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
FACT BOOK

FOR AD HOC COMMITTEE

ACTIVITIES

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May 3, 1966

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CORONA **GAMBIT**

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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27 April 1966

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MEMORANDUM TO: DOD - Mr. McNaughton
 ✓ Dr. Flax
 ACDA - Mr. Fisher
 CIA - Mr. R. J. Smith
 White House - Mr. Keeney
 - Mr. Charles Johnson
 NASC - Mr. Welsh
 NASA - Mr. Seamans

SUBJECT : Study of Possible Disclosure of Satellite Reconnaissance Data, Peaceful Applications of Such Data, and Possible Relationship to NASA Programs

1. Attached is a letter received by Secretary Rusk from Mr. Schultze of the Bureau of the Budget and Dr. Hornig of the White House. The Secretary has requested that our Committee study the general issue and specific proposals raised in this letter.

2. It is evident that a number of complex and sensitive questions are involved, and I believe we should begin promptly to consider them. Accordingly, I suggest you personally plan to represent your agencies if possible, and that the subject be handled on the basis of minimum necessary staff participation.

3. I suggest that we meet in my conference room for initial consideration of our program for conducting this study on Friday, May 6 at 11:30 AM. We should seek to prepare our report and recommendations by July 1.

U. Alexis Johnson
U. Alexis Johnson

Enclosure:

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

APR 4 1966

Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Dean:

There is a growing interest in the possible uses of satellite reconnaissance-type systems for peaceful purposes. This interest is reflected in studies being conducted under the auspices of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to investigate the potential for earth sensing from satellites. We believe it is essential to study the relationships between these peaceful programs and our classified reconnaissance programs if we are to avoid unplanned disclosure of our reconnaissance-type systems.

We think such a study should review our current security restrictions on reconnaissance activities and our national policy established under NSAM 156, and then develop a plan of action based on this review. Accordingly, we wish to request that you convene the NSAM 156 ad hoc committee for this purpose. Enclosed for the committee's consideration is a list of issues which must be addressed if we are to develop a satisfactory solution to this problem and an appropriate plan of action. The committee will probably develop additional points for consideration in the course of its deliberations.

It would be most helpful if the committee could complete its work on this question by July 1.

Sincerely,

Charles L. Schultze
Director, Bureau of the
Budget

Donald F. Hornig
Director, Office of Science
and Technology

Enclosure

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~~TOP SECRET~~HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLYRelationship of the AAP to the NRP - Potential Issues

1. Should there be a national plan defining the discrete steps to be taken in the next four or five years in a program to gradually expose satellite surveillance capabilities to public view? If so, what major steps should be included in the plan and what objectives should it aim to achieve? Who should be responsible for coordinating the formulation and execution of the detailed actions necessary to accomplish this plan?

Examples of possible steps to be considered:

- (a) Declassification of the ARGON photography and the geodetic data derived from it.
- (b) Declassification of the Apollo-Gambit system and its photographs.
- (c) Sanitization and declassification of selected NRP photos to demonstrate value of peaceful economic or scientific uses.
- (d) Declassification of first generation reconnaissance systems, e.g., CORONA and GAMBIT, and the non-bloc photography collected by these systems for use in programs found to be economically feasible.

2. During the period that the satellite reconnaissance program remains classified, what role, if any, should NASA have in planning and executing missions involving high-resolution image sensors of reconnaissance quality?

a. Should NASA be allowed to plan or conduct earth orbital missions involving high-resolution imagery sensors? If so, what control or monitoring mechanism should be established to handle problems that arise about the extent of the tests, classification, and press releases?

b. Should any special control be applied to NASA's ground and aircraft based experimental program which involves high-resolution imagery sensors?

c. Is it possible to make available to NASA, now, data already collected by the NRP in order to evaluate its economic and scientific usefulness? If so, how and at what level of classification?

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3. Who should decide the classification to be placed upon studies or development of new high-resolution imagery sensor hardware that NASA may wish to pursue from time to time?

4. Should the development of such hardware be centralized in the Department of Defense? If not, how should it be coordinated?

5. In view of the MOL capability for making high quality astronomical measurements, can MOL be used to meet NASA requirements for orbital astronomical experiments? If so, how and at what level of security classification?

