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[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

1965 MAR 5 58

SAFSS

TSBA528/052

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TSBA528/05023 Z ZEA
BT
XXXXX ZEA
THREE SEVEN SIX [REDACTED]

URGENT [REDACTED] 050126Z
CORONA [REDACTED] TZZZ
FOR DR. McMILLAN FROM GEN GREER. DELIVER AT 0800 FRIDAY,
5 MARCH
PART III.

ON 12 AUGUST 1965 [REDACTED] 593 ANNOUNCED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
DCI AND THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE EFFECTIVE 17 AUG @ THAT
"THE DIRECTOR, PROGRAM A IS ASSIGNED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CON-
TRACTING FOR THE SYSTEM ENGINEERING FUNCTION ON THE CORONA PROJECT.
ACCORDINGLY, THE [REDACTED] CONTRACT NOW HELD BY DIRECTOR, PROGRAM B
CONTRACTING OFFICER WILL BE ALLOWED TO EXPIRE ETC." (SUGGEST THIS
ENTIRE MESSAGE BE READ). IN MID-SEPTEMBER @, AFTER COMPLETION OF
ALL NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SAFSP CONTRACT (2710) TO REPLACE [REDACTED] (AND
SAFSP CONTRACT [REDACTED] FOR INTEGRATION AND QUALIFICATION OF THE ISIC)
LMSC DECLINED TO SIGN THE NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS. THE LMSC CONTRACTING
OFFICER @ [REDACTED] STATED THAT LMSC HAD RECEIVED SPECIFIC VERBAL
INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CIA NOT TO SIGN THE SAFSP CONTRACTS. THE [REDACTED]
CONTRACT EXPIRED ON 17 AUGUST @, AND TO DATE, NEITHER THE [REDACTED] CONTRACT
NOR THE [REDACTED] ISIC CONTRACT HAS BEEN SIGNED. (WE ESTIMATE THAT THE
PRESENT PRE-CONTRACTUAL LMSC EXPOSURE IS ABOUT [REDACTED] DOLLARS.)
OBVIOUSLY, IT IS ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE TO CONDUCT RESPONSIBLE
MANAGEMENT OF THE PROGRAM AND CONTRACTOR UNDER THESE CONDITIONS.

PART IV.

ON 7 NOVEMBER 1964, IN RESPONSE TO SAFSP REQUEST THAT THE CLEARED
WORKING TROOPS OF THE PROGRAM OFFICE BE GIVEN PERMANENT ACCESS TO THE
A/P AREA, THE REQUEST WAS NOT ONLY DENIED, BUT ALL EXISTING SAFSP
PERMANENT ACCESS APPROVALS WERE WITHDRAWN EXCEPT COLONELS HERAN AND
[REDACTED]

MURPHY. WE WERE THEN TOLD THAT ALL SAFSP VISITS TO A/P WOULD REQUIRE INDIVIDUAL WRITTEN CLEARANCE FROM WASHINGTON, BASED UPON DETAILED INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED AND PROCESSED AND LEAST 48 HOURS IN ADVANCE.

PART V.

ON 1 DECEMBER 1964, SAFSP PROGRAM OFFICE PERSONNEL AND INDIVIDUALS FROM FAIRCHILD INSTRUMENT COMPANY WERE DENIED ENTRY TO A/P EVEN THOUGH SPECIFIED SECURITY PROCEDURES HAD BEEN FOLLOWED. THE ONLY EXPLANATION GIVEN WAS "INADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION."

PART VI.

ON 29 DECEMBER 1964, THE [REDACTED] REPRESENTATIVE AT THE A/P FACILITY (MR. [REDACTED]) REFUSED TO FURNISH TO SAFSP DATA NECESSARY FOR A SYSTEM ANALYSIS OF SPECIAL MISSIONS REQUESTED BY [REDACTED] (SEE [REDACTED] 2197.)

PART VII.

