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# THE 1976 SELF STUDY



## PART III

# PROPOSED ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NRO STAFF

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Date ..... Initials .....

PREPARED BY  
SAFSS SELF STUDY GROUP  
18 MARCH 1976

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THE 1976 SAFSS SELF STUDY

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PART III  
THE PROPOSED ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS  
OF THE  
NRO STAFF

18 MARCH 1976

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Prepared by  
SAFSS SELF STUDY GROUP

*Working copy*

We trained hard...but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized...I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.

Petronius Arbiter, 210 B.C.

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Preliminary copies of all issues were distributed to the Study Group and the Staff between 12 and 15 March 1976. Substantial changes were made in the issues of Annexes B, K, L and N, and final copies of those were distributed at 0800 on 17 March 1976.

The Study Group Chairman translated the recommendations of PART II into the Staff structure contained in this part, PART III. The Study Group was given only a few hours to respond with comments to PART III itself, and the Staff Deputy Directors had no opportunity to comment on this part.

Even though the Staff and the Study Group had a few days to comment on the issues, I believe that at least one week should be allowed for further comment after PART II and PART III are distributed. These comments would then be added to those of Appendix I.

While a general consensus exists on the Study Group on the vast majority of issues, this is not true of the SS-4, SS-6 and SS-7 functions (PART II, Annex B) issue. In the brief period that was available for coordination, it was clear that the Study Group was split four to three against the total dissolution of SS-6 shown in this part. An acceptable group consensus would probably be to retain an independent analytical capability on the Staff, either as an in-house capability, or to be contracted for independent of the Program Offices.



DANIEL B. HUTCHISON  
Lt Col, USAF  
Chairman, SAFSS Self Study Group

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This is the last Part of the three-part report of the 1976 SAFSS Study Group, and incorporates the changes recommended in Part II, "ISSUES", to give an overall view of the result of those changes.

Throughout this part, changes from the current organization documented in Part I are marked with a vertical bar in the right-hand margin. Significant Staff or study group disagreement with the majority view represented in this Part are indicated by superscripts which refer to paragraphs in Appendix I which document dissenting comment. Each section of Appendix I is lettered to correspond with the Annex letters of Part II which contained the analysis of that specific issue, e.g. Appendix I, Section A contains the comments on the "SS-4 Operations Interface" issue paper, which was in Part II, Annex A. The basic section of Appendix I contains comments of a more general nature.

It should be emphasized that substantial changes are supported by issue papers in Part II, and that it is recognized in those papers that many of the proposed changes will take extensive preparation and coordination in and out of the Staff prior to successful implementation. The proposed organization is an objective for the most complete compliance with the management criteria of Part II, and cannot be implemented overnight.

This Part completes the 1976 Self Study effort. Because of the tight schedule, the Staff had only three or four days to digest Part II and did not see Part III before publication. It may be expected that more comments will be generated after a more thorough Staff review.

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1.0 THE CURRENT MISSION OF THE NRO

The NRO is responsible for the development, acquisition and operation of reconnaissance satellites for the United States Government, and for the processing and delivery of photographic materials to the Intelligence Community.

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2.0 THE CURRENT MISSION OF THE NRO STAFF

The NRO Staff provides Staff assistance and advice to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in the organization, development, and execution of the National Reconnaissance Program, and performs support functions for the NRO as directed by the DNRO.

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## 2.1 THE CURRENT FUNCTIONS OF THE NRO STAFF

### 2.1.1 Program Monitoring and Guidance

A. Provide the DNRO with descriptions of projects and project activity, insuring that he is immediately advised of significant changes in project status.]

B. Monitor the Program Directors' conduct of each project, providing guidance on project implementation in accordance with existing policy.

### 2.1.2 Budget and Programming

A. Develop top level launch and availability program schedules responsive to mission requirements in the light of technical and fiscal factors.

B. In coordination with the Comptroller, review each Program Director's budget and budget justification, and recommend action to the DNRO.

C. In coordination with the Comptroller, assist the DNRO in defining the recommended program, and prepare the Director's Report to the NRP ExCom.

D. In coordination with the Program Directors and the Comptroller, prepare Congressional budget justification.

E. Review proposed modifications to existing projects and new projects and recommend action to the DNRO.

### 2.1.3 Research and Development

A. Analyze mission requirements and systems' capabilities and new approaches proposed for development.

B. Monitor the Program Directors' conduct of R&D projects, including in-depth periodic review, and provide guidance within existing policy and recommendations for action to the DNRO.

C. Keep the Program Offices informed of R&D activity of possible utility.

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#### 2.1.4 Administration, Security and Communications

A. Provide Staff administrative and security services support to the DNRO.

B. Provide appropriate assistance to the Program Directors in those limited cases where higher headquarters intercession is required.

C. Provide, operate, and maintain the BYEMAN communications system.

#### 2.1.5 Policy and Procedures

A. Continually review the NRP environment and mission to develop recommended mission, security and management policy and organizational changes.

B. Assist the DNRO in establishing and maintaining streamlined management procedures.

C. Participate in the formulation and implementation of national and military space policy.

#### 2.1.6 Interfacing

A. Establish and maintain the NRO interface with the USIB.

B. Establish and maintain active interfaces with those elements of the Intelligence Community which use NRP products.

C. Establish and maintain active interfaces with Government agencies interacting with the NRP.

D. Maintain liaison with Services to develop new concepts and applications of existing NRP resources.

E. Maintain an active ARPA/JCS interface for development of concepts and applications.

F. Promote an active J2/J3 interface as the translator between user and developer to define and refine requirements.

G. Keep the Program Directors informed of Staff and Government action having actual or potential impact on their programs.

H. Provide timely feedback on the specific mission accomplishments of NRP projects to the DNRO, the Staff, and the Program Directors.

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I. Act for the Program Directors when required by the Governmental level, security, or physical proximity..

J. Chair the Configuration Change Board, which coordinates the photographic science research and development activities of the NRP.J

2.1.7 Operations

A. In coordination with elements of USIB and the Program Offices, develop policy and procedures for the passing of USIB guidance to NRP programs.<sup>a</sup>

B. Monitor logistics and depot support for the NRP.

C. Monitor airlift logistics support for the NRP.

D. In coordination with the Program Offices, develop operational strategies and employment policies which maximize the effectiveness of NRP resources in meeting intelligence requirements.<sup>a</sup>

E. Monitor the planning and execution of NRP missions for adherence to DNRO policy and USIB guidance.<sup>a</sup>

F. Provide a dedicated communications system for the NRP.

2.1.8 Evaluating

Evaluate for the DNRO the utility and value of NRP systems in meeting intelligence needs.<sup>a</sup>

2.1.9 Concepts, Applications and Analysis<sup>b</sup>

A. Develop advanced concepts for satellite intelligence collection and applications.

B. Conduct independent analyses for the DNRO and the Staff.

C. Develop and maintain the necessary analytical tools for studies and simulations.

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2.1.10 Planning<sup>b</sup>

A. Participate in the development, coordination, and interpretation of national level plans for intelligence collection, e.g., the National Imaging Plan for Satellites.

B. In consultation with the Comptroller and the Community, develop and maintain plans for the NRP.

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3.0 NRO STAFF ELEMENTS

This section provides the principal responsibilities, functions, and interfaces of each major element of the NRO Staff.

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### 3.1 SS-1 - DIRECTOR OF THE NRO STAFF

Assists the DNRO/DDNRO in discharging his responsibility for the direction, supervision, and control of the National Reconnaissance Program.