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DOD Areas of Concern Relative to NASA Satellite Sensor ProgramsI. BackgroundA. References

- (1) Letter from Secretary McNamara to Mr. Webb dated July 31, 1965.
- (2) DOD/CIA-NASA Agreement on NASA Reconnaissance Programs dated August 28, 1963.
- (3) Letter from Dr. McMillan to Dr. Seamans dated August 5, 1965.
- (4) Letter from Dr. Seamans to Dr. McMillan dated August 24, 1965.

The Department of Defense is responsible for protecting the security and viability of the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). NASA activities involving reconnaissance-like sensors pose a serious problem to both the security and viability of the NRP. The Secretary of Defense has called to the attention of the Administrator of NASA (Reference 1) that the considerations of national security which formed the basis for the DOD/CIA-NASA Agreement of August 28, 1963 (Reference 2) must apply to current NASA activities involving reconnaissance sensors and that all such activities including studies are of concern.

The definition of a reconnaissance sensor and of an activity of interest were provided by the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in Reference 3. The Associate Administrator of NASA in Reference 4 accepted the criteria and definitions established in Reference 3 as a basis for further NASA-DOD consideration of NASA reconnaissance activities.

As agreed to with the Director NRO, the Associate Administrator, NASA designated a committee of three NASA members to be given BYEMAN clearances and briefed on NRO activities. This committee was to keep the Associate Administrator of NASA informed of reconnaissance-related activities within NASA which fell within the scope of the criteria and definitions. Any such activities were to be discussed with the Director NRO and resolved in accordance with the principles of agreements already in force. However, the actions of this committee have not effectively met the concerns of the DOD.

2. Criteria

The criteria agreed to, as defined in Reference 3, are:

A. Activities of Interest

An activity is defined as the expenditure of NASA research and development money with a university or industry, or the transfer of money to another activity to be used in this way. The activities to be brought to the attention of the NRO are those involving the study, design, development, fabrication or test of reconnaissance-like sensors, or significant components thereof, for use in orbital systems or studies of the use of such sensors in orbital systems.

B. Reconnaissance-Like Sensor

A reconnaissance-like sensor is defined to be an image forming sensor having an angular resolution of .1 milliradian or finer or an optical or infrared image forming system with a physical aperture greater than 30 cm and an optical figure controlled to better than 1/4 wave length.

C. Other Activities of Interest

Other possible activities of interest include development or test of pointing, tracking and stabilizing techniques or systems to be used with satellites bearing high resolution sensors in which the pointing accuracy is better than 20 microradians or the unstabilized rate is less than 20 microradians per second. Development or test of new recording media for use with reconnaissance-like sensors are also activities of interest.

D. Additional Activities of Concern

The evolution of NASA program planning activities since the exchange of References 3 and 4 has brought to light the following additional activities of concern:

(1) RFP's, Symposia, Requests for Program Recommendations, etc.

Prior to actually initiating funded programs, NASA has issued RFP's, Requests for Program Recommendations or Endorsements and held or encouraged widely attended symposia which have led inevitably to a series of proposed studies, design and experimental activities involving the use of reconnaissance sensors in earth-orbiting satellites. This has

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resulted in widespread discussion and publication of satellite reconnaissance (earth sensings) potentials as well as statements of needed and attainable equipment capabilities. NRO contractors have been involved in some of these activities, since they are the obvious sources for equipment of the kind desired.

Therefore, issuance of RFP's, and Requests for Program Recommendations or planning activities for symposia and conferences where the subject matter is or could evolve into an activity of interest as defined above, is a matter of DOD concern.

(2) Polar Orbits

The particular sensitivity of satellite reconnaissance of the Soviet Union is introduced as an additional factor when reconnaissance quality sensors are flown in high inclination (polar) orbit. Such flights potentially involve acquisition of data from "denied" areas and are presently governed by rigid national level surveillance and control (e.g., President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the 303 Committee and the USIB). Planning for such polar flights with reconnaissance quality sensors could excite unwanted reactions from the Soviet Union or other affected nations.

3. Specific DOD concerns

In reviewing activities of interest, the following factors will be considered.

A. Security

It is essential to protect the security of the NRP in accordance with established national policies. The security policies of the NRP have been formulated to meet the requirements of NSC Action 2454 and are responsive to the general policy guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence. These policies have met and are meeting the purpose for which they were intended, namely the protection of probably the most important single U. S. intelligence source and the maintenance of an international environment conducive to continuation of this covert program. Under this system of security, information which might reveal the extent and success of the NRP is tightly controlled. Such controlled information includes the identity and scope of specific operational and development programs, the U. S. state-of-the-art in reconnaissance sensors and related equipment and the quality and quantity of photography being obtained.

