INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

21 August 1975

The Honorable James W. Plummer
Under Secretary of the Air Force
Washington, D. C. 20330

Dear Mr. Plummer:

Attached is a copy of the report Jack Kulpa prepared for me and the DCI prior to his departure. I am forwarding this copy to you for information with no action required.

I believe that the Director is planning to pursue some of the suggested thoughts contained in Jack's report.

Sincerely,

WHEELER

Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

Attachment
BYE 111306-75

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INFORMATION

NATIONAL IMAGERY PLAN FOR SATELLITES (NIPS)

The National Imagery Plan for Satellites is the companion document to the National SIGINT Plan and the National HUMINT Sources Plan; ultimately leading to a National Foreign Intelligence Plan or strategy. The objective of the NIPS is to provide visibility into today's activities or planning, and into the alternatives available for the future. For each of the alternatives the consequences (benefits/resource commitments, etc.) will be provided. It is not intended that this plan will take the place of any existing document or decision mechanism; rather, it should provide the DCI, the ExCom and the National Security Council or the President, the information necessary to gain a better insight into what can be expected today and the opportunities for the future. Likewise, it will be one of a set of planning documents which should be of great value to the DCI in future relations with Congress and Congressional oversight.

It also will provide lower echelons with an authoritative source of information from which they may understand current activities and future alternatives, allowing them to develop their own plans and strategies accordingly. The NIPS has been designed to look at the entire spectrum of imaging over a fifteen year time period. This approach is reflected in the annexes to the NIPS. There are six annexes:

Annex A: Requirements
Annex B: Collection
Annex C: Exploitation
Annex D: Dissemination
Annex E: Military Operational Use
Annex F: Fiscal Implications

Each Annex is divided into three sections; the current time period, which includes the current fiscal year and the budget year; the mid-term period, which includes the budget year through the FYDP; and a five to fifteen year futures projection. The main body of the plan will be organized by time periods, looking at the entire imaging system for each of the three time periods. An outline for the NIPS appears in Attachment A.

Development of the NIPS has been a joint effort between the NRO and the Intelligence Community. The IC Staff has acted as a focal point for the Intelligence Community,

making assignments, monitoring progress, and eventually will coordinate and publish the plan. The NRO, in addition to writing Annex B, will be responsible for consolidating the information in each of the Annexes into the main body of the plan and producing a coordinated draft. Attachment B shows the flow of information in the development of the NIPS, indicates the organization responsible for each Annex, and the scheduled completion dates.

Due primarily to the impact of the Photo Resolution and Photo Search Studies, the scheduled completion of the NIPS has been revised. Originally, we had planned to have a copy with preliminary Community coordination available for review before the end of 1975. It now appears that this will be adjusted to the first half of 1976.

Preliminary information has been passed since early in the year to allow development of the draft Annexes. We have already received early drafts of some of the sections of the NIPS and expect that working drafts of all sections of the Annexes will be completed by November. Section III of Annex A, The Futures Trend Projection of the Requirements Annex, is key to the development of other Futures Sections and has given us some difficulty in getting it developed. To get some activity started I have tasked MPRRD of the IC Staff to develop the first draft. With the first draft we plan to work with the NIOs and the Community to develop the final form. This may also be helpful in triggering other futures work within the Community.

Annex E, "Military Operational Use," is a recent addition to the NIPS and will be of major significance. It will represent a big step in recognizing military use of national assets as a legitimate objective, provide a better understanding of potentials and shortfalls, and help to foster military interest in developing their own concepts and planning. [redacted], is responsible for producing the first draft. We are working very closely with the JCS Joint Staff, but are staying out of their formal arena. Within a few weeks we should have the first draft, [redacted] will then take it out to the field to allow for early military operational user involvement. Attachment C provides a detailed outline of Annex E and an indication of the tentative list of military operational organizations we plan to touch base with.

The development of the NIPS is a major effort and it appears that it will prove to be one of the better expenditures of manpower resources. Eventually, the NIPS will provide an organized, easily understandable treatment of very complex, multi-agency endeavors. Even if the first annual edition does not reach this ultimate potential, it will still represent a major and very significant milestone to the Intelligence Community and future plan iterations should show marked improvements and sophistication.

NATIONAL IMAGING PLAN FOR SATELLITES

ANNEX C
Exploitation in National Imagery Planning

Part I: Current Exploitation in National Imagery Planning--1975-1976
Part II: Mid-Term Exploitation Objectives Planning--1976-1981
Part III: Long-Range Perspective and Estimates--1980-1990

ANNEX D
Dissemination in National Imagery Planning

Part I: Current Dissemination Capabilities--1975-1976
Part II: Mid-Term Objectives Planning for Dissemination--1976-1981
Part III: Information Handling and Intelligence Interfaces: Long-Range Perspective and Estimates--1980-1990

ANNEX E
Military Operational Use of National Imagery

Part I: Current Utilization--1975-1976
Part II: Mid-Term Utilization--1976-1981
Part III: Long-Range Utilization--1980-1990

ANNEX F
Fiscal Considerations in National Imagery Planning

Part I: Current Fiscal Capabilities--1975-1976
Part II: Fiscal Guidelines and Considerations for the Mid-Term Objectives--1976-1981
Part III: Objectives and Fiscal Implications--1980-1990

NATIONAL IMAGING P

		Working Drafts	
		Responsibility	Date Due
ANNEX A			
	Requirements in National Imagery Planning		
Part I:	Requirements in the Current Capabilities Plan—1975–76	ICRS/COMIREX	30 Sept
Part II:	Requirements in the Mid-Term Objectives Plan—1976–81	ICRS/COMIREX	30 Sept
Part III:	Long-Range Perspective and Estimates—1980–90	IC/MPRRD	30 Aug
ANNEX B			
	Collection in National Imagery Planning		
Part I:	Current Collection Capabilities—1975–76	NRO	Completed
Part II:	Mid-Term Collection Objectives Plan—1976–81	NRO	Completed
Part III:	Collection Technology: Long-Range Perspective and Estimates—1980–90	NRO	30 Sept
ANNEX C			
	Exploitation in National Imagery Planning		
Part I:	Current Exploitation in National Imagery Planning—1975–76	EXSUBCOM/COMIREX	25 July
Part II:	Mid-Term Exploitation Objectives Planning—1976–81	EXSUBCOM/COMIREX	30 Sept
Part III:	Long-Range Perspective and Estimates—1980–90	EXSUBCOM/COMIREX	30 Sept
ANNEX D			
	Dissemination in National Imagery Planning		
Part I:	Current Dissemination Capabilities—1975–76	IHC/USIB	5 Sept
Part II:	Mid-Term Objectives Planning for Dissemination—1976–81	IHC/USIB	14 Nov
Part III:	Information Handling & Intelligence Interfaces: Long-Range Perspective & Estimates—1980–90	IHC/USIB	28 Nov
ANNEX E			
	Military Operational Use of National Imagery		
Part I:	Current Utilization—1975–76	IC/PDP	15 Sept
Part II:	Mid-Term Utilization—1976–81	IC/PDP	15 Sept
Part III:	Long-Range Utilization—1980–90	IC/PDP	15 Sept
ANNEX F			
	Fiscal Considerations in National Imagery Planning		
Part I:	Current Fiscal Capabilities—1975–76	IC/MPRRD	30 Sept
Part II:	Fiscal Guidelines and Considerations for the Mid-Term Objectives—1976–81	IC/MPRRD	15 Nov
Part III:	Objectives and Fiscal Implications—1980–90	IC/MPRRD	15 Nov

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Attachment 13

LAN FOR SATELLITES

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BODY OF PLAN



Attachment C

ANNEX E

Military Operational Use of National Imagery

Part I: Current Utilization--1975-1976

A. Operational Utilization
   1. Peace-time
   2. Crisis period
   3. Hostilities

B. Needs
   1. Peace-time
      a. Type of product
      b. Quality
      c. Quantity
      d. Timeliness

   2. Crisis Period
      a. Type of product
      b. Quality
      c. Quantity
      d. Timeliness

   3. Hostilities
      a. Type of product
      b. Quality
      c. Quantity
      d. Timeliness

C. Exploitation and Dissemination
   1. Peace-time
   2. Crisis period
   3. Hostilities

Part II: Mid-Term Utilization--1976-1981

A. Operational Utilization
   1. Peace-time
   2. Crisis period
   3. Hostilities

B. Needs
   1. Peace-time
      a. Type of product
      b. Quality
      c. Quantity
      d. Timeliness

Part II: Continued

2. Crisis Period
   a. Type of product
   b. Quality
   c. Quantity
   d. Timeliness

3. Hostilities
   a. Type of product
   b. Quality
   c. Quantity
   d. Timeliness

C. Exploitation and Dissemination
   1. Peace-time
   2. Crisis period
   3. Hostilities

Part III: Long-Range Utilization--1980-1990

A. Operational Utilization
   1. Peace-time
   2. Crisis period
   3. Hostilities

B. Needs
   1. Peace-time
      a. Type of product
      b. Quality
      c. Quantity
      d. Timeliness

   2. Crisis Period
      a. Type of product
      b. Quality
      c. Quantity
      d. Timeliness

   3. Hostilities
      a. Type of product
      b. Quality
      c. Quantity
      d. Timeliness

C. Exploitation and Dissemination
   1. Peace-time
   2. Crisis period
   3. Hostilities

Tentatively we are planning that the draft of Annex E to the National Imaging Plan for Satellites, "Military Operational Use of National Imagery" will be discussed and worked with:

1. JCS - J-2 (DIA) - J-3 (Operations) - J-5 (Plans)
2. EUCOM
   a. USAFE
   b. USAREUR
   c. NAVEUR
   d. Sixth Fleet
3. PACOM
   a. CINCPACFLT
   b. PACAF
   c. Seventh Fleet
   d. Fifth Air Force
   e. Eighth Army
4. SAC, TAC, REDCOM, FORCOM, LANTCOM, CINCLANTFLT

Discussions will be on working level middle management of Plans, Operations and Intelligence Divisions.

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PLANNING PROCESS

The United States Intelligence Community is made up of a variety of segments, each of which has its own management structure, fiscal process, goals, and in many instances, independent power bases within the Government. Within this environment, the President and Congress increasingly look to the DCI to provide leadership in the efficient management and effective operation of the National Foreign Intelligence Program--a task and responsibility of fantastic magnitude and complexity.

Several Advisory Boards and Committees, as well as procedures and mechanisms, have been established to help facilitate accomplishment. Intrinsic to all of these techniques is a recognition of the importance of creating a flow of information among the various elements of the Community so that the individual program and functional managers have a common understanding of national goals and objectives. Also, the DCI and the senior level managers, decision makers and users of intelligence should have an understanding of the current and projected capabilities and limitations, as well as the future potential of each of the elements and of the total Intelligence Community. Another significant step toward improving the flow of information and the overall DCI leadership position would be the establishment of a National Foreign Intelligence Planning Process (NFIP).

The concept of comprehensive Community-wide planning of intelligence activities is new and still viewed with a degree of skepticism in certain elements of the Community and little or no effort has been devoted to conceptualizing and defining a Community planning process or system. However, a degree of formal national foreign intelligence planning at the Community level was initiated in 1974 and planning at the program level has long been established.

The Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy has clearly perceived the need for, and the possibility of, more comprehensive Community-wide planning of intelligence activities:

"Under the direction of the DCI, the IC Staff should expand perspectives for intelligence into an annually revised multi-year plan for the allocation of responsibilities across the Intelligence Community. The plan should be reviewed by the USIB and approved by the NSCIC."

In the latter part of 1974, the DCI established a Principal Deputy for Planning in the IC Staff, with the responsibility of staffing and coordinating national intelligence planning. Since that time, the first iteration of a National SIGINT Plan has been completed, and a National Imagery Plan for Satellites and a National Human Sources Plan have been started. For the most part, these efforts have been unilateral in nature, lacking a concept or plan for addressing "an annually revised multi-year plan for the allocation of responsibilities across the Intelligence Community."

Planning can be defined as the process of deciding where you want to go and what methods and means should be used to get there. It involves making predictions about the conditions of a future environment, setting objectives and goals, and then establishing the policies, programs and procedures for achieving them. In addition, planning of course involves the selection of suitable alternatives from a myriad of choices.

Many of these elements are already present in existing efforts which, with modifications and additions, can form a framework for a comprehensive national intelligence plan.

The following provides a conceptual framework for a National Foreign Intelligence Planning Process (or System) and suggests some initial steps toward its implementation. It can be used as either a model for an overall NFIP planning system or as a guide for introducing new planning elements and actions as appropriate. The overall process is depicted on the foldout attachment.

The primary planning components of the proposed system are three time-phased plans which make up the section of the chart entitled, National Foreign Intelligence "Plans and Strategy." These are the National Foreign Intelligence Capabilities Plan, Objectives Plan and Long Range Study. Since the preponderance of intelligence resources are within DoD programs, an important consideration with respect to any NFIP planning system is that it is compatible with

current DoD/JCS planning procedures. The components suggested above are conceptually compatible with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan and the Joint Long-Range Strategic Study in the JCS planning system.

The second principal component of the proposed planning system are the plans which make up the group called, National Foreign Intelligence "Functional Plans." These are the National Foreign Intelligence Production Plan, SIGINT Plan, Imagery Plan, Human Sources Plan, and Research and Development Plan. Three of these plans are in existence or in development today. The work of the Intelligence Research and Development Council of IRAC makes it apparent that an R&D plan can be effectively developed from a set of IR&D Council documents, reports and special plans. A National Foreign Intelligence Production Plan also is essential and considering the recent discussions of this function in both the Executive and Congress, it could be our payoff function.

Each of the five functional plans proposed will identify current capabilities, mid-term objectives and plans, and long range trends, which will serve to feed the primary planning components discussed in the paragraph above. Thus, it is clear that the workhorse of the proposed planning process will be the functional plans.

At the top of the attached chart in a broken-lined box entitled, National Foreign Intelligence "Policy Objectives" are the instruments which must logically drive the proposed planning process. They are, (a) Current Objectives and KIQs, (b) Mid-Term Priorities (DCID 1/2), and (c) Long Range Perspectives. At the present time the first two items are produced by the DCI as Community guidance. Long Range perspectives are currently being developed as Part IV of the draft 1976 DCI Perspectives paper. Additional work will have to be done to tailor these documents before they become effective instruments in the proposed planning system.

It is recognized that the proposed National Foreign Intelligence Planning System will probably take several years to implement fully. However, until a basic plan design is established and accepted by the Community, our planning efforts will essentially be fragmented, uncoordinated and without common purpose.

A suggested action which will help to focus the Community's attention on the DCI's desires in the planning area is a National Foreign Intelligence Planning Seminar, the theme of which will be the organization, management and orchestration of the National Foreign Intelligence Plan and planning system. Such a seminar should have representatives from the Intelligence Community's agencies and departments and their principal planners. It would include presenting prepared papers covering planning at both the national and departmental level, with panel discussions on various aspects of the proposed National Foreign Intelligence Planning System. The primary objective of the seminar would be to initiate a dialogue and understanding of the NFIP planning.

Preliminary planning for this Seminar is now under way. A proposal will be provided for DCI consideration in mid-August.

Proposed National Foreign I



DCI/USIB/IRAC JURISDICTIC

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ntelligence Planning System



NATIONAL INTELIGENCE SUPPORT TO MILITARY FIELD COMMANDERS

The President's memorandum of 5 November 1971 highlighted the DCI's responsibility for all intelligence programs, including tactical intelligence. With few exceptions, tactical intelligence assets fall outside the NFIP. They include units and activities organic to the operating military forces and also strategic warning systems, military department and theater intelligence staffs, and R&D projects.

The DCI's objectives for the Intelligence Community for FY 1974 and FY 1975 included, as an objective, the improvement of the interface between national intelligence and the intelligence support to commanders.

In October 1974, the Principal Deputy for Plans, IC Staff (PD/DCI/IC), was assigned the responsibility to review and help define military intelligence needs and to look for ways that national assets could support military forces. Since then, several activities have been initiated, the one receiving the most attention has been the Pilot Study, "National Intelligence Support To The Field Commanders." An interim status report, discussing the objectives, scope, approach, limitations and potential pay-off areas, was provided in April 1975. This report will simply update the status of the pilot study, identify other activities and provide some personal observations of this very complex arena.

The pilot study has proceeded on schedule since the interim report. The Theater Working Group has completed its assessment of theater capabilities to meet a representative sample of theater intelligence information needs. It has identified information gaps, timeliness factors and constraints on the employment of theater intelligence assets. The National Working Group has completed its assessment of national intelligence capabilities against the same representative sample of theater information needs, and against assumed national information needs for the scenario situation and area of operations. The majority of the overall study report is now in draft form. The Study Group must still review the report and develop its conclusions and recommendations. These actions should be completed and the report ready for printing by early September.

Our expectations for the results of the pilot study are unchanged from those I identified in my interim status report. I think it safe, however, to advance two tentative conclusions:

-- National intelligence capabilities can in many cases supplement theater intelligence assets, but it is unlikely that they can replace or substitute for combat intelligence assets organic to the operating forces.

-- There are important theater intelligence needs that cannot now be met with high confidence by either theater or national intelligence assets. Finding ways to fill these gaps should be a major focus of future studies of the national/ tactical intelligence interface.

A most significant approach towards improving the national intelligence support to the military field commanders should be Annex E of the NIPS. This Annex was discussed in some detail in the NIPS Section of this report. At this point, I would like to reiterate that Annex E will attempt to direct the key problems of proposed military utilization in terms of the entire cycle; collection, dissemination, and exploitation for various levels of conflict. An attempt has been made to include the involvement of the JCS, CINCs and component commanders during the early phases of development of the NIPS Annex E. During future iterations of the National SIGINT Plan, a similar approach to addressing military utilization should be considered.

In addition to the Pilot Study and Annex E of the NIPS, the PD/DCI/IC is involved in a third major arena of investigation concerning the potential interaction of national intelligence with military/tactical users. This is the Electro-Magnetic Intercept and Position Fixing Subcommittee of the Intelligence Research and Development Council. This body has been chartered to develop a common technology base among tactical SIGINT programs. In effect, it will identify and evaluate in an European-type scenario many current and proposed tactical SIGINT collection and location systems. This baseline should prove very useful in formulating a better understanding of the interaction of those systems with national capabilities.

Creation of a better mutual understanding with the military users has resulted from an increased number of direct personal contacts with these military users of intelligence. For instance, within the past six months I have

personally spoken to CINCSAC, SACEUR, SACLANT and all the U.S. component commanders in Europe and their staffs. [redacted], has maintained excellent contacts with numerous Navy, Army and Air Force operational units, and is frequently called upon to provide them with information and assistance that they would not be able to obtain elsewhere. In the near future, he will be visiting many of the operational commands to solicit their inputs for Annex E of the NIPS and to discuss the results of the Pilot Study. Numerous other visits by members of the IC Staff and USIB Committees and recent meetings at CIA Headquarters in support of the Photo Studies have not only helped to develop a better mutual understanding but, more importantly, they have been an indication of DCI interest to these military users.

My personal observations, which I have drawn from the Pilot Study efforts and other involvements during three years on the NRO and the IC Staffs are provided here for your information and consideration.

-- My overall observation is that, although there has been a great improvement recently, there is still a critical need to further improve the dialogue and the understanding between the military combat forces and the National Intelligence Community.

-- The current mechanisms within the USIB and its Committees are not totally adequate to accomplish this task and should be modified and/or augmented to improve the communications flow between the CINCs and the component commanders and the key members of the Intelligence Community.

-- There is a need for the military to understand more fully the present and potential capabilities and limitations of national assets. Secondly, military concepts and procedures need to be developed for utilizing these assets within the planned command and control and expected operational environments.

-- Increasing attention needs to be given to potential military operational use and to early involvement of the military users during the conceptual phases of planning for national intelligence systems.

-- In the near term, efforts should concentrate on improving support to the military tactical commander

as opposed to attempting to reduce or eliminate tactical assets through the substitution of national capabilities.

-- National intelligence data needs to be made more accessible to the military field commander. Efforts should be made to improve usage within the SI-TK compartments, however, further decompartmentation or sanitization of data may be required. More information, which under current procedures can be in the SI-TK compartment as well as the BYEMAN system, should be provided under SI-TK. The BYEMAN system, per se, should be maintained to protect technical, developmental and collection technologies and procedures which are not required by the military operators.

As the final thought, it is suggested that the DCI schedule occasional lunches with the Chairman of the JCS and meet with the individual CINCs when they are in town. Prior to these meetings, appropriate staff work should take place by both staffs to help produce meaningful discussions and a better mutual understanding.

EXCOM

The Principal Deputy for Planning has had the responsibility for IC Staff preparations for the April 1975 and July 1975 NRP ExCom meetings. The NRO has the responsibility for conducting the meeting and developing the substantive issues and topics to be covered during the meeting. The D/NRO's report proposes the recommended program for the NRP and is the prime factual document to support the meeting. The IC Staff's job is to interface closely with the NRO and the Community to insure:

-- Correct issues are highlighted.

-- That we fully understand the significant factors relating to each of the potential issues. (In the process we quietly insure that there is common understanding of the issues and the background information.)

-- Arrange special briefings for the participants of the ExCom meeting.

In effect, it consists of reducing a large amount of complex data to a simple objective output which can be used by the DCI in conjunction with other considerations in arriving at a best decision. It should permit him to focus his attention on the aspects of the problem which are most deserving, and to restrict the attention he has to allocate to those things which are best handled elsewhere. In simple terms, it enables the DCI to get the big picture in its proper perspective, rather than requiring him to devote attention to relatively minor aspects of the total situation. This is accomplished essentially through three techniques:

-- We prepare a notebook for the Director's personal use which provides some additional insight, beyond that presented in the D/NRO's report, into the current issues.

-- We conduct a pre-ExCom meeting, at which the DCI has an opportunity to ask questions regarding sections of the D/NRO's report or the ICS notebook which may need clarification, and we may provide special information if appropriate. During these sessions, the synergistic effects of open discussion often illuminates new aspects or considerations relative to the issues.

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-- We arrange for special briefings as required or appropriate.

[redacted]

The preparations for the July ExCom meeting proceeded very well. We got an early start and made detailed assignments to members of the IC Staff on issues, potential issues, or possible items of interest. We set up a schedule which included developing as much information as possible as soon as possible and held weekly meetings to be sure that everyone was up to speed. We also established the key interface points within the Community and the methodology by which we would conduct these interfaces. As a result, from the beginning everyone knew what was expected of them and how to proceed; thus, allowing concentration on the substance of the issues.

[redacted]

THE INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

Within the Office of the Principal Deputy for Planning, ICS, rests the prime responsibility for establishment, planning and administrative management of the Intelligence Research and Development Council (IR&D Council). [redacted] is the Executive Director of the IR&D Council and is almost solely responsible for its efficient and effective operation. The PD/DCI/IC also sits on the Council.

The Council was established in November 1973 as a permanent subcommittee of the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC). It is chaired by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering. This Council represents a grouping of the most senior Defense and Defense-related R&D Government officials.

The IR&D Council meets monthly in the Pentagon for a four-hour session. During the past year, the Council has reviewed all R&D programs of member organizations. In July 1974, the Council issued a report citing the perceived top five R&D problem areas, further described other problem areas, and listed those technology areas where it observed that increased emphasis by the Intelligence Community could lead to high pay-off in satisfaction of intelligence objectives.

