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# MANPOWER STUDY




## 1976

PREPARED BY--  
**THE NRO STAFF**

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GAMBIT  
HEXAGON  
EARPOP



KENNER



IDEALIST



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MANPOWER STUDY

September 1976

Prepared By

the

NRO Staff

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The undersigned have coordinated on and agreed with the contents of the Manpower Study. The contents of this study accurately reflect the views of the NRO Staff and the NRO Comptroller.

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INTRODUCTION

The NRO Staff is at the crossroads. The staff's philosophy and mode of operation, manpower and physical plant have remained essentially the same over the past 10 years, while our external environment has changed dramatically in the past four years. These changes, which have impacted every activity in the staff, are due to a variety of factors, including increased oversight of NRP activities, the creation of higher level intelligence staff organizations, tighter fiscal constraints, and a loosening of traditional compartmented security controls.

The manner in which we conduct our business is evolving at a rapid pace. Senior NRO management had recognized the forces of change and commissioned the 1976 Self Study in late 1975 to study their impact. The Self Study Group completed its report in March 1976 with the conclusion that the NRO could retain its proven effective mode of operation and structure if we returned to our basic principles and codified other precepts. As a result, the Self Study Group recommended relatively minor organization and manpower changes.

In the five months since the publication of the Self Study Report, the pace of our changing environment has accelerated considerably. The two most significant events

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during this period were the implementation of the President's Executive Order 11905 designed to establish more effective controls over the intelligence community and the DOD's response to that Order, the creation of the Director of Defense Intelligence. The steps that are being taken to carry out the "spirit and intent" of the Executive Order are so all-encompassing that a return to a posture which retains most of the basic tenets of our traditional philosophy and way of business is now a very faint hope. Nevertheless, transformation of the NRO to a completely "normal" staff activity is not complete, and there are still some vestiges of the streamlined management left. The DNRO, the DDNRO and the staff must zealously guard those prerogatives.

The structure and operation of the intelligence community are still evolving. It could be argued that the forces behind normalization have not run their full course and that any increase in manning would be, at the least, premature and, at the most, result in an excuse for further normalization of the NRO by outside forces. This latter argument is based upon one of the precepts of Parkinson's Law--work expands to occupy the available personnel. That is, if you increase the size of the staff, another barrier, albeit, an apparently slight one, will be withdrawn, External staffs will then feel more comfortable with laying on ever-increasing tasks

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and the defense of inadequate manpower to perform various tasks dissolves. This argument assumes that our limited manpower has been an effective deterrent to outside tasking, and does not take into account the present excessive tasking in most functional areas.

The purpose of this study, therefore, is to analyze the workload versus resources with primary emphasis on that tasking which exists now and that projected tasking which can be documented. This study assesses the major functional areas which have been impacted by the changes, evaluates the extent of the impact, identifies shortfalls in available resources, and recommends manpower actions. After the manning requirements are identified, the physical space needs are assessed based upon this expanded staff. A modified staff study approach has been chosen for this effort because it parallels the earlier Self Study and because the structure permits a systematic and logical development of the issues.

Before initiating this staff study approach, it is important to briefly review the way the NRO formerly operated in contrast to the way the NRO staff now functions. This discussion provides a foundation to understand both the climate within which the manpower of the NRO staff once worked and the fundamental changes that have occurred.

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THE NRO OF THE PAST

There are several adjectives that can be used to describe the NRO as it functioned in the 1960s and early 1970s--the following come to mind: closed, black, singleness of purpose, protected, streamlined, authoritative. The NRO system was non-bureaucratic and based upon a relatively few basic, but inviolable, tenets.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

The Director of the NRO was normally the Under Secretary of the Air Force. The DNRO had direct access to his line organizational elements. This short, vertical chain made his programs highly responsive and made him directly accessible to his program managers.

Formerly only the Executive Committee (ExCom) of the NRP could provide resource allocation direction to the NRP and recommended level of effort to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). Operational tasking was provided through the USIB Committee structure. At one time, the Under Secretary was able to devote approximately one-half of his time to the conduct of the NRP.

FENCED BUDGET

In the past, the DNRO had resource allocation authority within a fenced budget. The budget was contained in

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the overall DOD budget



This system permitted extraordinary budget flexibility.

PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTING PROCEDURES

Determinations and findings were submitted by Program A and quickly approved by the DNRO with minimum staffing outside the NRO structure. Procurement actions, including statements of work, were managed by the program offices with little outside influence. Waivers to ASPRs and other procurement regulations were granted upon request after a determination of legality and with minimum, sufficient discussion between the NRO staff and staff elements in DOD to further justify the requirements of such waivers. The overall emphasis in procurement was to obtain the necessary goods or services with a minimum of extraneous staff action and in the shortest possible time. Program C conducted procurements through Program A while Program B had separate procurement authority.

EXTERNAL/INTERNAL REVIEW

External review of the NRP was primarily provided by the ExCom. This body officially met twice a year to meet programming requirements, but normally met at least three to four times a year to review the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP and to approve/modify the consolidated NRP and its budget. These decisions were based upon a published Director's Report and a Recommended Program.

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Based upon these inputs, which determined the course of the NRP, the ExCom made clear-cut decisions.

Formerly, Congressional reviews were at the total program level. The frequency, level of detail and committee member participation in the NRP budget reviews were determined by the Chairman of the Congressional Armed Services and Appropriation Committees. The budget justification procedures varied from an interaction at the staff level to the appearance of the DNRO to give testimony.

Internal review was accomplished by select audit organizations and personnel at the direction, or with the permission of, the DNRO. This method of review prohibited indiscriminate reviews by any number of agencies that might have felt that a review of the NRP was within their charter.

#### SECURITY

Extraordinary security was employed with regard to the United States' satellite reconnaissance since its inception. The primary reason for these security measures was to prevent the disclosure of "facts about" the quality/quantity and methodology of our reconnaissance capability to our adversaries. The "fact of" satellite reconnaissance has been classified to prevent public discussion. There has been a tacit agreement by the US and USSR to engage in space reconnaissance activities. A fall-out benefit of the tight security controls has been a limiting of the number of people who had knowledge of the

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details of the NRP. This limitation thus reduced the number of people who were authorized to review our activities and make demands on our resources, thus further enhancing streamlined procedures.

SIMPLIFIED MISSION

The mission of the NRO was defined as follows: The NRO is responsible for the development, acquisition and operation of reconnaissance satellites to meet the intelligence collection requirements of the United States Government and for the processing and delivery of photographic and SIGINT material to the intelligence community. Our mission statement is simplified, the thrust is strictly reconnaissance satellites whose existence is, by national policy, covert.

The responsiveness only to the national requirements was a cornerstone and one which scoped our efforts. The NRP was a closed society, the program was almost totally divorced from other "white" space programs, the exception being the Defense Meterological Satellite Program (DMSP), which was initiated covertly and subsequently transferred to the Air Force.

DEVELOPING NEW TECHNOLOGIES

In the early days of the NRP, the NRO concentrated in developing specific technologies for high priority reconnaissance missions. The year-to-year evaluation of the

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programs consisted of correcting past mistakes, improving existing PHOTINT/SIGINT systems and continuing towards ultimate accomplishment of the original mission. Few difficult trades between programs were required, as the systems proceeded from a demonstration of feasibility to ultimate operation. Essentially, one system for each class of mission existed in the NRP. During this period, the systems generally were not in competition with each other.

The NRO still clings to the above basic tenets. Using these principles as a baseline, it is extraordinary how substantially each has changed in the past three years.

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THE NRO OF TODAY

CHAIN OF COMMAND

The Secretary/Under Secretary of the Air Force is still the DNRO; however, the percentage of time that the designated DNRO can devote to NRP management has changed markedly. At one time, 50 percent of the Under Secretary's time was devoted to NRP matters, this percentage has slowly evolved from 50-50 to 30-70 to 10-90 in the last six months of Mr. Plummer's tenure as DNRO, to the present 2-98 with Mr. Reed as the DNRO. The command line up is still direct, but the exercise of authority in the chain of command has been diminished. The command line down is still as direct and the operational authority of the program direction has not diminished.

The chain of command above the DNRO has become clouded. The DNRO once took direction only from the ExCom-- now the fortunes of the NRP are ruled by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), a three-man body consisting of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It is not this change alone, but the fact that the DCI and the DepSecDef are assisted by staffs--the DCI by the IC Staff and the DepSecDef by the ASD(I)/DDI structure--which are providing ever-increasing oversight and direction over the NRO.

