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~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

January 31, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISP)

SUBJECT: START Treaty: Ballistic Missile Production and Storage Facilities Verification

Within OSD and the Intelligence Community, a number of papers are circulating which address verification policy for strategic ballistic missile production and storage. We have reviewed the subject and would like to provide comment.

A basic National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) position regarding START inspection regimes is

The current round of papers proposes mandatory Suspect Site Inspection (SSI) for facilities that have the "capability" to store a START-accountable missile. A facility is considered "capable" if it can store a LANCE-class missile. (b)(1) (b)(3)

Inspection regimes are also proposed for solid rocket motor manufacturers which are "capable" of producing strategic ballistic missile motors and stages. "Capable" is defined as having the proper sized equipment at the production facility. We

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recognize that the solid rocket motor production infrastructure for either "strategic ballistic" or "space launch" motors is similar; however, we anticipate minimal difficulty with mandatory SSI at SRMF as long as site diagrams are prepared carefully with full input from the NRO.

I appreciate the support that you have given our concerns in the past and trust that you will carefully consider any proposal to reduce the size of facilities subject to SSI.

J. D. HILL

cc:
OSD(A), Mr. Minichello
SAF/AQS, MGen Moorman

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BACKGROUND PAPER

ON

SOLID ROCKET MOTOR PRODUCTION AND STORAGE VERIFICATION

Issue

What should be the NRO position regarding Portal Perimeter Continuous Monitoring (PPCM) and Suspect Site Inspection (SSI) of facilities that are involved with Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) production, assembly and storage.

Background

OSD Verification Policy (Sally Horn's Group) has produced four concept papers addressing issues on inspecting for START restricted SRM stages. ACIS has asked for our input to the papers.

The first paper, Selecting Facilities for PPCM (Tab 1), is an issue resulting from language in the Joint Draft Text allowing PPCM of facilities involved in any or all of the processes required to create solid-propellant ballistic missiles.

The current U.S. position, is for PPCM at SRMF that produce any stage of a ballistic missile, subject to the treaty, if that facility produces a solid rocket motor for any purpose that is as large as, or larger than, the solid rocket motor for the smallest accountable stage. The U.S. position would capture a short list of manufactures:

(b)(3)

The second paper, How to Treat "Capable" Solid Rocket Motor Producers (Tab 2), is a fallout of the first paper. The current U.S. position does not address solid rocket motor production facilities that have casting pits of sufficient size to produce treaty-limited SRMs, but are not currently producing ballistic missile components. To capture these facilities, two options, PPCM and Mandatory SSI, are being considered by OSD Verification Policy. U.S. SRM manufacturers impacted would be:

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

The third paper, Mandatory SSI Of "Incapable" Solid Rocket Motor Producers (Tab 3), addresses the other shortfall from the first paper, capturing the SRM manufacturing facilities with casting pits too small for treaty-limited ballistic missile stages. Two options are considered, mandatory SSI or establishing a physical criteria for exemption from the mandatory SSI list. Impacted U.S. manufacturers would be:

[redacted]

The fourth paper, Mandatory SSI of Missile Storage Facilities (Tab 4), addresses a fallout from the JDT language which allows SSI of strategic ballistic missile storage areas baselined in the treaty, but is silent as to whether there should be mandatory SSI at non-strategic ballistic missile storage facilities that have the "capability" to store a START-accountable missile or have stored START-accountable ballistic missiles in the past. A facility is "capable" if it can store a LANCE-class missile, capturing the following U.S. facilities:

[redacted] (b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Discussion

Together, these papers attempt to place inspection regimes at all key points in the life cycle of an SRM. On the issue of inspection regimes at SRM manufacturers, SRM production infrastructure is identical for making either "strategic ballistic" or "space launch" SRMs so it is difficult to maintain any distinction. Additionally, the NRO

(b)(3)

Recommendation

(b)(3)