

~~TOP SECRET~~
Handle Via SYEMAN
CHANNELS ONLY

ITN 0072
121247 RR 000 RUXPDAA0285 2622245 00037-XXXX--RUXPDAA.
2NY XXXXX 000 ZNM
P R 102244Z
BT
XXXXX

[redacted] 537; ALLOT 606, [redacted] 774; JACKAL 271; ASPIC 255;
COGNAC 841; CONCH 003
ALLOT PASS BISON
[redacted]
JACKAL PASS FALCON
ASPIC PASS DEMURE

AA-6209

DISSEMINATION	
SAPDS	ALL
SAPAI	
SAPUSA	
SAPSK	
EXEC	
LMA	
PER	(b)(1)
NET	(b)(3)
SAP/SPE	
TO	
REGISTRY	
CONF	
SP	

~~TOP SECRET~~ 102244Z SEP 80 CITE DRIVER 1290
PRIORITY [redacted] INFO BISON, [redacted] FALCON, DEMURE, COGNAC, CONCH.
HANDLE VIA SYEMAN CONTROL CHANNELS ONLY
SECUR

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted] FOR 046/054/P4/W/V/D5; KWBISON FOR [redacted] SP-8;
FROM: AUSTIN/BUNN

SUBJECT: RELEASE OF SATELLITE DERIVED ELINT TO NATO
REFERENCE: DRAFT MEMORANDUM TO THE DCI, BYE 3097-00 OF 20
AUG 80, SUBJ: HANDLING OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT
UNDER APEX

1. IN THE DRAFT MEMORANDUM TO THE DCI ON THE HANDLING OF
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT UNDER APEX (REFERENCE) WE HAVE
SOME CONCERNS THAT THE SECTION ON PROVIDING SATELLITE DERIVED
ELINT TO NATO, AS WRITTEN, MAY NOT BE SPECIFIC ENOUGH FOR
THOSE COMMISSIONED TO WRITE THE MANUAL TO ENSURE THAT ADEQUATE
PROTECTION IS PROVIDED THE COLLECTION AND PROCESSING CAPABILITIES
OF [redacted] THAT NEED TO RECEIVE
CONTINUED PROTECTION EITHER IN COMPARTMENTED CHANNELS OR BY
LIMITING DISTRIBUTION TO US/UK/CAN/AUS/NZ.

2. [redacted] IS ATTEMPTING TO ASSESS IF THERE EXIST ANY SPECIFIC
EMITTERS ON OPERATIONALLY DEPLOYED SYSTEMS WHICH BY THEMSELVES
DISCLOSE SIGNIFICANT ADVANCED COLLECTION OR PROCESSING CAPABILITY
AND SHOULD NOT BE ROUTINELY RELEASED TO NATO. IF THIS BE
THE CASE, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO THE SIGINT COMMITTEE THAT THE
DISSEMINATION OF THESE SPECIFIC EMITTERS BE LIMITED TO THE
US/UK/CAN/AUS/NZ AT THE SECRET LEVEL CHANNELS AND NOT ROUTINELY
REPORT THEM TO NATO. REQUEST [redacted] SUPPORT IN REVIEWING
THE PROCESSING SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED WITH [redacted]
FOR THE PURPOSE OF IDENTIFYING ANY EMITTERS AGAINST WHICH
WE USE ADVANCED PROCESSING TECHNIQUES (CURRENT AND SCHEDULED
NEW CAPABILITY).

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

3. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE SIGINT COMMITTEE
WITH SOME SPECIFIC EXAMPLES WHICH ILLUSTRATE OUR CONCERN ON
CAPABILITIES OF OUR SYSTEMS AGAINST OPERATIONALLY DEPLOYED
SYSTEMS WE HAVE REQUESTED OUR PROGRAM OFFICES TO PROVIDE INPUTS
(WITH SUPPORTING RATIONALE) ON THE FOLLOWING:

A. SPECIFIC EMITTERS THAT SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED TO NATO, E.G.,
POSSIBLY THE [redacted] WHICH DEMONSTRATES ABILITY TO ROUTINELY
PROCESS SHORT ON TIRE EMITTERS.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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B. ARE THERE CERTAIN FREQUENCY BANDS OR CAPABILITIES
WE NEED TO PROTECT FROM A TECHNOLOGY VIEWPOINT, E.G., LORRI?
C. TYPES OF EMITTERS NOT TO RELEASE WHICH BY THEMSELVES
INDICATE A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY, E.G., AIRBORNE, USE OF

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

REVW SEPT 2000
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