#### 3.1.1 Functions

##### 3.1.1.1 Planning

A. Organize, man, and supervise the NRO Staff.

B. In consultation with the NRO Comptroller, develop the DNRO's Recommended Program.

C. Maintain cognizance of all significant activity within the NRP and its external interfaces.

D. Maintain close liaison with the NRO Comptroller on all aspects of the NRP.

E. Formulate policy for DNRO implementation on matters impacting either the NRP or the NRO.

##### 3.1.1.2 Implementing

A. Act for the Program Directors when required.

B. Maintain an active interface with senior Government officials who have influence on the NRP.

C. With the NRO Comptroller, provide the Program Directors guidance which results in technically meaningful NRP program options.

D. Support the Director's Recommended Program before the ExCom, the Intelligence Community and other ExCom advisors.

##### 3.1.1.3 Evaluating

A. Measure the performance of the NRO Staff and take corrective action, when required.

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B. Review program briefings intended for presentation outside the NRO to insure support of the DNRO position.

C. Periodically review, with the DNRO and the NRO Comptroller, all NRP programs.

D. With the NRO Comptroller, recommend program actions to the DNRO.

3.1.1.4 Supporting

A. Provide support to the DNRO for statements or presentations to Congress.

B. Provide support to the DNRO in his meetings within the Intelligence Community.

C. Keep Program Directors informed of Intelligence Community and Congressional activities of immediate or potential impact.

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3.2 SS-2, EXECUTIVE

Provide executive and administrative support to the Director of the Staff, the DNRO, the DDNRO, and, on occasion, the Program Directors.

3.2.1 Functions

3.2.1.1 Executive Management

A. Provide the primary interface with the Air Force Secretariat in the areas of administration, supply, travel and civilian personnel.

B. Interact and coordinate with the Executive Offices in SAF and the Air Staff.

C. Assist the Staff Director in insuring that Staff actions are prioritized, timely, and appropriate.

D. Advise the Director of the Staff on military and civilian personnel, administrative and manpower policy.

3.2.1.2 Personnel Management

A. In coordination with all interfacing personnel offices and the Staff leadership, responsible for the identification, selection and assignment of personnel to the Staff and certain SAF Project Offices in the Central Control Group.

B. Oversee the administration of the Personnel Control List for the NRO.

C. In coordination with the Civilian Personnel Office in SAF/AAA, responsible for the selection and assignment of DAF civilians.

3.2.1.3 Administration

A. Manage the travel budget for the Staff and recommend reprogramming actions.

B. Provide administrative support to certain SAF Project Offices of the Central Control Group.

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C. Provide document control, message handling and classified waste destruction services to the Director of the Staff, the Staff, the Director, the Deputy Director, and the NRO Comptroller.

D. Assist Program A providing selected personnel and supply services.

E. Manage the Awards and Decorations support for the Staff Director and Director, Program A.

F. Organize and conduct ceremonies for the DNRO and Staff Director.

G. Arrange and coordinate maintenance and construction work on Staff offices and equipment.

H. Coordinate DDNRO, and Director of the Staff official visits with SS-5.

#### 3.2.1.4 Administrative Security

↘ A. Insure that staff administrative procedures and physical security practices are in accordance with established policy.

B. Arrange for back-ground investigations and adjudication associated with the assignment of personnel to the Staff and the Central Control Group.

C. Responsibility for action on matters relating to Staff physical security violations, compromises, or problems of a security nature affecting the Staff.

D. Act as the Staff internal security officer under AFR 205-1.

E. Manage Staff and Central Control Group access billets.

F. Maintain special access list maintenance.

G. Provide routine access certification of the Staff and incoming visitors.

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H. Act as SSO/TCO/BCO.

I. Provide routine telephonic access certification.

J. Maintain access lists for BYEMAN studies and projects.

K. Provide clearances on visitors.

✓ L. Responsible for KY 3 card change.

change. ✓ M. Responsible for cypher lock code

Security Police. ✓ N. Maintain alarm access list for USAF

maintenance. ✓ O. Obtain ADT alarm

records and changes. ✓ P. Responsible for safe combination

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### 3.3 SS-4, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR REQUIREMENTS, OPERATIONS, AND EVALUATION

Ensure that the operational employment of NRP systems optimizes satisfaction of validated requirements.<sup>a</sup> Analyze and assess new and long-range requirements for overhead collection activities, determining the impact on existing and proposed systems and developing plans for the NRO.<sup>b</sup> Formulate, test, and evaluate new applications of NRP systems in support of current and potential users.<sup>b</sup> Evaluate the effectiveness of NRP systems in meeting requirements.<sup>h, i</sup>

#### 3.3.1 Functions

##### 3.3.1.1 Current Requirements and Operations Policy

A. Represent the NRO on the appropriate USIB Committees (COMIREX and SIGINT) and subcommittees (ICRS, SORS and EXSUBCOM) and associated ad hoc working groups.

B. Define collection capabilities to the requirements community based on technical data provided by the Program Offices.

C. Develop, with the program directors, collection concepts, policies and strategies which optimize requirements satisfaction.

D. Participate with the Community in the development and interpretation of collection requirements and criteria.

E. Develop, in conjunction with the system program directors, system launch schedules that are consistent with requirements and with allocated resources.

F. Develop and maintain means of coordinating and disseminating time-phased events and critical data flow.

##### 3.3.1.2 New Requirements and Applications <sup>a, b</sup>

A. Act as the NRO Staff focal point for operational methods and applications directed toward optimizing satisfaction of USIB requirements.

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B. Provide recommendations pertaining to potential expansion of the application/utilization of available systems.

C. Advise the Director and Staff of any change in requirements or methods of utilization that could impact upon existing or planned systems.

D. Participate with the military departments in developing concepts for the potential application of overhead earth sensing to their needs. This includes the support of military field exercises designed to test concept feasibility.

### 3.3.1.3 Operations Monitoring

A. Maintain cognizance of Program response to tasking to insure compliance with approved policy and procedures.

B. Provide the DNRO and the Staff with timely reports on operational system status.

### 3.3.1.4 Evaluation and Analysis

A. Develop and apply methods for the evaluation of NRP program's effectiveness in terms of validated requirements.

B. Analyze and assess new and long-range needs for intelligence collection for which the NRO is responsible.

C. Develop long-range plans and support system mix studies to aid management decisions related to optimizing the use of available NRP resources against requirements.

D. Define and/or coordinate collection analyses performed by the NRO Program Offices.

E. Participate in Community-sponsored studies as required.

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### 3.4 SS-5; DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR DOD AND INTERAGENCY POLICY

Act as the general policy focal point within the NRO Staff for all organization and management matters and as the non-technical interface with the Intelligence Community, contractors, the Congress and other Government agencies. Provide Staff supervision of the BYEMAN communications system. Includes the principal security advisor to the DNRO and Staff Director, insuring implementation of the NRP security policy established by the Director of Central Intelligence, who for all other functions, reports to SS-5.

#### 3.4.1 Functions

##### 3.4.1.1 National Policy

A. Formulate and implement military and national space policy including organizational and security policy for the DNRO.

B. Establish and provide the focal point for NRP vulnerability policy.

C. Maintain liaison with SALT and MBFR task forces.

D. Provide DNRO policy representation on interagency panels, working groups and committees.

E. Provide Executive Secretariat support and security advice to the Satellite Contingency Planning Group.

##### 3.4.1.2 Policy Support to the NRO

A. Provide the focal point on policy matters related to the NRP transition to the Space Shuttle.

B. Provide the principal interface with Congress for the DNRO for NRP programming and policy matters.

C. Supervise the special communications network of the 1814 Comm Squadron (AFCS).

D. Responsible for all public information matters of concern to the DNRO.

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E. Manage industrial priority allocations and act as a focal point for NRO procurement policy.