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The NRO now takes direction from a host of masters.

#### FENCED BUDGET

Currently the NRP budget is reviewed and approved by Congress at the project level with normal fiscal reprogramming constraints between projects. Additional review by the CFI staffs requires substantially more data and justification of the provided financial details. The DNRO resource allocation authority has been reduced to the level of the reprogramming authority among projects and less overall flexibility. The time and effort to realize any fiscal change have increased and require additional planning to preclude project impacts. In addition, increased OMB oversight will require significant program and budgeting data, both written and oral, during each fiscal cycle.

#### PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTING PROCEDURES

Determinations and findings are now submitted from both Program A and Program C with the latter requiring extensive staffing within "white" Navy channels for "white" procurement authority. Requests for proposal (RFPs) for some satellite systems are not only closely tracked by the staff, but are actually submitted to the staff for review and approval. Waivers to ASPRs now are questioned on why the requester cannot accomplish the effort using normal existing

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procedures. The current emphasis in procurement is leaning towards the philosophy of learning to do things under normalized procedures like everyone else.

#### EXTERNAL/INTERNAL REVIEW

The greatest impact on NRO workloads has occurred as a result of a breakdown in the traditional controls on the external review function. Not only has the number of activities, which are empowered to review the NRP, increased substantially but the level of detail to which the NRP is being examined has also changed.

This review is being accomplished by OMB, the IC Staff, the ASD(I) Staff, the DOD Inspector General for Intelligence, the Intelligence Oversight Board, the Internal Revenue Service, as well as the multi-faceted Congressional review (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees, and the HAC Survey and Investigations Team). The drain on the "streamlined" staff to accommodate the seemingly insatiable demands for information has been considerable.

#### SECURITY

Our security policies of "must know" access and compartmentation are under attack from several quarters. The effect of the post-Watergate and Congressional Intelligence Hearings have created a climate of open Government which philosophically runs counter to the security system within which the NRP has always operated. In addition, the tactical

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use of PHOTINT and SIGINT satellites is presently being evaluated. When the KENNEN system becomes operational, the products from the system will be directly integrated into the intelligence data base of the U & S commander.

These trends have reinforced the long-standing arguments that the reconnaissance satellite product must be completely decompartmented and have inevitably led to demands that more and more of the operational aspects of the satellite reconnaissance programs be released. The issues of decompartmentation and tactical applications have necessitated a deep and continual involvement by the NRO staff.

Security responsibility for NRO and NRP has traditionally been viewed as flowing from the DCI's statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. With the erosion of the DCI's authority, a result of the post-Watergate sensibilities and the reluctance of the Agency to assume a strong security stance in today's anti-security atmosphere, the NRO no longer has the authority of the DCI to sustain its security policies.

#### SIMPLIFIED MISSION

The NRO has slowly been drawn into activities which complicate the simplified mission of being strictly builders

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and operators of reconnaissance satellites. These activities include the aforementioned tactical applications question, the cover program for the KENNEN relay satellite

the DSP augmentation, the dialogue with NASA on proposed "white" NASA programs, and the transition of NRP programs into the Shuttle and numerous intelligence community studies.

These activities expose the staff to an infinite variety of actions which had previously not required any expenditure of resources.

DEVELOPING NEW TECHNOLOGIES

The outstanding success of the NRO Program Offices in developing space reconnaissance technology has provided more technically viable options for useful systems than can be considered within the limited NRP budget.

With the introduction of the KENNEN and real-time SIGINT systems, more sophisticated technological approaches to the same mission, which produce better data, are now possible. Also, during the last few years, basic program success has spurred innovative and important opportunities which could vastly improve collection capability in virtually every area of NRP responsibility. The implications for the NRO staff are that the decision makers supported by the staff must pick and choose between a greater number of options than ever before.

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Typically, fundamental program decisions which would have been self-evident in 1970 and earlier now require formal community study to produce the data to support decisions. The NRO staff must coordinate the program offices' participation in these studies, provide first-hand technical support in the areas of intelligence requirements and Congressional interface, and orchestrate the planning and meshing of these studies with the decision and budget cycles.

The discussion now turns to a systematic examination of the impact of these fundamental changes on the staff.

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PROBLEM

Is the NRO staff manpower adequate to handle the present tasking?

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ASSUMPTIONS

1. The workload on the NRO staff will either continue at the present level or increase over the next year.

2. The prevailing NRO philosophy will continue to be to attempt to respond to all legitimate tasking and requests for briefings, budget justifications, and working group participation while continuing to attempt to minimize external involvement in the conduct of the NRP.

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1. The total authorized manning for the NRO staff is 68. Military personnel consist of representatives from the Army, Navy and Air Force, while civilian personnel include personnel from the Department of the Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

(See Attachment 1)

2. The dominant service is the Air Force since that service provides the DNRO with a security cover and because the Air Force is dominant in DOD space activities/expertise.

3. The manning of the Air Force Secretariat is under close scrutiny by Congress and, as a result, it is highly unlikely that the Air Force's portion of the manning level will increase.

4. The Program Budget Decision (PBD) 324, Support Personnel, specifies the military and civilian strength levels for FY 77. The overall reductions will result in a reduction of 1700 military personnel and 1800 civilians in the Washington area. Although SAF has been directed to take a 10 percent manpower cut in USAF military and civilian manning, a reduction in the NRO staff probably will not be levied.

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5. The USAF position on the NRO staff has remained relatively constant over the past 12 years. In 1964, there were 40 USAF positions. USAF manning reached a high of 48 in 1966 and then steadily diminished to the present 40 positions. (See Attachment 2)

6. The level of Army manning has increased slightly over the years. In 1970, there were five Army officers on the staff; there are now seven, resulting from increased Army involvement in space. This interest was manifested in a letter from the Department of the Army, DCS/Research, Development and Acquisition (10 January 1975), offering to expand participation in the NRP. The result has been to add two more officers to the staff.

7. The Navy element on the NRO staff has remained constant. At present, the Navy has five officers and three enlisted assigned versus four officers in 1971.

8. The CIA manning on the staff has remained fairly constant over the years. The authorized manning from 1964 until 1974 was six to seven professionals. This strength has been increased by two since that time.

9. The amount of overtime for the 14 DAF civilian secretaries has shown an increase over the past six fiscal years. In FY 71, the staff expended \$3089 and in FY 76 the figure had grown to \$9607. These increases have occurred

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despite a constant manning level. Prior to FY 73, there were 12 DAF secretaries as one slot was added in FY 73 and another added in FY 75, therefore, making the present total 14. The overtime growth is graphically depicted in Attachment 7.

10. The number of positions in the Central Control Group to which the NRO staff must provide support has grown from 3 in 1965 to 71 as of FY 1/77. More significantly, only in the last two years, the size of the CCG has more than doubled from 29 to 71 people.

11. Since its establishment in early 1972, the IC Staff has grown to 141 on its rolls as of FY 1/77 and has submitted a request for incremental manpower increases--an ultimate of 250 people.

12. The ASD(I) staff, established in 1971, now includes 70 personnel. This figure includes certain personnel which support the Defense Intelligence Board and the Inspector General for Defense Intelligence.

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DISCUSSION

The discussion which follows will address the major functions of the staff which have been impacted by our changing environment and the extent to which our manpower has been able to cope.

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The trend towards a more normalized staff activity has had a major impact on the SS-2 function. As the staff has increased its interaction with outside activities, the volume of correspondence has grown proportionately. This has led to the decision to use the Executive Officer in a more traditional role in contrast to his earlier function of performing strictly personnel and administrative tasks.

SS-2 now monitors all correspondence and suspenses as well as providing other executive service support to the Director. The workload has been compounded by the growth in the Central Control Group. SS-2 now supports 71 personnel in 11 locations throughout the CONUS and in Europe. This problem was addressed in the Self Study, resulting in a recommendation to obtain an increased authorization for an Administrative Officer.

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SS-3 originally was the same as today, but in the 1969-70 period an additional officer was assigned. Following termination of the MOL program and delegation of 'must know' authority for some BYEMAN programs to DIA, one billet was dropped. The manning has since remained as it is today. The NRO security function has undergone a major change in the past four years.

