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CORONA



23 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Proposed Instruction for CIA Operations
Officer for CORONA Mission 1018

REFERENCES : A. [REDACTED] Draft of Directive from
D/NRO to Director, Program B and Info:
Director, Program A.

B. Letter from DDCI to D/NRO, dated
16 March 65 re

1. This is in response to your request to Mr. Sheldon on 22 March 1965 for DD/S&T comments to your revision of Reference A which, in effect, would be a cable instruction from you to the Operations Officer at the AP Facility directing that he, or his representative, be present at the STC during CORONA orbital ops and that he release certain operational information to the Program A representative. It is also understood that Secretary Vance would be notified by memorandum that you had given this cable directive to our representative at the AP.

2. It is our position that the Operations Officer is now present at the STC during all critical phases of the ops and does transmit operational information to Program A representative. Basically, no change is needed to the present modus operandi; the onus has always been on our representative to pass on to the Program A representative any payload information he requires to ensure the health of the AGENA vehicle is protected. Further, it is our belief that all that would be accomplished by this directive would be to give Program A a much sought-after "foot in the door" to control operations.

Declassified and Re...

In Accordance with E. O. 12958

on NOV 26 1997

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3. There are two other additional pertinent inputs which bear on this problem:

One is the fact that we simply do not possess enough personnel to comply fully (i. e., at all times) with this requirement. It is our belief that we would need at least three more technical/operational personnel (such as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to maintain the requested posture at the STC.

The second item we would wish to raise is that it should be [REDACTED] prerogative in the SOC to decide whether or not a satellite should be de-orbited regardless of the particular technical problem that is uncovered since [REDACTED] in this instance represents the Intelligence Community and its requirements. The evaluation of the impact of the technical problem and or its solution is accomplished by the Resident Opr. Officer supported by a small team of highly experienced, competent contract personnel. This is the input that must be paramount in any decision to de-orbit - - - our concern is that if all payload information is given Program A that a unilateral decision to de-orbit or take corrective action might be given by their representative.

4. If you agree with this general philosophy, attached is a letter which can be transmitted to Secretary Vance reiterating the stand outlined in Reference B.

ALBERT D. WHEELON

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