F. Coordinate and approve all visits of senior non-NRO personnel to NRP program offices, facilities and contractors.

G. Prepare the annual NRP input to the DCI's report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

H. Review justification for all new automated data processing equipment proposed for the NRP, and obtain necessary approval.

I. Prepare and coordinate Memoranda of Agreement for the DNRO's signature.

J. Responsible for the preparation and maintenance of the NRO history.

K. Prepare and coordinate the NRP Contingency Plan.

L. Responsible for NRO input to DDR&E on UN Space Registration.

M. Perform security review of DOD and other space-related documents as required.

#### 3.4.1.3 Logistics and Airlift<sup>h,i</sup>

A. Exercise Staff surveillance over the NRO covert depot activities which provide special logistics support.

B. Coordinate test bed aircraft (SR-71, U-2, etc.,) support for special exercises and tests.

C. Provide airlift support management for the NRP.

#### 3.4.1.4 NRP Security Policy

A. Recommend security policy to the Special Security Center/CIA and prescribe security requirements and provide central staff supervision of the overall NRP security program.

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B. Effect security coordination and liaison with Government agencies outside the NRP as required..

C. Provide control of serious incident reports and assist in arranging and controlling required investigative support.

D. Review news media security breaches affecting the NRP and initiate appropriate action.

E. Provide special security support for the documentation of NRP testimony for Congress.

F. Represent the DNRO at interagency meetings on security policy.

G. Monitor NRP programs and other activities to insure compliance with approved policy.

#### 3.4.1.5 Routine Security Support

A. Review documentation and determine classification and compartmentation requirements.

B. Provide supervision of special security support for offices not under Program Office supervision.

C. Provide routine security services to the NRO Staff, Program Offices, and contractors in the areas of indoctrinations, and introductions.

D. Adjudicate BYEMAN access requests.

E. Provide badging services for the NRO Staff.

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### 3.5 SS-7, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PROGRAMS

Plan, develop, monitor and guide the program content of the NRP within DNRO policy. As principal deputy, act for the Staff Director in his absence.

#### 3.5.1 Functions

##### 3.5.1.1 Program Development

A. Insure that system capabilities, including launch schedules, are compatible with published requirements or that acceptable tradeoffs are achieved.

B. Coordinate and recommend NRO action on proposed changes to systems or programs.

C. Translate USIB requirements into preferred options or proposals for systems.

D. In coordination with the NRO Comptroller, prepare and analyze issues, tradeoffs, priority conflicts, and management approaches to develop options and supporting data for the DNRO's recommended program.

E. In coordination with the NRO Comptroller, prepare the Director's Report and Director's Recommended Program for DNRO approval. Publish these documents.

F. Provide liaison with other staffs on programmatic matters.

##### 3.5.1.2 Program Monitoring and Guidance

A. Provide descriptions of projects and reports of project activity for the DNRO, insuring that he is immediately advised of significant changes in project status.

B. Monitor the Program Director's conduct of each project, providing guidance on project implementation.

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~~TOP SECRET~~3.5.1.3 Technical Support<sup>b</sup>

A. Provide technical information, analyses, guidance and advice as appropriate to the DNRO, DDNRO, and all Staff elements.<sup>b</sup>

B. Provide the Staff point-of-contact for technical information on the NRP for outside agencies.

C. Provide NRO technical representation on interagency panels, working groups and committees.

3.5.1.4 Program Support<sup>j</sup>

A. Monitor and guide the program support provided the NRO by outside agencies for space launch vehicle systems, ground support systems, and the Air Force Satellite Control Facility.

B. Monitor the Program Offices' management of film procurement, processing, production and associated research and development.

C. Chair the Configuration Change Board (CCB) and represent the NRO Staff on COMIREX's Exploitation R&D Subcommittee (EXRAND).

3.5.1.5 Budget

A. Review each Program Director's budget and budget justification and recommend action to the DNRO in coordination with the NRO Comptroller.

B. In coordination with the Program Directors and the NRO Comptroller, prepare Congressional budget justification.

3.5.1.6 Advanced Technology and Research and Development<sup>b</sup>

A. Serve as the NRO focal point for advanced technology and research and development.

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B. Monitor the progress of advanced technology and R&D programs.

C. Provide program guidance, coordinate and issue program approvals, and recommend priorities.

D. Analyze new R&D programs to determine need, technical feasibility, and cost effectiveness


E. Identify potential technological applications that resolve operational deficiencies and provide guidance to the Program Directors for development. <sup>b</sup>

F. Explore and evaluate potential system concepts and new operational methods that might satisfy existing or changing requirements. <sup>b</sup>


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### THE NRO STAFF



SS-1  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



# SS-2 EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR  
NRO STAFF

EXECUTIVE OFFICER  
MAJOR T. S. MOORMAN, USAF  
PROVIDE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINIS-  
TRATIVE SUPPORT TO THE  
DIRECTOR OF THE STAFF, THE  
DNRO, THE DDNRO, AND, ON  
OCCASION, THE PROGRAM  
DIRECTORS

ILLUSTRATOR  
GS-12

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER  
MAJOR, USAF  
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISOR  
MSGT, USAF

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT  
GS-8

NCOIC  
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION  
TSGT R. RANDALL


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PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT  
SSGT J. SEIBEL

NCOIC  
DOCUMENT STORAGE  
AND RETRIEVAL  
SSGT P. WILLIAMS


NCOIC  
BYEMAN DOCUMENTATION  
BRANCH  
TSGT M. MILLER

NCOIC  
MAIL AND MESSAGE  
DISTRIBUTION BRANCH  
TSGT T. GARRETT


# SS-4 DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR REQUIREMENTS, OPERATIONS AND EVALUATION



# SS-5 DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR DOD AND INTERAGENCY POLICY



# SS-7 DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PROGRAMS



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This Annex summarizes the significant management and policy recommendations contained in the Annexes of Part II which are not apparent in the proposed functional statements and organization charts in Part III. The appropriate Annex in Part II which contains the supporting discussion for each recommendation is indicated in parentheses after each recommendation.

1. The following Staff functions, currently accomplished in SS-4, should be deleted or transferred to the appropriate Program Office:

- a. Detailed Mission Planning.
- b. Daily interfacing with ICRS to develop detailed mission guidance, passing on detailed mission guidance.
- c. Maintaining collection data bases.
- d. Generating routine collection reports.

The following functions should be emphasized for SS-4:

- a. Maintaining cognizance of program response to tasking to ensure compliance with approved policy and procedures.
- b. Developing and applying methods for the evaluation of NRP systems' effectiveness in terms of validated requirements (Annex A).

2. Improve internal Staff communications, coordination and understanding of proper and appropriate staff action (Annexes B, C, F, N, and O).

3. Consolidate the Staff into one central location in the vicinity of 4C1000 (Annexes F and O).

4. Support requirements for selected segments of the Central Control Group should be transferred to the appropriate Program Office (Annex K).

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5. The Staff Executive office should be physically located adjacent to the Staff Director's office (Annexes O, F, and N).

6. The policy of wearing the Air Force uniform should be re-evaluated (Annex L).

7. A separate manpower study group should review the manning criteria, position descriptions, and Army-Navy personnel policies and recommend to the Director of the Staff a plan to further diversify NRO Staff manning (Annex L).

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THE NRO STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR LT COL HUTCHISON, SAFSS-7

SUBJECT: Self-Study Briefing for Brig Gen Shields

The fact that the Delphi technique has not been adhered to because of the short time allowed to complete the study should be mentioned to General Shields. It appears obvious from recent events that a recommendation to General Shields should be that the Delphi technique be continued, particularly in those areas where so much diversity of opinion exists.