1. Decompartmentation: Community decompartmentation efforts have impacted SS-3 in three areas. First is in participation in NFIB Committee meetings and debates, second is in private consultations with representatives of virtually all NFIB agencies, and third is in preparation of staff issue papers and reviews of other agencies' proposals. Activity in all three areas has been heavy but unquantifiable and the trend is expected to continue as the "fact of" debate and deliberations proceed. Another factor is KH-11 activation. Within 90 days after IOC, new determinations must be made regarding decompartmentation and sanitization of KH-11 imagery. The CIA/Proctor Group and the new compartmentation subcommittee, NFIB Security Committee, will continue their deliberations for some time.

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2. Access Determinations: Access requests have significantly grown in the past three years for several reasons and growth is expected to continue. In 1971, DIA was delegated must-know authority for BYEMAN, GAMBIT, HEXAGON, EARPOP and [ ] which was a significant relief on the staff. DIA carefully applied NRO guidelines, and in 1972 there were 35 recorded requests for access referred to NRO by DIA. In 1975, there were 290 and the trend continues with approximately 150 received by August 1976. It should be pointed out that these are received directly in SS-3 and released by SS-3, but may require extensive coordination across the staff, the requesting agency or NRO Program Offices. Some requests are for individuals and some are for large numbers or for conduct of controversial studies or contracts. These have been averaging in excess of one per work day for the past two years. It also does not reflect telephonic requests for access approvals for urgent problems or requests from other agencies. There will be a surge of requests if [ ] proceeds to program status. During this period, there has been three major new program starts requiring SS-3 review of all DOD access requests (KENNEN, [ ])

3. Security Interface and Guidance: The creation of ASD(I) and the IC Staff and the establishment of new points of contact, such as the Army Space Project Office (ASPO) and

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AF/XOT, have greatly increased the number of outside contacts and have produced requests for security guidance. In the case of ASD(I) and the IC Staff, there has been an increase in support by the NRO and other staff members which is proportional to the level of interface established. Each new initiative by ASD(I) or the IC Staff will invariably result in new access requests, security advice to ASD(I) or the IC Staff members as well as the NRO staff, security review of papers prepared for ASD(I) or DCI action, access certification, or monitoring contacts with contractors. NRP security requirements are not well understood outside the NRO and SS-3 must continue to be available for these contacts. In the case of the ASPO, SS-3 was involved in establishing ground rules for ASPO BYEMAN activities and is continually required to provide advice and assistance in their contacts with programs and contractors as well as ASPO-sponsored special exercises. Each new interface point or external interface requirement will result in additional requirements on SS-3.

4. New Projects and Increasing Complexity: A great many new projects have been established and new technologies introduced which have required security support. There is a direct correlation between the complexity of project sensitivity and management arrangements and the requirements

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
imposed on the staff security function to control the program and develop security guidance. A few of these projects are listed below. It should be noted that this tasking is additive. Routine security support for the older NRO programs continue.

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e. Other Factors: Maintaining a tightly controlled security posture is becoming increasingly difficult in today's environment. The environment within the intelligence community and the general public is increasingly hostile to strict security. The general permissiveness of society and the erosion of confidence in government integrity have had a corrosive effect on the NRP security posture. New laws which reflect these factors have also increased the NRO profile and as a result the workload. The Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts are examples. The Privacy Act has produced a continuing dialogue between the NRO, program offices, and DOD legal staffs. The Freedom of Information Act has had a similar impact. Freedom of information requests on the NRO mission or aspects of, as well as requests for data on background investigations, have complicated our investigative procedures.

5. Security-Related Areas Not Receiving Proper Attention: There are a number of security-related areas

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which currently need attention. Security planning for [REDACTED] has been fragmented and late. More in-depth analysis of security issues is needed for which there is no time. New initiatives and improved insight into program activities is required. Increased visitation to program and contractor activities is needed to insure compliance with security policies and to increase awareness of current policies. Security review of numerous documents has either been too late to be effective or was referred to other people. There has been an increasing reliance on verbal instructions because of inadequate time to document instructions. Documentation for facilities accreditation has not occurred. Improved scrutiny and accountability for accesses are needed. Increased attention to security instruction and office procedures is needed now.

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The manning of SS-4 Operations has changed over the past 10 years to meet the dynamics of the situation. In 1967, there were 16 officers, 13 airmen and 3 secretaries assigned to the Director, Photo, SIGINT, Weather, Analysis and Data Support Branches. In 1973, the SIGINT Branch was reorganized and SS-4A was established at Fort Meade and manned by three additional officers, one airman and a secretary. By 1974, the Projects Branch was formed and the Analysis Branch transferred to SS-6 along with the Data Support Branch, reducing the SS-4 manning to the current 18 officers, 3 enlisted men, and 3 secretaries.

The mission of SS-4 today is that of a central coordinating, neutral interface agency. The primary tasks are defining system collection capabilities for users; participating in the development and interpretation of NFIB collection requirements, reviewing approved collection requirements to optimize mission performance; providing reports to user committees on collection results against NFIB requirements; developing system schedules that are consistent with requirements within resources allocated by the CFI; acting as the coordinating interface between the system program directors and the intelligence community;

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and exercising staff surveillance over the

In accomplishing its mission, SS-4 is divided into four distinct and separate branches with responsibilities that are separate from each other and could, in fact, be separate SAFSS directorates (SS-8, SS-9, SS-10 and SS-11). However, they are under the one SS-4 deputy director because of their shared interest and responsibility in current satellite operations. The following general responsibilities are delegated to the SS-4 branches.

PHOTO Branch: Responsible for all photographic intelligence collection functions of PHOTO reconnaissance satellites. It is responsible for implementing NFIB requirements through coordination with the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) as effectively as possible.

SIGINT Branch: Responsible for all functions relating to the collection of signal intelligence collected through the use of satellites. It is responsible for implementing the NFIB SIGINT requirements through coordination with the SIGINT Committee and the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee.

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Weather Branch: Responsible for providing meteorological support for the plans and operations of the PHOTO and SIGINT Branches and other SAFSS directorates as required.

Projects Branch: This branch was established in 1974 and is responsible for NRP airlift




PHOTO Operations

The manning of the PHOTO Branch, since 1973, has been constant with seven officers and two enlisted men. In the days when the PHOTO Branch wore the "scarf and goggles" and actually selected the areas to be photographed, the office was manned on a 24-hour basis during the period when PHOTO satellites were on orbit. Although in 1968, for example, there were 16 CORONA and GAMBIT missions launched, they were on orbit only 214 days of the year. Today, for the period July 1976 through July 1977, while there are only five GAMBIT, HEXAGON and KENNEN missions scheduled for launch, there will be a PHOTO satellite on orbit continuously, and manning is scheduled for a 12-hour day, seven days a week, plus standby duty during the remaining 12 hours.

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In the past, and although working a 24-hour shift, it was possible in the interval between missions to update operations manuals, support special study requirements, attend committee and program evaluation meetings, and perform other operational and administrative functions in a timely and efficient manner. Today, however, it is a different story. Although the selection of cloud-free areas for photography against NFIB requirements is generally accomplished with the use of computers, there is more "other work" involved in the PHOTO operations:

1. New Target Requirements: Monitoring and inputting new target requirements into the operations have greatly increased as users become more aware of the systems' capabilities causing daily additions and deletions to target requirements.
2. KENNEN Development and Operation: The development of the KENNEN program has increased coordinating and liaison with the KENNEN Program Office and members of the staff and other offices and agencies. The KENNEN program and the development of the COMIREX Automated Management System (CAMS) have nearly doubled the usual amount of time spent with ICRS and EXSUBCOM.

3. Civil Applications Committee for Classified Overhead Photography: The establishment of the new Civil Applications Committee for Classified Overhead Photography, participation in already formed NFIB/COMIREX/ICRS/EXSUBCOM and other committees and the preparation of supporting reports, documents and memoranda all contribute to an ever-increasing workload.

As a result, today there is hardly sufficient time available to make necessary changes and additions to highly important operational manuals; to prepare inputs to the daily, weekly and monthly reports; present numerous planned and non-scheduled informational briefings; participate in the NDSM 333 Study; and in the updating, coordination of new contingency plans against the current USSR anti-satellite threats. Today's "normalization" has significantly increased the workload by the additional discussion, contacts, and briefings that are constantly required in our daily operation.

