreed and squared away and he thought this was a great step forward. He felt that most of the NRO problems could eventually be solved by this type of informal discussion between Vance and McCone. I agreed in part but pointed out that the major problem with NRO was the attitude and the frustrations to the Agency that had been built up over the past several years, and a change in these relationships would not occur overnight. Vance agreed and said we should work toward these objectives.

3. I pointed out to Vance that the response from McMillan to Mr. McCone's budget memorandum clearly indicated the need for additional briefings for Mr. McCone, myself, and our advisers and that before proceeding with the remainder of the program, these briefings should be held. Vance agreed but asked specifically if there was anything on the budget that we might discuss today. I pointed out that if CIA is going to continue to contract for the CORONA payload, then funds should be available since present funds cover only the contracts that terminate in September and October of '64. Fubini stated that at previous meetings Mr. McCone had reluctantly agreed that since the majority wanted [redacted] as Systems Manager for CORONA, he had reluctantly gone along with it but pointing out his distaste



for the procedure. Fubini said that the whole package for this exercise included the transfer of contracting responsibility to [redacted] and that was why the money had not been allocated to Program B. I stated that I felt it was essential that the high competence in satellites and missilery which the Agency has established be utilized in all pertinent NRO programs. Fubini denied that we had the competence, especially on the West Coast, and stated that to all intents and purposes the Agency was already out of the CORONA program. Kiefer reviewed the Coordination Board activities and Vance pointed out that this was an unsatisfactory arrangement for him and he wanted one individual who could be responsible to him and to Mr. McCone for a complete program. He thought that this should be [redacted] and that if it required [redacted] to do the contracting as well, then [redacted] should do it. Upon being questioned by Vance, Fubini pointed out that it was not absolutely necessary to transfer the contracting to [redacted] although it was probably neater to do so. Vance proposed that in order to utilize the CIA competence, the Agency establish a small group of people, say three, who would be attached to [redacted] staff, who would have full knowledge of all of the CORONA program and would have access to all of it, who would provide [redacted] additional technical assistance in an advisory capacity, and that this small group could look directly back to the CIA satellite staff for additional advice and guidance or any help that they might need in assisting [redacted]. Fubini pointed out that this would also be a training camp in which CIA could augment its competence by assignment (say eight months, he said) to this small CIA component on [redacted] staff. (This Vance proposal has considerable merit since it will put us back in the act insofar as knowing what's going on is concerned but also would appear to support our contention -- through Vance's remarks on [redacted] - that we need a single manager for [redacted] and we have it.)

4. Mr. Vance read from a memorandum for record dated 12 August by McMillan in which McMillan stated that Mr. McCone's agreement on accepting [redacted] as Systems Manager also

included the contract changes as proposed in McMillan's original package. This was all news to me and I told Mr. Vance I would have to check it out with my records and with Mr. McCone. (See subsequent actions in this regard.) I stated also that I would take a look at the proposal to send personnel from the Agency out to be advisory to [REDACTED]

5. I then mentioned that we continue to have problems as between the allocation of responsibility from NRO to [REDACTED] and Westover, particularly since there appears to be a steadily increasing workload on [REDACTED] while we are required to hold them to a fixed personnel ceiling. I said that this is a problem that must be resolved and that we would not be satisfied with budget allocations as indicated by NRO until we were satisfied that a delineation of workload and responsibilities was agreed by Mr. McCone. Dr. Fubini pointed out that, much to his horror, SAC was building a very fancy system for processing [REDACTED] photography and that it had gone so far before he knew about it that he could not stop it. I made no comment.

6. [REDACTED]

7.

[REDACTED]

8.

[REDACTED]

9.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

Distribution:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

*attaché*

HANDLE VIA [REDACTED] SYSTEM ONLY

*to be g/*