B. Policy

In accordance with NSC Action 2454, it is necessary that open disclosure of U. S. capabilities and intentions to orbit reconnaissance sensors be controlled to avoid unfavorable international reactions. The stimulation of ill-timed discussion of this issue in the international arena could produce unfavorable reactions from neutral or unfriendly nations; or might confront the Soviet Union with a situation in which it would be forced to take a hard position on the issue of satellite reconnaissance. The attainment of international acceptance of satellite reconnaissance is a U. S. goal, but it is of the utmost importance to national security to protect the viability of the NRP as a covert operation until there is a high degree of assurance that overt activity is acceptable.

It is extremely difficult to envision circumstances under which the U. S. would be able to continue indefinitely the present degree of control of technology associated with sensing of earth's surface from satellites, particularly when such devices represent the best potential for lunar and planetary exploration and study. On the other hand, the uncontrolled disclosure of such technology at a time when the U. S. can reasonably be presumed to be engaged in a major program of satellite reconnaissance, might prove provocative and might well contribute to causing an unfavorable reaction in the international sphere.

C. Utilization of the Industrial Base

The U. S. industrial organizations experienced and capable in the development of satellite reconnaissance sensors are relatively few in number and subject to severe security restriction. In order to avoid compromise of security or interference with NRO activities in dealing with these contractors, all government-sponsored activities in relation to reconnaissance sensors must be managed through the NRO as provided for in Reference 2.

D. Duplication

The initiation of new NASA programs which essentially duplicate equipment capabilities or operations of the DOD or vice versa should not be allowed to occur, unless after a thorough consideration of each specific program by the DOD and NASA, it is determined that some overriding consideration in the national interest warrants such duplication. Certainly no

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such duplication should be allowed to occur because of lack of accurate knowledge of its existence, extent and cost by responsible officials of both agencies. Proposed NASA reconnaissance programs should be reviewed to determine whether:

(1) They involve development of systems, sensors, techniques or related equipment closely duplicating those already developed or being developed by the NRO.

(2) They involve development of systems, sensors, techniques, and other related equipment to collect data which can be collected by NRO systems already operational or in development.

(3) They involve development of systems, sensors, techniques and related equipment to collect data (such as mapping and charting data) which have already been collected, in whole or part, by the NRO.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DOD(NRO)-NASA RELATIONSHIP

1963 A number of NASA contractors who were working on MORL studies examined - at NASA direction - optical reconnaissance systems. Objectives of the studies included R&D in surveillance and reconnaissance as well as in other purely military domains.

28 August 1963 A DOD/CIA-NASA Agreement formalized arrangements between NASA and the NRO on NASA Reconnaissance programs. The Agreement recognized:

1. The NASA requirement to perform both unmanned and manned lunar reconnaissance operations.
2. The NASA requirement for testing equipment in earth orbit prior to engaging in lunar operations.
3. The existence of covert and highly sensitive NRO technology, contractor resources, management skills and security methods for on-going reconnaissance satellite programs.

The Agreement established specific working procedures whereby NRO derived technology could be applied to NASA's stated requirements in lunar reconnaissance.

March 1964 Discussions between Drs. McMillan and Mueller failed to resolve problems created by uncontrolled activity related to reconnaissance.

23 March 1964 At the time of the 28 August 1963 DOD-CIA/NASA Agreement the mapping and survey mission of APOLLO was envisioned as being designed to provide NASA with lunar surface mapping in addition to high resolution photography of specific lunar areas, necessary to effect the APOLLO lunar landing.

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23 March 1964
(Continued)

While it was anticipated that an advance earth orbital mission for system checkout purposes might also be required, no specific security procedures had been formulated.

On 23 March 1964, a Supplemental Agreement and Security Addendum, specifically designed for this set of circumstances was negotiated and signed. Work then proceeded toward system definitions with the ultimate selection of the GAMBIT and improved stellar index camera combination as the photographic equipment to be used for the APOLLO M&S mission.

The Security Addendum to the Agreement was designed to afford continued security protection to the NRP, while rendering complete assistance to the NASA.