SIGINT Operations

SIGINT operations workload has increased significantly over the past years by the proliferation of entities becoming more interested in the NRP activities because "normalization" has increased the number of staffs,


committees and personnel involved in the SIGINT intelligence. The NRO SIGINT operations at NSA have become more involved in providing liaison functions between the NRO, NSA and DIA, and the current involvement of the ASD(I), NSA, DIA and others in the collection of intelligence. However, if the proposed NSA revision of the 1962 Memorandum of Agreement is concurred with by the DNRO, the effect will ultimately remove the NRO from the operations functions, which would probably result in a one- or two-man liaison element located at NSA which could hopefully oversee and insure that the NRO's responsibilities in meeting intelligence requirements are performed satisfactorily. If, however, the NRO operation at NSA continues essentially as at present, the demand and involvement with additional outside agencies will be expected to increase. On or about 1 October 1976, a new entity (the CCF--an NMIC/DIA organization) will become operational.

Generally, the SIGINT operations are performed in an 8-hour workday with night "on-call" operations available. This mode of operation has been adequate; however, during periods such as the Middle-East crisis, a considerable number of routine functions were curtailed, and will be whenever crisis situations occur under the present manning.

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To adequately perform SIGINT operations in SS-4, more than two professionals are required. A considerable amount of time is consumed in supporting the SORS function (developing impact statements, attending SORS Working Groups, etc.,) and attending other meetings, providing support to special studies and presenting numerous briefings.

To hold even this current workload, [redacted]



[redacted] As representatives of the NRO, the NRO/NSA operation personnel at Fort Meade are often looked upon as experts in their respective systems and as convenient sources of information or points of contact for many other aspects of the NRP programs/policies. To perform these functions adequately, participate in numerous meetings, and perform briefings and liaison, etc., require the assignment of one project officer of the five programs [redacted]

[redacted] and low orbiters), plus a chief who will, in addition to supervisory duties, also act as the NRO staff/liaison officer to NSA.

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The present growing trend of the intelligence community to utilize the SIGINT Branch personnel for manning for the numerous working/study groups (SORS, [redacted] Technical Operations Working Group, Electro-Optical Working Group, ELINT Working Group, Foreign Instrumentation Working Group, COMINT Working Group, [redacted] etc.,) and seriously impacts the primary mission of the SIGINT Branch. The increase of operational ELINT activities and its requirement for fast answers/responses has stressed the present SIGINT operations "on-call" operations and has given rise to the trend for 24-hour operation. During periods of crisis, the SIGINT operations have enlisted the aid of NSA and NSOC personnel to meet TCRs until an NRO SIGINT operations officer arrives on the scene. Politically, this could lead to a defacto acceptance of the NSA-proposed Memorandum of Agreement.

For the DNRO to maintain control over NRP resource operations, 24-hour operation of the NRO operations located at NSA would be appropriate, requiring five additional officers to cover around-the-clock shifts. Manning would be for either the NSOC or the CCF. However, if both locations (NSOC and CCF) are manned, additional manning would be required. Manning should be made from the military and civilian intelligence career fields.

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3. NRO tests, studies and developments, e.g.,  
arrange loan of static display site equipment [redacted]

KENNEN IOC), coordinate [redacted]

4. Test bed aircraft (U-2, SR-71, A3B) require-  
ments monitoring, e.g., coordinate airspace, develop impact  
statements.

5. [redacted]

Weather Operations

The weather operation is the focal point for all  
natural atmospheric and near-space environmental matters of  
concern to the NRP, and encompasses three major functions:  
(1) act as interface between the NRO staff and Air Weather  
Service for weather support requirements and implementation,  
(2) act as technical consultant on the weather support to  
current and planned NRP systems, and (3) serve as command  
section for Detachment 1, HQ AWS, a unit of USAF officers  
attached to NRO agencies in the Washington area. These  
functions are unique in that they deal exclusively with  
weather support in BYEMAN channels and associated requirements.

All meteorological interfaces with the intelligence  
community, outside the NRO, are performed by the weather  
operations function through the appropriate NRO staff OPR.

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It is essential that the weather operations remain attached to SS-4 and, particularly, collocated with the PHOTO operation. Current manpower and accommodations are adequate for the present and anticipated workload. However, should a 24-hour operation become a fact, the weather operations will require at least three additional meteorological spaces. Should KENNEN operations require more manpower at the [ ] [ ] manning will be provided from the present weather operations.

#### Operational Areas Not Receiving Proper Attention

Although SS-4 is accomplishing their mission in a timely fashion with their available personnel, there are certain areas which either presently are not being worked up or have the potential to become problem areas. Once the NSDM 333 planning is completed and procedural and operational requirements defined, SS-4 will likely become heavily involved with satellite contingency planning.

It is felt that SS-4 could probably be more involved in educating imagery intelligence users outside of the Washington area on system collection capability and system use.

SS-4 needs to do more work in SIGINT mission optimization and interfacing with the NSOC (the round-the-clock operation at Fort Meade).

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As the principal interface between the NRO and non-NRP/intelligence-associated activities, such as Congress, State Department, NASA, the Executive Office of the President, and the Air Force, SS-5 has been affected dramatically by the increase in NRP visibility. As the policy maker for the NRP, this function has also been greatly affected by the implementation of the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommendations, Executive Order 11905, the resulting reorganization within the CIA and Defense Department, and the establishment of the various activities charged with oversight of the intelligence community.

SS-5 still performs essentially the same kinds of functions as it has over the past 10 years. But while the tasks are the same, the requirements are considerably different in terms of level of detail, frequency, coordination required, etc. These increases can be measured in terms of number of briefings; visitors to the 4C1000 complex, program offices and contractors; and requests for information. Comprehensive briefings on the NRP, for example, have roughly doubled since 1969--from 25 to an estimated 49 in 1976, which will include over 100 people by year end. Also policy matters tend to affect other elements of the staff much more

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broadly now than in the past, which requires a continued high level of internal coordination.

The single most profound change in the workload has been in the area of Congressional interface. SS-5 manning was augmented in January 1976 by the addition of one Lt Col space. Despite a steadily increasing workload across all SS-5 functions, there have been no other manpower increases in SS-5 for a period of 10 years. A discussion of the major SS-5 functions and the impact of this mushrooming workload is included below:

1. National Policy: Responsibilities under this function include the formulation and implementation of military and national space policy and providing DNRO policy representation on interagency panels, working groups and committees. Over the past few years, the latter function has included developing and staffing policy positions for the DNRO to table before the Standing Committee on Space Policy of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, and before the joint DOD-NASA-CIA Program Review Board. SS-5 has prepared and staffed the DNRO's position for both of these committees, and in addition provides, jointly with NASA, the Secretariat function for the Program Review Board. Both of these committees have undertaken policy issues which treat more than satellite reconnaissance alone and include the broader

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subject of technology transfer. While not strictly an NRO concern, the staff must nevertheless prepare the DNRO to participate in all deliberations. In addition, SS-5 provides a member to the Space Policy Committee Working Group. This has been a significant workload for the past year, preparing papers for presentation to the full Committee.

2. Congressional Interface: The NRP justification book prepared for the first time this year required some 3300 manhours of effort. Within the NRO staff approximately 3000 manhours were expended during the month of January 1976 to the detriment of other staff functions. Stated in different terms, during a three-week period in January, the task of building the Congressional Budget Book took the full effort of about 12 people of the NRO staff. The NRO will be required to prepare this book each year and it is expected that several committees of Congress which review the NRP will each want some form of this data. In addition to the two Appropriations and two Armed Services Committees, the NRO will now be required to respond to the new Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Congressional Budget Office. The Senate Select Committee has established four subcommittees, including budget and charter groups. The NRO has been

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notified that members of these subcommittees plan to visit NRO field organizations and facilities, and dedicated hearings before these subcommittees are anticipated on the NRP. The House Appropriations Committee requirements for FY 77 pre-hearings (formal statements on FY and reprogramming, hearing books for each member of the committee, viewgraphs), hearings (witness preparation and full-day session), and post-hearings (over 100 pages of follow-on questions, transcription review and session with and field trips for Mr. Snodgrass), were by far the most extensive in the history of the NRP.

3. Implementation of EO 11905: EO 11905 led to the establishment of a myriad of new organizations and activities. The creation of the CFI, the Intelligence Oversight Board, and the Operations Advisory Group directly impacted on the NRO. Within the Defense Department, the DDI and the DOD Inspector General were created. The DDI spawned the creation of the Defense Intelligence Board, and its three panels. As these activities evolve, it is clear that intense oversight of the NRP is felt to be within the charter of each. The present effect on the policy arm of the NRO has been overwhelming. The projection is for an ever-increasing involvement.

