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DATE: 18 AUG 74

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
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NRP MONTHLY FORECAST

MEMO INFORMING JRC OF NEW
PROCEDURES.

BY Dunk

COMMENTS/DIRECTION:

FORWARD TO  ASAP

Mr. Plummer has seen.

SS-5/SS-4

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Action.

SSO AND SPO HANDLING ONLY

CJB

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Rewrite

14 September 1959

General Thomas D. White
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

AF recommends RIP

Dear General White:

I am deeply concerned over the events which are besetting the SAMOS Program. These events have jeopardized the Air Force objective to achieve the capability of performing satellite reconnaissance in the visual and ferret areas in satisfaction of stated national intelligence requirements.

Of major concern to me are the problem areas that follow:

a. ARPA directed in June of this year a deferment of the recoverable capsule planned for the SAMOS Program and withdrew all FY '60 program support for this portion of the system. On 4 September ARPA authorized us to proceed in an extremely limited fashion on certain long lead time items, but as yet have not clarified the funding status. Instead, we are required to again reexamine this portion and provide a detailed technical and funding breakdown item by item against projected monthly expenditure rates. The Air Force has reacted to ARPA's action by indecision and has not capitalized on the opportunity to place this vital element of the program under firm Air Force control. In this particular case I strongly reaffirm the facts and recommendations made to you in my letter of 1 August 1959, and again emphatically urge immediate positive Air Force support of the program.

b. ARPA funding support of the SAMOS R&D program has been marked by changing decisions which denote essentially a situation where we are forced into a day-to-day type planning for conduct of the program. Establishment of a logical plan and execution of that plan in terms of procurement, scheduling, production, test and operation of SAMOS has

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been rendered essentially impossible. I discussed this matter also in my letter to you of 1 August. I well recognize the direct deleterious effect the changing ARPA fiscal plans have on the Air Force fiscal portion of the R&D program. The currently recognized and accepted definition of funding responsibilities of ARPA and the Air Force make it appropriate that the Air Force fund and support the operational aspect of SAMOS. Funding authorization from the Air Force is required immediately to permit initiation of procurement actions necessary in the planned operational program if we are to retain October 1961 as the date we are to realize operational capability. To date, I have not received official notification of an Air Force decision regarding the extent of funding support planned for either the R&D or operational programs of SAMOS.

c. A state of indecision exists within the Air Force as to the planned availability of the Vandenberg Launch Complex 65-1 for use in the operating portion of the SAMOS Program. Although this has been a much discussed point by members of both the Air Weapons Board and the Air Council, the Hq USAF message AFOOP-R 8574806 to Hq SAC stating that Launch Complex 65-1 will not be made available to the SAMOS Program is the latest official position of which I have knowledge. Considerable augmentation of both FY '60 and FY '61 Air Force fund requirements for the operational SAMOS Program is needed immediately if SAMOS is deprived the use of 65-1, to attempt to maintain the integrity of the SAMOS schedule.

d. There is growing concern that the problems associated with construction and use of the PMR - Point Arguello complex for the SAMOS R&D launches are increasing and threaten to slip the planned SAMOS launch schedule. Although this is undoubtedly part of the overall Navy/Air Force PMR problem, my people are attempting to push on with the job as expeditiously as possible in this area regardless of the overall situation. Definition of inter-service roles and responsibilities at Pt. Arguello for SAMOS will be required, particularly when it is becoming clear that operational launches should also be considered at that site.

e. I received a letter dated 5 August from General ^{you} ~~Dunby~~, subject: "(U) Assignment of Operational Planning Responsibility," which assigned the operational planning responsibility of SAMOS to SAC and rescinded

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James

all other previous directives on this subject. In view of the national policy with respect to space operations the Secretary of Defense and ARPA agreed to the assignment by the Air Force of the operational responsibility for the SENTINEL program to the ARDC for the next several years and until final objectives are obtained. Unless there has been a major shift in national policy it appears that there is some ambiguity in the 5 August directive. It has certainly been made clear to me that ARDC is to initially be the operating command for the system. ~~General Galt's~~ letter did not suggest altering this arrangement. As the command responsible for operating the system, ARDC must accomplish the planning required to effectively fulfill these responsibilities and I fail to see how these can be expected to become the responsibility of another command. In accordance with all previous directives I have worked out with General Power an inter-command agreement that was approved by the Vice ~~Chief of Staff~~ *you* which provides for joint operational planning by SAC and AFBMD. This agreement has been upheld and augmented in detail. However, a recent message from the Air Staff to SAC directed that SAC submit a preliminary operations plan to Hq USAF. I consider that this is my responsibility and am preparing the necessary planning documentation for coordination with the Strategic Air Command prior to submitting to the Air Staff for approval.

you

In addition to the planning for the system operation and organizational command and administration that is presently being done jointly by SAC and AFBMD, there is a requirement for some detailed planning in the intelligence requirements area. I do not feel that ARDC is in a position to provide this kind of planning. It would appear to me that in view of the SAC responsibility to process and distribute all "live take" during both the R&D and operational phases, SAC should also provide ARDC with the required detailed intelligence objectives in terms of priority areas of interest, photo and ELINT coverage requirements, frequency of repeat coverage by area and other detailed operational requirements as appropriate. I assume this kind of planning is intended to be the SAC responsibility outlined in General ~~Galt's~~ *you* letter.

In conclusion, it is my understanding that there has been no change in the national policy with respect to space operations. Further, the requirement for ARDC to command, administer, and operate the SAMOS

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system through the medium of the 6594th Test Wing is still valid. Finally, I assume this operation, with SAC as a classified silent partner, will continue until the political atmosphere clears and permits open transfer of the organization, personnel, and facilities to SAC.

I am proceeding with our current planning and programming as outlined above and would appreciate your comments on my views.

In view of the national importance of the SAMOS Program and the grave impact delayed decisions can have on the Air Force capability to satisfy national intelligence requirements, I strongly urge that a firm Air Force position be established regarding the SAMOS Program, that funding actions be taken to permit implementation of the program activities required in support of that position, and that action be taken at the highest levels to resolve the AF/Navy positions regarding the Ft. Arguette problem.

Sincerely,

B. A. SCHRIEVER
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

Copies to:

1. General White (original)
2. Col. Appold (copy 2 destroyed)
3. Major Wienberg
4. General Schriever

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