

~~TOP SECRET~~



HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

HANDLE VIA  
BYEMAN-COMINT  
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

THE NRO STAFF

3 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR NSA

SUBJECT: Security Handling of Covert Satellite SIGINT  
Collection Projects and Control of Raw SIGINT  
Intelligence

During the 30 October 1968 meeting to resolve the BYEMAN/COMINT problem, I believe it may be fairly stated that the NSA position was one of understanding and co-operation but strongly limited by DCID 6/3, and that any change in the "rules" would require USIB action.

Continued historical research in this area revealed evidence that our problems have already been resolved, and the solution (USIB direction) is available - to wit: NRP Security Policy Directive #2, USIB D-41.5/17 and associated documents (Atch 1).

This subject has been discussed with SSC/CIA and it is their opinion as well as ours that adequate license exists for BYEMAN control of "all activities relating to the development, manufacture, improvement, and operational utilization" of all covert SIGINT satellite reconnaissance systems.

Bearing this in mind, it is our proposal that COMINT controls and access will only be required for the following:

1. COMINT controlled intercept tapes (or joint BYEMAN, T/KH, COMINT).
2. COMINT controlled substantive intelligence materials that are derived only from COMINT sources and downgrading is not possible.

**WORKING PAPERS**

EARPOP/UMBRA

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To be more explicit, that information that would normally be "Handle Via COMINT Channels Only" in the case of covert SIGINT satellite systems will be "BYEMAN EARPOP." That information that would normally be "COMINT SPOKE or UMBRA" will continue to require COMINT access unless NSA provides downgrading instructions.

Your comments are requested at an early date. We are available should you desire to meet with us to further discuss the problem.



Assistant for Security  
NRO Staff

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as

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BYE-8013-62

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30 DEC 1962

3 DEC 1962

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman, Committee on Overhead  
Reconnaissance

SUBJECT : Security Handling of Covert Satellite SIGINT  
Collection Projects and Control of Raw SIGINT  
Intelligence

For the information of COMOR there is attached the NRO Directive which implements the USIB decision placing all SIGINT raw materials collected by satellite under the BYEMAN Security System through initial processing. Provision has been made whereby intelligence data which does not reveal the method of collection or which can be attributed to plausible sources other than satellite can, during the various stages of processing, be released outside BYEMAN control under appropriate security classification.

All SIGINT reports published and distributed to the Intelligence Community by NSA and other authorized processors will be in the T-K system and will be distinguished by the codeword ZARF.

Your attention is invited to the fact that the separate EARDROP and POPPY clearances have, under this directive, been eliminated. The clearance, EARPOP, has been created and will provide "must-know" access to either system. The several Program Directors have agreed to this consolidation inasmuch as it provides greater flexibility in the exchange of technical information.

The attached directive is forwarded for COMOR/USIB information only and should not be given further dissemination. NRO

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Program Directors are the principle addressees and will insure that subordinate units are advised as appropriate and necessary to the implementation of this directive.

  
JOHN L. MARTIN, JR.  
Colonel, USAF  
Director, (S) NRO Staff

Attachment:

BYEMAN-3011-62

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12-3

MEMORANDUM FOR: NRO Program Directors  
NRO Staff

SUBJECT : Security Handling of Covert Satellite SIGINT  
Collection Projects and Control of Raw SIGINT  
Intelligence

A. General:

1. Pursuant to the USIB decision of 23 August 1952 (See USIB-D-41.5/17) all U. S. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) raw materials collected by various satellite projects will be handled under the BYEMAN Security System until they have undergone initial processing. Projects affected by this decision are POPPY, EARDROP and 102. In keeping with this decision and the official intent for the integration of similar and compatible SIGINT projects under the NRO, the individual activities POPPY and EARDROP will henceforth be identified as Project EARPOP within the BYEMAN System. The codewords EARDROP and POPPY are voided for purposes of NRO SIGINT policy and administration.

2. Consolidation of covert SIGINT projects under one system of control and project title does not in any way abrogate the "must-know" policy established for the NRP. The intent is to permit Program and Project Directors the opportunity to exchange technical information as necessary and as may be deemed of mutual benefit. Individuals approved for access to information pertaining to Project EARPOP, though eligible for access to all the separate systems under this title, will only be briefed to the extent necessary to the effective performance of their assigned duties. Program and Project Directors will exercise discretion in justifying the "must-know" for any individual whom they desire to brief on other systems and will coordinate with each other concerning the "must-know" and extent of access necessary.

3. Program Directors are responsible for controlling access to classified work areas and dissemination of the systems data under their

jurisdiction, in conformance with NRO Security Policy.

4. Effective 7 December 1962 all activities relating to the development, manufacture, improvement and operational utilization of existing covert satellite SIGINT reconnaissance systems now identified as Project EARPOP and all raw intelligence materials produced by the Project and Project 102 will be subject to the security policy established for the National Reconnaissance Program. Though Project 102, is likewise subject to the security policy established for the NRP, it is not presently being combined with Project EARPOP due to certain elements of incompatibility existing within Project 102.

B. Document and Communication Control:

All communications pertaining to such covert systems and the aforementioned raw SIGINT materials produced by all satellite projects will be handled in accordance with procedures as prescribed in the BYEMAN Security Manual. Documents or communications previously issued under Project POPPY and EARDROP security procedures will not be placed under BYEMAN control unless re-transmitted or reissued but will, where practicable, be given the same or comparable physical protection.

