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NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting Held November 13, 1968
Office of Deputy Secretary of Defense
Room 3E 928, The Pentagon
2:30 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.

Members Present

Mr. Paul H. Nitze	Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Richard Helms	Director of Central Intelligence
Dr. Donald F. Hornig	Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

Others Present

Dr. Alexander H. Flax	Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Ex Officio
Mr. James Q. Reber	Secretary, NRP Executive Committee Ex Officio

Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.	DDR&E
[REDACTED]	DOD
[REDACTED]	DOD
[REDACTED]	DOD
[REDACTED]	DOD
[REDACTED]	DOD
[REDACTED]	DOD
Vice Adm. Rufus Taylor	DDCI
Mr. Carl E. Duckett	CIA
Mr. Thomas A. Parrott	CIA
Dr. Donald Steininger	PSAC
Mr. Fred S. Hoffman	Assistant Director, BOB
Mr. C. William Fischer	BOB
Mr. Charles A. Sorrels	BOB
[REDACTED]	NRO Comptroller
Brig. Gen. Russell A. Berg	Director, NRO Staff
Col. Lew Allen, Jr.	NRO Staff

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HEXAGON CORONA GAMBIT [REDACTED] IDEALIST

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Review of the FY 1970 NRP Budget
(Ref: BYE-13529-68, Nov 6, 1968) ✓

In response to the request of Dr. Flax, the NRO Comptroller, [REDACTED] briefed the NRP Executive Committee on the major categories in the NRP Aircraft/Satellite Budget.

Dr. Flax in introducing consideration of the budget issues noted that his approach to the budget had been governed by the need for austerity and that compared with other recent budgets this one was significantly lower. He suggested that the Executive Committee in its review examine in turn each of the budget issues which had been outlined in the subject reference.

Budget Issue No. 1: U-2 Aircraft Program Options

In the consideration of this issue the question was raised whether CIA could take over SAC's responsibility for coverage of Cuba. It was explained that with the six aircraft assigned to the CIA two would be stationed at Taiwan, two at Edwards, one used for training, and one in IRAN; accordingly, with these limited assets such transfer of responsibility would not be feasible. Note was also taken of the responsibilities of SAC for reconnaissance in the Cambodian and Laotian areas in connection with the war in Vietnam.

Action: Approved a 50-50 split of U-2R's between the CIA and SAC, maintenance of six active U-2's each for the Agency and SAC by replacing U-2R attrition with U-2C/G's and use these for training and operational missions where vulnerability is not an important factor. The remaining U-2C/G's will be placed in flyable storage until needed for attrition replacement. AFSC to fly 2.5 average U-2A/F's. FY 1970 costs: [REDACTED] Qualification: That the aircraft allocations between the Agency and SAC should not be considered inflexible and should be subject to change if circumstances warrant.

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Budget Issue No. 2: [REDACTED]

Action: Approved proceeding with this new program. Approved [REDACTED] for the FY 1970 budget and FY 1969 appropriate funding.

Budget Issue No. 3: Advanced Aircraft R&D

Dr. Flax recalled that the Executive Committee in its consideration of the FY 1969 Budget had approved [REDACTED] for survivable quick-reaction reconnaissance capability studies to be allocated equally between aircraft/drones and satellites. Mr. Duckett explained that McDonnell-Douglas/Pratt & Whitney have already put about [REDACTED] of their own money in studies on such a capability. Whereas the 1969 money had not yet been contracted for, CIA proposed to ask these companies to bring their studies up-to-date using the 1969 funds plus [REDACTED] of 1970 money with the aim of arriving at the point of initiating full-scale development for FY 1972. The DNRO recommended that the FY 1970 budget include only [REDACTED]

Action: Approved [REDACTED] limited to study effort.

Budget Issue No. 4: HEXAGON Launch Schedule

Mr. Hoffman of the Bureau of the Budget felt that existing studies on the HEXAGON question had not dealt with the questions of whether the HEXAGON was essential to achieve the level of effort required for this type of reconnaissance and what is the most effective and least expensive mix of satellite photographic reconnaissance capabilities. In the ensuing discussion, the following points were brought out which bore upon the Executive Committee's decision to continue the HEXAGON:

a. Admiral Taylor called attention to the study prepared by the National Intelligence Resources Board which concluded that we could buy a great deal more at little additional cost through the use of HEXAGON rather than an improved CORONA because of the higher resolution and the wider swath width.

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b. The break-point in the photographic interpreter's ability to discriminate lies in the 2.5- to 4.5-foot area which is highly desirable for effective search. The GAMBIT cannot serve as an effective search instrument.

c. Mr. Nitze felt that looking ahead five to ten years there will be a continuing need for a search capability and that the costs in the latter part of the period would equate to the five-year differences in cost of the HEXAGON/GAMBIT mix compared to a CORONA/GAMBIT mix.

d. Dr. Hornig considered the search function very important and that it is not effective with the 6- to 10-foot resolution of CORONA. Aside from military needs, there is a political need to know where things are and what is or is not happening. This cannot be effectively done with the CORONA/GAMBIT combination.

The Committee considered ways in which the CORONA could be used during FY 1971 and 1972 to provide backup against failure of the HEXAGON in its early life and to provide additional support in addition to the HEXAGON if that were required.

Action: Approved a HEXAGON launch schedule as follows:

FY 1971	4 vehicles, total
FY 1972	4 vehicles, total
FY 1973	4 vehicles, total
FY 1974	4 vehicles, total

FY 1970 budget reduction, [REDACTED]

Budget Issue No. 5: GAMBIT Launch Schedule

Action: Approved the following GAMBIT launch schedule:

FY 1970	7 vehicles, total
FY 1971	5 vehicles, total
FY 1972	5 vehicles, total
FY 1973	4 vehicles, total
FY 1974	4 vehicles, total

FY 1970 budget reduction, [REDACTED]

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Budget Issue No. 6: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Budget Issue No. 7: [REDACTED]


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Budget Issue No. 8: Vulnerability R&D

Dr. Flax called attention to the fact that the Executive Committee did not approve funds for vulnerability hardware. He also cited a recent Special National Intelligence Estimate which indicated that the probability of attack or harrassment was quite low. Although there was some support initially for the low option of [REDACTED] the members, through dis-

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cussion, finally desired more than the low option but were reluctant to go to a higher cost option for budgetary reasons. Dr. Flax suggested that the effort be at the rate of [REDACTED] which would be concentrated principally on a single device for protection of HEXAGON against attack or interference which was immediately accepted.

Action: Approved [REDACTED] for satellite vulnerability R&D for HEXAGON.

FY 1970 budget reduction, [REDACTED]

Budget Issue No. 9: Readout System R&D

Dr. Flax pointed out that if it were deemed imperative to go for expedited development of a readout system at this time it would have to be film readout. At a later date the selection could be made from a variety of possibilities although he could not at this time predict which. He indicated that cost was a big factor in going ahead.

Dr. Hornig referred to an upcoming December meeting of the Land Panel in which it will probably be the view that we are rapidly approaching an understanding as to the feasibility of particular technologies and also to establish priorities for support. He was certain that the Panel would want to accelerate work in certain areas of technology.

Action: Approved Option 1 of [REDACTED] with the understanding that, if it is deemed necessary to redirect our present efforts and also to accelerate work in specific areas which have an impact on FY 1969 funds, these funds would have to be reprogrammed and might be as much as [REDACTED] out of 1969 money.

Budget Issue No. 10: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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
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Budget Issue No. 11: SI Camera for HEXAGON

Action: Approved Option 1 of [REDACTED]


James Q. Reber
Secretary
NRP Executive Committee

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