Basically, it requires classification of NASA APOLLO products as follows:

Lunar photography as initially processed	SECRET
Sanitized lunar photography (i. e., remove fiduciaris and enlarge)	UNCLASSIFIED
Earth photography, if any	TOP SECRET/ TALENT-KEYHOLE

31 March 1965

In a letter to the Asst Secretary of Navy (R&D), the Deputy Associate Administrator, NASA, listed 28 technical items in the NASA program as being of current or prospective interest to the Navy. The first eight were categorized as "visual, photographic and electronic surveillance of ocean areas and included such efforts as detection, observation, tracking and various uses of large telescopes and antennas."

12 April 1965

Dr. McMillan, Dr. Hall, and Mr. Shapley attended a NASA briefing at which a NASA representative outlined a proposed program of 15 earth-orbital APOLLO missions - extra to the

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12 April 1965
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lunar mission - being considered by NASA. On five of the missions, earth mapping and other remote sensing of the earth's surface by image forming devices were listed as primary experiments. The devices included radar, optical cameras, and IR cameras.

21 April 1965

Dr. Seamans stated that NASA had, or was planning to have, a number of contracts for the study and development of satellite-borne high resolution radar mapping systems.

28 April 1965

Dr. McMillan, in a resume of NASA activities related to earth reconnaissance, recommended to Mr. McNamara that:

1. The resources of the NRO be made available to NASA in a manner similar to that agreed upon for NASA's lunar program, with the NRO supporting all of the necessary reconnaissance-like activities of NASA, as well as any reconnaissance-like activities undertaken by NASA in response to actual or assumed military requirements.
2. A general agreement be struck with NASA setting up a procedure which would identify NASA requirements for reconnaissance sensors or reconnaissance-like activities and provide in each case for specific agreements at the level of the Associate Administrator, NASA, and the DNRO.

6 May 1965

In a letter to Mr. Webb, Mr. McNamara proposed that the Air Force serve as NASA's agent in procuring, developing and testing in earth orbit, sensor equipment for NASA reconnaissance related activities.

Mr. McNamara offered a formal agreement for Mr. Webb's signature. The agreement stipulated that all NASA requirements for reconnaissance-like sensors and activities would be reviewed and if reasonably construed to be of reconnaissance quality, the DCD would serve as the agent to NASA in carrying out the specific effort required.

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19 May 1965

Mr. Webb indicated he would like to take a little more time to review the closely related activities under the McMillan-Seamans Agreement of 20 April 1964, and correlate a response to Mr. McNamara's letter with negotiations which NASA had undertaken with the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior.

23 June 1965

Mr. Webb's final reply to Mr. McNamara's letter cited elements of national policy (NSC Action 2454 and NSAM 156) as supporting NASA's efforts in the study of the possibilities of non-military terrestrial surveys utilizing satellite technology.

Mr. Webb considered that NASA's current activity in the satellite technology area was fully covered by the DOD/CIA-NASA Agreement on NASA Reconnaissance Program (28 August 1963) and suggested in lieu of a further agreement at the Administrator/SecDef level, that future cases be covered by memoranda of understanding between the Associate Administrator, NASA and the DNRO.

27 July 1965

Dr. McMillan met with Dr. Seamans to discuss a general procedure for identifying and reviewing reconnaissance-related activities in NASA.

31 July 1965

Mr. McNamara replied to Mr. Webb's letter, stating that, in view of the grave possibility of endangering the national security, certain NASA study contracts should not be carried any further with the industrial and academic groups and that those study groups should be disbanded until determination by agreed upon management procedures could be brought to bear. (Mr. Webb never replied to this letter.)

5 August 1965

Dr. McMillan, in a letter to Dr. Seamans, defined the scope of reconnaissance-related activities and outlined criteria by which activities would automatically be selected for review. The criteria:

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5 August 1965
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1. Those activities involving the study, design, development, fabrication or test of reconnaissance-like sensors or significant components thereof, for use in orbital systems, or studies of the use of such sensors in orbital systems.
2. A reconnaissance-like sensor is defined to be an image forming sensor having an angular resolution of 0.1 milliradian or finer, or an optical or IR image forming system with a physical aperture greater than 30 cm and an optical figure controlled to better than 1/4 wave length.
3. An activity is defined as the expenditure of NASA research and development money with a university or industry, or the transfer of NASA money to another government agency for spending in this way.