/s/

J. D. HARDEN  
CDR, USN

*page 35 of 71*

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THE NRO STAFF

## MEMORANDUM FOR SAFSS SELF STUDY GROUP

SUBJECT: SAFSS Self Study Issues and Conclusions

I do not concur in one of the issues as it appears in the Part II of the Self Study Report and I do not support some of the conclusions given in Part III of the Report. The specific areas to which I object and my reasons are as follows:

GENERAL

The data-gathering process during which the Study Group interviewed the numerous people on the Staff, within the NRO and associated with the NRP, provided the group with a very substantial and significant data base. The problem is that the time to complete the study was so drastically curtailed that an objective and complete conclusion of the study was not possible. Feedback to those contacted by the Study Group was incomplete and hardly any time was made available for one to even read the report, much less digest the information and comment intelligently. This is a complete waste of the experience of the various Staff members as it could apply to any restructuring of the Staff.

Some of the issues in Part II received inadequate attention and discussion by the Study Group members. There was even one issue which was radically changed at the last minute, with no discussion within the Study Group, and no opportunity to comment and coordinate before Part II was published. Again, opportunity for the NRO Staff Deputy Directors to review and comment was almost nonexistent.

The radical change to the Staff structure as shown in Part III was not consistent with discussions during Study Group meetings. Again, the time allocated to review this section and comment was completely inadequate.

PART II

I object to the last minute change to the issue on SS-4, SS-6 and SS-7 roles (Annex B). The conclusion drawn in the

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draft of the issue circulated for comment was based on a thorough discussion of the situation and the various options possible. The Discussion, Conclusion and Recommendation sections of the draft were acceptable to this Study Group member and are attached. I strongly support these conclusions and I heartily endorse the portion of the recommendation which suggested additional study of this issue.

PART III

I object to the conclusion drawn regarding the dissolution of SS-6 with transfer of SS-6 functions to SS-4 and SS-7. This conclusion was hurriedly drawn by a very definite minority of the Study Group with negligible consultation given to the remaining members of the Study Group or the Staff Deputy Directors. If any conclusion at all is drawn on this issue, it should be that these SS-4, SS-6, SS-7 functions remain as they currently are with a mandate to commission a study as soon as possible to reexamine the issue. I believe that this Staff needs an independent and objective study and analysis capability which is free of the requirements/operational bias of SS-4 and the program advocacy of SS-7. This issue needs more study.

I do not concur with the assignment of the Logistics and Air Operations support functions to SS-5 without the addition of one manpower slot. The additional workload would be too great for the present manpower in SS-5.

I believe that following the transition period during which General Shields becomes familiar with the Staff functions, the Study Group should be recommissioned to complete the study beginning with the circulation for comment of the Part I and Part II to the Deputy Directors and key persons outside the Staff. Following digestion and analysis of the comments, a logical and more acceptable restructuring of the Staff can be made if necessary.

*Keith S. Peyton*  
KEITH S. PEYTON  
Major, USAF

1 Attachment  
PART II Discussion,  
Conclusion, Recommendation  
Sections

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THE NRO STAFF

16 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC HUTCHISON, SS-7

SUBJECT: Comments to be Included in Self Study Briefing  
to the Staff Director

Without waiving the right to make comments about specific line items at some appropriate time, I would like to be very general at present.

The Self Study overemphasizes developing a "pure staff". Our Staff should perform those functions that are logical to perform even though these same functions are not normal Staff functions. The NRP was never intended to be a "normal organization", and has been resisting normalization for years. It appears inconsistent to establish this as an important goal for our internal structure and functions.

Perhaps the most dangerous results of removing the Staff from direct "in line" involvement in the execution of the NRP is that we would become increasingly unknowledgeable to the extent that we could not properly support the DNRO but would need to constantly go to a third party for information and support. To understand and influence events one must get involved directly. We could isolate ourselves to the point of being very ineffective.

The entire NRP is a service organization. While the prime duty of the Staff is to support the DNRO, one of the ways we can support him best is by providing necessary and logical services for both the system Program Offices and the Intelligence Community. Some of the functions we now do were never designed to be normal Staff functions. This does not bother me as long as it is functional and logical.

I must correct one misconception in the first paragraph of 2.2.3 of Part II. It is true that the imagery intelligence community requirements are coordinated prior to formal presentation to the NRO; however, this occurs after much reiteration with SS-4. The management of the NRO resources in satisfying the imagery requirements is a dynamic day-to-day operational function which is the direct response of the DNRO.

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I would also disagree with the transfer of the logistical functions and the operational support functions to SS-5, simply because this appears to be a change just for change sake. During General Kulpa's tenure where these functions should be placed got considerable attention. While it is certainly true that there was no clear-cut location for logistics on the Staff, it was very logical to place operational support in SS-4. The two functions are interleaved and it was felt that they should be kept together for mutual management support. SS-4 has developed the necessary external contacts and management relationships that would have to be re-established by SS-5. All of the alternatives suggested in the Self Study for these sections can be carried out in SS-4 without going through a dual Staff transfer to SS-5 and then carrying out one of the alternatives.



CHARLES L. MURPHY  
Deputy Director for  
Operations

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
THE NRO STAFF

15 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR LT COLONEL HUTCHISON, CHAIRMAN 1976 SELF STUDY

SUBJECT: General Comment on the Self Study

The attached two papers are my general comment on the Study as a whole and a short paper on 4/6/7 organizational concept for inclusion in the Study per your 12 March 1976 memo to the Staff. I do not mind your attributing these comments to me; I think the general comment should be attributed to a group member. I do not believe that specific line-in, line-out comments would be particularly useful at this point.



JOHN E. ANDERSON  
Major, US Army  
~~SS 4~~ Member

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I have one basic reservation with respect to the Group's general and specific findings. I believe that the majority of the Group was overly concerned with the self-perceived need to create a "pure" Staff. In the stampede to cleanse the Staff, two prime items were overlooked or given only cursory consideration.

First, the NRO is a service organization. We would not exist if it were not for the NRO's end product -- a few frames of film or an intercepted signal. No matter how we state the NRO's mission, it boils down to providing scraps of film and "green worms" as a service to the Intelligence Community and other consumers. Succinctly stated the Staff's mission is to help the DNRO as he serves the customer.

Second, somewhere in the antiquity of our birth, a founding principle must have been efficiency. With justifiable pride I have heard many of us, including myself, brief the efficiency of the NRP and of the NRO structure -- the audience listens in awe; compared to most other Government organizations, the NRO is the pinnacle of efficiency.

I have little criticism of the criteria stated in Part II of the Self Study; the criteria are basically sound, if somewhat bureaucratic. It is the very strict interpretation sought by the adherents to the "pure" Staff concept that portends disaster. The organization resulting from this interpretation could and probably will provide less service to the customer; it will certainly confuse the Community. It is apparently inherently legal for the Staff to screen Program Office inputs and present a concise, objective statement to the DNRO. The NRO customer expects (and has been provided) the same service, he needs more!

The customer is not an expert in technical areas, he needs someone readily available to interpret and condense technical details, iterate requirements, capabilities and optimization for several systems, etc.; he needs a high level (Staff) interface. He periodically finds Program Office level detail interesting, but has no desire to bog down in the minutiae available at the Program Office. Throughout the Self Study, there is a lack of understanding and recognition of the unique service the DNRO and the Staff provide to the customer. Amazingly, several of the individual issue papers blatantly admit that the recommended organization or functional change is less efficient or cost effective than another alternative.

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Through some 15 years of changing environment, the NRO has withstood a variety of attacks from hungry bureaucrats and remained substantially intact. There are probably many reasons, but I suspect that the excellence of our service and our efficiency are prime factors in keeping the wolves at bay. In their considerations of the Self Study and its possible implementation, the Staff Director, DDNRO and DNRO should be fully aware of the Group's overwhelming bias toward purity and its lack of concern for customer service and efficiency. If we disregard these key factors, the NRO is in serious jeopardy.

