

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON 20330



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

JUL 5 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR DR: FLAX

*SAM briefing in SPSL*

SUBJECT: NPIC Training for Astronauts

On Monday, July 15, the following astronauts are scheduled to begin the two week orientation and training course at NPIC:

Lt Col R. T. Herres  
Major D. H. Peterson  
Major J. A. Abrahamson

In addition to these astronauts, selected individuals from the Program and Systems Offices and AFNIN will attend the course on a part or full time basis as their duties permit.

This program, you will remember, was initiated with your approval last summer. Two classes have been conducted and those who have attended the course have been most favorably impressed with the caliber of the instruction and utility of the curriculum.

Attached for your review is the Security Plan for this action (Tab A), and the Training Course Outline (Tab B), both of which you have previously approved.

Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I shall proceed, together with Mr. Mazza, with the actions necessary for the July 15 class.

JAMES T. STEWART  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director, MOL Program

2 Atchs:  
a/s.

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SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR MOL ASTRONAUTS  
TRAINING AT NPIC

Astronaut identification at NPIC facility by uncleared personnel would reveal the intelligence nature of the MOL Program. With this underlying postulate in mind, the building access procedure and general milieu at NPIC was surveyed by an NRO security representative.

NPIC building access procedures are conducive to covert access by persons where specific identities in relation to NPIC would be sensitive. The building environment is similarly satisfactory. Recognition of astronauts at NPIC is considered extremely remote. All personnel given access to NPIC have SI and TKH clearances.

According to NPIC officials, up to 50 visitors come to NPIC daily -- some in small groups. The appearance of a small number (4 or 5) of strange faces for building access is not unusual and will not draw any special attention.

Special security arrangements are set forth below:

1. The fact of astronaut-NPIC association will be DORIAN.
2. Astronauts will visit and/or participate in activity at NPIC in civilian attire only.
3. To preclude inadvertent identification to unwitting persons of astronauts, now or in the future, as having visited NPIC, arrangements will be made to preclude astronauts' names from appearing in the building access register.
4. The tentative plan is to schedule astronauts for the NPIC orientation in groups of 4 or 5.
5. For directing transportation conveyances, NPIC will be identified as "Navy Yard, Building 213, corner of M and 1st Street, S.E."

DORIAN

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5 July 1968

"D" TRAINING COURSE PROGRAM

15 through 25 July 1968

First Week

Monday - 15 July

0800-0830	Introduction to Course	
0830-1030	Modern History of Photo Intell	
1030-1220	Suez, the Congo, Cyprus	Brugioni
1220-1320	Lunch	
1320-1420	Film: "How Israel Won the War"	
1430-1515	Film: "Inside North Vietnam"	
1520-1630	Photo Intell on Vietnam	

Tuesday - 16 July

0800-0930	Target Positioning in Photographic Analysis	
0930-1100	Mensuration of Photographic Analysis	
1100-1200	Climatology of the Eurasian Land Mass	
1200-1300	Lunch	
1300-1450	Geography of the Soviet Union	Brugioni
1500-1630	Geography of China	

Wednesday - 17 July

0800-1230	Soviet Rocket Forces	
1230-1330	Lunch	
1330-1630	Plesetsk, Tyuratam, KY/Vlad Missile Test Centers	

Thursday - 18 July

0800-1230	Sary Shagan, SA-5, AMM/ABM	
1230-1330	Lunch	
1330-1430	Film: "True Sons of the People"	
1430-1630	Shuang-Cheng-Tzu Test Center and SARF	

Friday - 19 July

0800-0830	Introduction to Atomic Energy	
0830-0920	Materials Production & Nuclear Research	
0930-1200	Weapons Fabrication & Testing	
1200-1300	Lunch	
1300-1420	Semipalatinsk Proving Ground	
1430-1520	Novaya Zemlya Proving Ground	
1530-1630	Lop Nor Test Site	

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

Second Week

Monday - 22 July

0800-0950	Aircraft Production	
1000-1050	Soviet Long Range Air Capabilities	
1100-1200	Soviet & Chinese Tactical Air Capabilities	
1200-1300	Lunch	
1300-1350	Naval Facilities & Vessels	
1400-1450	Naval Production - Shipyards	
1500-1600	Naval Missile Storage	
1600-1630	Film: "Great Thoughts of Mao Tse Tung"	

Tuesday - 23 July

0800-0850	Ground Forces Order of Battle	
0900-0950	Tactical Missile Storage (SSM's)	
1000-1130	Sensitive Operations Complexes	
1130-1230	Lunch	
1230-1410	Soviet Nuclear Weapons Storage	
1420-1630	Missile Production	

Wednesday - 24 July

0800-1020	Biological/Chemical Warfare	
1030-1200	Cuba/Near Real-Time Reporting	
1200-1300	Lunch	
1300-1420	Camouflage & Deception	
1430-1630	Soviet & Chinese Electronics	

Thursday - 25 July

0830-0930	Tour/Briefing of Instrumentation	
0940-1040	Sino-Soviet Border Activity	
1050-1200	Course Wrap-up	

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DOD/MOL ASTRONAUT ORIENTATION

AT

NPIC

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this plan is to set forth security arrangements including cover and contingency procedures for MOL astronaut orientation at NPIC.

GENERAL:

Arrangements have been made for DOD/MOL astronauts to receive intelligence orientation at NPIC (see attached). Special security considerations are required because astronaut identification at NPIC facility by uncleared individuals would reveal the intelligence nature of the MOL Program. With this underlying postulate in mind, the building access procedure and general milieu at NPIC was surveyed by an NRO security representative.

NPIC building access procedures are conducive to covert access by persons where specific identities in relation to NPIC would be sensitive. The building environment is similarly satisfactory. Recognition of astronauts at NPIC is considered extremely remote. All personnel given access to NPIC have SI and T/KH clearances.

According to NPIC officials, up to 50 visitors come to NPIC daily -- some in small groups. The appearance of a small number (4 or 5) of strange faces for building access is not unusual and will not draw any special attention.

COVER AND CONTINGENCY ASPECTS:

The presence of MOL astronauts in Washington, D.C. will be "low key" in order not to provoke interest on the part of the news media. Whereas the identities of MOL astronauts have

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been made public, their exposure to the press has been extremely modest in keeping with the strict security requirements of the program. Therefore under carefully controlled conditions, the possibility of their presence provoking news inquiry is extremely small. This is particularly true in the Washington, D.C. area as their presence here is commonplace because the office of the Director of the MOL Program is located in the Pentagon.

Security arrangements have been keyed to the theme of "apparent normalcy" under the theory that any elaborate clandestine or covert arrangements, if exposed for any reason, would only result in additional compromise and embarrassment to the program. Astronauts therefore, will identify themselves according to their true names, service affiliation and rank, but will wear civilian dress and will not volunteer their occupation as MOL astronauts.

The following cover story may be used only under circumstances prescribed by the MOL Program Office and is not to be used at NPIC:

"Several DOD MOL astronauts are presently in Washington, D.C. participating in consultations and briefings under the auspices of the MOL Program Office."