24 August 1965

Dr. Seamans concurred in the arrangements and criteria set forth in Dr. McMillan's 5 August letter and designated three individuals (Gray, Garbarini, and Sullivan) to serve as a committee to keep him informed of reconnaissance-related activities within NASA which fell within the scope of the agreed-upon definition.

30 August 1965

Mr. Vance directed all agencies to deal exclusively with the NRO on all DOD needs for the study, development, test or use of satellite-borne image forming earth sensors. The NRO was designated the DOD point of contact with the NASA as well as with other governmental agencies with regard to activities involving study, development, test or use of satellite-borne image forming earth sensors.

1 September 1965

Dr. Seamans forwarded to Dr. McMillan copies of letters by which NASA had informed the USGS, USDA, and the US Navy of its willingness to initiate interagency fund transfers for the planning and definition of APOLLO Extension System programs, excluding spacecraft hardware development, in the fields of geo-science, agriculture, and oceanography.

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- 1 September 1965
(Continued) Dr. Seamans advised that NASA was not forwarding a work statement to the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, in accordance with Dr. McMillan's request.
- 2 September 1965 Dr. McMillan furnished to Dr. Hornig an outline of NASA activities in the area of earth reconnaissance. Dr. McMillan indicated his feeling that the NASA activities ran counter to national policy as expressed in NSC Action 2454 and jeopardized security discipline within the NRP.
- 15 September 1965 Mr. Peter C. Badgley produced a proposed NASA position paper on remote sensing. The paper stated that NASA was currently using remote sensing devices in many of its spaceflight programs and that these devices were being improved continuously for very extensive use on the upcoming APOLLO, VOYAGER, and APOLLO Applications Programs.
- Badgley related that specific expressions of desire for cooperation and participation in the NASA remote sensing program had been received from appropriate officials in the NAS, U. S. Dept of Interior, U. S. Navy, U. S. Army, U. S. Air Force, U. S. Dept of Commerce, U. S. Dept of Agriculture, and many leading universities.
- The paper cited the Space Act of 1958 as the derivation of "NASA's vital responsibility" in the remote sensing of planetary (earth) surfaces and reaffirmed NASA's belief that the observation of the earth from outer space was a legitimate and permissible activity vis-a-vis NASA's concurrence in the UNGA Resolution 1721 (XVI).
- The paper identified four general fields of application of earth sensing: geography/cartography, geology/hydrology, oceanography, and agriculture/forestry.
- With regard to international relationships, the paper stated that to the maximum extent possible, NASA sponsored remote sensing equipment would be unclassified and that all data acquired by NASA sponsored (non-DOD) remote sensing investigators over foreign areas would be unclassified.

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15 September 1965
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The paper recognized the need for NASA to cooperate with the DOD to:

1. Minimize instrument duplication.
2. Insure that latest NASA developments in remote sensing would be available to DOD.
3. Insure that latest DOD developments in remote sensing were available to NASA.

The paper recommended:

1. NASA use of the best possible instruments with resolutions recommended by the scientific community.
2. NASA documentation of a list of unclassified remote sensing instruments to be flown over foreign test sites.
3. Continued coordination with DOD on equipment availability and state-of-the-art.
4. Necessity for complete access to all phases of DOD development of remote sensing instruments for selected NASA program scientists and engineers, NASA center program management, and NASA principal investigators.

20 - 21 September
1965

NASA held a conference on the "Post-APOLLO Lunar Photographic Program" at Dayton, Ohio

NASA was proposing a group of cameras to be flown in an APOLLO continuation program. This group included:

- 2 metric mapping
- 2 panoramic
- 1 ultra-high resolution
- 4 wide angle multiband cameras

NASA proposed a hold on the ultra-high resolution system until the UPWARD system could be evaluated for the task.

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- 30 September 1965 Dr. McMillan recommended that Dr. Morse work with Dr. Flax to see whether missions directed to Navy requirements could be included in current data gathering requirements. Dr. McMillan felt that many Navy requirements for oceanographic data could be met by use of systems currently in operation, sooner, and at a much lower total cost to the Government, than would be experienced by proceeding as NASA had proposed.
- 16 October 1965 Admiral Raborn expressed his concern that the increasing use of photographic equipment in NASA programs would necessitate consideration of the security of intelligence programs in terms of both equipment and product if such use should result in photography approaching intelligence quality.
- 22 November 1965 Dr. Flax issued policy guidance for participation by DOD representatives in conferences, symposia, etc., on the NASA APOLLO Applications Program for earth orbital satellites. Attendance was authorized; however, representatives were directed not to express either orally or in writing any endorsement of proposed NASA programs, nor comment favorably or adversely on proposed APOLLO systems or components, nor submit any proposals direct to NASA to participate in this APOLLO effort.
- 22 November 1965 NASA set \$250 million as the most acceptable amount for FY 67 for the APOLLO Applications Program. This amount would enable achievement of the first APOLLO Applications flight in March 1968, and a follow-on series of manned, highly-instrumented missions to 1972.
- 27 December 1965 In a letter to Dr. Seamans, Dr. Flax expressed serious concern about the rapidly accelerating NASA program planning activity directed toward earth sensing (reconnaissance) from satellites.
- Dr. Flax indicated that he had anticipated that actions in response to the August 1965 agreement between Dr. McMillan and Dr. Seamans would identify for a joint consideration

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21 January 1966

The first meeting of the newly constituted MSFPC was held at NASA Hq, with Dr. Seamans presiding.

Considerable time was devoted to a discussion of the remote sensing possibilities considered for the APOLLO Applications Program -- specifically the possible political and security sensitivity of earth sensing.

The Committee noted that while individuals had been previously selected by NASA and DOD to review this problem, sufficient guidance had not been provided. Dr. Flax was asked to prepare a document setting down these areas of concern and to develop guidelines for a joint review by selected individuals.

1 March 1966

In a letter to Admiral Boone, Dr. Flax indicated that the proposed geography/cartography program by USGS for NASA appeared detrimental to the security of the National Reconnaissance Program and that it was directed in large measure toward the development and later operation of satellite techniques and systems to collect mapping data which had been or was being collected in the operational programs of the NRP.

Dr. Flax stated that he could not concur that the major part of the proposed work was either necessary or desirable.

11 April 1966

Dr. Flax submitted to the Manned Space Flight Policy Committee the two papers requested at the first meeting:

1. DOD Areas of Concern Relative to NASA Satellite Sensor Programs
2. Guidelines for DOD/NASA Committee on Reconnaissance Sensors

The two papers presented criteria and an organizational mechanism for identifying NASA activities of concern to the DOD because of their potential impact on the National Reconnaissance Program.

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12 April 1966

In a memorandum for Admiral Boone, Dr. Flax accepted, from the standpoint of NRP security only, the revised USGS/NASA work statement.

Dr. Flax iterated the concerns expressed in his letter of March 1, 1966 as still applicable.

Dr. Flax pointed out that unless the actions taken in phases 1 and 2 of the proposed program resulted in directing the program away from reconnaissance quality sensors and mapping and charting they would raise the issues including security addressed in his letter of March 1.

Dr. Flax stipulated several conditions under which the program could proceed.

14 April 1966

The second meeting of the Manned Space Flight Policy Committee was held at the Pentagon, with Dr. Foster presiding.

As directed in the first meeting, Dr. Flax had prepared and distributed a memorandum on "DOD Concern with NASA Remote Sensing Activities." Mr. Shapley of NASA had prepared a similar memo which was to be transmitted to Committee members.

It was agreed that the NASA three-man group (Gray, Sullivan and Jaffe) would review the NASA program in the light of Dr. Flax's memo and recommend procedures for adopting the suggested ground rules as well as flagging potential difficulties.

15 April 1966

Dr. Seamans forwarded for Dr. Foster's consideration a paper by Mr. Shapley on earth observation from space -- the paper referred to in the Manned Space Flight Policy Committee meeting of 14 April 1966.

The paper summarized:

1. The principal reasons of current direct concern to NASA for moving ahead with consideration of

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15 April 1965
(Continued)

the policy question related to earth observations from space for other than intelligence and other military purposes.

2. The principal policy and program evaluation question that must be addressed in considering whether these should be programs for non-military earth observations from space.

18 April 1966

Mr. Schultze and Dr. Hornig co-authored a letter to Secretary of State Rusk which related a growing interest in the possible uses of satellite reconnaissance-type systems for peaceful purposes reflected in studies being conducted under the auspices of the NASA.

Mr. Schultze and Dr. Hornig considered it essential to study the relationships between these peaceful programs and our classified reconnaissance programs "if we are to avoid unplanned disclosure of our reconnaissance-type systems."

The letter:

1. Proposed a review of current security restrictions on reconnaissance activities and national policy established under NSAM 156 and then the development of a plan of action based on the review.
2. Requested that the NSAM 156 ad hoc committee be reconvened for this purpose.

Inclosed for the committee's consideration was a list of issues:

1. Should there be a national plan defining the discrete steps to be taken in the next four or five years in a program to gradually expose satellite surveillance capabilities to public view?
2. During the period that the NRP remains classified, what role, if any, should NASA have in planning and executing missions involving high-resolution image sensors of reconnaissance quality?

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18 April 1966
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3. Who should decide the classification to be placed upon studies or development of new high-resolution imagery sensor hardware that NASA may wish to pursue from time to time?
4. Should the development of such hardware be centralized in the DOD? If not, how should it be coordinated?
5. In view of the MOL capability for making high quality astronomical measurements, can MOL be used to meet NASA requirements for orbital astronomical experiments? If so, how and at what level of security classification?

27 April 1966

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson alerted the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee principals:

DOD	Mr. McNaughton
	Dr. Flax
ACDA	Mr. Fisher
CIA	Mr. R. J. Smith
WH	Mr. Keeney
	Mr. Charles Johnson
NASC	Mr. Welsh
NASA	Dr. Seamans

to a meeting on May 6, 1966 for initial consideration of a program for conducting the study requested by Mr. Schultze and Dr. Hornig.

Mr. Johnson suggested that the principals personally plan to represent their agencies and that the subject be handled on the basis of minimum necessary staff participation. The letter established a goal of July 1, 1966 for preparation of a report and recommendations.

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NSAM 156 AD HOC COMMITTEE
AND ITS ACTIONS

26 May 1962

President Kennedy sent NSAM 156 to the State Department, directing State to assume leadership in developing a U. S. policy on satellite reconnaissance. The President's directive:

1. Cited the fact that the U. S. is engaged in negotiations on disarmament and peaceful uses of outer space.
2. Noted that these discussions raised a problem of "what constitutes legitimate use of outer space, and in particular, the question of satellite reconnaissance."
3. Directed State to formulate a position which:
 - a. Avoids the dangers of restricting ourselves,
 - b. Compromising highly classified programs, or
 - c. Providing assistance of significant military value to the USSR, and
 - d. Permits us to continue to work for disarmament and international cooperation in space.

(See Tab No. 1)

29 May 1962

State (Mr. U. Alexis Johnson) passed NSAM 156 to several agencies and convened a meeting on 1 June 1962.

Representatives: DOD Mr Nitze WH Dr Wiesner
Dr Charyk Mr Kaysen
NASA Dr Seamans CIA Dr Scoville
ACDA Mr Fisher

This was the beginning of an Ad Hoc Interagency Committee which was never given a name.

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30 June 1962

The Ad Hoc Committee submitted its final report to the President, who approved it on 10 July, establishing Eighteen Points of National Space Reconnaissance policy. This policy has furnished a firm basis for all U. S. informational activities and international negotiations. (See Tab No. 2)

17 January 1963

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson sent a memorandum to members of the Ad Hoc Committee requesting them to prepare material for a contingency paper to be available in conjunction with an approach to the Soviets on a possible separate arms control measure on outer space. The DOD was asked to prepare a study on:

1. The possible usefulness of inspector satellites against bombs-in-orbit, and
2. The feasibility of neutralizing bombs-in-orbit by means of a non-nuclear satellite.

(See Tab No. 3)

18 January 1963

Mr McGeorge Bundy sent NSAM 216 to Messrs Rusk, McNamara, and McCone, stating that the President desired a study covering:

1. Should there be a high-level disclosure of our satellite reconnaissance to the Soviets?
2. Should our U. S. Embassy in Moscow keep suitable disclosure materials on a contingency basis?

(See Tab No. 4)

26 February 1963

The NSAM 216 response was undertaken by the Ad Hoc Committee and completed on this date. The final report stated:

1. Concur in the consensus that the disadvantages of disclosure under conditions both of calm and crisis appear to outweigh the potential advantages.

