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September 1960

Reorientation of SAMOS Project

Beginnings of the National Reconnaissance Office

**Open announcement of the establishment of the SAMOS Project
under General Greer at El Segundo, California**

11 October 1960

SAMOS I - Unsuccessful launching

Openly announced

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17 January 1961

Security Policy on SAMOS Satellites Outlined

- No announcement permitted regarding success or failure on orbit
- Only initial statement of launching and orbital achievement permitted

31 January 1961

SAMOS II - Successful launching

Openly announced

9 February 1961

Chief of Staff message to all major commands reiterated "deep and continuing concern" over SAMOS publicity and directed strict compliance with current instructions.

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March 1961

Concern expressed by new administration regarding possible Soviet reaction to satellite reconnaissance. SAFUS directed to prepare plan which would

1. enhance and protect adequate, timely data collection without inviting political counteraction
2. establish and maintain ability to acquire these data by covert means, if necessary.

3 April 1961

RAINCOAT plan published. Key elements:

1. Information on all military space activities to be controlled to provide cover for reconnaissance programs.
2. Launchings to be dissociated from missions.
3. Nicknames to be discontinued; arbitrarily-selected numbers to be used to designate projects.
4. Launching and recovery schedules to be protected.
5. "Need-to-know" to be enforced, in an unusually firm manner.
6. A single, authoritative office to be established to enforce security program.

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21 April 1961

SAFUS directed AFSC to put RAINCOAT plan into effect for Air Force.

14 July 1961

ASD(PA) expressed concern over continued "extra" information appearing in press, despite strict rules to field agencies.

9 September 1961

SAMOS III exploded on pad.

Openly announced.

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14 September 1961

UMBRELLA plan prepared. Objectives more limited than RAINCOAT.

Key elements:

1. Launchings not to be identified with missions.
2. Vehicles and projects not to use names; letter-number indicator to be applied.
3. All payloads to be budgeted as a single classified line item.
4. Public information
 - only accomplishments to be mentioned
 - pre-launch information limited to vehicle nomenclature
 - post-launch information limited to a "yes" or "no" on orbit attainment
 - no payload or mission stories
 - no recovery releases
 - press conferences on non-reconnaissance missions some days after launching

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17 October 1961

Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum to Service Secretaries and key OSD staff proposing a "Directive on Security and Information Policies for the DOD Space Program." Directive followed principles of RAINCOAT and UMBRELLA very closely.

Key elements:

1. Give adequate protection to military space programs.
2. Vigorously enforce need-to-know.
3. "Reveal" information from unclassified documents.
4. Eliminate unauthorized public discussion.

Procedures:

1. Designate space project and vehicle by numbers - no nicknames.
2. Disassociate space vehicles and projects from payloads and missions.
3. Clear all public news releases through single office.
4. Limit and control reports, plans and other documents on space activities.

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17 October 1961 (Continued)

Responsibilities:

1. Heads of all OSD agencies to insure adherence to Directive.
2. SAF to handle nomenclature and registry.
3. ASD(PA) to be single news office.
4. ASD(Comptroller) to develop and issue budgetary guidance.

28 November 1961

AFSC directed to prepare implementing plan for Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum.

8 March 1962

Secretary of Defense concerned over announced launching and retrieval of DISCOVERER packages - asked "Can't we hide these activities completely?"
SAFUS expressed difficulty of abrupt changes for single program and need for a policy "applicable to the entire military space program."

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23 March 1962

Deputy Secretary of Defense signed DOD Directive S-5200.13 "Security and Public Information Policy for Military Space Programs."

26 May 1962

President Kennedy signed NSAM 156 which directed State to formulate a U. S. position which:

1. Avoids dangers of restricting ourselves.
2. Avoids compromising highly classified programs.
3. Provides no assistance of significant military value to the USSR.

29 May 1962

NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee established by Mr. U. Alexis Johnson.

30 June 1962

Final report of NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee submitted to the President.

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10 July 1962

The President approved the recommendations of the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee and signed NSC Action 2454.

Key relevant item:


"9. The present practice of not identifying individual military space launchings by mission or purpose is sound. We believe, however, that there should also be a more open (but not more detailed) public reference to the general over-all military program. All military launchings would be described in terms of the general objectives of the over-all military program. No specific mission would be ascribed to any particular launch."