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a. DOD Inspector General: There will be an increasing interface with the newly established DOD Inspector General for Intelligence. SS-5 is now required to submit a quarterly report on the NRO through the DOD IG to the Intelligence Oversight Board as specified by EO 11905. Additionally, SS-5 has already had three meetings with the DOD IG and members of his staff and a field trip is planned for the IG the last week in September 1976. Further, it is acknowledged that the CIA Inspector General will provide oversight for detailed activities of the CIA Reconnaissance Program Office and this will generate a need for continued interface and coordination between the staff, the DOD IG and the CIA IG.

b. The Defense Intelligence Board: SS-5 supports the newly created Defense Intelligence Board and two of its panels. Dr. Cook as the principal NRP representative; General Shields on the Producers Panels;  on the Resources Panel. This Board has resulted in a significant increase in workload for SS-5, particularly in preparing the NRO representatives for meetings every second week, and also in acting as an alternate representative to General Shields on the Producers Panel. Preparation requires one to two man days for each meeting.

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4. Tactical Interface: As the national-tactical interface is defined and more potential users become involved, SS-5 is charged with developing policies which will permit the best use of satellite reconnaissance products while protecting NRP streamlined management and maintaining necessary security constraints. This is an area which caused considerable increase in workload in the last three years, and is anticipated to require significant effort in the months and years ahead.

5. NASA Interface: As NASA programs become more sophisticated and as the scientific community demands even greater technical achievements, there has been a profound effect on the NRO-NASA interface in the earth-sensing systems area. A significant effort was devoted to preparing a very comprehensive plan to permit Eastman-Kodak to bid for the Space Telescope Program optical telescope assembly, which

Several man-months of effort were required for the NRO staff alone with augmented support from the NRO Program Office.

6. Impact: The impact on SS-5 of these trends and the increased NRP visibility have been manifested in several areas. The number of staff actions assigned to SS-5 has grown substantially over the past year. The staff officers, as a matter of routine, are required to spend long hours of overtime

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to complete the most pressing actions. Overtime requirements on an average monthly basis have exceeded 185 hours (150 hours for the four officers and 35 hours for the two secretaries). These time-sensitive actions are normally accomplished within the desired suspenses. Most of the actions do not require in-depth study or coordination.

7. Policy Areas Not Receiving Proper Attention. There are, however, a host of other policy-related functions which, because of a lack of resources, are either being placed on the "back burner" or not being addressed in sufficient detail. Examples are an NRP contracting policy; periodic review and updating of memorandums of understanding and agreement; on-going daily interface with program directors' policy personnel and with other DOD and interagency personnel on policy matters; net assessment of our security policy impacts stemming from multiple on-going intelligence community actions; appraisal of the effects on the NRP of direct and indirect Congressional actions; and the establishment and retention of a close, personable relationship with professional staff members of the Congress; plus internal NRO staff interface to facilitate personal understanding of the policy aspects as they apply to specific NRP systems and efforts.

This workload has also seriously affected the secretarial and administrative function. The secretarial

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The basic responsibility of SS-6 is to analyze new and long-range requirements for overhead collection activities, determine the impact of requirements on existing and proposed systems, and develop plans and studies in support of the NRO and the staff. This responsibility has led SS-6 to become deeply involved in developing and testing of tactical concepts for the use of NRP systems. SS-6 also is the major interface for the NRO staff on community-wide mix and systems studies. With the expanding intelligence collection technologies, this latter task has become a significant consumer of manpower. The SS-6 major functional areas are: advanced planning, evaluation support, advanced concept development, study support and analyses.

1. Advanced Planning: Until 1974, programmatic planning in the NRO was based only on near-term perspectives of NFIB requirements and the fenced budget. Shortly after SS-6 was re-formed, the DNRO assigned this section the problem of long-term planning. As a result, the National Imagery Plan for Satellites (NIPS) was developed by SS-6 for the entire community. For the first time, planning became available which cut across the previously isolated areas of capabilities, requirements, exploitation and dissemination.

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The positive impact of the NIPS has been felt within the staff and throughout the community. It presented for the first time the breadth of imagery activities.

Preparation of the NIPS required about three man-years of effort in SS-6 alone, primarily from the Analysis Branch. In spite of the cost, such planning activities are necessary and allow not only the DNRO, but also the CFI, a total overview of the intelligence program. This breaking of new ground will result in other top-level planning (e.g., in SIGINT) at an increased cost in staff manpower resources.

Advanced planning is one area which will be "out-prioritized" by short-term problems when the overall manning of the staff (not just SS-6) is too thin. Failure to continue the efforts which were started with the NIPS will result in reversion to an ad hoc mode of planning the NRP. The resulting lack of continuity and community consensus will increase the number and intensity of disputes over "where the NRP is going," reducing the effectiveness of the staff, and, possibly, the NRP itself, as the possibility of poor decisions to solve only the immediate problems continues.

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2. Evaluation Support: Increasing interest by DOD and the community in the NRP product has sparked numerous studies, exercises, and analyses that have required extensive evaluation support from the NRO. When this staff section was formed in 1974, the only formal agreement for support was with the Army. Since then, agreements with ARPA-JCS on the mobile command post effort and the IC Staff on NIPS have formally defined SS-6 as the NRO responsible element. SS-6 has participated in an ever-increasing number of evaluation support efforts, such as the exercises BRAVE CREW, GALLANT SHIELD, OUTLAW HAWK, BOLD EAGLE, and COLD FIRE. These exercises each entail many man-months (approximately 25) of NRO support from inception to final report. SS-6 also provided formal evaluation support for DIA on the Korean Scenario, JCS on the Pilot Study, and ASD(I) on System Evaluation, NSC on Tactical Support Panels, and OMB on system capabilities. These missions are currently handled by two officers (Army and Air Force) who also support the advanced concepts development effort. Proper support of each of the formal agreements entails most of an individual's full time. With an expansion currently underway in the Air Force (AF/XOT) to considerably increase their interface with

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the NRO, support requirements for this directorate will increase measurably. In fact, since initiating this new interest in the NRP, the Air Force support requirement in the past two months (July-August 1976) has required the full-time support of one man. If the assigned manpower is not sufficient to support this area, it will be a major set back to the expanded NRP support to the DOD. In particular, the development of the military/NRP interface to support the operational field commander will never be properly evolved.

3. Advanced Concept Development: While the advanced concepts mission has been the victim of inadequate future requirements definition by the NFIB, the users have attempted to clarify their future needs through independent studies and evaluations. With the increased awareness of the NRP by the community, these independent efforts have significantly multiplied. Historically, the overhead systems have evolved from earlier generations, or, in some instances, near technological break throughs have initiated sufficient interest to permit development of systems. Seldom has a specific requirement paced system development. Control over advanced concepts development was no problem when most of the users were unaware of the systems' capability. As users became more knowledgeable of the NRP potential, there was a

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realization that advanced concepts could be developed which would meet their needs. The staff has felt that the NRO should take the lead in the development of advanced intelligence collection and employment concepts. The present staffing has only a monitorship capacity. While control and guidance responsibilities are being attempted, the present staffing reflects only part-time availability of two officers (Army and Air Force) whose time is mostly consumed in meeting study, exercise, and service coordination responsibilities. Without adequate manpower to interface with and guide elements of the community in the development of advanced concepts, there is a high risk that we will find ourselves in the position of building satellites for an obsolete requirement. Many of the staffs in the community are attempting to develop advanced concepts without a clear understanding of technical and operational limitations. It is much better to lead in advanced concepts than to find yourself in the position of having to correct a plausible, but impossible concept developed within the community.

4. Study Support (External to Staff, Single or Multi-Agency Involvement): SS-6's involvement in community study efforts insures that NRP systems are accurately presented in the study effort and that programmatic aspects of the study

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are properly addressed and interpreted. The staff is often required to plan and/or chair studies, as well as provide expert representation and accurate data inputs.

Prior to 1972, the NRO staff was mainly concerned with representing the program offices at the higher levels of government, interfacing the NRP to the rest of the government, and supporting the DNRO and ExCom with data on the systems as they sought to evolve to meet relatively static missions. After a transition period, which began in 1973 and which may not yet have reached the limits of activity, SS-6 continually plans, directs, conducts and participates in complex system trade studies which attempt to select those systems and variants which will be developed and flown. Studies are conducted not only to determine technical feasibility, but the optimum utility for the United States, considering a limited budget. The magnitude of this activity is such that the IC Staff has six professionals assigned who only work NRP imaging system studies. Neglect of this mission area through inadequate staffing could have significant results in the immediate future. As solutions are presented as a result of expensive and exhaustive studies, the entire study becomes invalid if the basic assumptions and facts were incorrect.

