

*NRO Staff
Chen*

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
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(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

8 DEC 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION



I can arrange to have you more fully briefed on the results if you desire. Thank you for your support on these issues. If we can be of any other assistance please feel free to contact me or my staff.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

J. D. Hill
J. D. HILL

1 Attachment
Inputs to SSI Terms of Reference (TCS51854/88)

DISTRIBUTION:
NSC (B. Linhard)
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~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

8 DEC 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY CHIEF, ARMS CONTROL INTELLIGENCE STAFF
(ACIS)

SUBJECT: Inputs for Suspect Site Inspection (SSI) Terms of Reference

[Redacted]

addition, we agree that the authority for that decision properly rests with the cognizant cabinet official and should not be arbitrated through lower level interagency groups. In the event, however, an NRO facility or operation should become subject to Soviet SSI, then the following SSI guidelines and policies should be in place.

(b)(1)

The DDNRO has requested they be incorporated in the Intelligence Community's SSI response to the tasking received from National Security Decision Directive 318.

(b)(3)

Key recommendations for SSI:

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

b. Facilities: A Soviet SSI request should identify a specific building. Identifying an entire contractor facility could subject many non-related activities to inspection.

c. Time limits: The NRO would like one week to study an SSI request and make a recommendation. A recommendation to refuse an SSI request presumably can be made more rapidly by using internal lists which identify critical facilities which should not be inspected under any circumstances. However, there

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
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are NRO facilities which could fall under political pressure to be favorably considered for inspection. These must be evaluated (b)(1)
(b)(3)



d. Mechanism for accepting/rejecting SSI requests:

(1) The first alternative would be to allow each cabinet-level official to act as the final authority on whether or not his/her agency can accept an SSI. The decision could only be overturned by the President.

(2) A second approach warrants consideration: The use of an advisory council selected as a non-political arbitrator of the Soviet SSI request. The council should be approachable, agencies should front-load it with their sensitivities, and an agency director should have the right of appeal. Details need to be fleshed out, but this may represent a compromise between a bureaucratic interagency forum and unilateral actions by agency directors.

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e. Sensitive facilities: Each organization should develop its own list of facilities. They should segregate facilities and operations into categories and identify locations which are absolutely off-limits and those that could be inspected given adequate preparation time. Lists would not be shared. If SSI refusals become politically untenable [redacted]

f. Criteria for accepting/rejecting an SSI request: Requests for SSI should be accompanied by some evidence of specific "illegal ballistic missile activity." The criteria for accepting or rejecting a request should then be based on the legitimacy of the alleged infraction. If the USG determines the US facility is not conducting "illegal ballistic missile activity," the request is refused and a good faith effort is made to explain the perceived violation IAW NSDD 318. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

My staff will continue to coordinate with you to ensure that our concerns are reflected in the emerging SSI regime protocol.

DONALD G. WARD
Brigadier General, USAF
Director

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