C. Control of Raw (SIGINT) Intelligence Product:

BYEMAN control of the raw intelligence product will begin at the point at which recorded signal intercepts can be identified as satellite derived SIGINT. Insofar as the POPPY System is concerned, BYEMAN control will begin at the point at which satellite signal transmissions are received, recorded and initially analyzed by ground stations. The point of initial BYEMAN control for EARDROP and 102 derived raw intelligence will be when the decommutation processes begin within the SAFSP "Custom Shop". Such controls will remain in effect until processing has reached the point of final analysis and a report is published for distribution to the Intelligence Community. During the various stages of processing, intelligence data which does not reveal the method of collection (satellite) or which can be attributed to a plausible source other than satellite, may be released outside the BYEMAN control system under an appropriate security classification. All SIGINT reports which are based on analysis of data under BYEMAN control will be placed in the T-100 System by NSA and other authorized processors

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when published and distributed to the Intelligence Community. Such reports will be distinguished by the codeword EARF and will be classified TOP SECRET. The minimum level of clearance of personnel involved in the handling or processing of BYEMAN material will be BYECOMINT (See Section IV, C, 3, of BYEMAN Security Manual).

D. Covert Project Security:

1. All activities relating to the development, manufacture, refinement and operational utilization of SIGINT collection systems under the Project title EARPOP will be subject to the provisions of NRO Security Policy Directives and the BYEMAN Security Manual.

2. Program Directors are authorized to issue Security Access Approvals to individuals involved in the management and operation of their respective covert SIGINT systems. In so doing they will effect, through BYEMAN channels, timely reporting (14 days maximum) and subsequent written certification to the Special Security Center (SSC/CIA) that the individual:

- (a) requires access to project information in order to effectively perform his assigned duties,
- (b) has been investigated and meets the personnel security criteria as established for the National Reconnaissance Program,
- (c) has been appropriately security briefed, and
- (d) has executed the required secrecy oath.

3. Individuals not directly involved in the management or operation of such covert systems, but who require access for other reasons of national interest must be approved by the DNRRO or his designee. Request for such approvals must be addressed to the DNRRO in triplicate, stating the full details justifying the individual's "need-to-know" for access and certifying that the prescribed investigation has been conducted and that the individual meets the personnel security standards of the NRP. The request, if approved, will be returned to the originator and a copy, bearing the signature of the approving authority, will be forwarded to the SSC/CIA.

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The requesting office will subsequently certify to the SSC/CIA when the individual has been security indoctrinated and has executed the prescribed secrecy oath.

4. All actions relating to security access approvals for Project BARPOP which concern employees of the Department of Defense who are not directly involved with the management or operation of any collection system under this project title will be transmitted via the Special Activities Office, Defense Intelligence Agency (SAO/DIA). Department of Defense personnel approved for access by the respective Project BARPOP Program Directors will, for record purposes, be identified in writing to SAO/DIA who maintains a list of all such Project BARPOP Security Access Approvals granted.

5. To the extent feasible, and with due regard for events that have already transpired, the development and manufacture of covert satellite reconnaissance SIGINT collection systems will be effected under conditions of maximum security and compartmentation. Therefore all industrial personnel involved in the covert development, manufacture or refinement of Project BARPOP collection systems must possess Security Access Approval under criteria as defined in the National Reconnaissance Program. In those cases where the contract responsibility is vested in the CIA, Program Directors will submit requests for Industrial Security Access Approvals via established EYESHED channels to SSC/CIA. Such requests should reflect the Security Access Approval "phase" (as defined in NRP security policy) and will be accompanied by a minimum of two executed copies of DD-48. Responsible Program Directors are delegated authority to issue Security Access Approvals to industrial personnel in those cases where the contract responsibility is under their cognizance. Following such issuances, responsible Directors will effect prompt notice and subsequent written certification to SSC/CIA that the individual concerned:

- (a) meets the prescribed personnel security standards,
- (b) has received security indoctrination, and
- (c) has executed the required secrecy oath.

6. Program and Project Directors will ensure that industrial personnel do not receive information relating to collection systems



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
other than those to which their work is directly related.

7. Program and Project Directors presently responsible for management and operation of covert systems under the Project title BARBROP and officials of departments and agencies concerned, will, at the earliest possible opportunity, advise OSD/CI (and SAC/DIA where appropriate) of the names, identifying information and date of clearances of those personnel whom they have listed as presently holding clearances for the aforementioned POPPY and BARBROP Projects. All personnel approved for Project BARBROP must be duly processed and approved in accordance with this directive.

8. Recognizing that the security criteria established for covert projects under the DIEMARK Security Control System differ in certain respects with the criteria previously used in granting Project POPPY and BARBROP security clearances, it is necessary that the security records of all individuals presently holding POPPY and BARBROP clearances be reviewed to insure that sufficient investigative information is available to enable proper evaluation and that such information is consistent with the personnel security criteria presently prescribed.


9. Full field investigations will be initiated on all individuals whose such investigation is not of record. Clearance determination and security record reviews on all individuals cleared for Project BARBROP should be completed within six months from date of this issuance. During the interim period, POPPY and BARBROP clearances held by individuals will remain in effect on a provisional basis until field investigations are completed and a satisfactory access approval determination has been made.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, WFO



*Approved by the Chief*

John L. Martin, Jr.  
Colonel, USAF  
Director, WFO S-1



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