ON 15 JANUARY 65, WHEN COL [REDACTED] ARRIVED AT THE STC FROM VANDENBERG AFB, FOLLOWING LAUNCH OF MISSION 1016 (FLIGHT VEHICLE 1600), THE FTPO STATED THAT HIS REQUEST FOR FRONT END TEMPERATURE DATA HAD BEEN DENIED BY THE A/P REPRESENTATIVE MR. [REDACTED]. UPON REQUEST FOR THE DATA BY COL [REDACTED], MR. [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO STATE ONLY WHETHER THE PAYLOAD WAS "GOOD" OR "BAD" AND TO PROVIDE NO OTHER DATA TO THE SAFSP PROGRAM OFFICE OR THE FTPO AT THE STC ON ANY PORTION OF THE SYSTEM FORWARD OF THE AGENA INTERFACE. THIS SAME POLICY IS BEING FOLLOWED ON MISSION 1017 (FLIGHT VEHICLE 1610), WHICH IS NOW IN PROGRESS. THESE ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A DRASTIC ALTERATION TO THE PROCEDURES PREVIOUSLY FOLLOWED IN THE CORONA PROGRAM. AS A RESULT OF THIS DENIAL OF INFORMATION, THERE IS NO OVERALL SYSTEM TECHNICAL SUPERVISION DURING THE MISSION, AND NO SINGLE MANAGER THAT CAN IN ANY SENSE BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISSION. SUCCESS IS ENTIRELY CONTINGENT UPON NO PROBLEM OCCURRING IN THE PAYLOAD OR RECOVERY VEHICLE AREA THAT AFFECTS OR IS AFFECTED BY VEHICLE SYSTEM PROBLEMS. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN VEHICLE HEALTH AND PAYLOAD IS OBSCURED, AND NO ONE RESPONSIBLE MANAGER IS IN ANY POSITION TO MAKE A REALISTIC DETERMINATION OF MODIFICATION TO ORBITAL OPERATIONS WHICH, AS A RESULT OF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS MAY BE REQUIRED TO ENHANCE THE CHANCE OF SUCCESSFUL MISSION COMPLETION, OR WHEN TO INITIATE EARLY RECOVERY SHOULD SUCH ACTION BE REQUIRED BECAUSE OF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS.

PART VIII.

ON 19 JANUARY 65, THE SAFSP PROGRAM OFFICE REQUEST FOR A MEETING AT A/P BETWEEN A/P, PROGRAM OFFICE, AND FAIRCHILD REPRESENTATIVES WAS DENIED. (THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF THE PROBLEM REFERRED TO IN PART V.)

PART IX.

ON 9 FEB 65, SAFSP PROGRAM OFFICE REQUESTED ROM DATA FROM GE ON [REDACTED] PROPOSAL TO PLACE 8 AMPERE HOUR BATTERY IN THE SATELLITE RECOVERY VEHICLE. GE STATED THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO GIVE THE DATA DIRECTLY BUT MUST PASS THROUGH [REDACTED]. SUBSEQUENT SAFSP REQUEST MADE TO [REDACTED] AS OF 4 MARCH, DATA NOT YET RECEIVED.

PART X.

ON 12 FEB 65, [REDACTED] 225 D DIRECTED THAT ALL SAFSP DIRECTION TO CORONA CONTRACTORS MUST BE THROUGH [REDACTED] AND THAT NO TASKS OF ANY SORT COULD BE HANDLED ON A DIRECT BASIS. THIS WAS A MAJOR CHANGE TO THE DAY-TO-DAY WORKING PROCEDURES WHICH ACTUALLY HAVE BEEN IN EFFECT OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS AND WHICH HAVE ALLOWED SOME DEGREE OF MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS TO BE REALIZED IN SPITE OF THE EXTREMELY AWKWARD CORONA CONTRACT STRUCTURE. THIS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATES ANY EFFECTIVE DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE PROGRAM OFFICE AND THE CONTRACTORS.

PART XI.

IN MID-FEBRUARY 65, THE AGENCY A/P REPRESENTATIVE DIRECTLY COUNTER-MANDED THE SAFSP PROGRAM DIRECTOR'S INSTRUCTIONS TO LMSC ON TWO OCCASIONS. THE FIRST INCIDENT OCCURRED DURING THE R-1 DAY TEST WHEN THE PROGRAM DIRECTOR MADE THE DECISION TO CHANGE THE 8 AMPERE HOUR BATTERY AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE MAIN BATTERIES WERE BEING CHANGED, SINCE THE 8 AMPERE HOUR BATTERY LIFE WOULD OTHERWISE BECOME A DOWN-STREAM LIMIT ON HOLD LIFE. THE OTHER INCIDENT OCCURRED WHEN THE PROGRAM DIRECTOR MADE THE DECISION TO CHANGE THE 2-YEAR OLD HEAT SHIELDS, BASED UPON GE REFUSAL TO CERTIFY TO THEIR FLIGHT WORTHINESS.

