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| STAFF COORDINATION SHEET | | | | | | |
|--|---------|----------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| TO | ACTION | SIGNATURE, GRADE, AND DATE | TO | ACTION | SIGNATURE, GRADE, AND DATE | |
| 1 | PA/EXEC | INFO | | | <i>Cy Provided best</i> | |
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| | | | 12 | BUD | INFO | Cy Provided (b)(3) |
| 3 | PRO A | COORD | | | <i>J.H./ 11 OCT 90</i> | |
| | | | 13 | POL | COORD | <i>For, Rodgers (11)</i> |
| 4 | PRO B | COORD | | | <i>Cy Provided 12 Oct 90</i> | |
| | | | 14 | LL | INFO | Cy Provided |
| 5 | PRO C | INFO | | | Cy Provided | |
| | | | 15 | EXEC | | <i>SEE ENCLOSED NOTE</i> <i>NOT</i> |
| 6 | UST | INFO | | | Cy Provided | |
| | | | 16 | DDMS | COORD | <i>DDMS Coord 10/15/90</i> |
| 7 | DSPO | | | | | |
| | | | 17 | SD | COORD | |
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| SURNAME OF ACTION OFFICER AND GRADE Major Rodgers <i>JR</i> | | | SYMBOL POL | PHONE <input type="text"/> | TYPIST'S IN <input type="text"/> | SUSPENSE DATE October 15, 1990 (b)(3) |
| SUBJECT DNRO DNRO-DCI Memo Re: "Current Practices" | | | | | DATE October 11, 1990 | |
| SUMMARY | | | | | | |
| <p>Issue of "current practices" vice "one-watt power level" in the START Data Denial provisions is still unresolved. Mr. MacEachin at ACIS has forcefully advanced the NRO/IC position regarding the need for the current practices formulation, as well as a supplemental tape exchange. However, time is running out, as it appears that START will be signed in late 1990 or early 1991. Thus, Mr. MacEachin is planning to advocate raising the "current practices" issue to be one of the major topics at the early November Ministerial meeting in Washington between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.</p> <p>Enclosed, recommended DNRO-to-DCI memorandum underscores--but without overstatement--the importance of the issue, in terms of both collection capabilities and the avoidance of future cost growth. Believe sending this memorandum would reaffirm to the DCI the importance of the issue and the need to resolve it in the near future. We believe this memorandum would be supportive of Mr. MacEachin's efforts to elevate the issue.</p> <p>If approved, it is important that the memorandum be forwarded ASAP--preferably NLT 15 October--in order to arrive in time to impact preparations for the November Ministerial.</p> <p>RECOMMENDATION: That the DDNRO sign the enclosed memorandum to the DCI.</p> <p><i>We could include a note that Senate probably won't ratify treaty without current practice + tape exchange of the <input type="text"/> system in the NRP.</i></p> | | | | | | |
| <p>(b)(1) (b)(3)</p> <p><i>Dec</i></p> | | | | | | |

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~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

October 18, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Importance of "Current Practices" Versus 1 Watt Limit
for Telemetry in the START Treaty

As you know, we have been concerned in recent months about the potential negative impacts of the U.S. agreeing, as a part of the START negotiations, to a minimum power level of 1 watt for the transmitting of ballistic missile telemetry. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted] becomes part of the final treaty, I believe that this could become a major issue during the ratification process. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has already expressed concerns about our ability to monitor the START Treaty and insisted upon the continuation of the [redacted] which we have recommended terminating, until the START monitoring issue is resolved.

In order to protect critical telemetry collection capabilities, we have recommended strongly that: first, both sides be required to continue to broadcast telemetry in accordance with "current practices," a much broader concept that keeps power levels at their current collectable level and includes other signal characteristics in addition to power; and second, there be an exchange of telemetry data to guard against future changes in the collection environment. Doug MacEachin has been advancing these two positions within U.S. arms control forums.

As we approach the end-game for START, I want to reaffirm the importance, in terms of our ability to continue monitoring telemetry data and avoiding future cost growth, of ensuring these two provisions are included in the final START agreement. Therefore, as we prepare for the early November Ministerial meeting, I recommend that the Intelligence Community (IC) elevate this issue as one of the major topics to be discussed between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. I have attached a memorandum to General Scowcroft for your signature that draws attention to what I believe is a critical issue for the IC.

(POL-MAJ RODGERS)
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I appreciate your attention to this issue. Please call me if you require any further information.



Martin C. Faga

1 Attachment
Proposed Memorandum to the APNSA

cc: SECDEF

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PROPOSED

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Importance of "Current Practices" Versus [redacted]
for Telemetry in the START Treaty

As you know, we have been concerned in recent months about the potential negative impacts of the U.S. agreeing, as a part of the START negotiations, to a minimum power level of [redacted] the transmitting of ballistic missile telemetry. [redacted]

[redacted] becomes part of the final treaty, I believe that this could become a major issue during the ratification process. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has already expressed concerns about our ability to monitor the START Treaty and insisted upon the continuation of the [redacted] program, which we have recommended terminating, until the START monitoring issue is resolved.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

In order to protect critical telemetry collection capabilities, we have recommended strongly that: first, both sides be required to continue to broadcast telemetry in accordance with "current practices," a much broader concept that keeps power levels at their current collectable level and includes other signal characteristics in addition to power; and second, there be an exchange of telemetry data to guard against future changes in the collection environment.

As we approach the end-game for START, I want to reaffirm the importance, in terms of our ability to continue monitoring telemetry data and avoiding future cost growth, of ensuring these two provisions are included in the final START agreement. Therefore, as we prepare for the early November Ministerial meeting, I recommend that this issue be one of the major topics discussed between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

I appreciate your attention to this issue. Please call me if you require any further information.

William H. Webster



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