For the purpose of receiving contacts from friends, relatives, etc., the astronauts will use the MOL Program Office as a cut-out. While at NPIC, astronauts will be at all times under the personal control of DORIAN approved NPIC personnel. Consultation between the Security Officer/NPIC and the Assistant for Security/NRO Staff will occur in the event of any compromise of the fact of a MOL astronaut's presence at NPIC to non-DORIAN approved NPIC personnel and appropriate corrective security action will be prescribed in each instance.

All press inquiries regarding the presence of MOL astronauts in Washington, D.C. will immediately be communicated via NRO Staff Assistant for Security, Mr. Mazza, to the D/NRO. Following consultation with responsible CIA and DOD officials, a response will be made by the OSAF/Office of Information. Unless circumstances indicate the necessity of responding

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otherwise, the response will be worded in accordance with the above quoted cover story with the possible addition of:  
"... which are oriented toward familiarizing them with program experimental objectives." Under no circumstances, will an attempt be made to publicly explain or justify the specific presence of MOL astronauts at NPIC. The NPIC and CIA, in the event that inquiry is addressed to them, should refer to the USAF.

PROCEDURES:

1. The fact of astronaut-NPIC association will be DORIAN.
2. Astronauts will visit and/or participate in activity at NPIC in civilian attire only.
3. To preclude inadvertent identification to unwitting persons of astronauts, now or in the future, as having visited NPIC, arrangements will be made to preclude astronauts' names from appearing in the building access register.
4. Astronauts will be scheduled for the NPIC orientation in groups of 3 or 4.
5. Astronauts will use private auto rent-a-car to convey themselves to NPIC. One or two astronauts to a car. Under no circumstance will they approach NPIC in either government or public transportation vehicles.
6. Astronauts will lunch at the NPIC cafeteria and will have no association with NPIC personnel outside of NPIC.
7. Astronauts will not be billeted in close proximity to NPIC.
8. SAFSL will be used as cut-out. Anyone inquiring as to astronaut location will be referred to MOL Program Office, X50961. Secretary will indicate (name) is not immediately available -- will take message and have astronaut call back. (Press inquiry will be handled in consideration of discussion under "Cover and Contingency Aspects").

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All press inquiries regarding the presence of MOL astronauts in Washington, D.C. will immediately be communicated via NRO Staff Assistants for Security, Mr. Mazza and/or Maj Cohen to the D/NRO. Following consultation with responsible CIA and DOD officials, a response will be made by the OSAF/Office of Information. Unless circumstances indicate the necessity of responding otherwise, the response will be worded in accordance with the above quoted cover story with the possible addition of: "... which are oriented toward familiarizing them with program experimental objectives." Under no circumstances, will an attempt be made to publicly explain or justify the specific presence of MOL astronauts at NPIC. The NPIC and CIA, in the event that inquiry is addressed to them, should refer to the USAF.

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~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

March 13, 1967

Dear Ed:

Reference is made to our recent phone conversation concerning conduct of a Photographic Intelligence Indoc-trination Program for our MOL Astronauts by NPIC. The purpose of this letter is to confirm arrangements and program content as agreed to last week by personnel of NPIC, the MOL Program Office, and the Special Projects Office.

The arrangements are for the program to commence on March 20, 1967, for ten working days for four astronauts, followed by a second session starting April 3 for three additional astronauts. Additional Air Force personnel will attend some of the sessions, their number to be limited under direct control of Major General Evans, the Vice Director, MOL. Program content is as indicated in the attachment.

At the request of the Director of NPIC we have been working with his Technical Director, [REDACTED]. He proposed that it would be appropriate for a MOL Program representative to make some brief introductory remarks at the opening session. We agree and are making arrange-ments for General Evans to be present and perform this task on March 20.

[REDACTED] and other NPIC personnel who have worked with MOL Program Office representatives have been very helpful in formulating an excellent program. We are certain that the NPIC indoctrination will make a very significant contribution in preparing the astronauts for the vital role they will play in the DORIAN Program.



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We are advised that the program schedule and content are satisfactory from an NPIC viewpoint. With your approval we would like to make arrangements now for the astronauts to be present at NPIC starting March 20, and we will continue to work closely with Mr. Lundahl or his designee on administrative details.

Yours truly,

*James Q. Reber*  
James Q. Reber

Attachment  
NPIC Program Agenda

Distribution:

- 1 Addressee
  - 2 Mr. Lundahl
  - 3 Gen. Martin
  - 4 Gen. Evans
  - 5 Col. Battle
- |                      |
|----------------------|
| 6 SS-1               |
| 7 RF                 |
| 8 SS-3               |
| 9 SS-5               |
| 10 RD-2 w/attachment |
| 11 RD-2 w/attachment |

Mr. Edward W. Proctor  
Acting Deputy Director  
for Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency

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20 July 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR NPIC

SUBJECT: NPIC Indoctrination for MOL Astronauts

This is the attendance for the MOL Astronauts and associated personnel.

All personnel listed below are cleared SI, TKH, GAMBIT and DORIAN.

25 July Class

BERG, Russell	BGen
CRIPPEN, Robert	Lt (USN)
OVERMEYER, Robert F.	Maj (USMC)
BOBKO, Karol	Maj
FULLERTON, Charles G.	Capt
HARTSFIELD, Henry W.	Maj
JOHNSON, Lawrence	Capt
LORET, Benjamin J.	Lt Col

25 July Class (A.M. Only)

STEWART, James T.	Maj General
MacLEAY, Lachlan	Maj
TRULY, Richard H.	Lt (USN)

LOUIS MAZZA  
Assistant for Security  
NRO Staff

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

2 February 1967

*R.*  
GENERALS BERG/STEWART

"Policy related to DOD MOL Astronauts" has been implemented by Gen Ferguson as MOL Directive 67-1. It is in two parts: Part 1 repeats D/NRO directive, part 2 provides implementing instructions.

Seven astronauts were indoctrinated SI and T/KH last week at which time Maj Cohen provided the first in a series of security instructions and defensive security briefings.

LOUIS F. MAZZA  
Assistant for Security  
NRO Staff

*Mary Ann  
file please  
[Signature]*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY


20 JAN 1967



MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MOL PROGRAM

SUBJECT: MOL Directive No. 67-1, "Policy Relating to MOL  
Astronauts"

Attached is MOL Directive No. 67-1, "Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts". This directive has been established to minimize any possibility of security compromise or unfavorable international incident in connection with MOL astronauts, with particular emphasis on their selection, training, and operational use. I consider this directive most important. The eventual overall accomplishment of the MOL Program objectives may depend on its careful implementation.




JAMES FERGUSON  
General, USAF  
Director, MOL Program

- 2 Atchs  
1. Cy ltr, Dr. Flax to  
Gen Ferguson  
2. MOL Directive No. 67-1

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~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

28 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, MOL

SUBJECT: Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts

Attached is a directive entitled "Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts", which is applicable to the selection, training, and operational use of Department of Defense MOL astronauts. This policy is designed to reduce risk to program security and negate the possibility of any international incident unfavorable to the United States Government.