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DOD ASSIGNMENTS FOR NSC ACTION 2454

....	Strict Control Over Public Statements	ASD(PA)
....	Prepare Directives on Handling of Military Space Activity Info	ASD(PA) with DNRO
....	Study Releasability of Mapping Information	DNRO
....	Standby Capability for Clandestine Operations	DNRO
....	Liaison with State and ACDA on International Negotiations	ASD(ISA)

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DOD DIRECTIVE S-5200.13 SECURITY

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DOD Directive S-5200.13

... Establishes security policy for military space programs for all components of the DOD.

Policy:

1. Details of all DOD military space programs will be classified.
2. Need-to-know within DOD and by contractors will be vigorously enforced.
3. Identification, mission, and scope of specific projects and programs will not be revealed in unclassified documents.
4. Unauthorized disclosure of results, effectiveness, capabilities and potentialities of specific projects and programs will be eliminated.

Procedures:

1. Projects and vehicles will be identified by numerical and alphabetical designators selected at random.
2. Names or nicknames no longer will be used.
3. New method of identifying projects will not be associated with payload or mission, except under the most strict security procedures.
4. Preparation and dissemination of over-all reports and plans will be severely limited and controlled.
5. Authorization of blanket need-to-know will be sharply curtailed.

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DOD Directive S-5200.13 (Continued)

Responsibilities

1. All DOD components responsible for insuring adherence.
2. SAF responsible for determining and assigning nomenclature and maintaining central registry of numbers and designators.

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Constructively interpreted, DOD Directive S-5200.13 calls for the following:

1. There will be no "open" launchings (those to which uncleared visitors are invited).
2. No prior announcement of a specific launch date can be made.
3. The program can be assigned no nickname.
4. No launch schedule can be published.
5. Stories and discussions of broad program objectives are permissible provided they are released much prior to the launch date.
6. Announcements made immediately after a launching will state only the name of the space booster combination and will not refer to its payload or identify the program.
7. Flight results may be released at a later date with reference to the program from which it is obtained, provided that a specific flight is not identified.

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5200.13 EXEMPTION SYNDROME

- o My payload isn't actually sensitive
- o Other agencies are doing work like this on an unclassified basis
- o Classification will inhibit my public relations program
- o Classification will make it difficult to deal with Congress
- o My program management is less effective in a classified environment
- o Classification renders my operation much more expensive
- o My secret has already been divulged to quite a few people

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OUR EXPERIENCE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE S-5200.13 HAS SHOWN THAT:

- Its restraints do not inhibit public relations -- no restrictions are imposed on rather extensive post-launch success stories nor on early pre-operational program releases.
- It does not inhibit our dealings in Congress -- the "blackest" programs have been the most generously supported.
- It does not impede technical progress nor preclude effective management of a program
- It does not impose unwarranted additional administrative workloads nor entail the expenditure of significant additional funds in the area of program security.

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HOW IS THE 5200.13/205-23 SYSTEM WORKING

February 19, 1963

"FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ITS TRUE OBJECTIVE, 5200.13 HAS BEEN
GRATIFYINGLY SUCCESSFUL. THE PRESS INTEREST IN OUR MILITARY SPACE
LAUNCHINGS HAS DWINDLED TO A ONE-OR-TWO-PARAGRAPH STEREOTYPE.
I HAVE NOT SEEN A PRESS STORY - EVEN LOCAL - ON A CAPSULE RECOVERY
FOR MONTHS. SPECULATIVE "SPY IN THE SKY" STORIES ARE NOT NEARLY
SO POPULAR AS THEY WERE SIX TO TWELVE MONTHS AGO. BASED ON THE
EVIDENCE, IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THE DIRECTIVE HAS PROVED ITS WORTH
AND SHOULD CONTINUE IN FORCE."

DR. CHARYK
DNRO

- Excellently in general
- Effective throughout DOD
- No complaints from scientists; no inhibition of publication

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19 March 1966

Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that "the space launches scheduled during the remainder of 1966 at the TITAN IIC complex at Cape Kennedy will be conducted under 'open launch' procedures." Programs involved:

572 - IDCSP

638 - VELA



24 May 1966

Special Assistant to the Deputy Director, Research & Engineering proposed a complete revision to DOD Directive S-5200.13. The net effect of the proposed changes would be to eliminate the Directive.


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WHERE DO WE STAND?

1. What cover is now available?

- What programs remain under the provisions of the Directive?



HOW MANY LAUNCHINGS PER YEAR?



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2. In what direction should we be moving?

- Broaden capability of ETR
- Furnish cover for new NRP programs

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