PART XII.

ON 10 FEB 65, THE SAFSP PROGRAM OFFICE HAD A MEETING AT A/P TO DISCUSS SEVERAL SUBJECTS. AEROSPACE PERSONNEL FROM THE PROGRAM OFFICE WERE INCLUDED. DURING THE MEETING, THE ADIC REPRESENTATIVE AT A/P (MR. [REDACTED]) INFORMED COL MURPHY THAT AEROSPACE PERSONNEL COULD PARTICIPATE IN AND DISCUSS ONLY THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS LISTED IN THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE VISIT. THIS WAS A CHANGE TO PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES. LATER THAT DAY, MR. [REDACTED] GRANTED SPECIAL DISPENSATION TO THIS NEW RULE FOR THE DURATION OF THIS MEETING,

BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THIS REQUIREMENT WOULD BE IN EFFECT FOR ALL FUTURE MEETINGS IN WHICH ANY AEROSPACE PERSONNEL PARTICIPATE. THIS NEW RULE OBVIOUSLY CAN BE USED TO LIMIT OR STOP ALMOST ANY DISCUSSION OF AN OVERALL SYSTEM ENGINEERING TYPE, AT THE ARBITRARY DISCRETION OF THE A/P REPRESENTATIVE.

PART XII.

AS A RESULT OF THE SRV AGE PROBLEM NOTED PREVIOUSLY, THE PROGRAM OFFICE SCHEDULED A MEETING FOR 17 FEBRUARY AT GE. AMPLE ADVANCE NOTICE WAS GIVEN AND ALL SPECIFIED SECURITY PROCEDURES WERE FOLLOWED. PERMISSION FOR ACCESS TO THE GE FACILITY INVOLVED HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED BY LAST POSSIBLE PLANE TIME ON 16 FEBRUARY. IN VIEW OF THE OBVIOUS [REDACTED] INTENTION NOT TO ALLOW THE MEETING, THE PROGRAM OFFICE CANCELLED THE MEETING TO SAVE A USELESS TRIP.

PART XIV.

AS OF 4 MAR 65, NO TECHNICAL DATA HAS BEEN RECEIVED CONCERNING THE SRV AGE PROBLEM NOTED EARLIER, ALTHOUGH THE AGENCY WAS DIRECTED BY DMRD TO DO SO, AND SAFSP HAS REQUESTED IT FROM BOTH GE AND [REDACTED] GE REPRESENTATIVE ON [REDACTED]. ON 17 FEBRUARY STATED THAT [REDACTED] HAD INSTRUCTED GE THAT THIS DATA COULD NOT BE PROVIDED TO SAFSP BY GE BUT MUST BE PROVIDED THROUGH [REDACTED].

PART XV.

ON 3 MAR 65, SAFSP PROGRAM REPRESENTATIVE, AFTER FOLLOWING PRESCRIBED SECURITY PROCEDURES WAS DENIED ACCESS TO THE A/P. THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE DISCUSSION ON DESIRED SUBJECTS COULD NOT BE HELD UNTIL AFTER THE CURRENT OPERATION WAS COMPLETED. HOWEVER, THE SUBJECT REQUIRING DISCUSSION AND THE PEOPLE WITH WHOM THE DISCUSSION WAS REQUIRED ARE NOT INVOLVED IN THE REAL-TIME MISSION OPERATION, AND THIS EXCUSE FOR DENIAL IS IN OUR OPINION UNJUSTIFIED.

PART XVI.0

IN SPITE OF THE DCI-DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AGREEMENT REFERRED TO IN [REDACTED] 593, DATED 12 AUG 64, AND DMRD DIRECTION CONTAINED IN THIS SAME MESSAGE, AS OF 4 MAR 65, THE AEROSPACE ENABLING CLAUSE HAS NOT BEEN INCLUDED AS PART OF THE FOLLOWING [REDACTED] CONTRACTS:

- 1) NO. [REDACTED] WITH LMSC.
- 2) NO. [REDACTED] WITH LMSC.
- 3) NO. [REDACTED] WITH GE.

THE ENABLING CLAUSE WAS INSERTED IN LETTER CONTRACTS [REDACTED] WITH ITEK LAST FALL. [REDACTED] IS NOW PLANNING TO DEFINITIZE THESE CONTRACTS AND RECENTLY HELD A NEGOTIATING MEETING FOR THIS PURPOSE. MR. CROWLEY AND MR. [REDACTED] OF [REDACTED] HAVE INFORMED SAFSP (COL MURPHY) THAT [REDACTED].