I consider this directive to be an important interpretation of national policies related to the matter of overhead reconnaissance, as they pertain to the DOD MOL Program. It is requested that you effect an early and careful implementation of its provisions.

*Alexander H. Flax*

Alexander H. Flax

Atch  
Policy Relating to  
MOL Astronauts

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~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

28 December 1966

POLICY RELATING TO  
MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY (MOL) ASTRONAUTS

I. PURPOSE:

To prescribe policy applicable to the selection, training, and operational use of Department of Defense Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) astronauts, designed to reduce the risks of security compromise or embarrassment to the U.S. Government to an acceptable minimum without impairing mission objectives.

II. SITUATION:

The Department of Defense MOL is not a covert or clandestine overflight program, although the primary mission is covert. Under national policy applicable to the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program, the reconnaissance mission of MOL is controlled under policies and procedures consistent with all projects of the National Reconnaissance Program. Security protection is afforded the reconnaissance mission, within the BYEMAN system of security as project DORIAN. Compatible with the publicly acknowledged military development objectives of MOL, MOL astronauts will retain their status in the military service. In all probability, a modest public information release will be associated with at least the initial fully manned MOL launches.

Department of Defense MOL astronauts, selected to date, have been publicly identified. The extent of their exposure to the public, however, has been controlled in keeping with the strict security prescribed under this program. Those selected to date have undergone a careful selection process, which included evaluation against selected security criteria prescribed in Section III, A of this directive. These security criteria are well within the standards prescribed for access to BYEMAN, as well as specially compartmented intelligence products.

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The nature of the primary mission of the Department of Defense MOL Program, which is the acquisition of high resolution reconnaissance photography, is such, that the on-board presence of man, as an integral part of the intelligence collection system, is intended to provide benefits to the effective accomplishment of this mission not technically possible through the use of an unmanned satellite. Initial studies suggest that the inclusion of man will enhance such benefits with respect to providing: (1) a manual backup for complex automated functions especially in the development phase; (2) manual repair or adjustment of sensor elements, controls and displays during on-orbit operations; (3) a greater percentage of cloud-free photography; (4) a possible quick reaction intelligence read-out capability; and (5) target selectivity.

The full realization of these benefits will require training of MOL astronauts to include a thorough familiarization with the operation of the space laboratory and associated camera equipment, in addition to intelligence target recognition and selected aspects of photographic intelligence interpretation. In addition, it is apparent that MOL astronauts will require access to target cue materials -- probably during mission -- which currently require security handling under special compartmented control systems prescribed for certain intelligence products. The denial of such training and access for MOL astronauts would severely limit the use of man as an integral part of the MOL intelligence collection system.

Certain calculated risks are assumed coincidental with receipt of this training and access by the MOL astronauts. These risks stem from the fact that they, as publicly identified figures, will be more easily targeted by individuals, groups of foreign intelligence organizations intending to acquire classified information; and from the possibility, however remote, of a system malfunction of such nature as to place them in peril of hostile interrogation. The probability of a system malfunction of such nature is extremely slight, with the greatest incidence of risk associated with launch activities, wherein through a partial booster failure the vehicle might fail to achieve orbit.

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In addition, it is believed that under the MOL program, the best interests of the United States would be served by careful avoidance of circumstances which could result in the capture of MOL astronauts with incriminating intelligence mission products, with armament which might be construed as hostile and with devices designed to bring about their voluntary or directed self destruction.

### III. POLICY:

The following stated policies are intended to preclude practices in conjunction with selection, training and operational use of MOL astronauts, which could result in unnecessary risk of security compromise or international embarrassment to the United States government as highlighted in the foregoing background discussion.

#### A. Selection

Security criteria to be applied to the selection process are those previously established by D/NRO which are restated below:

"Security criteria for selection of MOL astronauts will be applied as an integral part of the selection processes and are so designed as to cause an assessment of the individual in terms of the total security risk factor as related to the sensitive tasks the individual might be required to perform, rather than being restricted to evaluation in terms of suitability for access to classified and special access information.

Candidates will meet the personnel security criteria prescribed in USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver, and of AFR 205-34 relating to Ultra Sensitive Positions.

A current security background investigation consistent with USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, and AFR 205-34, will be initiated and a careful

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psychological and psychiatric examination made in the case of all candidates. Both the investigation and the psychological and psychiatric examination will be of such detail as to provide a basis to assess the candidates' ability and compunction to perform a wide variety of sensitive tasks as might be assigned to the MOL program under unusual military security restrictions. All facets of the candidates' behavior, conscience, motivation and personal affairs that might have a bearing upon his ability to so perform should be carefully explored."

The final decision with respect to the selection of MOL astronauts rests with the Director, MOL Program. As has been prior practice, he may be assisted in this regard by a MOL astronaut selection board upon whose recommendations he acts. However, any such selection will be consistent with the security criteria stated above.

Each candidate will be reviewed by competent authorities against the requirements of USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver and AFR 205-34, and the certifications of these authorities made a matter of record. Inasmuch as the criteria stated above go beyond that included in the cited AF regulations, the final review of the investigative files, security certifications, and the psychiatric assessments must be made at no less level of authority than the MOL astronaut selection board constituted by the Director, MOL Program. A project DORIAN cleared professional security officer and psychiatrist will be present to assist the board in the interpretation of these materials.

B. Training and Operational Use

Whereas the identities and general background of MOL astronauts may be released publicly, their exposure to the public will otherwise be limited and controlled in keeping with the security requirements of this program. Personal appearances before public groups and interviews with representatives of the news media or writings for publication, therefore, are not to be authorized.

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Access on the part of MOL astronauts to classified and specially compartmented information will be controlled on a strict "must-know" basis as required to training and the successful and full accomplishment of their mission.

MOL astronauts will be required at all times to maintain a high standard of moral, ethical and military conduct.

MOL astronauts will receive periodic briefings on the subject of their responsibilities to the program and to program security (to include its basis in national policy) in addition to defensive security briefings similar to that prescribed under AFR 205-21. Periodic debriefings of all MOL astronauts will be conducted by program security and psychiatric personnel with particular emphasis upon events transpiring in the personal life of the astronaut and his family which might have a bearing on security of the program.

Special security arrangements will be invoked at such time as the astronaut's training program requires his presence at facilities indicative of the program's intelligence mission (e.g.: camera contractors and the National Photographic Interpretation Center) in order that such mission may not be compromised to unauthorized personnel or the public by virtue of the astronaut's presence at the facility. In general, such facility visits will be avoided if at all possible, and will in each instance require the approval of the D/NRO.

MOL astronauts will be provided with no instructions, devices or equipments for purposes of bringing about their personal destruction in the event of incident.

Any equipments provided to astronauts for purposes of survival, will undergo careful screening against a standard of practical application, to insure that the purpose of such equipments can logically be defended as not intended to bring about the death or injury of other individuals, or to induce such individuals to act in a manner contrary to their allegiance.