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16 March 1976

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CHARLES L. MURPHY  
Deputy Director for  
Operations

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THE NRO STAFF

17 March 1976

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Self-Study Group Issues

ISSUE: SS-4 Operations Interface

The conclusion that SIGINT system functions cannot be transferred to the program offices is based on the assumption that the SIGINT community mechanism is not well enough structured (as compared to the COMIREX operations). I believe an appropriate conclusion would be to recommend transfer of the SIGINT system responsibilities in phase with SORS development of capabilities similar to ICRS. The only reason it can't be done at this time is because we keep offering ourselves as a crutch to the SIGINT committee mechanism.

I note the absence of conclusions and recommendations essential to bring the image of SS-4 in line with the expressed desires of the DNRO. Specifically, in paragraph 4(b) the statement is made that "SAFSS-4 is known in the community and the NRO charter as the Satellite Operations Center." First, they are not known as the Satellite Operations Center in the proposed new charter, and, secondly, the DNRO has stated that he does not desire a Satellite Operations Center--that operations are the responsibilities of the individual mission ground stations. I have recommended to the Self-Study Group before and state again that one of the principal problems of SS-4 from an "image" standpoint--with both our program offices and the DNRO--are the terms "SOC" and "WAHOO." I recommend immediate termination of those terms and the elimination of the "WAHOO" communications slug. It would be to SS-4's benefit to operate as an element of the Staff and coordinate both its message traffic and correspondence with the Director of the Staff rather than attempting to operate in a role that had its purpose in 1965 but is ill-suited to the current environment.

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ISSUES: Logistics Management and Aircraft Operations

The conclusions in both of these Issues state that if there is no pressing need to reduce or realign Staff manning or Staff profile a "status quo" approach should be taken and that evolution will cause a change in posture. I am of the opinion that status quo never results in a change and that a more appropriate recommendation in both cases is to transfer the line responsibility to a line organization; that is, put these functions in the program offices where they belong. For example, [redacted] has successfully handled aircraft support for Program A for years without NRO Staff interference or help. I see no reason why Program B cannot do the same.

ROBERT A. ROSENBERG  
Colonel, USAF  
Acting Director

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
THE NRO STAFF

15 March 1976

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JOHN E. ANDERSON

Major, US Army

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
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SUBJECT: A Simplistic Organizational Concept

In assisting the NRO in the development, acquisition and operation of reconnaissance satellites, SS-4, 6 and 7 perform, or should perform, five basic functions. Requirements are the basis for development of Concepts, building Program hardware, and ultimately on-orbit Operations; these areas require Evaluation. In a simplified flow chart, the process is as follows:



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(Several of the arrows should be double ended representing iteration. The user to requirements flow is currently an iterative process which includes evaluation of NRO resources capability against tentative requirements. The user of course, evaluates the product and feeds back requirements. If a new concept uses existing systems, it is possible to go from concept to operations without involving program, etc.).

There is nothing unique about this flow diagram. The process occurs in many government and industrial organizations (the Army's Combat Development Command was highly structured along this line). What is unique is the Staff's approach: We time-phase, divide between approved (validated) and non-approved (unvalidated) requirements, break concepts up into applications, etc. The resulting duplication of effort, doubling up of expertise and confusion is often viewed as a system of checks and balances. It is not, it is a source of continuing problems. The above flow chart has a built-in self checking system, any three functions form an evaluation loop, e.g., does the concept (program or operation) fulfill the requirement, if not, iterate or go back to the user, if yes, continue.

An organization based on this flow ideally has five independent units integrated by the flow itself. There are numerous sound arguments in favor of separate elements; the resounding disadvantage is high overhead - too many chiefs. Combining requirements and evaluation, leaving four organizational elements is a logical step. Going one step further to include concepts is probably dangerous, the disadvantages of incest build up as a check loop is lost; In the case of the NRO Staff combining the program and operations (less requirements) elements may have merit. Currently both elements are concerned (in varying degrees) with system status, capabilities, engineering, etc.

Thus, one can envision an NRO Staff organization (in this area) of three elements: requirements and evaluation, concepts (long range, short range, etc.), and program/technology (including all R&D) Ops.

This simple paper is not intended to solve the myriad problems existent in the current SS-4/6/7 relationship, only provoke thought on these problems in a functionally structured frame.

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

## MEMORANDUM FOR SAFSS SELF STUDY GROUP

SUBJECT: SAFSS Self Study Issues and Conclusions

I do not concur in one of the issues as it appears in the Part II of the Self Study Report and I do not support some of the conclusions given in Part III of the Report. The specific areas to which I object and my reasons are as follows:

GENERAL

The data-gathering process during which the Study Group interviewed the numerous people on the Staff, within the NRO and associated with the NRP, provided the group with a very substantial and significant data base. The problem is that the time to complete the study was so drastically curtailed that an objective and complete conclusion of the study was not possible. Feedback to those contacted by the Study Group was incomplete and hardly any time was made available for one to even read the report, much less digest the information and comment intelligently. This is a complete waste of the experience of the various Staff members as it could apply to any restructuring of the Staff.

Some of the issues in Part II received inadequate attention and discussion by the Study Group members. There was even one issue which was radically changed at the last minute, with no discussion within the Study Group, and no opportunity to comment and coordinate before Part II was published. Again, opportunity for the NRO Staff Deputy Directors to review and comment was almost nonexistent.

The radical change to the Staff structure as shown in Part III was not consistent with discussions during Study Group meetings. Again, the time allocated to review this section and comment was completely inadequate.

PART II

I object to the last minute change to the issue on SS-4, SS-6 and SS-7 roles (Annex B). The conclusion drawn in the

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draft of the issue circulated for comment was based on a thorough discussion of the situation and the various options possible. The Discussion, Conclusion and Recommendation sections of the draft were acceptable to this Study Group member and are attached. I strongly support these conclusions and I heartily endorse the portion of the recommendation which suggested additional study of this issue.

### PART III

I object to the conclusion drawn regarding the dissolution of SS-6 with transfer of SS-6 functions to SS-4 and SS-7. This conclusion was hurriedly drawn by a very definite minority of the Study Group with negligible consultation given to the remaining members of the Study Group or the Staff Deputy Directors. If any conclusion at all is drawn on this issue, it should be that these SS-4, SS-6, SS-7 functions remain as they currently are with a mandate to commission a study as soon as possible to reexamine the issue. I believe that this Staff needs an independent and objective study and analysis capability which is free of the requirements/operational bias of SS-4 and the program advocacy of SS-7. This issue needs more study.

I do not concur with the assignment of the Logistics and Air Operations support functions to SS-5 without the addition of one manpower slot. The additional workload would be too great for the present manpower in SS-5.

I believe that following the transition period during which General Shields becomes familiar with the Staff functions, the Study Group should be recommissioned to complete the study beginning with the circulation for comment of the Part I and Part II to the Deputy Directors and key persons outside the Staff. Following digestion and analysis of the comments, a logical and more acceptable restructuring of the Staff can be made if necessary.

*Keith S. Peyton*  
KEITH S. PEYTON  
Major, USAF

1 Attachment  
PART II Discussion,  
Conclusion, Recommendation  
Sections

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DISCUSSION:

There are many ways to break up the requirements, planning, programming, R&D and analysis functions into elements of manageable size. The staff is currently organized in a time-phased manner with anomalies and grey areas between staff sections that need clarification.

