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~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

February 23, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS DIVISION, ARMS
CONTROL INTELLIGENCE STAFF
DIRECTOR, VERIFICATION POLICY, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


SUBJECT: Data Denial Agreement (~~S~~)

This letter provides the formal National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) position on outstanding issues regarding the Data Denial Agreement (DDA) now being negotiated, per our 22 Feb 90 telecons.

The NRO does have firm, validated requirements over the next several years to use Minuteman III 3rd stage-type solid rocket motors to boost already-orbiting satellite payloads to higher orbits. (These stages are taken directly from the production line, and in fact, are never part of a deployed ballistic missile system.) We have no specific plans for other stages at this time.

With regard to the "Data Denial and Space Launch Vehicles" paper (21 Feb version) now being considered in the interagency, the NRO strongly recommends at least Option 2, that is, exempting all payload telemetry from the data denial agreement once the payload or orbital vehicle has separated from the final boost stage. Option 1 (exempting all payload telemetry from launch on) would be preferable in some respects, and in keeping with current National Space Policy regarding encryption of space launch telemetry. However, we defer to policy agencies and the Intelligence Community (IC) on whether the additional risks of covert Soviet development from allowing encryption of all payload telemetry from launch outweigh the benefits.

We recommend that policy agencies carefully consider the adverse implications of extending the DDA to include upper stages of converted ICBM or SLBM stages mated with any stage of non-START accountable space launch systems. Extending the DDA to include 2nd/3rd stages could, if not crafted precisely, alter the fundamental U.S. position that only ballistic missile 1st stages are Treaty Limited Items (TLI) for Suspect Site



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Inspection (SSI) purposes under START. This would have the effect of significantly increasing the risks of SSI to satellite reconnaissance assets, due to the much smaller sizes of upper stage boosters. While it is important to preclude as many cheating scenarios as possible, we must balance that need against the consequent risks to the DCI's sources and methods. It may be better to leave the DDA silent on 2nd and 3rd stages if the alternative is to reduce the effective TLI size.

The NRO has no requirements for "strategic R&D boosters" using ballistic trajectories.

This memorandum represents a formal, approved NRO input on this issue. Your support on this matter is greatly appreciated. If we can be of other assistance, please contact me directly.

JAMES L. RODGERS, Capt, USAF
Deputy for National Security
Affairs

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