

WDZ

17 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL RITCHIE

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Organizing to Accomplish the Communication Satellite Job

1. I avoid technical consideration since no really sensible conclusions can be arrived at prior to the return of our people from Washington.
2. I believe we should insist on receiving through some sort of proper channel communication which:
 - a. Spells out ARPA responsibilities.
 - b. Indicates, at least roughly, the level of funding to be expected through FY '61. Without funding information we cannot generate a sensible or acceptable Development Plan.
 - c. Indicates any target dates established by ARPA or other echelons for accomplishing objectives.
3. WDZ will have to create a project office on the order of Evans' or Latimer's office. This can be readily done by changes of moderate magnitude in the functional statements of either Burch's or Lowe's existing office. The Division sub-structure under the offices would require substantial rearrangement. There is relatively complete deficiency in qualified manpower since the only individuals readily available from WDZ are recent arrivals or trained in non-pertinent fields. Mesquite manpower will present a serious problem.
4. There are two kinds of "requirements" problems. One of the obvious is the technical need to know the user's requirements in order to properly design the system. The other is the policy problem of determining who the priority users of the system are and to what extent they will actively participate in operating the system once it is developed. I propose we keep these problems segregated as follows:
 - a. Use SAC/WKX, possibly ADC resident representation, and our own HQD-STL imagination along with Signal Corps inputs to define the technical-requirements problems sufficiently well so that system design may proceed.

b. separate the policy problem by insisting (probably through SAC channels) that the user-operator relationship for any ultimate satellite communication systems be determined through appropriate military staff studies at Service Headquarters and JCS levels. This procedure would keep the local complex sufficiently remote from jurisdictional disputes so that we might have some hope of rapid progress.

5. Since adequate technical treatment of compromise and trade-off areas is absolutely essential, it will be necessary to have resident representation permanently at EMD from Evans Laboratories. I think we should waste no time in inviting them to assign an appropriate number of people to the Inglewood complex. Such a group would be physically integrated with the project office. If we don't move out immediately on this point we are likely to be faced with a requirement to furnish a group of our own people for assignment at Evans Laboratories, which would be disastrous.

6. In our attempts to man WDC we have identified Major W. D. Hale, WDCMC, as an appropriate person for transfer to WDC. He is an experienced and capable communicator. We have no such individual now. I have not brought this subject up with Col Hudson yet; however, Hale's transfer would be most timely. In any event he should be made available to WDC on a 100 percent basis for the duration of the six-week exercise.

7. It is by no means clear to all parties that communication satellites offer a significant long run advantage over other means of communications. Therefore, a special local effort - not involving the Signal Corps - should be made which clarifies this area to the extent that we know our own mind and are able to talk convincingly about real advantages.

SIGNED

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