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Validation of the input data for studies is critical to the survival of an effectively managed program. Thorough validation is dependent upon adequate staff support to the study.

5. Analyses (Internal Staff Generated): The need for an analysis capability within the staff is critical to the staff's support of the DNRO. Prior to 1974, there were two separate analysis sections on the staff: the SS-4 Analysis Branch (2 officers, 1 enlisted), and the Office of the Scientific Advisor [redacted] (1 civilian, 3 officers). In 1974, with the departure of [redacted], the SS-4 Analysis Branch and the Office of the Scientific Advisor were consolidated into SS-6. The most important contribution of the Analysis Branch has been and will continue to be independent, unbiased analyses. This in-house analysis capability has been used with excellent success on many occasions. Examples of the use of this analysis capability are: The Effects of Weather on Near-Real-Time Imaging Systems, the Addendum to the previous study, [redacted] [redacted] and now bounding the Search Studies Analysis. Future trends in analysis requirements point toward a greatly increased need for this capability, as increased Congressional oversight demands more detailed and

precise justification of program decisions. Major decisions are on the horizon for both SIGINT and PHOTINT system mixes which will be supported by studies. These studies must be closely monitored by independent analyses to verify study assumptions and results. In addition, verification of the feasibility of multiple program options other than system mixes is important in support of the DNRO and the staff. The Analysis Branch does not have the manpower available to adequately support the projected analysis requirements of the staff. Considerable effort is being expended evaluating other government agency attempts to optimize resource allocation. These efforts are being undertaken within the present blanket level of effort support contract which at its present level is not adequate to address this problem.

As a compromise between greatly expanding the Analysis Branch with a goal of doing all of the analysis tasks in-house and maintaining current Analysis Branch size with level of effort study contracts available, the Analysis Branch should be expanded slightly by the addition of a senior officer or equivalent civilian proficient in SIGINT matters and possessing systems analysis experience. This manpower increase coupled with a level of effort study contract authority should permit the Analysis Branch to adequately support the staff. Failure to provide adequate analytical support will result in DNRO reliance on unchecked analysis provided by outside agencies.

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Furthermore, it will be very difficult to obtain analyses which are desired, unless the outside agency can be convinced of its utility.



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SS-7 plans, develops, monitors and guides the program content of the NRP within DNRO policy. This function has been accomplished over the years by the assignment of an officer for each of the major imaging and SIGINT programs of the NRP and with an officer responsible for R&D; one for photographic management of the film procurement, processing and associated R&D; and another for other program support activities, including launch schedules, Air Force Satellite Control Facility and frequency allocation and management. This arrangement has resulted in a small, efficient staff of experts, but did not make provisions for any deliberate overlap or backup capability among staff members. This was acceptable in a situation in which the workload was reasonably well defined and peaks could be accommodated by rescheduling, but is unacceptable in the current environment which requires rapid response to unpredictable questions from many sources as well as greater involvement in community studies. The major functions of SS-7 are described in the following paragraphs


1. Program Development: SS-7 has the primary responsibility for preparing and publishing the Director's Report to the CFI. In coordination with the NRO Comptroller

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and other staff elements, SS-7 prepares and analyzes issues, tradeoffs, priority conflicts and management approaches to develop options and supporting data for the DNRO's Recommended Program. Preparation of these reports requires several months of carefully scheduled preliminary work by the program offices and the staff based on CFI meeting dates in April, July and November. Recent unanticipated changes to these schedules have resulted in compressed schedules, incomplete reports and increased workloads.

2. Program Monitoring and Guidance: SS-7 provides descriptions of projects and reports of project activity for the DNRO, insuring that he is immediately advised of significant changes in project status. SS-7 monitors the program directors' conduct of each program, providing guidance on project implementation. Programs have tended to become larger, more complex and with more interfaces. As an example, the KENNEN program has complex technical and



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resources. The SIGINT systems are becoming increasingly interactive and thus requires that the staff monitors have increased technical and operational knowledge of all systems.

3. Program Support: Film procurement and processing, as well as launch vehicle support, AFSCF support and radio frequency allocations and management are included. SS-7 program management of film procurement, production, processing and associated R&D is expected to decrease over the next few years. For this reason, it is planned that the officer responsible for this activity will assume the position of Assistant for Imaging Systems, thus providing some backup for the imaging system monitors. Launch vehicle support has become a much more complex problem over the last year as involvement with the STS increases. Transition to the Shuttle will affect each of the systems which will exist in the mid-1980s time frame and is requiring greatly increased staff and management attention.

4. Advanced Technology and R&D: SS-7 serves as the NRO focal point for advanced technology and NRO-related R&D programs. Also provides program guidance, coordinates and issues program approvals, and recommends priorities. SS-7 analyzes new R&D programs to determine need, technical feasibility and cost effectiveness. This activity, in

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for GAMBIT, HEXAGON, and [ ] under one program element monitor will probably not be desirable as [ ] becomes an active developmental program leading to an early acquisition.

2. SIGINT Systems: In the past two years, the SIGINT area has grown from a two-man to a four-man operation. In many respects, this is an optimum size under normal workload conditions. It permits approximately one-man full time to monitor a given program. The branch chief has general responsibility and thus provides a degree of backup.

3. Technology/Applications: This has been a three-man effort, recently augmented by a fourth person on a temporary basis. There are a number of tasks not being adequately addressed, and they are described below.

a. R&D Program:

(1) Detailed R&D Project Review: Currently, for other than high-interest items, the most detailed project review occurs during the budget cycle and there is limited technical and programmatic review during the year--only fiscal. There should be quarterly program reviews at each program office. Further, there should be a review of each project, at the contractor's facility, no less often than every 18 months (critical manpower and travel fund shortages have precluded this). Projects are reviewed on an ad hoc basis with the

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program offices and the contractors are visited only as opportunities are available with other business while on TDY status.

(2) Close Monitoring of Related Non-NRP R&D:

To coordinate joint-interest R&D and to assure that BYEMAN restrictions are being observed, NRO representatives should attend major program reviews at NASA, DARPA, and to a lesser extent at NSA and CIA. Despite the fact that all these agencies have R&D directly related to NRO needs, a critical manpower shortage precludes all but a few such reviews (several per year). This is an area which will become increasingly important to the NRO as we experience the fund crunch of FY 78, and NASA and DARPA move increasingly into BYEMAN areas. It is also desirable that the NRO initiate a liaison with certain service laboratories.

(3) Congressional Justification: This is the first year of Congressional justification. The Air Staff currently prepares a considerable array of planning and programmatic documents for this purpose. If that is required for the AR/AT and AD accounts (it takes eight pages just to list all the projects), it will probably require a third of a man-year just to establish and maintain the justification documentation.

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(4) New Mission Technologies and Concepts:

The early investigation of new mission technologies requires concentrated staff support (SS-4 and SS-6 as well as SS-7) due to the large number of interface meetings with potential users and requirements groups. Examples are [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Each requires a series of iterative meetings with using groups to derive a viable system concept. As the R&D Advisory Council has stated, it is mandatory that the traditional walls of organizational prerogatives be removed between the requirements groups, collectors and processors, and disseminators. This can only be achieved through a major increase in coordination and discussion with these groups.

(5) Resolving Technical Program Office Disputes:

Advancing some exotic technologies requires considerable funding and often only a very few projects can be funded. In such cases, the competition between program offices requires choosing one to the exclusion of the other. The Mass Memory Program is an example. Both Program A and Program B were supporting [redacted] CCD technology, but only one could be afforded. A considerable independent technical analysis was required and a single project was selected. Very little of this type of effort can be performed due to manpower limitations, resulting in funding inefficiencies which need not exist.

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CONTROL SYSTEM(6) Non-National Command Authority (NCA)

Missions (Staff Coordination): As the NRP becomes more involved in non-NCA missions (tactical and economic), the amount of coordination with other staffs increases significantly. Although the prime office for interfacing with the tactical users is SS-6, nevertheless SS-7 is also involved. The current AR/AT project looking at advanced ocean surveillance missions requires continuous coordination with Program C, the operational Navy, ASD(I), and ODDR&E. As we become further involved, the amount of such coordination, just in the R&D field, will increase drastically.