It is planned that MOL astronauts will return to earth in the GEMINI vehicle with a substantial portion of the mission photographic product on-board. However, the

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operational plan will provide for an exception to the procedure related to the return of film, in the event it would appear, due to some emergency circumstance, that the impact of the GEMINI will occur in an area where U.S. forces cannot exercise prompt control.

MOL astronauts, in the absence of other U.S. personnel, will attempt in a non-violent manner to exercise U.S. sovereignty over all MOL equipments both while in space and on the earth's surface.

All MOL astronauts will be instructed that in the event of incarceration or interrogation by a foreign government, they will provide no information other than name, rank, serial number, date and place of birth, places of residence and the fact of their occupation as MOL astronauts. Under such conditions the astronauts should request to be placed in contact with representatives of the U.S. Embassy or Legation, or in the absence of any U.S. representation, the International Red Cross. Astronauts will be advised that the U.S. Government in such event will make every effort to secure their prompt release through regular diplomatic channels.

The instructions contained in this directive, to be applicable to MOL astronauts, are intended to supplement rather than substitute for Department of Defense directives and military service regulations related to the personal and official conduct of military personnel.

*Alexander H. Flax*  
Alexander H. Flax

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**MANNED ORBITING  
LABORATORY**

**PROGRAM DIRECTIVE**


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POLICY RELATING TO MOL ASTRONAUTS

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NO. 67-1

JANUARY 1967



**HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE**

**WASHINGTON, D.C.**

**MOL PROGRAM OFFICE**

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MOL PROGRAM OFFICE

5

DIRECTIVE NO. 67-1

POLICY RELATING TO MOL ASTRONAUTS

JANUARY 1967

PROGRAM REQUIREMENT DOCUMENT

THIS DOCUMENT IS AN OFFICIAL RELEASE OF THE  
MOL PROGRAM OFFICE AND ITS REQUIREMENTS ARE  
DIRECTIVE ON ALL COGNIZANT ELEMENTS OF THE MOL PROGRAM

APPROVED



JAMES FERGUSON  
General, USAF  
Director, MOL Program



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This directive sets forth policy relating to MOL astronauts. Its purpose is to enhance the achievement of MOL Program objectives by avoiding a security compromise or unfavorable international incident as a result of astronaut activity.

This directive contains two parts:

Part I is the policy relating to MOL astronauts as established by the D/NRO.

Part II contains the implementing instructions. The channel for actions which requires the review or approval of the D/NRO or the MOL Program Director will be through the MOL Program Office, SAF-SL

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MOL PROGRAM OFFICE  
DIRECTIVE NO. 66-2

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PART I

POLICY RELATING TO

MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY (MOL) ASTRONAUTS

A. PURPOSE

To prescribe policy applicable to the selection, training, and operational use of Department of Defense Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) astronauts, designed to reduce the risks of security compromise or embarrassment to the U. S. Government to an acceptable minimum without impairing mission objectives.

B. SITUATION

The Department of Defense MOL is not a covert or clandestine overflight program, although the primary mission is covert. Under national policy applicable to the U. S. Satellite Reconnaissance Program, the reconnaissance mission of MOL is controlled under policies and procedures consistent with all projects of the National Reconnaissance Program. Security protection is afforded the reconnaissance mission, within the BYEMAN system of security as project DORIAN. Compatible with the publicly acknowledged military development objectives of MOL, MOL astronauts will retain their status in the military service. In all probability, a modest public information release will be associated with at least the initial fully manned MOL launches.

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Department of Defense MOL astronauts, selected to date, have been publicly identified. The extent of their exposure to the public, however, has been controlled in keeping with the strict security prescribed under this program. Those selected to date have undergone a careful selection process, which included evaluation against selected security criteria prescribed in Section C, 1, of this directive. These security criteria are well within the standards prescribed for access to BYEMAN, as well as specially compartmented intelligence products.

The nature of the primary mission of the Department of Defense MOL Program, which is the acquisition of high resolution reconnaissance photography, is such that the on-board presence of man, as an integral part of the intelligence collection system, is intended to provide benefits to the effective accomplishment of this mission not technically possible through the use of an unmanned satellite. Initial studies suggest that the inclusion of man will enhance such benefits with respect to providing: (1) a manual backup for complex automated functions especially in the development phase; (2) manual repair or adjustment of sensor elements, controls and displays during on-orbit operations; (3) a greater percentage of cloud-free photography; (4) a possible quick reaction intelligence read-out capability; and (5) target selectivity.

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The full realization of these benefits will require training of MOL astronauts to include a thorough familiarization with the operation of the space laboratory and associated camera equipment, in addition to intelligence target recognition and selected aspects of photographic intelligence interpretation. In addition, it is apparent that MOL astronauts will require access to target cue materials--probably during mission--which currently require security handling under special compartmented control systems prescribed for certain intelligence products. The denial of such training and access for MOL astronauts would severely limit the use of man as an integral part of the MOL intelligence collection system.

Certain calculated risks are assumed coincidental with receipt of this training and access by the MOL astronauts. These risks stem from the fact that they, as publicly identified figures, will be more easily targeted by individuals, groups or foreign intelligence organizations intending to acquire classified information; and from the possibility, however remote, of a system malfunction of such nature as to place them in peril of hostile interrogation. The probability of a system malfunction of such nature is extremely slight, with the greatest incidence of risk associated with launch activities, wherein through a partial booster failure the vehicle might fail to achieve orbit.

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In addition, it is believed that under the MOL Program, the best interests of the United States would be served by careful avoidance of circumstances which could result in the capture of MOL astronauts with incriminating intelligence mission products, with armament which might be construed as hostile and with devices designed to bring about their voluntary or directed self destruction.

C. POLICY

The following stated policies are intended to preclude practices in conjunction with selection, training and operational use of MOL astronauts, which could result in unnecessary risk of security compromise or international embarrassment to the United States Government as highlighted in the foregoing background discussion.

1. Selection

Security criteria to be applied to the selection process are those previously established by D/NRO which are restated below:

"Security criteria for selection of MOL astronauts will be applied as an integral part of the selection processes and are so designed as to cause an assessment of the individual in terms of the total security risk factor as related to the sensitive tasks the individual might be required to perform, rather than being restricted to evaluation in terms of suitability for access to classified and special access information.

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"Candidates will meet the personnel security criteria prescribed in USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver, and of AFR 205-34 relating to Ultra-Sensitive Positions.

"A current security background investigation consistent with USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, and AFR 205-34, will be initiated and a careful psychological and psychiatric examination made in the case of all candidates. Both the investigation and the psychological and psychiatric examination will be of such detail as to provide a basis to assess the candidates' ability and compunction to perform a wide variety of sensitive tasks as might be assigned to the MOL Program under unusual military security restrictions. All facets of the candidates' behavior, conscience, motivation and personal affairs that might have a bearing upon his ability to so perform should be carefully explored."

The final decision with respect to the selection of MOL astronauts rests with the Director, MOL Program. As has been prior practice, he may be assisted in this regard by a MOL astronaut selection board upon whose recommendations he acts. However, any such selection will be consistent with the security criteria stated above.