The Deputy Director for Operations, SS-4, is unquestionably the current operations element of the staff, while near-term planning is shared with SS-7, and long-term planning is shared with SS-6 and SS-7. The anomaly in time-phased responsibilities stems from the fact that SS-4 is the interface with the USIB structure for requirements (current, near term, and long term). There are members of the staff who believe that SS-6 should be alternate NRO representatives on the USIB Committees and others who feel that SS-4 should represent the NRO only on ICRS and SORS with SS-7 as primary on the COMIREX and SIGINT Committees. The current single voice toward USIB approach prevents misunderstandings in continuity and content of information. It does cause internal coordination and information flow problems but these are kept internal to the organization rather than causing confusion in the outside world.

The Deputy Director for Programs, SS-7, is the staff element responsible for the programmatic aspects of the NRP, which gives him current, near-term and long-term (up to 5-10 years) activities in all of the functions under discussion. The anomaly in the time-phased approach in this section is the arena for non-program specific R&D. Some members of the staff feel that this type of R&D activity should be placed under SS-6 purview. This would keep the long-term planning and analytic function cognizant of the technology that is potentially available in the out years. The disadvantage of moving the R&D function to SS-6 is that it moves SS-6 more into the programmatic arena, creating a more complicated interface with the Comptroller in the preparation of the Director's Recommended Program. Another disadvantage of this approach to R&D is

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that it separates the R&D effort from the program monitors from day-to-day interface with the R&D monitor. This could tend to allow non-productive R&D. That is, more R&D without direct or immediate payoff would tend to occur without program control. Another argument against moving R&D to SS-6 is that cross-fertilization from an SS-7 R&D monitor to SS-6 concepts and analytic personnel would be less difficult than from an SS-6 R&D monitor to SS-7 program monitors. Cross-fertilization is highly dependent on the personalities involved, their common experience and expertise as well as the organizational biases that naturally develop when functions having a similar nature are divided between staff sections.

The Deputy Director for Concepts and Applications, SS-6, is responsible for assisting potential users of satellite reconnaissance information in developing applications or deriving new concepts for programs. These are then presented to the formal requirements mechanism by the information consumers involved. This process means that SS-6 normally works in the long term (5-15 years in the future). SS-6 also works in the current operations environment to test future concepts using today's systems and in the near-term environment through the analysis function by determining new applications for current capabilities or participating in both internal and external studies which result in modified near-term plans.

There are organization schemes other than time-phasing which are possible. Functional schemes which draw hard lines between staff sections could be implemented (i.e., all studies done in SS-6 period) or a split along intelligence functions (technical, operational) could be devised or a split along programmatic lines (imagery, SIGINT). An attractive concept is to create a staff section for imaging programs and a staff section for SIGINT programs and give these two deputy directors full responsibility for all staff functions in their respective areas. This has several disadvantages; however, the most serious of which is that the programmatic aspects never come together, except at SS-1. This forces SS-1 to be the programmatic interface as well as the political interface with the community. If a more vertical organization were formed so that the Deputy Director for Programs had under him two sections; one for imaging and one for SIGINT systems and that each performed all staff functions for their respective area, then such an organization could function.

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
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This has the potential, however, of putting the other staff sections into a support role of the Deputy Director for Programs.

Another organization scheme which is not quite as much of a change from what currently exists would be to have SS-4 be the total needs/requirements/applications organization and SS-7 be the total concepts/R&D/analysis/programmatic organization; thus eliminating SS-6. This has an advantage in that the sections with the responsibility for making things happen have the responsibility for determining what should happen. This, however, is a double edged sword in that future thinking is influenced heavily by current programs. It could be more advantageous in the long run to maintain a separate organization which, through independent innovative action, fleshes out new concepts through analysis. Some good concepts would never otherwise be considered seriously.

No matter how the staff is organized, the actions from the time a need is identified until a system satisfies that need can be depicted as follows:



However, since most people tend to think in time-phased terms, that feature should continue to be reflected in the staff organization. The charters of SS-4, SS-6 and SS-7 are ambiguous enough that considerable conflict exists as to where one section drops responsibility and another accepts responsibility in certain areas. For example in planning, the National Imagery Plan for Satellites (NIPS) is generally accepted as a long-term planning document and hence under the purview of SS-6. The staff focal point on the National SIGINT Plan, however, is SS-7 even though it is a companion document to the NIPS.

One of the issues raised during the self study related to whether an analysis function should exist on the staff

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or not. Some of the people interviewed by the study group indicated that the existence of an in-house analysis capability is not necessary and should be eliminated. Others advocate that an independent of the program office analysis capability is essential to a well managed NRP. The consensus of the study group seems to be that an analysis group is required to perform independent checks on the program office analytic actions and to conduct studies directed by the DNRO which may be inappropriate for a program office. It was agreed, however, that the detailed analytic tasks should be performed by the program offices or contractors and monitored by the staff rather than create and maintain an extensive analytic capability on the staff.

The remaining point of contention is the non-program specific R&D function currently performed by SS-7 which some people believe is better placed in SS-6. The R&D program is monitored by two individuals who spend a large share of their time working such things as satellite vulnerability and IR&DC study tasks. The results of these efforts are not always visible to SS-6 for advanced concept planning and in the same way, the SS-7 R&D monitors are excluded from the display technology and data correlation efforts being studied by the ARPA and SS-6. The benefits of closer ties between these functions can be found in improved long-range planning and realistic concept developments.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The USIB Committee representation should be from a single staff section to facilitate a common approach to requirements and information flow between the NRO and the USIB structure.
2. The new applications for current systems function should move to current operations.
3. The new concepts function must be aware of current system capabilities and work closely with current operations to develop feasibility demonstrations of new concepts when possible.
4. The concepts function needs to be aware of the "state of the art" in many technology areas and take the lead in devising techniques for application of new technologies which enhance NRO mission satisfaction.

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4. With three deputy directors, one each for Operations, Programs, and Concepts/Analysis, the director of the staff necessarily will devote more time to adjudicating differences of opinion than if only two were necessary. The purest organization from the point of objectivity, however, is to organize with an independent concepts and analysis organization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Concentrate the USIB Committee representation, including primary and alternate representatives, in SS-4.

2. Move the non-program specific R&D program to SS-6, provided a photo-scientist and a SIGINT specialist are assigned to administer the program and monitor related program office activities.

3. Explicitly assign the responsibility for devising new applications for existing systems to SS-4.

4. Retain the responsibility for new concepts development in SS-6.

5. Split the responsibilities between SS-4, SS-6 and SS-7 as follows:

SS-4

USIB Requirements

Current System Capabilities Articulation

Requirements Satisfaction Evaluation

Establishing Operations Structure

New Applications for Existing Systems

SS-6

Independent Analysis

Advanced Concepts Development

Non-Program Specific R&D

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SS-7

Program Development Monitoring

On-Orbit Failure Analysis

Program Changes

New Systems for New or Unfulfilled Requirements

6. Adopt the attached sets of function statements for SS-4, SS-6 and SS-7.

7. Since some considerable sentiment existed on the study group to eliminate SS-6 by splitting the functions between SS-4 and SS-7, this should be studied further as a separate matter.

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THE NRO STAFF

17 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR LT COLONEL HUTCHISON

SUBJECT: Input for the Self Study, Part III

Both the original issue paper on the relative roles of SS-4, SS-6 and SS-7 and subsequent iterations of the issue failed to recognize and capitalize on the organizational wisdom of the immediate predecessor to the current Staff Director who created the present SS-6 organization and charter. This was not mentioned in either paper nor apparently was any attempt made to determine the underlying motivation for the present organization.

The motivation for the change, which brought the Analysis Branch out of SS-4 along with advanced concepts and applications and provided an independent Deputy Directorate, was due to the inability of the earlier organizational arrangement to provide the atmosphere which permitted:

1. The NRO to investigate the application of NRP resources to tactical needs. This was not then being addressed by COMIREX.
2. The analytical capability to be better applied in response to a broader class of problems than could be addressed with the fragmented analytical capability which then existed.
3. Advanced planning beyond the next Director's report or mission.

