

~~TOP SECRET~~B1  
COI~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

October 17, 1968

  
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX

On October 10, we received a copy of a State Department message from the U.S. NATO Mission to the Secretary of State (Tab A). The message contains a report of discussions on the strategic arms race held during a meeting of disarmament experts on October 7. Referenced in this message is another message from the Secretary of State to Mr. Scoville (ACDA) setting forth general guidelines for discussions at the October 7 meeting. We have obtained a copy of the referenced message and it is at Tab B.

You will note that paragraph two of the message containing guidelines very specifically directs the U.S. delegation to "not reveal scope or details of U.S. position, including associated verification considerations."

These messages are forwarded for your information only and no action is required.

  
JOHN R. MECEDA  
Captain, USAFHANDLE VIA  
BYEMAN~~TOP SECRET~~CONTROL NO \_\_\_\_\_  
COPY \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_

AF IN: 18871 (10 Oct 68) A/fj

AF DIST: XOX-1, XPP-2, SAFOS-3, NIN-3, AFTAC-4, SAFSS-1 (15)

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FOR NMCC/MC  
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ACTION ACDA 16  
INFO NSA 02, AEC 11, AF 10, ARA 08, CIAE 00, DODE 00, EA 10, EUR 15, GPM 0  
H 02, INR 07, IO 13, L 03, NASA 04, NEA 13, NSC 10, OIC 05, OST 01, P  
RSC 01, SCI 05, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, RSR 01, /184 W

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FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3601  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
USMISSION USUN NY  
USMISSION GENEVA  
ALL OTHER NATO CAPITOLS

**WORKING COPY**

SECRET USNATO 5171

DISTO

SUBJ: DISARMAMENT EXPERTS - STRATEGIC ARMS RACE

REF: STATE 245303'

1. DISCUSSION ON STRATEGIC ARMS RACE CENTERED AROUND  
SCOVILLE PRESENTATION ALONG LINES REFTEL. SCOVILLE STRESSED  
THAT US STILL ATTACHES TREMENDOUS IMPORTANCE TO MEANINGFUL  
AND VERIFIABLE MEASURES TO CONTROL THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE,  
NOTING CONSIDERABLE US EFFORT IN RECENT YEARS TO THIS END.  
SCOVILLE ALSO NOTED THE FRANK, FORTHRIGHT DISCUSSION ABOUT THE  
STRATEGIC ARMS RACE AT PREVIOUS DISARMAMENT EXPERTS MEETINGS.  
WE WELCOMED MANY OF THE COMMENTS MADE IN SUCH EXCHANGES, FOUND  
THEM USEFUL, AND HOPED SUCH USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WOULD CONTINUE.

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INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 J3-8 J5-2 NMCC-1 SAAC-3 S/DEF-7 ASu/ISA-9  
G/C-1 ASD/PA-1 DDRE-1 AE-1 DIA15 CSA-1 CNO-9 CSAF-1 CMC-3  
ACSAN-1 FILE-1(69)RAN/J

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2. SCOVILLE SAID THAT THE US WAS, OF COURSE, EXTREMELY PLEASED WHEN THE USSR AGREED JULY 1 TO DISCUSS STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS. THE US HAD BEEN FULLY PREPARED TO GO AHEAD WITH SUCH TALKS; HOWEVER, THE CZECHOSLOVAK EVENTS HAD BEEN A SERIOUS POLITICAL INTERFERENCE WITH SALT, AND AT THIS TIME IT NOT POSSIBLE TO SPECULATE ABOUT SALT TIMING. HE REPEATED THAT THE US HAD NOT LOST INTEREST IN SALT, BUT AT THE MOMENT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS NOT SO GOOD. SEVERAL DELS, INCLUDING FRG AND ITALY, EXPRESSED VIEWS THAT SALT SHOULD PROCEED DESPITE CZECH CRISIS.
  
3. THE DISARMAMENT EXPERTS COULD CONTINUE TO HAVE USEFUL TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED WITH THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE, BUT SCOVILLE CAUTIONED ABOUT DRAWING INFERENCES WITH RESPECT TO SPECIFIC US POSITION FOR SALT. IT INAPPROPRIATE TO DISCUSS THIS SINCE SALT TENUOUS POST-CZECH.
  
4. SCOVILLE THEN OUTLINED IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLLING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE, NOTING SOME POTENTIAL DESTABILIZING FACTORS (E.G., FOBS, LARGE ABM DEPLOYMENTS, AND MIRVS), AND OUTLINED SOME SYSTEMS THAT MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN ANY ARMS CONTROL MEASURE IN THE STRATEGIC AREA (E.G., LAND-BASED ICBMS, IR AND MRBMS, BOTH LAND AND SEA-BASED MOBILE MISSILES, BOMBERS, ABMS, AND SUBMARINES AND RELATED ASW SYSTEMS).
  
5. FIRST QUESTION AFTER SCOVILLE PRESENTATION RELATED TO RECENTLY REPORTED USSR MIRV DEVELOPMENTS. SCOVILLE SAID THERE HAD BEEN COUPLE OF SOVIET TESTS WHICH MAY HAVE INVOLVED MORE THAN ONE RV, DATA WE HAVE ON THESE TESTS IS IMPRECISE, BUT HAS NOT PRESENTLY WSD US TO CONCLUDE THAT SOVIET TESTS WERE MIRVS. SCOVILLE ADDED THAT US HAS BEEN TESTING MORE THAN ONE RV FOR THREE OR FOUR YEARS, SO SUCH TESTS DO NOT NECESSARILY INDICATE GREAT DEGREE OF SOPHISTICATION.
  