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26 February 1963
(Continued)

2. Question the feasibility of exploiting mapping information as a means of convincing the Soviet Union of their declining secrecy.
3. Non-concur in the desirability of establishing a standby disclosure capability in Moscow on the ground that potential utility does not appear to justify the effort and security risks involved. You might suggest instead that such a capability be held in readiness in Washington for rapid movement to Moscow, should circumstances ever require.
4. Agree that the basic paper, with an expanded treatment of the Cost of Disclosure to reflect the implications involved in an official acknowledgment and with changes consistent with recommendation 3., above, provides an appropriate framework for the required report to the White House. (See Tab No. 5)

13 March 1963

The Ad Hoc Committee completed its response to NSAM 192 ("bombs-in-orbit").

20 December 1963

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson circulated a memorandum to Ad Hoc Committee members, Subject: "Consideration of Possible Disclosure of Satellite Reconnaissance Information." It stated that at a recent White House review of the disarmament situation the question had been raised of exploiting our satellite reconnaissance capability for progress in the disarmament field. (1) Could we share more actual information with our Allies, revealing the source? (2) Should we press the Soviet leaders to realize the obsolescence of their closed society?
(See Tab No. 6)

21 January 1964

The Ad Hoc Committee made its final report on "possible disclosure," stating "we find no present necessity for additional disclosures to our Allies..."; "we have concluded that no additional action to disseminate more knowledge of our satellite reconnaissance capability is required at this time in support of our disarmament or other policies."
(See Tab No. 7)

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2 June 1964

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson sent a memorandum, Subject: "Recent Commentaries on Satellite Reconnaissance" to members of the Ad Hoc Committee. He remarked on the Benton/Pearson/Khrushchev conversations. He raised a question as to what "measures we might take to effect or use these Soviet views to serve our own objectives." Specifically, should we "privately surface our program to Khrushchev, or publicly, or both? (The idea being to reduce adamant Soviet opposition to inspection). He called for a meeting on 5 June. (See Tab No. 8)

June - September
1964

From June through September 1964, the Committee met seven times in attempting to resolve the disclosure questions. Discussions of possible alternatives included:

1. TOP SECRET briefings to key U. S. Senators and/or SECRET level dissemination to the North Atlantic Council by the CIA.
2. A proposal by the DCI that he brief Heads of State instead of the NAC.

As of September 15, it was agreed that we would not privately or publicly surface the satellite reconnaissance program to Khrushchev, the Congress, or the North Atlantic Alliance. Mr. McCone was authorized to give a carefully-reviewed presentation to selected European Heads of State.

22 September 1965

The Ad Hoc Committee met to consider some of the questions which had arisen in connection with the Manned Orbiting Laboratory. Ambassador Thompson suggested that the recent MOL announcement might have aggravated the difficulty of achieving international legitimization of satellite reconnaissance. State suggested further that the U. S. should be prepared to offer to the Soviets a mutual pre-launching inspection of space vehicles and indicated that it would prepare a paper outlining such a proposal with the pros and cons.

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6 October 1965

Mr. Lewellyn Thompson forwarded to Ad Hoc Committee members a paper, "An Offer of Inspection of the MOL." The paper proposed that the U. S. meet Soviet allegations that we were pursuing a weapons-in-space program by publicly offering, on the basis of reciprocity, to permit inspection adequate to demonstrate that there were no nuclear weapons aboard any manned space vehicle.

23 October 1965

The DOD completed its review of the State Department proposal for possible mutual pre-launching inspection of MOL. Highlight of the paper:

"The inspection proposal would seem to be too high a card to play in any propaganda game the Soviets might initiate over MOL. . . Recommend the proposal be spelled out in greater detail. . . Recommend we consider other, and less potentially sensitive, ways to cope with any Soviet propaganda attack on MOL. . . Our primary concern in all these discussions is the preservation of our national security; and, in this case, I rate the value to national security of preserving our reconnaissance capability above that of public and official opinion in other countries. . . Impact on our national security is not adequately treated in the State proposal."

To date, the Ad Hoc Committee has not reconvened to resolve the issue outlined above. Thus, its last formal meeting was on 22 September 1965.

27 April 1966

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson advised members of the Ad Hoc Committee to prepare for a meeting to study possible disclosure of satellite reconnaissance data, peaceful applications of such data, and possible relationship to NASA programs.
(See Tab No. 9)

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