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Approved for Release: 2021/06/24 C05126887

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS (OSAF)
PO BOX 92960, WORLDWAY POSTAL CENTER
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90009



11 September 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Dear Admiral Turner:

During our June discussion concerning the Interim Tactical ELINT Processor (ITEP) and the Exercise Capability (EXCAP) Vans, you related one of the major concerns of the JCS was that in order to use national systems for direct military support, information would have to be provided to our NATO allies. For this information to be creditable and usable, our allies would have to understand what it is, how to use it, its degree of accuracy and reliability and be able to practice its use. You asked me whether it would be possible to run an exercise which passed real and/or simulated information to NATO.

Handwritten notes:
10
1. DIA
S&T

Working with the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities offices (TENCAP), we have determined that it appears feasible to release simulated and actual intelligence information derived from satellite collection. Several actions have already occurred or are currently underway toward achieving this. These actions and a potential risk assessment are discussed in the attached paper.

The Post Oak II exercise schedule for March of 1980 will involve NATO and is designed to assess the utility of reconnaissance assets to commanders in implementing combat decisions. It is an ideal candidate for the initial NATO involvement in the use of satellite derived data. Also, the ITEP Van has recently been delivered to the Army and is presently located with the V Corp near Frankfurt ready to provide exercise support. The EXCAP Van which handles simulated data developed by SAFSP in the United States is available for deployment to Europe. Depending upon the exercise scenario both could support Post Oak II.

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HANDLE VIA

~~TALENT KEYHOLE~~
CHANNELS ONLY

The following types of information could be provided to NATO:


- a. [] as previously approved.
- b. Sanitized simulated [] satellite COMINT reports as scripted by NSA. (b)(1)
- c. Sanitized simulated [] and [] satellite ELINT reports as (b)(3)
recommended by NSA to the SIGINT Committee with action currently pending.

In order to proceed with this approach we would require SIGINT Committee concurrence with the NSA recommendations as well as authorization from you and the JCS.

After assessment of the results of Post Oak II the desirability of release of actual data consistent with the security controls established for the [] and ELINT reports used in Post Oak II can be evaluated. At this time I would not recommend the release of actual COMINT reports due to the lack of source protection. (b)(1)
(b)(3)

By establishing precedents and procedures at a minimal security risk, I am convinced that long term advantage can accrue to U. S. interests through the involvement of data from national systems in these exercises. I recommend your approval within the constraints established in the attachment. I stand by to implement the required plans and actions.

Sincerely,



JOHN E. KULPA, JR.
Major General, USAF
Director

1 Atch

Cy to: Dr. H. Mark
Lt Gen J. Pustay
Lt Gen E. Tighe
VAcm B. Inman
Mr. J. Koehler

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~~PLAIN-TEXT~~
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11 September 1979

RELEASE OF SANITIZED AND/OR SIMULATED
SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE DATA TO NATO
FOR TACTICAL EXPLOITATION OF
NATIONAL CAPABILITIES (TENCAP) PROGRAM

I. PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

The purpose of this paper is to describe and assess factors relating to the release of sanitized and/or simulated satellite-derived intelligence to the POST OAK II element of CRESTED EAGLE 80.

A. CRESTED EAGLE 80 is an upcoming major NATO Command Post Exercise scheduled for March 1980. A sub-element of this exercise, titled, POST OAK II, is designed to assess the utility of simulated US national and theater reconnaissance assets by commanders in implementing combat decisions. Previous exercises of this type have been conducted in Europe and Korea with TENCAP providing live or simulated data from satellite sources but only to cleared US participants. POST OAK II has been proposed as the initial involvement of NATO forces in the use of simulated satellite-derived data.

B. To date, a major barrier to NATO use of satellite systems data has been security policy. A reassessment of the risk involved in sanitizing and releasing satellite data appears warranted. Even though some compartmentation is necessary to protect critical sources, accuracies, and limitations, security can accommodate the release of selected data.

