

~~SECRET~~HANDLE VIA  
~~TALENT-KEYHOLE~~  
CONTROL SYSTEM~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

February 13, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, ARMS CONTROL INTELLIGENCE STAFF

SUBJECT: Space Launch Issues (RFG-074) (U)

(U) OSD/Policy asked us to comment on the potential agreements regarding space launch issues proposed by the U.S. START Delegation in Request for Guidance (RFG-074), and related issues that have arisen subsequently in Washington. These are the inputs we provided:

a. ~~(S/TK)~~ The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has no substantive problem with the approach outlined in RFG-074, assuming that paragraph 8 is meant only to limit the number of space launch facilities (SLFs) from which ICBMs or SLBMs converted to space launch use can be launched. We understand this was Ambassador Burt's intent.

b. ~~(S)~~ Paragraph 6 needs clarification--it is unclear whether the agreement would be to limit the number of converted ICBMs/SLBMs at a given SLF to no more than the number of launchers at that facility declared for such use, or the (presumably larger) overall number of space launchers for all space systems at the facility. Also, policy-makers should be aware that this approach may limit future options for quick reaction concepts such as the "tactical satellites" now being studied--we defer to OSD/Acquisition on those impacts.

c. ~~(S/TK)~~ We strongly advise against limiting in any way the number of U.S. SLFs, except for those directly involved in launching ICBMs/SLBMs converted to space launch use. Indeed, we think it imperative that there be no discussions in START of any limitations on space launch or any other space activities not directly involving ICBMs/SLBMs used for space launch purposes. Should such a policy option be pursued, there would be no immediate, direct impacts to the NRO as long as the launch facilities at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) were protected for space launch purposes. However, such an approach would severely constrain future U.S. options for new or different space launch facilities, and thus unnecessarily constrain future national security, civil (e.g., NASA and NOAA), and commercial space activities.

REG/RSP PROCESSED

Date 9/10/226 Initials *MS*

HANDLE VIA

~~TALENT-KEYHOLE~~

CONTROL SYSTEM

CLASSIFIED BY

TKH J

~~SECRET~~(Pol. Maj Rodgers)  
CONTROL NO TCS-51701/91  
COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES  
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES


~~SECRET~~HANDLE VIA  
~~TALENT-KEYHOLE~~  
CONTROL SYSTEM

We believe that would be unwise. It is also unclear whether the space launch facilities at Wallops Island, Barking Sands and White Sands would be included in some overall SLF limit--the NRO does not now utilize those facilities, but may need to in the future. We recommend preserving such options for the entire space launch community.

c. ~~(S/PK)~~ Regarding reducing the limits on the number of launchers at space launch facilities for converted ICBMs/SLBMs from 25 to 20, and reducing the sublimit on silo and mobile launchers at space launch facilities from 15 to 10: the NRO would not be impacted by such a change, although other potential users might be.

d. ~~(S)~~ We recommend maintaining the position, now agreed with the Soviets, that the Pegasus space launch vehicle is neither a ballistic missile nor a weapon-delivery vehicle, and therefore is not limited by the START Treaty. It is important to maintain the principle that space launch vehicles, per se, are not limited by the START agreement.

(U) Please call me if you have any questions on our input.



J. D. HILL

HANDLE VIA  
~~TALENT-KEYHOLE~~  
CONTROL SYSTEM~~SECRET~~CLASSIFIED BY TKH 1CONTROL NO TCS-51701/91  
COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES  
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

~~SECRET~~HANDLE VIA  
~~TALENT-KEYHOLE~~  
CONTROL SYSTEM~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

February 13, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY POLICY

SUBJECT: Space Launch Issues (RFG-074) (U)

(U) Your Verification Policy office asked us to comment on the potential agreements regarding space launch issues proposed by the U.S. START Delegation in Request for Guidance (RFG)-074, and related issues that have arisen subsequently in Washington.

a. ~~(S/TK)~~ The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has no substantive problem with the approach outlined in RFG-074, assuming that paragraph 8 is meant only to limit the number of space launch facilities (SLFs) from which ICBMs or SLBMs converted to space launch use can be launched. We understand this was Ambassador Burt's intent.

b. ~~(S)~~ Paragraph 6 needs clarification--it is unclear whether the agreement would be to limit the number of converted ICBMs/SLBMs at a given SLF to no more than the number of launchers at that facility declared for such use, or the (presumably larger) overall number of space launchers for all space systems at the facility. Also, policy-makers should be aware that this approach may limit future options for quick reaction concepts such as the "tactical satellites" now being studied--we defer to OSD/Acquisition on those impacts.

c. ~~(S/TK)~~ We strongly advise against limiting in any way the number of U.S. SLFs, except for those directly involved in launching ICBMs/SLBMs converted to space launch use. Indeed, we think it imperative that there be no discussions in START of any limitations on space launch or any other space activities not directly involving ICBMs/SLBMs used for space launch purposes. Should such a policy option be pursued, there would be no immediate, direct impacts to the NRO as long as the launch facilities at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) were protected for space launch purposes. However, such an approach would severely constrain future U.S. options for new or different space launch facilities, and thus unnecessarily constrain future national security, civil

REG/RSP PROCESSED

Date 9/02/91 Initials *[Signature]*

HANDLE VIA

~~TALENT-KEYHOLE~~

CONTROL SYSTEM

CLASSIFIED BY

TKH 1

~~SECRET~~

(Pol-maj Rodgers)

CONTROL NO. TCS-51702/91

COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES


~~SECRET~~HANDLE VIA  
~~TALENT KEYHOLE~~  
CONTROL SYSTEM

(e.g., NASA and NOAA), and commercial space activities. We believe that would be unwise. It is also unclear whether the space launch facilities at Wallops Island, Barking Sands and White Sands would be included in some overall SLF limit--the NRO does not now utilize those facilities, but may need to in the future. We recommend preserving such options for the entire space launch community.

c. ~~(S/TK)~~ Regarding reducing the limits on the number of launchers at space launch facilities for converted ICBMs/SLBMs from 25 to 20, and reducing the sublimit on silo and mobile launchers at space launch facilities from 15 to 10: the NRO would not be impacted by such a change, although other potential users might be.

d. ~~(S/TK)~~ We recommend maintaining the position, now agreed with the Soviets, that the Pegasus space launch vehicle is neither a ballistic missile nor a weapon-delivery vehicle, and therefore is not limited by the START Treaty. It is important to maintain the principle that space launch vehicles, per se, are not limited by the START agreement.

(U) Please call me if you have any questions on our input.



J. D. HILL

HANDLE VIA  
~~TALENT KEYHOLE~~  
CONTROL SYSTEM~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY TKH 1CONTROL NO. TCS-51702/91  
COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES  
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES