

SN  
21 J~~SECRET~~HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

March 7, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

SUBJECT: Suspect Site Inspection (SSI) For START

REFERENCES A: Director, IC Staff Memorandum, 5 Jan 90  
(ICS 0751-90)B: Director, IC Staff Memorandum, 7 Feb 90  
(ICS 0790-90)

We are pleased to participate in the effort to clarify positions on START Suspect Site Inspection (SSI) procedures for the DCI, and eventually the U.S. Government. This interim response provides our general concerns; we will forward additional, detailed inputs as they become available. Because of security implications, we are not forwarding detailed lists of sensitive NRO facilities to be exempted from SSI. However, we are prepared to brief the DCI and other Community leaders, as required.

As you know, the current U.S. position on SSI and the need for an unambiguous right of refusal (ROR) was validated in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 318 (October 1988). NSDD-318 also stated that to protect critical, non-SDI programs the U.S. should "not permit the on-site inspection of spacecraft." To the best of our knowledge, these statements still represent the official U.S. positions on SSI and inspections of space systems such as those of the NRO. To assure protection of sources and methods, the DCI may wish to revalidate and underscore the concepts embodied in NSDD-318 with this Administration.

The intelligence collection capabilities provided by NRO systems will continue to be the primary basis for all arms control treaty monitoring. On-site inspection regimes are important, but cannot substitute for the access, coverage and timeliness afforded by space-based reconnaissance. An SSI regime should achieve a balance between the benefits and risks of SSI, thus protecting the nation's overhead reconnaissance assets from unintended compromise. Congress will likely examine such considerations closely during the START ratification process.

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY BYEMAN . 1CONTROL NO. BYE28097V90  
COPY 42 COPIES  
3 PAGES  
WORKING COPY

~~SECRET~~HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

Still, to better inform decision-makers about the potential adverse implications of allowing Soviet SSI at sensitive space-related facilities, we have been assessing the impact of an SSI



(b)(1)


(b)(3)

In assessing candidates for exemption from SSI under START, we found a number of facilities [redacted] that should not be inspected under any circumstances due to the potential for significant compromises to our missions. Many facilities must be exempted only when particular payloads are present. Some "facilities" requiring exemption include various shipping containers--some clearly larger than TLI size--used to transport NRO payloads. A number of BYEMAN facilities can be inspected without necessarily revealing critical mission capabilities, given proper preparation time, and assuming the nation is willing to bear the expenses incurred. Such expenses could be considerable.

(b)(3)

However, we have found that the exact types and numbers of facilities requiring exemption depends on the SSI procedures used. Attached are our recommendations for SSI procedures that would lessen, but not obviate, the impact on NRO programs. Let me summarize our conclusions in this regard:

(a) Even for "inspectable" facilities, significant intelligence information regarding NRO facilities and systems will be derived. This reinforces our understanding that for some facilities and systems, an unambiguous right of refusal to SSI is essential.



(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(c) Sufficient time is necessary to accept or reject an SSI (one week), and to prepare for an SSI if accepted (three weeks). As a corollary, only minimal time (eight hours) is necessary to conduct an inspection.

(d) "Rapid" PPM and pre-inspection movement restrictions present the potential for significant compromises of national security space systems, as well as serious, costly impediments to launch plans and schedules.

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY BYEMAN - 1CONTROL NO BYE28097/90  
COPY OF 4 COPIES  
PAGE OF 3 PAGES  
WORKING COPY

~~SECRET~~HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

I have attached a number of recommendations for SSI procedures, based upon the draft DOD paper provided in the original tasker. These are generally consistent with the November 1988 DCI position on SSI. We recommend these inputs as a baseline for developing an updated IC position on SSI procedures.

Some agencies are considering alternative SSI regimes that might not contain an unambiguous ROR to SSI. Consistent with previous DCI positions, I caution against adopting any such regime, for the reasons outlined above.

Your support on these matters is greatly appreciated, and we trust that our inputs will prove useful as the report to the DCI is prepared. If we can be of other assistance, such as providing appropriate briefings, please contact me directly.



Martin C. Faga

## 2 Attachments

1. Candidate Sites for Exemption from SSI (BYE28096/90)
2. Inputs to SSI Procedures (BYE28094/90)

cc: Doug MacEachin, ACIS  
Dick Beyea, CCISCMO, ICS

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY BYEMAN - 1CONTROL NO BYE28097/90  
COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES  
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES  
*Working Copy*

~~SECRET~~HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

## CANDIDATE SITES FOR EXEMPTION FROM SSI

GENERAL

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is responsible for the research, development, acquisition and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems for the collection of intelligence from denied areas. NRO systems satisfy a host of intelligence requirements, including Indications & Warning (I&W); economic, military and science/technology intelligence; support to military operations; and arms control verification.

U.S. satellite reconnaissance systems are often based upon extremely advanced, state-of-the-art technologies and capabilities not available--and often unknown--to potential adversaries. The BYEMAN control system is designed to blur information about NRO systems and operations in order to minimize the development and employment of countermeasures by adversaries, or allow those techniques/technologies to be turned back against the U.S. Thus, NRO activities are conducted covertly to the maximum extent possible.

[REDACTED] a number of vital U.S. technical intelligence collection capabilities.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

To ensure effective satellite reconnaissance in support of national requirements, a number of NRO facilities, activities or operations should be exempted from Suspect Site Inspection (SSI) under the START Treaty.

[REDACTED] Thus, the START Treaty should strike a careful balance between verification benefits and risks to unrelated national security programs, including the ability to monitor arms control agreement via "national technical means of verification." For this reason, we recommend inclusion of an unambiguous right of refusal (ROR) to Soviet "challenge" SSI.

The following information is provided for ICS use in preparing a report on SSI for the DCI. Detailed examples will be made available through briefings to the DCI and other appropriate, cleared individuals, upon request.

TYPES OF SITES

The NRO conducts activities in many different types of government, military and contractor facilities, ranging from

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY BYEMAN - 1CONTROL NO. BYE28096/90  
COPY OF 4 COPIES  
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

~~SECRET~~HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

[redacted] Sites of each type (b)(3)  
are recommended for exemption from SSI, and examples are  
discussed below.

NUMBER OF SITES

The NRO conducts activities [redacted]  
however, the number and locations of facilities used changes as  
systems and contracts evolve through the life of a program.  
Thus, any lists of inspectable/exempt sites should be considered  
as "living documents" that change regularly. Thus, it is not  
feasible to have a "short-notice" determination, based on pre-  
positioned lists, of sites that can or cannot be subjected to  
SSI.

The exact number of sites that must be exempted from SSI  
will depend on how SSI procedures are negotiated and implemented.  
NRO recommendations on SSI procedures have been provided in a  
separate attachment. However, we have determined that a number  
of NRO sites must be exempted from SSI due to the need to protect  
critical mission capabilities, operations or key technologies.  
We are also concerned that the costs of actual SSIs could become  
prohibitive if inspections are not reasonably limited in scope  
(e.g., specific buildings, limited to 8 hours, etc).

Based on our current understanding of the START Treaty and  
assuming that SSI procedures in line with our recommendations are  
adopted, we expect that [redacted] will require [redacted] (b)(3)  
exemption from SSI.

[redacted]  
[redacted] We are continuing to refine our  
estimate, and hope to reduce it further. However, the final  
number of sites requiring SSI could increase depending on the  
final SSI procedures.

SITE FUNCTION/HARM TO THE U.S.


Sites that will require exemption include, but are not  
limited to:

-- Extremely large industrial facilities designed to  
integrate, test and prepare for launch a wide variety of  
satellites. Such facilities of necessity are often large enough  
to accommodate START-accountable activities. Inspections of  
facilities containing sensitive spacecraft could lead to  
compromise of significant intelligence collection capabilities  
that the Soviets are now unaware of. In certain cases,


HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY BYEMAN - 1CONTROL NO. RYE28096/90  
COPY OF 4 COPIES  
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM




-- Industrial facilities of various types containing advanced technologies or industrial processes, as well as sight-classified satellite components or site characteristics.



(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

-- Payload processing facilities at launch bases. Fully assembled spacecraft are integrated with space launch vehicles at the launch bases. As mentioned previously, many of these space facilities are located adjacent to or near START-accountable facilities. Many sensitive spacecraft are larger than what we understand will be TLI sizes,



HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY BYEMAN - 1

CONTROL NO. BYE28096/90  
COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES  
PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

*Working Copy*

~~SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

SITE LOCATIONS

In some cases, and particularly at the nation's two primary  
space launch bases (Cape Canaveral AFS and Vandenberg AFB),

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY BYEMAN - 1

CONTROL NO BYE28096/90  
COPY 4 OF 4 COPIES  
PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

WENTWORTH COPY

~~SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

NRO INPUTS TO SSI PROCEDURES PAPER

Inputs are laid out to parallel, to the extent possible, the structure of the draft paper on SSI procedures provided in your 8 Jan 90 tasker. Some information not directly covered in the paper, but important to the subject, is provided as appropriate.