II. SITUATION

Based upon a USEUCOM request to release simulated satellite data to NATO during the POST OAK II exercise, current US security policy is being reviewed by the SIGINT committee. POST OAK II affords an excellent opportunity to access the contributions of national intelligence collection systems, in conjunction with theater intelligence collection assets. However, to adequately evaluate this contribution, distribution of sanitized and simulated satellite data to NATO must be authorized. The current proposal on releasability to NATO is that all reports will cover only an area

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within range of conventional collectors [redacted]. In conjunction with this activity:

A. Release of [redacted] to NATO has been authorized under conditions described in the attachment. Further discussion is not necessary.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

B. NSA has authorized pre-scripted simulated [redacted] COMINT data to NATO with no reference to source. (Agreement between NSA and Department of the Army.) [redacted] COMINT simulated sanitized reporting will be merged with simulated conventional source collection reports without revealing the satellite source. Release of this data offers no security problems affecting satellite sources.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

C. NSA has proposed, pending approval of the SIGINT committee, releasing simulated sanitized [redacted] and [redacted] ELINT to NATO.

1. The following quote from DIRNSA message DTG 072000Z Aug 79 contains the substance of their proposal.

Quote. Subject: POST OAK II Planning

(TS-TK-NOFORN) National level decisions have not yet been made on initiatives for further decompartmentation of satellite ELINT. We are proposing that the following data elements in tactical reports based on satellite collection may be made available to NATO command organizations participating in joint exercises:

- a. Intercept day, month, year
- b. Non-compartmented ELINT notation and nickname
- c. PIN/SET numbers
- d. Canned remarks (except references to specific military units)
- e. Emitter location
- f. Confidence ellipse and orientation
- g. Intercept time

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~~(TS TK NOFORN)~~ We anticipate approval well in advance of POST OAK II and agree that planning for dissemination of simulated tactical reports to the NATO participating commands may proceed. We propose that your planning encompass only these data elements.

~~(TS TK NOFORN)~~ Insofar as Ref B pertains, we understand from earlier planning messages that there is no intention to identify simulated collection sources to the foreign nationals involved in the POST OAK II exercise. Please insure that the arbitrary digraphs identified in Ref b are not included in the reports which are distributed to NATO command participants. Unquote.

2. The only changes from US-only reporting would be the omission of emitter parametric data and reference to source. US participants are currently receiving parametric data (radio frequency, pulse repetition frequency, pulse width and scan), for follow-on correlation analysis. Based on lessons learned from prior TENCAP support, manual correlation analysis has proven impractical within the time constraints of a tactical situation, and therefore of little use to NATO in a tactical environment.

III. RISK ANALYSIS


This analysis is limited to the potential impact of a compromise of the [redacted] and [redacted] sanitized/simulated data to be released. [redacted] COMINT have been explained in paragraphs II A and B above.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

A. If data released to NATO is compromised, [redacted] and [redacted] ELINT could be traced to satellite platform based on time of intercepts and wide area of coverage by comparing the data to orbital parameters. Basic radio frequency range capabilities could be exploitable based on the specific emitters collected by each system. This will not, however, reveal the critical capability (specific radio frequency, pulse repetition frequency, pulse width, or scan) of either satellite system.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

D. It should be kept in mind that the data to be released would not be better than conventional aircraft intercepted data. A compromise would only result in this degraded level of capability being attributed to satellites. More refined and sophisticated satellite capabilities would continue to be protected. Attributing this data to the correct satellites assumes the Soviets know the missions of other U.S. satellites in view of emitters being collected.

IV. FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS

The desirability of the release of actual data consistent with the security controls established for the simulated [redacted] ELINT reports used in POST OAK II should be evaluated after an assessment of the results of POST OAK II.

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(b)(3)

1 Atch
DIA Msg, 172141Z Jul 79,
Special Project POST OAK II

HANDLE VIA

~~TALENT NETWORK~~
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FROM: SSO DIA

TO: SSO USEUCOM//ECJ2-P//ECJ3-OD-P//

INFO: SSO ACSI DA//DAMI-ISP//

SSO JCS//JRC//J3//JOD//

AFSSO USAF//SAFSS//

SSO HOOD//TCATA//ATCAT-CS-SP//

SSO DARCOM

~~TOP SECRET~~ HANDLE VIA ~~TALENT KEYHOLE~~ CHANNELS ONLY

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

SSO DARCOM FOR ADPO PASS TO SPC

SUBJECT: SPECIAL PROJECT POST OAK. II (U)

REF: SSO USEUCOM MSG DTG 041321Z MAY 79, SUBJ: SANITIZATION AND

NATO RELEASE OF POST OAK II INTELLIGENCE (~~S/NOFORN~~).