(7) Staying Abreast of Critical Technologies:

NRO technology needs cover a wide range. Many fields are expanding very rapidly (i.e., imaging CCDs) and much of the relevant work is non-government. Just staying abreast of the technology we are attempting to harness and apply is an exhaustive task. Right now the only source of such information comes from reading journals. There is almost no attendance at technical seminars.

b. Mission Support: The mission support functions are greatly increasing in scope. The mission support officer is responsible for the NRO interface with the STS (Space Shuttle), launch vehicles, SCF, and radio frequency communities.

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Prior to June 1976, these duties could adequately be covered by one staff officer; however, staff actions associated with the Shuttle now require the full-time attention of one staff officer. The mission support functions are summarized below.

(1) Space Shuttle: The increased emphasis on the Shuttle requires that the NRO/STS program staff officer be fully cognizant of all aspects of the STS as they relate to the performance of the missions and functions of the NRO. He must participate with and support the DNRO and NRO staff in the activities of the DOD/NASA STS Committee and DOD STS Users Committee. He must participate, as the DNRO's representative, in the Payload Accommodation Working Group (PAWG) meetings which are held every 4-6 weeks. The mission support staff officer maintains a close working relationship with the Air Staff Office of Space (AF/RDS) and ODDR&E (Space and Advanced Systems) to insure that all information or actions of NRO interest are provided to the NRO, and that NRO information impacting on the DOD STS planning and activities is provided to AF/RDS. He is responsible for the timely, efficient and cost-effective transition of the NRP to the STS as a primary launch vehicle, to include budget and fiscal planning, payload transition studies and analysis, operations and multi-agency interface

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concepts, and transition planning. These responsibilities require continual interface with [ ] AF/RDS, ODDR&E, contractors (such as [ ] [ ]), and launch facilities at Vandenberg AFB, KSC, and the SCF.


(2) Launch Vehicle/SCF: Concurrently with the NRP transition to the STS as the primary launch vehicle, the mission support officer is also responsible for the interface with AF/RDS for the current launch vehicle requirements of the NRO. This also involves coordination with the launch facilities as well as the SCF. To date, SCF responsibilities have not been adequately addressed.

(3) Radio Frequency: The mission support officer is also responsible for radio frequency coordination as it pertains to the NRP. An increasing number of operational satellites, increasing channel capabilities, and higher data rates necessitating expanded bandwidths have terminated the era during which the NRO could unilaterally build and operate satellites without causing interference. There is an international conference scheduled to meet in Geneva in 1979. This conference will address the international reallocation of frequency bands. The United States' positions are in the process of being formulated. NASA is presently

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wanting to "legitimize" the use of certain frequency bands for space usage and to eliminate the directionality of other bands. There could be a severe impact (conflict) with the NRP programs if this becomes the United States' position. The NRO must maintain a firm position in order that NASA's desires do not adversely affect the NRP. Although SS-5 and SS-6 are involved, the SS-7 staff officer will be deeply involved in this area in the future. At present, a potential



4. Other Factors: Increased oversight by Congress and OMB requires briefings, studies, and commitments to programs and policies much sooner than was previously required. A few are summarized below.

a. Budget Normalization: An additional R&D slot was authorized for January 1976. At the time, it was anticipated that, with increasing Congressional support and more active OMB involvement, etc., an extra man would only mean we did not lose ground. In fact, we are losing ground. Congressional support has been significant, i.e., HF Study and HAC investigating teams. OMB inquiry is at an unprecedented level of

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detail. The OMB examiner is now interested in individual R&D projects, rather than overall support R&D accounts.

b. Proliferation of Committees and Studies:

Difficult interface problems with other agencies are becoming epidemic. We are still required to  BYEMAN intrusions. NASA Shuttle continues to mushroom. NASA has now started a major campaign in the frequency allocation area. The NRO continues to participate in community studies, including the response to NSDM 333. Extensive coordination has commenced with white elements.

c. Survivability: The survivability area is rapidly expanding and currently requires the full-time efforts of one man and a large amount of effort of another. It is anticipated that survivability will become system evaluation criteria in the future and will require an increase in staff coordination with users, threat community, SPOs, and white equivalents. The survivability support previously provided by SS-5 is not now available.

d. CFI Preparations: When SS-7 is deeply involved in CFI preparations, the NRO has experienced especially heavy workloads, which have not allowed enough time for adequate review. At these times, outside organizational staffs (ASD(I), IC, DIA, NSA) are all trying to prepare position papers for their principals on the NRP issues in our report.

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This takes place at the same time that we are in the process of writing and putting the Director's Report together and causes considerable impact. Many briefings and presentations are also scheduled during these periods when we are preparing for CFI or budget presentation meetings. Special studies are also programmed to be completed during these critical times and represents additional demands for meetings and review of documentation.

e. Priority Items: In our everyday activities, not during periods of high activity, it is sometimes difficult to plan TDY trips, meetings, and schedule leave because of the very short fuses associated with many of the assigned action items. SS-7 is constantly on-call for an immediate response in many cases. Because of our streamlined nature, there is very little backup available and it is difficult to plan more than a few days in advance without some impact.

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The NRO Comptroller and his staff (2 officers and a secretary) are attempting to cope with the dramatic increase in intelligence community interfaces and the demands for increasing amounts of supporting financial data. The more traditional role of the NRO Comptroller which was concerned primarily with outlining the funding requirements of the NRP to the DNRO and ExCom and insuring that the actual funds received were properly controlled through adequate policies, procedures, and records has been expanded to include outlining financial requirements to the CFI and its expanded staff support. Attempts to normalize the NRP have required more interface with staff elements within the Department of Defense that handle the various accounts and appropriations.

1. External Funding: Up until five years ago, almost all of the funds expended by the NRP were contained within the NRP budget. Today over 10 percent of the yearly funds expended by the NRP come from offices and agencies outside the NRP. This creates significantly more financial interfaces (from one or two to now about 11) that require various amounts of financial data to support their contributions.

2. Congressional Review: The recent emergence of Congress, as a voting member with the Executive Branch in

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the proper execution of the NRP, has also created additional justification/briefing requirements that require an auditable trail to the more management-oriented financial displays used by the NRP and CFI.

3. Financial Management: The increased demands in the financial management area are generally being met. There are isolated instances where the level of detail being provided is questioned (OMB and the Air Staff), but thus far the NRO has been able to satisfy the important requirements.

4. Fiscal Control: The area which provides both a workload cushion to cover the immediate requirements and at the same time must always be accomplished is the fiscal control or records area of our activity. The current year approvals, reprogramming actions, tracking of commitments/obligations/expenditures and the maintenance of historical records may be sidelined for the immediate time frame but must always be returned to when time causes a reprogramming action/need for historical data to raise in priority such that an immediate requirement is stalled pending completion. The frequency at which this is now happening is increasing. The pressure to defer TDYs, leaves, etc., is greater. These are indicators that more personnel resources will be required or that the impact of increased interfaces be reduced/minimized.

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The general conclusion of this study is that the NRO staff and Comptroller function require additional manning in certain critical areas. However, it is felt that a large increase in manning is not warranted. It is the consensus of the staff and the Comptroller that the NRO should continue to operate as much as possible with a small group of highly trained and motivated professionals. Expanding the staff to a level more comparable to the Air Staff manning standards is felt to be counter-productive and would undoubtedly generate more external requests for information and an acceleration of the normalization process.

There are two approaches to increasing the manning. The first is to expand the number of Army, Navy and NSA billets while maintaining the current level of USAF manning. The second is to increase USAF manning along with selection Army, Navy, NSA and CIA resources. In view of the national nature of the NRO and in light of the USAF manning ceilings of the Secretariat, there is a strong argument to support an increase in the proportion of Army, Navy and NSA manning on the staff. The rationale for this conclusion is discussed in detail in Annex L of Part II to the Self Study Report.

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The only advantage is that, in general terms, the Army and the Navy currently do not possess a large cadre of space-trained personnel. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that there is not a career pattern for an officer to specialize in space in the Army and the Navy.

Increasing the Air Force manning, in view of the Secretariat's ceiling and pending cuts, is extremely difficult. If a manning increase for Air Force positions were approved, then it would have to be at the expense of other activities within the Secretariat. These constraints may mitigate against this approach; however, there is another way of achieving the goal of more Air Force positions. The way involves the transfer of positions within the SAC, which could be interpreted as non-staff type functions to the Central Control Group or the successor to the Central Control Group. SAC activity which could be so interpreted is the operational activity of SS-4. This would be a legitimate manpower transfer and consistent with the SAC Air Staff policy of making sure that headquarters slots are as they are advanced. If this option is adopted, then the staff would reduce three officers and three DAF civilian secretaries.

