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CONTROL SYSTEM**(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE**

WASHINGTON, D.C.



October 1, 1969

THE NRO STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ALLEN**SUBJECT: Meeting of the Verification Group Principals**

On September 30 I visited Lt Col Koehler, JCS, to obtain information on the Principals' meeting that was held on Sept 29. Col Koehler gave me the following rundown.

The MIRV Panel Report was by and large good. However, Mr. Richardson, INR, was not pleased with the fact that the MIRV Panel could not come up with a definition of a ban on multiple objects in space and maneuvering in space which would disallow MIRV testing but which would still permit operation of satellite intelligence collection systems. Mr. Richardson is going to attempt to come up with such a definition.

Dr. Kissinger then stated that he desired to speak only about general topics and then proceeded to go to a page by page review of the summary report. Mr. Nitze asked the question: "What is a mandatory ban?" Gerard Smith answered: By mandatory we don't mean necessary for a SALT agreement; a mandatory ban really is a guideline only. Mr. Richardson then added that the mandatory ban discussion was generally for education and that it would be a Presidential decision as to what risks we would be willing to take. The question of mobile strategic missiles came up and it was decided that the whole question of the number of mobile missiles which would have to be deployed before detection should be reworked.

The question of suspicious new activity was also raised and the principals agreed that a better definition of a new or improved missile must be developed. The question of suppression of telemetry

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also came up and the footnote contained in the summary report on this subject was unsatisfactory in the Principals' eyes. Mr. Duckett was in attendance supporting Mr. Helms and allegedly gave a long dissertation on what was meant by telemetry suppression and how such a ban would work. Mr. Packard then began a very lengthy dissertation on how infeasible such a ban was. He felt this was one area in which he had technical expertise. A staff member in attendance at the meeting stated that Mr. Packard's comments came very close to belittling Mr. Duckett's position and it was as strong an indictment as he had ever seen from Mr. Packard. The Principals agreed that a new definition of a ban on suppression of telemetry would be required.

The question of bans on ICBMs was raised and Mr. Packard asked a question: what is the overall view of a ban on strategic weapons? In other words, we should not only be concerned with restricting the deployment of individual weapons but should address ourselves to the question of total strategic posture. Dr. Kissinger added that he was not only concerned with cheating but was very concerned with what is still allowed after we get agreement on certain individual strategic systems limitations.

The question of SS-11 accuracy was raised and the Principals agreed that the footnote on the subject needs rework.

Mr. Packard then stated that we would still need money to buy counter weapons for those systems which were not limited by agreement. At this point, Dr. Kissinger raised the problem of a MIRV ban vs. a MIRV test ban and asked, "Why don't we want a test ban?" Mr. Packard answered, saying that a MIRV test ban would stop us but would not stop the Soviet Union. If we had a MIRV test ban Congress would not appropriate the funds for any clandestine testing while the Soviet Union had no such restrictions.

Mr. Nitze noted that the summary report contained a requirement for the control of missile "throw weight" capability. He asked how this could be verified. To my knowledge, nobody answered Mr. Nitze's question.

Mr. Richardson again brought up the question of MIRV space testing and reiterated his desire to attempt a more precise definition.


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The MIRV panel report was then discussed and Mr. Packard stated that Tab D (ABM Levels under MIRV Ban) must come out and that DOD will do the ABM position as a separate paper. Mr. Lynn will prepare a summary of the MIRV report.

Dr. Kissinger then stated that he wanted a paper on SAM radar upgrading. He also stated that the summary would have to be reworked. Mr. Nitze asked: What other options (other than the ones discussed in the summary report) are open to us? How about reductions? Dr. Kissinger stated that while there are other options such as reductions, only the five options contained in NSSM 62 have Presidential approval. The principals also agreed that an NSC meeting was needed to arrive at a U. S. position on the options.

I understand that the MIRV panel report will be reworked in addition to the summary report and we will continue to act as consultants to JCS and DDR&E as we have in the past.


JOHN R. MECEDA
Captain, USAFHANDLE VIA
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