WILL NOT AGREE TO AEROSPACE PERFORMING THE TECHNICAL DIRECTION FUNCTION. THE FUNCTION DESCRIBED IN THE ENABLING CLAUSES IS THE SAME FUNCTION [REDACTED] PERFORMS FOR THE OTHER PROJECTS UNDER SAFSP MANAGEMENT, AND WE SEE NO BASIS FOR THIS REVERSAL IN THE DCI AGREEMENT WITH THE DEPUTY SEC DEF [REDACTED] 1993, 12 AUG 04). IN ALL CASES, THE CLAUSES REQUIRE THAT ACTUAL DIRECTION BE PROCESSED TO THE CONTRACTOR THROUGH THE CONTRACTING OFFICER.

PART XVII.

[REDACTED] REFUSES TO PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION AND DATA FOR REAL TIME SYSTEM ANALYSIS. HISTORY OF THIS ITEM STARTS BACK WITH THE REFUSAL OF THE [REDACTED] A/P REPRESENTATIVE (COL WEBB) TO FURNISH AEROSPACE INFORMATION REQUESTED DURING OPERATIONAL MISSION IN MID-NOVEMBER. [REDACTED] WAS INFORMED OF THE EVENT, AND SENT A MESSAGE TO DIRECTOR PROGRAM 8, WHO IN TURN SENT A MESSAGE TO A/P (ADIC 0403) AUTHORIZING THE A/P TO RELEASE CERTAIN INFORMATION TO AEROSPACE PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE BIGGER PROBLEM. ON 1 FEB 05, [REDACTED] REQUESTED THAT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE [REDACTED] MESSAGE CERTAIN DATA BE AVAILABLE AT THE STC DURING MISSION 1017. THESE DATA WERE NOT AVAILABLE AND WERE REFUSED UPON DIRECT REQUEST DURING MISSION. (SEE [REDACTED] 143, DATED 26 FEB.)

PART XVIII.

[REDACTED] REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE SAFSP SYSTEM RESPONSIBILITIES. TWO MESSAGES HAVE BEEN SENT FROM A/P TO SAFSP STATING THAT THE AIR FORCE HAS NO TECHNICAL DIRECTION AUTHORITY OVER THE FRONT END. FOLLOWING IS A QUOTE FROM [REDACTED] 1726, DATED 4 FEB 05. THIS MESSAGE WAS SENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROBLEMS OF THE AGE SPV. "ALTHOUGH A CLOSE INSPECTION OF FOREBODIES WILL BE MADE TO DETERMINE IF INDEED THERE HAS BEEN ANY DEGRADATION OF SAME DURING R-1 HOLD PERIOD, IT IS NOT ANTICIPATED AT THIS TIME THAT THEY WILL HAVE BEEN CHANGED. THIS OFFICE WILL MAKE DECISION WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE STILL ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT AFTER WEIGHING ALL EVIDENCE AND ENGINEERING RECOMMENDATIONS. ON TWO OCCASIONS DURING THE R-1 HISTORY OF REF MISSIONS DECISIONS WERE MADE TO DISASSEMBLE THE PAYLOAD SECTION WITHOUT PROPER DIRECTION FROM [REDACTED]. PRIOR AUTHORIZATION MUST BE OBTAINED FROM THIS OFFICE BEFORE ANY DISASSEMBLY OF PAYLOAD HOWEVER SLIGHT IS MADE IN ORDER THAT [REDACTED] CAN EVALUATE REASONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND TAKE NECESSARY STEPS FOR INSPECTION AND REVALUATION DURING AND AFTER REASSEMBLY. AS A REMINDER, MISSION SLIPPAGE DUE TO PAYLOAD PROBLEMS REAL OR IMAGINED, IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] ALONE."

PART XIX.

AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE OR [REDACTED] HAS MADE THE STATEMENT THAT AEROSPACE WILL NOT BE PERMITTED ACTIVE IN LINE PARTICIPATION AT THE STC DURING CORONA MISSIONS. HE TOLD THE PROGRAM FTFD AT THE STC THAT ACCESS TO DATA DURING A MISSION IS CONSIDERED OPERATIONAL AND AS SUCH IS SOLELY THE PREROGATIVE OF THE AGENCY.

OCFN: 7227 WILL RERUN ON REQUEST [REDACTED]
BT [REDACTED]