Several subcommittees have been formed to address problems that have surfaced during Council sessions. They are:

-- The Space Shuttle Subcommittee to determine innovative applications for intelligence purposes;

-- The Wide-Band Data Link Subcommittee to inventory the wide-band data links under development, review anti-jam policy, and recommend a course of action that maximizes interoperability;

-- The Mass Memory Technology Subcommittee to assess and develop plans for acceleration of basic and exploratory research in this critical area;

-- The Electromagnetic Intercept and Position Fixing Subcommittee to develop a common technology base among the many tactical programs;

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-- The Analytical Terminals Subcommittee to inventory and assess competing technology efforts among COINS, SAFE, NMIC, and several tactical systems;

-- The Image Processing Subcommittee to develop recommendations for long-range R&D in this technology area; and,

-- The Remote Sensor Technology Subcommittee to develop a Community plan for R&D and application of this undersea technology to intelligence objectives.

The results of the review of intelligence R&D across Government organizations (less the FBI and Treasury) are reported in "Intelligence Research and Development--1974-1980." Published in three volumes, it contains departmental R&D organizations, R&D funding profiles, R&D project/program descriptions, and arrays this information at all classification levels by intelligence functional categories such as collection, production, analysis, ELINT, laser, etc., to cite a few. It is planned to update information contained therein twice yearly. These documents are distributed to the members and their R&D Planning Staffs. They could, along with other IR&D Council special reports and plans serve as a basis for developing a National IR&D planning document set.

The IR&D Council serves as a bridge among intelligence R&D planners as well as between intelligence R&D and other non-intelligence R&D efforts. It also serves as a common forum on technology exchange, national/tactical R&D interface, and future R&D plans in satisfication of intelligence objectives. Key leaders in industry, particularly those with long affiliations with the Intelligence Community, address the Council periodically on technology opportunities for intelligence applications as perceived from industry. Consultants from industry serve on or provide advice to certain subcommittees depending upon the scientific discipline required.

Future plans call for the Council to continue to address key problems as they surface and formulate recommendations, perform trends analyses and technological forecasting studies from the base now established, and provide direction to the several subcommittees presently in being. Administrative support to the Chairman and the Council is provided by the Intelligence Community Staff.

AD HOC IMAGERY EXPLOITATION STUDY

In a 4 November 1974 memorandum, the ASD(I) suggested that NPIC photo interpretation augmentation required for the KENNEN system operation might be minimized by transferring the more routine NPIC workload to field locations which normally perform the same functions as part of their internal mission. In response, the DCI requested the Intelligence Community Staff to inventory and examine exploitation resources and to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of centralization or decentralization of these resources. The Principal Deputy for Plans (PD/DCI/IC) was tasked to organize and lead the effort.

An ad hoc team was established in January 1975 composed of co-chairmen from ASD(I) and NPIC, and members from CIA, DIA and COMIREX. The Letter of Instruction requested the team to prepare a written report and briefing by March 1975. At the conclusion of the ad hoc team's efforts, the PD/DCI/IC was to establish a Community panel and to review the ad hoc team's report and make recommendations to the DCI.

The inventory of exploitation resources and investigation of special problem areas, such as search and the anticipated impact of NRT imagery satellite activity, proved more time consuming than originally expected. In addition, several of the ad hoc team members were involved in other on-going efforts related to the approaching IOC of the near-real-time system. As a result, the ad hoc team's study was delayed several months. A draft report was submitted to the Principal Deputy for Plans on 21 July. The report contains an excellent explanation on the imagery exploitation process with detailed discussion and statistics on: imagery exploitation manpower and resources, tasking, organizational interest, projected workloads 1975-1980, data bases and communications. Much of this information has never before been available.

In addition, a set of options concerning organizational tasking, Community data base and organization and management are provided. A review of the report and recommendations concerning the recommended or other options should be prepared by the end of August 1975.