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Based upon a review of the current workload and clearly identified projected trends, the study offers the following conclusions concerning future manning increases.

1. SS-2: Although the present workload in SS-2 is excessive, the assignment of an administrative officer in late September will provide the resources to permit SS-2 to adequately perform the executive support functions.

2. SS-3: The manning in the security area is insufficient to provide the necessary security policy guidance which is so vital in today's environment. The firm control of security policy that the NRO has always maintained is diminishing due to a lack of resources. The study concludes that SS-3 should be authorized additional manning.

3. SS-4: The manning level in SS-4 is greatly dependent upon the role that the DNRO wishes to assume in satellite operations. If it is determined that SS-4 should function as a systems operator, then the SIGINT operations area will require some additional manning. The answer to this question is also very much dependent upon the resolution of the question as to whether NSA will be given the responsibility to control all aspects of SIGINT satellite operations with the exception of safety of flight. If NSA is to become the systems operator, then there are several options available. These run from assigning a few officers to the Fort, to

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eliminating our presence there entirely and turning all aspects of the on-orbit operations over to NSA as soon as the payloads are initialized in orbit.

At the present time, there is little requirement to change the present photo operations although COMIREX has demonstrated an intent to take over more control of photo operations. There is a possibility that the CCF will create a requirement for 24-hour action with the GAMBIT and HEXAGON systems, as well as the KENNEN. Unless ICRS goes to a 24-hour operation, the odd-hour requirements now received are adequately supported by our photo operations standby duty officer. The present attention given to the USSR anti-satellite threat, however, combined national policies may require a 24-hour SS-4 operation.

4. SS-5: This function is in need of additional officer and secretarial manning. The combined increased workload has left this office in a totally defensive mode. The staff officers work pressing projects to the exclusion of those longer range projects or those items which have not been suspended, but nevertheless are critical to the NRO policy function.

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It is felt that efficiencies can be realized by making certain internal adjustments. This study concludes that the SS-3 function should be consolidated under SS-5. Consideration should also be given to transferring the logistics support officer in SS-4 to SS-5 as recommended in the Self Study.

5. SS-6: In view of the fact that the depth and scope of studies are ever expanding and in view of the fact that the interface with the tactical users in each service is increasing, the study concludes that SS-6 requires an increase in engineering capability.

SS-6 is now short a Navy O-6 position due to the transfer of that slot to SS-7. It is felt that this position should be re-established to permit a continuation of the active interface with the Navy operational commands.

6. SS-7: The increased workload in support of the CFI, OMB, and Congress has resulted in a situation which requires a small increase in manpower to provide the level of programmatic detail being requested. The long established NRO staff policy of one man per functional area with no overlap is no longer adequate in an environment of many simultaneous staff actions and increased study and committee representation, as a result a greater degree of cross-training and backup

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capability must be established in order to be responsive to increased tasking and still allow a reasonable leave and TDY policy. Depending upon the decisions of the next CFI,

[redacted] survives the October CFI at presently approved or increased funding levels. An additional secretarial slot is required to provide the necessary support in the ever-increasing administrative activities.

7. Comptroller: In light of the increased requests for financial and programming information, more detailed and timely financial record-keeping will be required. Since the two officers currently assigned to [redacted] are spending considerably more time interfacing with external staffs and agencies on program control and higher level budget matters, less time is now available for their execution of the internal NRO accounting and record-keeping functions at a period in time when increased emphasis is needed in support of these functions.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

SS-3

Create a new billet for an Air Force security officer. ✓  
The officer should be in the senior O-3 or O-4 level.

SS-4

Upon retirement of TSgt Merkey, convert the NCO slot to an officer's billet.

Arrange to fill the SS-4 Fort Meade  vacancy by the assignment of an additional SIGINT action officer.

SS-5

Current and anticipated future requirements support the addition of an officer and a DAF civilian secretary. ✓

SS-6

Establish a senior Navy position and fill it with an officer with an engineering background as well as operational expertise.

Explore the possibilities of obtaining a GS-13/14 SIGINT staff officer from NSA.

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Authorize an additional officer to provide sufficient resources in the imagery area.

Establish an additional DAF civilian secretary slot.

COMPTROLLER

Since many of the time-consuming functions in the Comptroller area are mechanical accounting activities and require extensive interface with normal Air Force budget, accounting and finance activities, it is recommended that a DAF GS-9 accounting and finance specialist be authorized. The position should be established with the provision for promotion to GS-11 and that an individual be selected based upon fiscal control experience.

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM~~TOP SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY BYEMAN 1 EXEMPT FROM  
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CODE  
A50560 (REF. APPROV. PAL/MS/01)CONTROL NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
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PAGE 78 OF \_\_\_\_\_ PAGES

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**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

RECAP

	<u>MILITARY</u>	<u>CIVILIAN</u>
SS-3	1	0
SS-4	0	0
SS-5	1	1
SS-6	1	1
SS-7	1	1
Comptroller	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	4	4

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

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GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION DATE  
09/04/2011 BY 60322 PJS

CONTROL NO \_\_\_\_\_  
COPY \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES  
PAGE 79 OF \_\_\_\_\_ PAGES

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INDEX OF ATTACHMENTS

Attachment

- 1 NRO Staff Manning
- 2 NRO Manning During 1964-1976  
(with comparison with ASDI and IC Staffs)
- 3 Access Requests
- 4 Number of Studies During 1968-1976
- 5 Number of Non-NRO Committees Requiring  
Active Membership During 1968-1976
- 6 Front End and/or Systems Briefings  
During 1969-1976 (Strictly SS-5)
- 7 Overtime for DAF Civilians (FY 1971-76)

~~SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN  
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

NRO STAFF MANNING

AS OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1976

	DIRECTOR		EXECUTIVE		SECURITY		OPERATIONS		POLICY		CONCEPTS & APPLIC		PROGRAMS		STAFF TOTALS	
	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
<u>MILITARY</u>																
USAF OFF	1	1	2	2	1	1	3	5	4	4	4	5**	6	6	21	24
USAF ENL			4	5*			1	1							5	6
AWS (AF OFF)							2	2							2	2
DMA (AF OFF)													1	1	1	1
USAF TOTAL	1	1	6	7	1	1	6	8	4	4	4	5	7	7	29	33
USA OFF							2	2			3	3	2	2	7	7
USA ENL							1	1							1	1
USA TOTAL							3	3			3	3	2	2	8	8
USN OFF							2	2			1	1	2	2	5	5
USN ENL											3	3			3	3
USN TOTAL							2	2			4	4	2	2	8	8
MIL TOTALS	1	1	6	7	1	1	11	13	4	4	11	12	11	11	45	49
<u>CIVILIAN</u>																
DAF	1	1	2	2	1	1	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	14	14
CIA					1	1	5	5					2	3	8	9
NSA													1	1	1	1
CIV TOTALS	1	1	2	2	2	2	8	8	2	2	2	2	6	7	23	24
OVERALL	2	2	8	9	3	3	19	21	6	6	13	14	17	18	68	73


\*One SS-2 Position on UDL, SAF Project Office, Washington Navy Yard (NPIC)

\*\*One SS-6 Position on UDL, SAF Project Office, Fort Belvoir

Atch 1  
Page 81

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MANNING




Attachment 2

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GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION DATE

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ACCESS REQUESTS




----- Projected  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Actual

Attachment 3

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NUMBER OF STUDIES




----- Projected  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Actual

NOTES: (1) SS-6 was established in 1974.

Attachment 4

~~TOP SECRET~~

NUMBER OF NON-NRO COMMITTEES REQUIRING ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP\*



----- Projected  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Actual

- \*Space Policy Committee
- \*STS Verification Panel
- \*DIB - Production/Resources
- \*PAWG
- \*IR&DC
- \*SIGINT/SORS
- \*COMIREX/ICRS
- \*DSB


Attachment 5

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GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13526 AND 13526-A.

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FRONT END AND/OR SYSTEMS BRIEFINGS  
1969-1976\*



----- Projected  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Actual


\*Strictly SS-5

Attachment 6

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GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF

~~TOP SECRET~~

DAF CIVILIAN OVERTIME  
FY 1971-76



R = Requested

S = Spent

Attachment 7