Each candidate will be reviewed by competent authorities against the requirements of USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver

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and AFR 205-34, and the certifications of these authorities made a matter of record. Inasmuch as the criteria stated above go beyond that included in the cited AF regulations, the final review of the investigative files, security certifications, and the psychiatric assessments must be made at no less level of authority than the MOL astronaut selection board constituted by the Director, MOL Program. A project DORIAN cleared professional security officer and psychiatrist will be present to assist the board in the interpretation of these materials.

2. Training and Operational Use

a. Whereas the identities and general background of MOL astronauts may be released publicly, their exposure to the public will otherwise be limited and controlled in keeping with the security requirements of this program. Personal appearances before public groups and interviews with representatives of the news media or writings for publication, therefore, are not to be authorized.

b. Access on the part of MOL astronauts to classified and specially compartmented information will be controlled on a strict "must-know" basis as required to training and the successful and full accomplishment of their mission.

c. MOL astronauts will be required at all times to maintain a high standard of moral, ethical and military conduct.

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d. MOL astronauts will receive periodic briefings on the subject of their responsibilities to the program and to program security (to include its basis in national policy) in addition to defensive security briefings similar to that prescribed under AFR 205-21. Periodic debriefings of all MOL astronauts will be conducted by program security and psychiatric personnel with particular emphasis upon events transpiring in the personal life of the astronaut and his family which might have a bearing on security of the program.

e. Special security arrangements will be invoked at such time as the astronaut's training program requires his presence at facilities indicative of the program's intelligence mission (e.g., camera contractors and the National Photographic Interpretation Center) in order that such mission may not be compromised to unauthorized personnel or the public by virtue of the astronaut's presence at the facility. In general, such facility visits will be avoided if at all possible, and will in each instance require the approval of the D/NRO.

f. MOL astronauts will be provided with no instructions, devices or equipments for purposes of bringing about their personal destruction in the event of incident.

g. Any equipments provided to astronauts for purposes of survival will undergo careful screening against a standard of practical application to insure that the purpose of such equipments can logically

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be defended as not intended to bring about the death or injury of other individuals, or to induce such individuals to act in a manner contrary to their allegiance.

h. It is planned that MOL astronauts will return to earth in the Gemini vehicle with a substantial portion of the mission photographic product on-board. However, the operational plan will provide for an exception to the procedure related to the return of film, in the event it would appear, due to some emergency circumstance, that the impact of the Gemini will occur in an area where U. S. forces cannot exercise prompt control.

i. MOL astronauts, in the absence of other U. S. personnel, will attempt in a non-violent manner to exercise U. S. sovereignty over all MOL equipments both while in space and on the earth's surface.

j. All MOL astronauts will be instructed that in the event of incarceration or interrogation by a foreign government, they will provide no information other than name, rank, serial number, date and place of birth, places of residence and the fact of their occupation as MOL astronauts. Under such conditions the astronauts should request to be placed in contact with representatives of the U. S. Embassy or Legation, or in the absence of any U. S. representation, the International Red Cross. Astronauts will be advised that the U. S. Government, in such event, will make every effort to secure their prompt release through regular diplomatic channels.

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k. The instructions contained in this directive, to be applicable to MOL astronauts, are intended to supplement rather than substitute for Department of Defense directives and military service regulations related to the personal and official conduct of military personnel.

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PART II  
IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS

This part consists of extracts of Part I with appended implementing instructions.

A. ATTENDANCE AT OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES

"Whereas the identities and general background of MOL astronauts may be released publicly, their exposure to the public will otherwise be limited and controlled in keeping with the security requirements of this program. Personal appearances before public groups and interviews with representatives of the news media or writings for publication, therefore, are not to be authorized."

Attendance of MOL astronauts at official activities where they may be subject to pressure for interviews by news media representatives is subject to prior approval by the Director of the MOL Program.

B. BRIEFINGS AND DEBRIEFINGS

"MOL astronauts will receive periodic briefings on the subject of their responsibilities to the program and to program security (to include its basis in national policy) in addition to defensive security briefings similar to that prescribed under AFR 205-21. Periodic debriefings of all MOL astronauts will be conducted by program security

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and psychiatric personnel with particular emphasis upon events transpiring in the personal life of the astronaut and his family which might have a bearing on security of the program."

1. The briefings and debriefings required by this paragraph will be administered or arranged by the MOL Program Office (SAF-SL) as follows:

a. An astronaut's first defensive security briefing will be given at the time he receives his SI/TKH clearances. Follow-up defensive security briefings will be given each six months thereafter and prior to any foreign travel.

b. Psychological interviews and security debriefings will be conducted at least once each year. The psychological and security meetings will be conducted separately.

2. Records of psychological debriefing interviews will remain in the confidential files of the Program Psychiatrist. Records of security debriefings will remain in the confidential files of the Program Security Officer. The records of all such debriefings will be permanently retained in their respective offices and made available for program use as approved by the Director of the MOL Program.

3. The security officer and psychiatrist are authorized to compare findings after each debriefing. Any information detrimental to the objectives or security of the program will be reported to the Program Director.

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C. VISITS TO FACILITIES

"Special security arrangements will be invoked at such time as the astronaut's training program requires his presence at facilities indicative of the program's intelligence mission (e.g., camera contractors and the National Photographic Interpretation Center) in order that such mission may not be compromised to unauthorized personnel or the public by virtue of the astronaut's presence at the facility. In general, such facility visits will be avoided if at all possible, and will in each instance require the approval of the D/NRO."

Requests for approval of visits to the type of locations referenced in this subparagraph will be submitted to arrive at SAF-SL at least seven (7) working days prior to the intended visit(s). The request will include names of astronaut(s), location(s) to be visited, date(s) of visit, reason for visit and proposed security arrangements.

D. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

"Any equipments provided to astronauts for purposes of survival will undergo careful screening against a standard of practical application to insure that the purpose of such equipments can logically be defended as not intended to bring about the death or injury of other individuals, or to induce such individuals to act in a manner contrary to their allegiance."

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The list of the proposed contents of the astronaut's survival package will be forwarded to SAF-SL for approval.

E. CONTINGENCY OPTION(S) FOR EMERGENCY FILM RETURN

"It is planned that MOL astronauts will return to earth in the Gemini vehicle with a substantial portion of the mission photographic product on-board. However, the operational plan will provide for an exception to the procedure related to the return of film, in the event it would appear, due to some emergency circumstance, that the impact of the Gemini will occur in an area where U. S. forces cannot exercise prompt control."

The MOL mission planning document will set forth contingency option(s) to cope with the emergency circumstance described in this subparagraph. If necessary, the Gemini B Spacecraft will be engineered to accommodate any special requirements to accomplish such contingency action.

F. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN EVENT OF INCARCERATION OR INTERROGATION BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

"All MOL astronauts will be instructed that in the event of incarceration or interrogation by a foreign government, they will provide no information other than name, rank, serial number, date and place of birth, places of residence and the fact of their occupation as MOL astronauts. Under such conditions the astronauts should request

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to be placed in contact with representatives of the U. S. Embassy or Legation, or in the absence of any U. S. representation, the International Red Cross. Astronauts will be advised that the U. S. Government, in such event, will make every effort to secure their prompt release through regular diplomatic channels."