Inherent in the situation at that time was the inability of the NRO to obtain the 5-year guidance from the COMIREX and the sheer frustration of the manner in which the KENNEN operational interface was being defined.

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A critical review of the documentation associated with the establishment of SS-6 will allow insight into the former Staff Director's reasons and intentions.



ROBERT J. PROCHKO  
Lt Colonel, USAF

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The discussion of the "SS-4/SS-6/SS-7 Issue" reflects a total lack of appreciation, by certain members of the Self Study Group, of the basic principles of proper staff actions. They lack the appreciation of the role of staff coordination and supportive interaction between staff elements. More important, however, is that this reflects a lack of confidence in the Deputy Directors and their ability to insure proper staff action by their sections. This is probably the most serious finding within this report.

  
JAMES R. BLANKENSHIP  
Colonel, USAF

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

16 March 1976

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Self-Study Report

ISSUE: How Should NRO Representation on Community Studies Be Determined?

I feel that this issue has been inadequately treated and does not take into account all significant factors. For example, regardless of the qualification and availability, a PEM should never be put in charge of a study that requires him to justify or negate the system(s) he is responsible for. The results will obviously be biased. Further, his actions with the program offices which he supports could be rendered ineffective, drying up a valuable source of informal Staff information essential to supporting the DNRO.

Regarding qualification and availability, I assume that all members of this Staff are highly competent, capable individuals and should be qualified from a management point of view to provide Staff representation and leadership on community studies, drawing when necessary the needed technical depth from other elements of the Staff.

Finally, with regard to the desire to maintain a small Staff, I see no reason why external analytical capability to support these studies should not be contracted directly for the Staff, i.e., similar to the Air Staff's Rand/Anser support.

My recommendation would be that the OPR for near-term requirements studies should be SS-4; near-term technical studies on a particular system should be SS-7, and long-term feasibility, conceptual, and trade-off studies amongst systems should be SS-6.

ISSUE: Present Mechanism for Maintaining Leadership, Management, and Continuity in the Absence of the Staff Director Satisfactorily to Meet the Needs of the DNRO, DDNRO, and the Staff

Regarding this issue, certain factors, I believe, are erroneous. First, I do not believe the majority of DNRO questions pertain to programmatic matters. My observations, having served as the Acting Director over 35 percent of the time this past year and one-half, are that policy issues are as paramount with the DNRO as programmatic matters. Running a very close second are where is the NRO going and our operational interfaces, both important issues from SS-6 and SS-4 viewpoints. Finally, the problems of BYEMAN security, decompartmentation (SS-3), and well-tuned administrative support (SS-2) are of key concern to SS-1 in serving the needs of the DNRO. If I had to quantify the preceding, it would be as follows:

SS-2	10%
SS-3	5%
SS-4	15%
SS-5	25%
SS-6	15%
SS-7	30%

SS-7 has not always progressed to SS-1. With regard to the statement "It would be highly unlikely for an SS junior in rank to substitute for SS-1 in his absence", I disagree. It could work if the DNRO would accept the burden-sharing concept within the NRO Staff. The pitfall of assigning a Vice Director to the Staff is associated with the current DNRO's apparent demand that the Staff Director be deeply knowledgeable of all activities under the Staff's cognizance. When "The Boss" intercom rings, the DNRO often asks very penetrating questions of the Staff Director and has left the impression that he would be dissatisfied with anything less than an immediate response. If this assumption is correct, then it would be ill-advised for the Staff Director to depend on a Vice Director to oversee the day-to-day operation of the Staff. On the other hand, if the DNRO expects the Staff Director to be an "outside man", representing him throughout the community in meetings, briefings, and other forums, then the DNRO must be made to recognize that the magnitude of the effort within the Staff requires an "inside man" as well as an "outside man" and he must be asked to accept some interface at the Vice Director level when he asks questions regarding the day-to-day pulse of the Staff.

*Quarling*

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

17 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Self-Study Group Issues

ISSUE: SS-4 Operations Interface

The conclusion that SIGINT system functions cannot be transferred to the program offices is based on the assumption that the SIGINT community mechanism is not well enough structured (as compared to the COMIREX operations). I believe an appropriate conclusion would be to recommend transfer of the SIGINT system responsibilities in phase with SORS development of capabilities similar to ICRS. The only reason it can't be done at this time is because we keep offering ourselves as a crutch to the SIGINT committee mechanism.

I note the absence of conclusions and recommendations essential to bring the image of SS-4 in line with the expressed desires of the DNRO. Specifically, in paragraph 4(b) the statement is made that "SAFSS-4 is known in the community and the NRO charter as the Satellite Operations Center." First, they are not known as the Satellite Operations Center in the proposed new charter, and, secondly, the DNRO has stated that he does not desire a Satellite Operations Center--that operations are the responsibilities of the individual mission ground stations. I have recommended to the Self-Study Group before and state again that one of the principal problems of SS-4 from an "image" standpoint--with both our program offices and the DNRO--are the terms "SOC" and "WAHOO." I recommend immediate termination of those terms and the elimination of the "WAHOO" communications slug. It would be to SS-4's benefit to operate as an element of the Staff and coordinate both its message traffic and correspondence with the Director of the Staff rather than attempting to operate in a role that had its purpose in 1965 but is ill-suited to the current environment.

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
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The conclusions in both of these Issues state that if there is no pressing need to reduce or realign Staff manning or Staff profile a "status quo" approach should be taken and that evolution will cause a change in posture. I am of the opinion that status quo never results in a change and that a more appropriate recommendation in both cases is to transfer the line responsibility to a line organization; that is, put these functions in the program offices where they belong. For example, [ ] has successfully handled aircraft support for Program A for years without NRO Staff interference or help. I see no reason why Program B cannot do the same.



ROBERT A. ROSENBERG  
Colonel, USAF  
Acting Director

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THE NRO STAFF

16 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC HUTCHISON, SS-7

SUBJECT: Comments to be Included in Self Study Briefing  
to the Staff Director

Without waiving the right to make comments about specific line items at some appropriate time, I would like to be very general at present.

The Self Study overemphasizes developing a "pure staff". Our Staff should perform those functions that are logical to perform even though these same functions are not normal Staff functions. The NRP was never intended to be a "normal organization", and has been resisting normalization for years. It appears inconsistent to establish this as an important goal for our internal structure and functions.

Perhaps the most dangerous results of removing the Staff from direct "in line" involvement in the execution of the NRP is that we would become increasingly unknowledgeable to the extent that we could not properly support the DNRO but would need to constantly go to a third party for information and support. To understand and influence events one must get involved directly. We could isolate ourselves to the point of being very ineffective.

The entire NRP is a service organization. While the prime duty of the Staff is to support the DNRO, one of the ways we can support him best is by providing necessary and logical services for both the system Program Offices and the Intelligence Community. Some of the functions we now do were never designed to be normal Staff functions. This does not bother me as long as it is functional and logical.

I must correct one misconception in the first paragraph of 2.2.3 of Part II. It is true that the imagery intelligence community requirements are coordinated prior to formal presentation to the NRO; however, this occurs after much reiteration with SS-4. The management of the NRO resources in satisfying the imagery requirements is a dynamic day-to-day operational function which is the direct response of the DNRO.

