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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STEWART

SUBJECT: TASK GROUP REPORT

The Task Group Report seems to have covered all the alternative management approaches. Comments with regard to each of the proposed schemes are given below:

a. Overall System Responsibilities in the NRO: Generally, the assignment of direct project responsibilities and authorities is not done in a Headquarters staff. The NRO/NRP is not a normal staff. The Presidential directive of 1 September 1960 establishes the single line of authority from the SecDef to the Secretary of the Air Force to a Field Program Director, and specifically excluding program review by OSD and Air Staff, which could make this arrangement a feasible one. The Apollo and Voyager Programs are run by Program Directors at the NASA Headquarters and direct lines to field units. An organization dedicated to the furtherance of the program objectives instead of pre-occupation of maintaining organizational identification will assure a successful project.

b. Fully Integrated System Project Office: The apparent rationale fundamental to the development of this particular alternative is out of context with the other alternatives. If it is interpreted that the 11 August Agreement is dedicated to maintaining organizational identities instead of the best management for the project then it may be worthwhile to start working on a new agreement. There are no cons that I can identify that would recommend against this particular solution. It appears to me that it would be equally applicable regardless of the Director, hence the Deputy, or the location. Since all of the management approaches are very strongly dependent on individual personalities this particular arrangement would suffer the least consequences because of a personality clash either on a personal basis or on an organizational basis. This approach is overwhelmingly more suitable for the FOSS.

c. Co-system Project Directors: This arrangement probably can work, but with continuous difficulties. Personalities of the co-directors will clearly determine whether this is a workable system or not and as a result this feature of it becomes its major weakness. There is no requirement for co-location and it is

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particularly well suited for instructed delegates. The Director of the NRO would be much better served with a single man charged with the responsibility for the development of the program rather than two people regardless of how well the responsibilities are identified and assigned. The other undesirable major weakness that should be identified is a high probability that a constant stream of both minor and major disagreements will necessarily be pushed to the DNRO for solution. The recommendation that one of the co-SPDs may arbitrarily be designated as responsible for on-orbital operations seems to me to be as difficult a decision as a selection of a single program director. Whatever rationale applies would also apply to the program director selection as well. It certainly is not clear that it should be an attribute of this solution that all participating agencies should have equal and common ground for coordination, cooperation, or non-cooperation. The total program knowledge and total control of individual agency responsibility by each of the participating agencies is a function of the individuals as a first order rather than whether they are a co-director, director, or the deputy director. Certainly, the participation of more than one agency, whether they have a detailed specific charter from DNRO or from a Program Director, will necessitate coordination between these two agencies. The management arrangement of the integrated proposal with a single program director is far superior to a co-management arrangement.

d. The Segregated System Project Officer: The title prejudices the conclusions before one has actually studied them. I am sure that you could select people such as a senior representative who was designated as an Assistant Project Director who would devote his time to mis-management rather than management. On the other hand, people can make this type of management arrangement (by committee and at long range) work, also, albeit, more difficult. One wonders what the committee motivation was that caused this approach to be considered.

I would certainly agree with the conclusion of the Task Group that the advantages in the precision and management direction which a single system project director offers is by far the more desirable. It is also more desirable that Systems Engineering and Technical Direction as well as Systems Integration should be assigned by the system Program Director to the organization he determines most competent to accomplish those functions.

It is my view that option two of FOSS Responsibilities, where the CIA-OSP is responsible for the entire Sensor Module with the structure for this module being provided by the same contractor

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as the OCM is the best of the considered task assignments. There appears no rationale as to why the RV module should be designated as a part of the sensor module. Indeed, there is a very clean and clear interface between the RV and Sensor Module that should be maintained.

  
HENRY C. HOWARD  
Colonel, USAF

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