Instruction required by this subparagraph will be covered as part of the defensive security briefings. In addition, the pre-flight training schedule will provide a block of time to be devoted to full review of this topic and to satisfy any related briefing requirements of other Government agencies. Provision for these briefings will be made by SAF-SL.

G. PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL CONDUCT

"The instructions contained in this directive, to be applicable to MOL astronauts, are intended to supplement rather than substitute for Department of Defense directives and military service regulations related to the personal and official conduct of military personnel."

Review of pertinent military service regulations and directives related to the personal and official conduct of military personnel will be included in the defensive security briefing program.

(See Section B.1.a., above).

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

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THE NRO STAFF

16 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX

*WHE*

VIA: GENERAL STEWART & GENERAL EVANS

SUBJECT: Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts

I wish to clarify language in my earlier memorandum to you related to this subject, wherein I used the term "tacit concurrence" and thereby possibly implied that DCI concurrence was required for the full substance of the "Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts" directive.

As you undoubtedly recognize, in this directive we are attempting to lay careful ground work for a contingency plan for the MOL operation, an element which in the past has been important to 303 Committee mission approval and a matter, for which you in your capacity as Chairman/ICPC have had direct responsibility. The directive is carefully worded to be responsive to applicable national and military policies and additionally to insure that during the development of the program, we take no irreversible steps which might subsequently effect mission approval.

General Evans and I previously considered the matter of requesting the DCI's approval of the full substance of the directive but concluded that such action might not be appropriate in that the matter was not totally within his competence. I also feel that it is premature to bring this matter to the attention of the ICPC. You will recall that a copy of your memorandum to Mr. Helms requesting T/KH billets, in addition to the proposed directive, was provided to Mr. Vance.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign TAB B.



LOUIS F. MAZZA  
Assistant for Security  
NRO Staff

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

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THE NRO STAFF

9 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX

SUBJECT: Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts


BACKGROUND

Attachment A is the DCI approval of T/KH billets for MOL astronauts. It is also tacit concurrence of the "Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts".

Attachment B is a letter which forwards the Policy as a directive to the Director of the MOL Program for implementation. As you are aware, this policy was coordinated in depth with the MOL Program Office and with the ACS/I USAF. Detailed implementing instructions are being prepared for the signature of General Ferguson.

RECOMMENDATION

Sign TAB B.

  
LOUIS F. MADIA  
Assistant for Security  
NRO Staff

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

5 December 1966

A handwritten mark consisting of several intersecting lines, possibly initials or a signature, located to the right of the date.

The Honorable Alexander Flax  
Director, National Reconnaissance Office  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Al:

I am pleased to approve your request for billets in the  
MOL Program which will enable indoctrination of the MOL  
astronauts into the T-KH Security System.

Enclosed herewith is a specific billet structure which  
has been negotiated between your Office and the CIA TALENT  
Control and Security Officers. In the event that there is a  
need for an expansion in the numbers sometime in the future,  
please do not hesitate to let us know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dick", located below the word "Sincerely".

Richard Helms  
Director

Enclosure

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Copy 1 of 6

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BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE  
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GROUP 1  
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downgrading and  
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~



BYE-57026-66  
Copy 2 of 5

5 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant for Security/NRO Staff

SUBJECT : T/KH Billets for MOL Astronauts

Pursuant to instruction of the Director of Central Intelligence,  
20 T/KH billets have been approved for MOL astronauts. They will  
be titled and numbered as follows:

Title : Crew Members

Numbers : 3014-00-303  
through 3014-00-322.



CIA/TCO



CIA/TSO



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Dear Dick:

Our studies of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) Program have made it evident that if the on-board presence of men, functioning as an integral part of a photographic satellite reconnaissance system is to achieve full realization of the potential that men can offer to the system, MOL astronauts must be provided a familiarity with substantive intelligence (such as would currently be subject to TALENT/KEYHOLE and possibly COMINT security controls) to a much greater degree than has been the practice in aircraft reconnaissance programs. It is probable that on-board target cue material will also be required.

Because the providing of such access is a departure from the usual security practices related to the handling of overflight reconnaissance personnel, I request your personal consideration and approval of a billet structure in the MOL Program which will enable indoctrination of MOL astronauts into the TALENT/KEYHOLE security system. Requests for clearance of the individual astronauts will be submitted through normal channels upon approval of the billet structure. COMINT clearances will be obtained through normal USAF channels.

As a matter of interest and as an indication of the manner in which the TALENT/KEYHOLE clearances will be utilized, I am attaching a copy of our draft "Policy Relating to Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) Astronauts" which is being prepared as a directive to the Director/MOL Program.

I would be pleased to discuss this matter further with you if you wish.

Alexander H. Flax  
Director

Mr. Richard Helms  
Director  
Central Intelligence

cc: Mr. Vance

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POLICY RELATING TO  
MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY (MOL) ASTRONAUTS

I. PURPOSE:

To prescribe policy applicable to the selection, training, and operational use of Department of Defense Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) astronauts, designed to reduce the risks of security compromise or embarrassment to the U.S. Government to an acceptable minimum without impairing mission objectives.

II. SITUATION:

The Department of Defense MOL is not a covert or clandestine overflight program, although the primary mission is covert. Under national policy applicable to the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program, the reconnaissance mission of MOL is controlled under policies and procedures consistent with all projects of the National Reconnaissance Program. Security protection is afforded the reconnaissance mission, within the BYEMAN system of security as project DORIAN. Compatible with the publicly acknowledged military development objectives of MOL, MOL astronauts will retain their status in the military service. In all probability, a modest public information release will be associated with at least the initial fully manned MOL launches.

Department of Defense MOL astronauts, selected to date, have been publicly identified. The extent of their exposure to the public, however, has been controlled in keeping with the strict security prescribed under this program. Those selected to date have undergone a careful selection process, which included evaluation against selected security criteria prescribed in Section III, A of this directive. These security criteria are well within the standards prescribed for access to BYEMAN, as well as specially compartmented intelligence products.

The nature of the primary mission of the Department of Defense MOL Program, which is the acquisition of high resolution reconnaissance photography, is such, that the on-board presence of man, as an integral part of the intelligence collection system, is intended to provide benefits to the effective accomplishment of this mission not technically possible through the use of an unmanned satellite. Initial studies suggest that the inclusion of man will enhance such

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benefits with respect to providing: (1) a manual backup for complex automated functions especially in the development phase; (2) manual repair or adjustment of sensor elements, controls and displays during on-orbit operations; (3) a greater percentage of cloud-free photography; (4) a possible quick reaction intelligence read-out capability; and (5) target selectivity.

The full realization of these benefits will require training of MOL astronauts to include a thorough familiarization with the operation of the space laboratory and associated camera equipment, in addition to intelligence target recognition and selected aspects of photographic intelligence interpretation. In addition, it is apparent that MOL astronauts will require access to target cue materials -- probably during mission -- which currently require security handling under special compartmented control systems prescribed for certain intelligence products. The denial of such training and access for MOL astronauts would severely limit the use of man as an integral part of the MOL intelligence collection system.