6. THERE WAS ALSO SOME TALK OF FOBS (SCOVILLE POINTED OUT THAT THEY INVOLVED LOWER WARNING TIME, BUT ALSO LOWER DEGREE OF ACCURACY, AND THAT THEY USEFUL PRIMARILY AS

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SURPRISE AGAINST SOFT TARGETS), ABMS ON SHIPS AND SEA PLATFORMS (SCOVILLE NOTED THAT EXPERTS HAD DISCUSSED FORMER BEFORE, THAT US STUDIES IN EMBRYONIC STAGE BUT WERE CONTINUING, AND HE DID NOT THINK THAT RESULTS WOULD HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON CONTROLLING STRATEGIC ARMS RACE), AND RANGE OF PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN VERIFYING A STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL MEASURE.

7. LANKES (FRG) EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION IR/MRBMS BUT WONDERED HOW TO NEGOTIATE SINCE WEST HAD NO SUCH WEAPONS. SUGGESTED THEY MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN EUROPEAN NFZ. SCOVILLE EMPHASIZED THAT AGREEMENT COULD NOT INVOLVE EQUALITY ON EVERY SPECIFIC SYSTEM; ONLY NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN OVERALL STRATEGIC BALANCE.

8. KUHN (CHAIRMAN), IN HIS SUMMATION, NOTED THAT WIDE SUPPORT HAD BEEN EXPRESSED BY EXPERTS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA NOTWITHSTANDING, FOR GETTING ON WITH SALT. SEVERAL COMMENTS HAD BEEN MADE ABOUT PAKISTAN NNC RES TO THAT EFFECT, WHICH ALL NATO NON-NUCLEARS HAD SUPPORTED.

9. COMMENT: DISCUSSION POINTED UP THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN STRATEGIC ARMS WOULD NOT STAND STILL, AND THAT CONTROLLING STRATEGIC ARMS RACE WAS IN COMMON INTEREST. GP-3. CARGO

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INFO: CJCS-1 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC-1 SAAC-3 SAMAA-1 USRMCI.O-2  
S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 DDRE-1 ARPA-1 AE-1 NSA-2  
DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-9 CSAF-1 CMC-3 ASCAN-1 FILE-1(66) EHC/C

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AFIN: 20387(100ct68) F/rm

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AF DIST: XOx-1, XPP-4 NIN-1, SAFOS-2, SAFSS-1, AFTAC-4 (15)

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INFO NSA 02, AEC 11, AF 10, ARA 08, CIAE 00, DODE 00, EA 10, EUR 15, C

H 02, INR 07, IO 13, L 03, NASA 04, NEA 13, NSC 10, OIC 05, OST 0

RSC 01, SCI 05, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, /183 R

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WHITE HOUSE - MR. KEENEY (SUBSTANCE)  
ACDA/DD- MR. WEILER  
ACDA/WEC - GEN. DAVIS  
ACDA/IR - MR. GLEYSTEN  
JCS- COL. STRACK (SUBSTANCE)

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R 261527Z SEP 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USMISSION NATO  
INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION GENEVA

SECRET STATE 245303

VIENNA PASS TO SCOVILLE

DISTO

SUBJECT: DISARMAMENT EXPERTS--DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC ARMS  
BALANCE ITEM

1. SUBJECT OF STRATEGIC ARMS RACE OR BALANCE AT EXPERTS MEET  
POSES US DELEGATION WITH PROBLEM OF BEING FORTHCOMING DURING  
DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING ANY FUTURE PRIVATE BILATERA  
SALT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN US AND USSR. THIS CABLE SETS FORTH  
GENERAL GUIDELINES SUBJECT TO CHANGE DEPENDING ON EVENTS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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BETWEEN NOW AND 7 OCTOBER.

2. DELEGATION MUST NOT REPEAT NOT REVEAL SCOPE OR DETAILS OF US POSITION, INCLUDING ASSOCIATED VERIFICATION CONSIDERATION. DELEGATION SHOULD NOT SPECULATE CONCERNING EITHER TIMING OR LIKELY SUCCESS OF SALT.

3. DELEGATION AUTHORIZED TO ENGAGE IN GENERAL DISCUSSION OF CONTROL ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC ARMS RACE, INCLUDING THOSE FACTS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS INVOLVED. AS IN PAST, DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS OF PROBLEM AND NOT ON BROADER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN STRATEGIC ARMS DECISION PROCESS.

4. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT HEAD OF US DELEGATION INDICATE AT BEGINNING OF DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT THE IMPORTANCE US AT TO ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL, VERIFIABLE CONTROLS ON STRATEGIC ARMS RACE AND WELCOMES CONTINUATION OF AN INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF ARMS CONTROL VIEWS ON STRATEGIC ARMS BALANCE IN THIS FORUM, BUT WILL BE UNABLE TO DISCUSS ANY ASPECT OF SALT AT THIS TIME. HE COULD INDICATE FURTHER THAT VIEWS EXPRESSED BY US DURING THESE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS REVEALING, CONFIRMING, OR DENYING US POSITION DURING FUTURE SALT BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS.  
GP-1. RUSK