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I would also disagree with the transfer of the logistical functions and the operational support functions to SS-5, simply because this appears to be a change just for change sake. During General Kulpa's tenure where these functions should be placed got considerable attention. While it is certainly true that there was no clear-cut location for logistics on the Staff, it was very logical to place operational support in SS-4. The two functions are interleaved and it was felt that they should be kept together for mutual management support. SS-4 has developed the necessary external contacts and management relationships that would have to be re-established by SS-5. All of the alternatives suggested in the Self Study for these sections can be carried out in SS-4 without going through a dual Staff transfer to SS-5 and then carrying out one of the alternatives.

  
CHARLES L. MURPHY  
Deputy Director for  
Operations

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

## MEMORANDUM FOR SAFSS SELF STUDY GROUP

SUBJECT: SAFSS Self Study Issues and Conclusions

I do not concur in one of the issues as it appears in the Part II of the Self Study Report and I do not support some of the conclusions given in Part III of the Report. The specific areas to which I object and my reasons are as follows:

GENERAL

The data-gathering process during which the Study Group interviewed the numerous people on the Staff, within the NRO and associated with the NRP, provided the group with a very substantial and significant data base. The problem is that the time to complete the study was so drastically curtailed that an objective and complete conclusion of the study was not possible. Feedback to those contacted by the Study Group was incomplete and hardly any time was made available for one to even read the report, much less digest the information and comment intelligently. This is a complete waste of the experience of the various Staff members as it could apply to any restructuring of the Staff.

Some of the issues in Part II received inadequate attention and discussion by the Study Group members. There was even one issue which was radically changed at the last minute, with no discussion within the Study Group, and no opportunity to comment and coordinate before Part II was published. Again, opportunity for the NRO Staff Deputy Directors to review and comment was almost nonexistent.

The radical change to the Staff structure as shown in Part III was not consistent with discussions during Study Group meetings. Again, the time allocated to review this section and comment was completely inadequate.

PART II

I object to the last minute change to the issue on SS-4, SS-6 and SS-7 roles (Annex B). The conclusion drawn in the

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draft of the issue circulated for comment was based on a thorough discussion of the situation and the various options possible. The Discussion, Conclusion and Recommendation sections of the draft were acceptable to this Study Group member and are attached. I strongly support these conclusions and I heartily endorse the portion of the recommendation which suggested additional study of this issue.

### PART III

I object to the conclusion drawn regarding the dissolution of SS-6 with transfer of SS-6 functions to SS-4 and SS-7. This conclusion was hurriedly drawn by a very definite minority of the Study Group with negligible consultation given to the remaining members of the Study Group or the Staff Deputy Directors. If any conclusion at all is drawn on this issue, it should be that these SS-4, SS-6, SS-7 functions remain as they currently are with a mandate to commission a study as soon as possible to reexamine the issue. I believe that this Staff needs an independent and objective study and analysis capability which is free of the requirements/operational bias of SS-4 and the program advocacy of SS-7. This issue needs more study.

\*\* I do not concur with the assignment of the Logistics and Air Operations support functions to SS-5 without the addition of one manpower slot. The additional workload would be too great for the present manpower in SS-5.

I believe that following the transition period during which General Shields becomes familiar with the Staff functions, the Study Group should be recommissioned to complete the study beginning with the circulation for comment of the Part I and Part II to the Deputy Directors and key persons outside the Staff. Following digestion and analysis of the comments, a logical and more acceptable restructuring of the Staff can be made if necessary.

*Keith S. Peyton*  
KEITH S. PEYTON  
Major, USAF

1 Attachment  
PART II Discussion,  
Conclusion, Recommendation  
Sections

\*\*[THE SLOT WAS MOVED IN PART III, ANNEX A. - Ed.]

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

15 March 1976

## MEMORANDUM FOR NRO SELF-STUDY GROUP

SUBJECT: Comments Regarding the SS-7 Photo Manager

I must preface my comments with the knowledge that the Self-Study Group spent untold hours and many with me in their very difficult task. It is apparent and becomes more so after many hours of discussion and many written pages that my job is very difficult to analyze and even harder to diagram. It is an "enigma" to the Staff.

Many specific items are incorrect in the study, but I do not wish to nit-pick a valiant effort. The photo manager's job was created at a time when the photo satellites were split between AF/CIA and at a time when the Washington Intelligence Community was expanding at a fantastic rate. In order to satisfy all users and to be cost-effective, the job was given to a Staff member so that all parties could be treated fairly from outside any specific program with savings in contract dollars because of one central streamlined managed effort. The photo manager's job was planted, nurtured itself and grew. Today we are cutting back and I predict that if left alone it will wilt back to where it is destined to go, to a program office in about two years.

All the rebuttal in the world will not change nor do I intend to try and re-do the group's recommendations. I believe that the first sentence of the group's conclusions speaks for itself "Management of photo activities by the Staff works well now, but does not conform to the Study Group criteria."



WESLEY D. OWENS  
Colonel, USAF

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

16 March 1976

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Self-Study Report

ISSUE: How Should NRO Representation on Community Studies Be Determined?

I feel that this issue has been inadequately treated and does not take into account all significant factors. For example, regardless of the qualification and availability, a PEM should never be put in charge of a study that requires him to justify or negate the system(s) he is responsible for. The results will obviously be biased. Further, his actions with the program offices which he supports could be rendered ineffective, drying up a valuable source of informal Staff information essential to supporting the DNRO.

Regarding qualification and availability, I assume that all members of this Staff are highly competent, capable individuals and should be qualified from a management point of view to provide Staff representation and leadership on community studies, drawing when necessary the needed technical depth from other elements of the Staff.

Finally, with regard to the desire to maintain a small Staff, I see no reason why external analytical capability to support these studies should not be contracted directly for the Staff, i.e., similar to the Air Staff's Rand/Anser support.

My recommendation would be that the OPR for near-term requirements studies should be SS-4; near-term technical studies on a particular system should be SS-7, and long-term feasibility, conceptual, and trade-off studies amongst systems should be SS-6.

ISSUE: Present Mechanism for Maintaining Leadership, Management, and Continuity in the Absence of the Staff Director Satisfactorily to Meet the Needs of the DNRO, DDNRO, and the Staff

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Regarding this issue, certain factors, I believe, are erroneous. First, I do not believe the majority of DNRO questions pertain to programmatic matters. My observations, having served as the Acting Director over 35 percent of the time this past year and one-half, are that policy issues are as paramount with the DNRO as programmatic matters. Running a very close second are where is the NRO going and our operational interfaces, both important issues from SS-6 and SS-4 viewpoints. Finally, the problems of BYEMAN security, compartmentation (SS-3), and well-tuned administrative support (SS-2) are of key concern to SS-1 in serving the needs of the DNRO. If I had to quantify the preceding, it would be as follows:

SS-2	10%
SS-3	5%
SS-4	15%
SS-5	25%
SS-6	15%
SS-7	30%

SS-7 has not always progressed to SS-1. With regard to the statement "It would be highly unlikely for an SS junior in rank to substitute for SS-1 in his absence", I disagree. It could work if the DNRO would accept the burden-sharing concept within the NRO Staff. The pitfall of assigning a Vice Director to the Staff is associated with the current DNRO's apparent demand that the Staff Director be deeply knowledgeable of all activities under the Staff's cognizance. When "The Boss" intercom rings, the DNRO often asks very penetrating questions of the Staff Director and has left the impression that he would be dissatisfied with anything less than an immediate response. If this assumption is correct, then it would be ill-advised for the Staff Director to depend on a Vice Director to oversee the day-to-day operation of the Staff. On the other hand, if the DNRO expects the Staff Director to be an "outside man", representing him throughout the community in meetings, briefings, and other forums, then the DNRO must be made to recognize that the magnitude of the effort within the Staff requires an "inside man" as well as an "outside man" and he must be asked to accept some interface at the Vice Director level when he asks questions regarding the day-to-day pulse of the Staff.


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