~~(S/TK)~~ AUTHORITY HAS BEEN GRANTED FOR USCINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR
 AND CINCUSAFE TO RELEASE SIMULATED, [REDACTED] KH-8, AND KH-9

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

SATELLITE IMAGERY DERIVED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO NATO COMMANDS
 PARTICIPATING IN THE POST OAK II COMMAND POST EXERCISE DURING THE
 PERIOD 6-11 MARCH 1980. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 8.C. OF
 THE REFERENCE, THIS NATO RELEASE AUTHORITY INCLUDES SIMULATED,

Distr:
 IC, DC-1, DC-1(CCF), DC-3, DC-3Y, DC-5, DC-5A, DC-5C, DC-7, DC-7C
 IC-ES, RSS-4, DP, DN

[REDACTED]
 IC-3Y, EXT. 75290, 16 JUL 79

(b)(3)

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[REDACTED] SPOT AND SUMMARY REPORTS AND

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

KH-8/9 AVAILABLE OFF-THE-SHELF REPORTS. SIMULATED COLLECTION
COVERS THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN/WARSAW PACT AREA AND THE USSR WEST OF
15 DEGREES EAST. THERE CAN BE NO ATTRIBUTION TO SATELLITE SOURCE.
SANITIZATION MUST OCCUR AT US (TK CERTIFIED) FACILITIES BY US
(TK CLEARED) PERSONNEL. THE CLASSIFICATION OF RELEASED INFORMATION
MUST BE NO LOWER THAN SECRET RELEASABLE TO NATO.

2. (U) AN APPROVED SET OF GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR POST OAK II
SANITIZATION FOLLOWS. HQ USEUCOM MUST FURTHER ESTABLISH SPECIFIC
WRITTEN GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES FOR ELEMENTS IMPLEMENTING THIS
AUTHORITY. COPIES OF THESE GUIDELINES MUST BE SUBMITTED TO DIA,
ATTN: DC-3Y.

3. (U) GUIDELINES FOR POST OAK II SANITIZATION:

A. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ SANITIZATION AS USED IN THESE GUIDELINES MEANS
THAT THERE WILL BE NO WRITTEN OR ORAL ATTRIBUTION TO THE IMAGERY
SATELLITE SOURCE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED TO NON-US NATO PERSONNEL.


B. ~~(S/TK)~~ SANITIZATION OF SIMULATED KH-8, KH-9 [REDACTED]
INFORMATION MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY US TK CLEARED PERSONNEL IN US
TK APPROVED FACILITIES.

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(b)(3)

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CONTROL CHANNELS

C. ~~(S/TK)~~ SYSTEM MARKINGS (TALENT-KEYHOLE), PRODUCT CODEWORDS (SUFF) AND ALL SIMULATED MISSION OR OTHER OPERATIONAL NOTATIONS, REFERENCES AND PI TERMINOLOGY (I.E., OBSERVED, SEEN, ETC.) MUST BE DELETED FROM WRITTEN REPORTS AND ORAL PRESENTATIONS.



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

E. (U) DATE OF ACQUISITION (INTELLIGENCE) MAY BE REPORTED BY QUARTER, DAY, MONTH AND YEAR.

F. (U) MATERIALS AND INFORMATION SANITIZED AND RELEASED UNDER THIS AUTHORITY WILL BE CLASSIFIED NO LOWER THAN SECRET AND WILL BE DEEMED RELEASABLE TO NATO OR ITS EQUIVALENT.

G. ~~(S)~~ SANITIZED TK MATERIALS MAY BE REPORTED SEPARATELY OR MIXED WITH OTHER RELEASABLE DATA.

H. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ NON-US DISSEMINATION WILL BE LIMITED TO THOSE TO COMMANDS AND UNITS PARTICIPATING IN THE POST OAK II EXERCISE.

I. (U) HQ USEUCOM WILL FURTHER ESTABLISH SPECIFIC WRITTEN GUIDELINES FOR ELEMENTS IMPLEMENTING THIS SANITIZATION AUTHORITY. A COPY OF THESE GUIDELINES WILL BE PROVIDED TO DIA, ATTN: DC-3Y.

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~~(TS//TK)~~ IN DEVELOPING THE GUIDELINES REFERENCED ABOVE, CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

GUIDELINES LISTED ABOVE SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO FIT THE EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AND PROVIDED TO DIA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR INCLUSION IN THE TEST DESIGN PLAN APPENDIX GOVERNING RELEASE AND SANITIZATION AUTHORITIES. INFORMATION REGARDING SIGINT RELEASE AUTHORITIES WILL BE PROVIDED AS SOON AS AVAILABLE.

EVW: 16 JUL 1999

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