I. OBJECTIVE AND UNIVERSE

1. The figures and descriptions contained herein do not reflect those NRO facilities that are certified and accredited by the DCI for compartmented research and development activities.

II. TREATY LIMITED ITEMS

1. TLI size should remain as large as possible.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

[Redacted]

III. PROCEDURES

A. The paper did not address several key points that directly bear on the overall question of the usefulness and net benefit of SSI to the U.S., and bear consideration:

1. An unambiguous right of refusal must be maintained. The right to refuse SSI requests is necessary to protect some truly sensitive space-related facilities and programs, as validated in NSDD 318.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

[Redacted]

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY BYEMAN - 1

CONTROL NO BYE28094/90  
COPY 4 OF 4 COPIES  
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES



~~SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

2. SSI requests must be handled consistent with the security of covert programs. Assuming that refusals will be exercised when necessary, we must be able to protect the existence or capabilities of sensitive programs as we formulate replies to Soviet requests. We recommend establishing a mechanism where authority to approve/disapprove SSI requests rests with the cognizant cabinet official. Attempting to arbitrate such decisions among lower-level interagency groups would inevitably lead to compromises of sensitive, highly compartmented information. Naturally, any decision to reject an SSI could be overturned by the President.

3. Requests for SSI should be accompanied by some evidence of specific "illegal ballistic missile activity," and identify particular suspects sites by building, not simply general geographic areas. If the USG determines the US facility is not conducting "illegal ballistic missile activity," the request should be refused and a good faith effort made to resolve the concern with the Soviets.

B. The paper identifies two different options for SSI procedures. Of the two, Option II would afford the least risk to our national technical means because it would not permit Rapid Portal Perimeter Monitoring (RPPM). However, key elements in both options would create difficulties.

1. Adequate decision time for SSI requests is essential. The NRO believes one week is needed to study an SSI request--to "cover all the bases"--and make an informed recommendation to the appropriate Cabinet-level officials and/or the President. Some argue that an SSI request must be accepted or rejected within a few hours to be meaningful. This is not the case. If the USG had concluded that the Soviets were cheating and an SSI was warranted, we would monitor the requested facility closely via NTM and other means to catch attempts to thwart the SSI.

2. Pre-Inspection Movement Restrictions (PIMRs) are neither necessary nor useful for an SSI regime. We must retain the right to continue space activities, particularly at the nation's two launch bases, without restrictions.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

a. Any SSI regime freezing movements at, for example, Vandenberg AFB and Cape Canaveral AFS, would likely result in

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY BYEMAN - 1

CONTROL NO BYE28094/90  
COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES  
PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

[Redacted]

b. There are also obvious security implications, if by mischance

[Redacted]

c. Finally, PIMRs would be extremely difficult to implement at non-designated sites, particularly at contractor facilities where there are no clear "chains of command" or direct communications links. In INF, PIMRs work only because we know precisely which facilities are affected. Some military bases have commercial railroads or public highways running directly through their boundaries, as do many contractor facilities. On a large scale,

[Redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

This type of provision may, in fact, needlessly complicate START end-game negotiations.

d. In any event, PIMRs would require some period of time during which compliance would of necessity be determined by NTM, as in the INF Treaty. It would thus seem feasible to simply use NTM to detect movements of TLIs.

3. RPPM would significantly increase the security risks and programmatic costs of SSI at or near sensitive facilities.

[Redacted]

4. Adequate preparation time is essential. In certain cases, no amount of preparation would be sufficient--thus the need for

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY BYEMAN - 1

CONTROL NO BYE28094/90  
COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES  
PAGE 5 OF 4 PAGES

**WORKING COPY**

~~SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

refusals. Should an SSI be permitted against an NRO facility, a

[Redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

IV. THE INSPECTION

A. SSIs should be very short, and revisits should be limited.  
It takes only a short time to verify the absence of illegal ballistic missile activity.

[Redacted] SSI should take less than eight hours on-site. Also, a regime that allowed inspectors to repeatedly revisit areas of intelligence interest that do not contain illegal ballistic missile activity represents a serious threat to NRO programs.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY BYEMAN - 1

CONTROL NO BYE28094/90  
COPY 4 OF 4 COPIES  
PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

*Handwritten:* WORKING COPY