Certain calculated risks are assumed coincidental with receipt of this training and access by the MOL astronauts. These risks stem from the fact that they, as publicly identified figures, will be more easily targeted by individuals, groups or foreign intelligence organizations intending to acquire classified information; and from the possibility, however remote, of a system malfunction of such nature as to place them in peril of hostile interrogation. The probability of a system malfunction of such nature is extremely slight, with the greatest incidence of risk associated with launch activities, wherein through a partial booster failure the vehicle might fail to achieve orbit.

In addition, it is believed that under the MOL program, the best interests of the United States would be served by careful avoidance of circumstances which could result in the capture of MOL astronauts with incriminating intelligence mission products, with armament which might be construed as hostile and with devices designed to bring about their voluntary or directed self destruction.

**III. POLICY:**

The following stated policies are intended to preclude practices in conjunction with selection, training and operational use of MOL astronauts, which could result in unnecessary

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risk of security compromise or international embarrassment to the United States government as highlighted in the foregoing background discussion.

A. Selection

Security criteria to be applied to the selection process are those previously established by D/NRO which are restated below.

"Security criteria for selection of MOL astronauts will be applied as an integral part of the selection processes and are so designed as to cause an assessment of the individual in terms of the total security risk factor as related to the sensitive tasks the individual might be required to perform, rather than being restricted to evaluation in terms of suitability for access to classified and special access information.

Candidates will meet the personnel security criteria prescribed in USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver, and of AFR 205-34 relating to Ultra Sensitive Positions.

A current security background investigation consistent with USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, and AFR 205-34, will be initiated and a careful psychological and psychiatric examination made in the case of all candidates. Both the investigation and the psychological and psychiatric examination will be of such detail as to provide a basis to assess the candidates' ability and compunction to perform a wide variety of sensitive tasks as might be assigned to the MOL program under unusual military security restrictions. All facets of the candidates' behavior, conscience, motivation and personal affairs that might have a bearing upon his ability to so perform should be carefully explored."

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The final decision with respect to the selection of MOL astronauts rests with the Director, MOL Program. As has been prior practice, he may be assisted in this regard by a MOL astronaut selection board upon whose recommendations he acts. However, any such selection will be consistent with the security criteria stated above.

Each candidate will be reviewed by competent authorities against the requirements of USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver and AFR 205-34, and the certifications of these authorities made a matter of record. Inasmuch as the criteria stated above go beyond that included in the cited AF regulations, the final review of the investigative files, security certifications, and the psychiatric assessments must be made at no less level of authority than the MOL astronaut selection board constituted by the Director, MOL Program. A project DORIAN cleared professional security officer and psychiatrist will be present to assist the board in the interpretation of these materials.

#### B. Training and Operational Use

Whereas the identities and general background of MOL astronauts may be released publicly, their exposure to the public will otherwise be limited and controlled in keeping with the security requirements of this program. Personal appearances before public groups and interviews with representatives of the news media or writings for publication, therefore, are not to be authorized.

Access on the part of MOL astronauts to classified and specially compartmented information will be controlled on a strict "must-know" basis as required to training and the successful and full accomplishment of their mission.

MOL astronauts will be required at all times to maintain a high standard of moral, ethical and military conduct.

MOL astronauts will receive periodic briefings on the subject of their responsibilities to the program and to program security (to include its basis in national policy) in addition to defensive security briefings similar to that prescribed under AFR 205-21. Periodic debriefings of all MOL astronauts will be conducted by program security and psychiatric personnel with particular emphasis upon events transpiring in the personal life of the astronaut and his family which might have a bearing on security of the program.

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Special security arrangements will be invoked at such time as the astronaut's training program requires his presence at facilities indicative of the program's intelligence mission (e.g.: camera contractors and the National Photographic Interpretation Center) in order that such mission may not be compromised to unauthorized personnel or the public by virtue of the astronaut's presence at the facility. In general, such facility visits will be avoided if at all possible, and will in each instance require the approval of the D/NRO.

MOL astronauts will be provided with no instructions, devices or equipments for purposes of bringing about their personal destruction in the event of incident.

Any equipments provided to astronauts for purposes of survival, will undergo careful screening against a standard of practical application, to insure that the purpose of such equipments can logically be defended as not intended to bring about the death or injury of other individuals, or to induce such individuals to act in a manner contrary to their allegiance.

It is planned that MOL astronauts will return to earth in the GEMINI vehicle with a substantial portion of the mission photographic product on-board. However, the operational plan will provide for an exception to the procedure related to the return of film, in the event it would appear, due to some emergency circumstance, that the impact of the GEMINI will occur in an area where U.S. forces cannot exercise prompt control.

MOL astronauts, in the absence of other U.S. personnel, will attempt in a non-violent manner to exercise U.S. sovereignty over all MOL equipments both while in space and on the earth's surface.

All MOL astronauts will be instructed that in the event of incarceration or interrogation by a foreign government, they will provide no information other than name, rank, serial number, date and place of birth, places of residence and the fact of their occupation as MOL astronauts. Under such conditions the astronauts should request to be placed in contact with representatives of the U.S. Embassy or Legation, or in the absence of any U.S. representation, the International Red Cross. Astronauts will be advised that the US Government in such event will make every effort to secure their prompt release through regular diplomatic channels.

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The instructions contained in this directive, to be applicable to MOL astronauts, are intended to supplement rather than substitute for Department of Defense directives and military service regulations related to the personal and official conduct of military personnel.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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THE NRO STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX

THRU: GENERAL STEWART  
GENERAL EVANS

SUBJECT: Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with additional information pertaining to "The Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts", a paper now pending. The requirement for action on this matter is urgent. I have been informed that lack of SI and T/KH clearances is hampering effective prosecution of the MOL Program.

I am advised by SAFSL that there is a need to provide SI and T/KH clearances to MOL astronauts at the earliest possible time because of two basic program requirements: MOL mission equipment system design and mission training.

A. MOL Mission Equipment Design: The console equipment to be used by the MOL crew depends on the formulation of operational procedures and concepts which will maximize man's ability to use the MOL optics sensor in achieving photographic take of highest possible resolution and intelligence value. As an example, inclusion of an Active Target Indicator mode of operation, in which the Reconnaissance Panel of PSAC has expressed interest, is presently under simulation study by the MOL Systems Office. The urgent need for MOL astronaut participation in this effort was the subject of [redacted] 2150, dated 16 August 1966, for General Evans from General Berg, copy attached (Atch 1). Participation of astronaut personnel as subjects in these simulations would be of extreme value, both in insuring validity of conclusions which may be reached concerning the advisability of incorporating the Active Target Indicator mode in the baseline MOL, and in providing the astronaut valuable experience which can subsequently be applied to design of the mission equipment, displays, controls, etc.

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Lack of SI and T/KH clearances to date has required that other, SI and T/KH cleared personnel be used instead, as subjects in the simulation effort, adversely impacting on the validity of the simulation results and the conclusions that may be drawn therefrom. Similarly, the Elemental Development Simulator effort at G.E., in which the astronauts are playing a key role, is of vital importance to design of the mission equipment console, hence to the overall effectiveness of the manned system. Utilization of SI and T/KH material, with concomitant SI and T/KH clearances granted to the astronauts, would insure better validity of system design in the use of actual product material and permit more realistic simulation of the real-world mission situation.

B. Mission Training: Manned conduct of photographic reconnaissance from earth-orbit is a new task for the NRO. Lacking direct experience, we cannot at the present time define in detail the exact tasks man is to perform, nor can we specify the mission oriented training he will require. However, this much is clear: for the astronaut to make a maximum contribution to mission accomplishment he will have to be completely familiar with the terrain over which he is to fly and with the specific targets and target complexes which he is to photograph. The large number and different types of targets involved makes it evident that considerable effort will be required to determine what kind and amount of target cueing material will be necessary to insure timely identification of targets, and the amount of related training that will be required. Receipt of SI and T/KH clearances will permit the astronauts to get an early start in familiarizing themselves with the multitude of targets involved and in participating in optimization of cue content, method of cue display, and real-world target identification. The training for each specific flight, to be provided in the months immediately prior to launch, must be based on previous familiarization with product information on targets in the DORIAN target deck and timely definition of cue content, display and use. Receipt of SI and T/KH clearances by the astronauts will enable them to play the key roles they must play in conduct of all of the required predecessor activity. The scope and importance of this effort, in terms of insuring manned mission success, cannot be overemphasized.

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
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In summary, early indoctrination of the astronauts to SI and T/KH target material will provide them a basic understanding of the real-world situation that will confront them during conduct of the mission. The exposure to SI and T/KH material will provide them a basic framework and a clear focus on the primary mission objective which will greatly improve their ability, in the short run, to make manned inputs into systems design, and, in the long run, to perform their assigned mission in orbit.

Informal discussions have been held with both Mr. Tidwell (TCO/CIA) and the Office of Security/CIA concerning the requirement for Talent/Keyhole access on the part of MOL astronauts. These are the two principal CIA elements which would be involved in staffing the DCI's response to your request. Their responses to these informal discussions have led me to believe that the request will receive favorable consideration by the DCI.

  
LOUIS F. MAZZA  
Assistant for Security  
NRO Staff

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FOR GENERAL EVANS FROM GENERAL BERG.

I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT OUR PRESENTATION TO PSAC WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE CONCLUSIVE HAD WE BEEN ABLE TO SUPPORT THE USEFULNESS OF MAN IN THE INDICATORS MODE, WITH DATA OBTAINED FROM SIMULATION USING TK PHOTOGRAPHY. THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION HAS DESIGNED STATIC AND DYNAMIC SIMULATIONS WHICH WILL ASSIST IN THIS DETERMINATION, PROVIDED THAT PERSONNEL WITH PROPER CLEARANCES CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE. EARLIER MY REQUEST FOR CLEARANCES FOR THE FLIGHT CREW TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK WAS DEFERRED. AS AN INTERIM SOLUTION, CLEARED OFFICERS FROM THE PROGRAM OFFICE HAVE DEVOTED AVAILABLE TIME ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS TO ASSIST IN THE SIMULATION. THIS ACTION CANNOT POSSIBLY ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULTS BECAUSE OF CONFLICTS RESULTING FROM HIGHER PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. PSAC'S INTEREST DICTATES THAT WE CONTINUE THE SIMULATION ON A PRIORITY BASIS. IN ORDER TO DO THIS, I FEEL THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO IMMEDIATELY OBTAIN SI/TK CLEARANCES FOR THE SEVEN (7) CREWMEMBERS THAT ARE CURRENTLY PRESENT FOR DUTY IN THE PROGRAM OFFICE. I MOST URGENTLY SOLICIT YOUR SUPPORT IN THIS MATTER.

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FOR COL FORD

THE FOLLOWING MOL ASTRONAUTS HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED BY  
THEIR PARENT SERVICE AS HAVING MET THE PERSONNEL  
SECURITY STANDARDS FOR ACCESS TO BYEMAN PROJECTS:

AIR FORCE: MAJOR MICHAEL J. ADAMS  
MAJOR ALBERT H. CREWS, JR.  
CAPTAIN RICHARD E. LAWYER  
CAPTAIN LACHLAN MACLEAY  
CAPTAIN FRANCIS G. NEUBECK  
CAPTAIN JAMES M. TAYLOR

NAVY: LT JOHN L. FINLEY  
LT RICHARD H. TRULY

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CFN: 4363

~~SECRET~~/SECUR  
FOR COL FORD

THE FOLLOWING MOL ASTRONAUTS HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED BY  
THEIR PARENT SERVICE AS HAVING MET THE PERSONNEL  
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CAPTAIN FRANCIS G. NEUBECK  
CAPTAIN JAMES M. TAYLOR

NAVY: LT JOHN L. FINLEY  
LT RICHARD H. TRULY

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*File: MOL  
Astronaut  
Selection*

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Gen  
Col



SS-3.

Maj Lisciotti/mhr/4 Oct 65

9 OCT 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF/SSC, CIA**

**SUBJECT: MOL Program Astronaut's Security Selection  
Criteria**

Attached for your information are "Security Criteria for Selection of MOL Astronauts" directed by the D/NRO and intended for SECRET (non-BYEMAN) classification. A copy of AFR 205-34 is also attached.

A special selection board has been established by the Chief of Staff, USAF, and it is expected that a total of 15 astronauts will be selected.

A public announcement is expected to be made in the near future announcing the identities of eight of the selected astronauts.

Atchs  
Security Criteria  
AFR 205-34

LOUIS F. MAZZA  
Chief Security Officer  
NBO Staff

Distribution

Cy #1 - SSC/CIA  
Cy #2 - SS-3



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*File: Mol Astronaut  
Selection*

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SECURITY CRITERIA FOR SELECTION  
OF MOL ASTRONAUTS

Security criteria for selection of MOL astronauts will be applied  
as an integral part of the selection processes and are so designed as  
to cause an assessment of the individual in terms of the total security-  
risk factor as related to the sensitive tasks the individual might be  
required to perform, rather than being restricted to evaluation in terms  
of suitability for access to classified and special access information.

Candidates will meet the personnel security criteria prescribed  
in USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver, and of AFR 205-34  
relating to Ultra Sensitive Positions.

A current security background investigation, consistent with  
USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, and AFR 205-34, will be initiated  
and a careful psychological and psychiatric examination made in the  
case of all candidates. Both the investigation and the psychological  
and psychiatric examination will be of such detail as to provide a basis  
to assess the candidates' ability and compunction to perform a wide  
variety of sensitive tasks as might be assigned to the MOL program  
under unusual military security restrictions. All facets of the candi-  
dates' behavior, conscience, motivation and personal affairs that might  
have a bearing upon his ability to so perform should be carefully  
explored.

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