



National Reconnaissance Office

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NROI 16-1-1

Program Planning, Analysis, & Evaluation

OPR: DA/OP

SUBJECT: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

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A. INTRODUCTION. This instruction provides guidance on National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) implementation of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) requirements. It includes background information on START, the treaty's impact on the NRO, and specific guidance to ensure that the NRO complies with START while protecting its programs and activities from potential compromise. This instruction supersedes NRO Instruction 16-4a (11 April 2002).

B. APPLICATION. This instruction applies to all NRO components and to all NRO military, civilian, and contractor personnel at government locations where the NRO operates or sponsors an activity. The NRO defines facilities as Secure Compartmented Information Facilities, rooms, buildings, or building complexes that it uses for its activities.

This instruction specifically applies to all government and contractor personnel assigned to or operating at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), California.

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Additionally, the Special Right of Access Visit (SAV) provision of START does apply to

CL BY:
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This provision, however, is unlikely to be exercised. All NRO contractor facilities may use this instruction as guidance; however, they are reminded that all U.S. companies must comply with Federal laws regarding arms control compliance. In addition to Federal arms control compliance laws and regulations, as NRO contractors they must comply with the security clauses of their contracts.

C. TREATY SUMMARY.

1. The U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the START I on 31 July 1991. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the four former Soviet Republics in possession of nuclear weapons (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) became parties to the START I (Lisbon Protocol) as legal successors to the Soviet Union on 23 May 1992.
2. The treaty establishes numerical limits on Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles and their associated launchers and warheads. In addition, the numerical limits apply to heavy bombers and their armaments, including long-range, air-launched cruise missiles. The treaty also establishes an upper limit on aggregate ballistic missile throw weight. The treaty parties were to achieve these limits either within seven years after the treaty entered into force or by 2001.
3. The treaty contains an elaborate verification regime that includes 12 different types of on-site inspections including provisions permitting SAVs. Any U.S. Government facility could be subject to a SAV. This challenge is intended to resolve urgent concerns related to treaty compliance. The treaty parties must agree to procedures for conducting SAVs on a case-by-case basis through a formal negotiation process. The U.S. has the right to provide alternative means of compliance verification and to refuse to permit a SAV if it believes such a request is unnecessary. If the U.S. agrees to allow a SAV, it can select the timing of the visit, within treaty-mandated timelines, to balance compliance concerns against the requirement to protect sensitive facilities. This aspect of the treaty demonstrates the importance of interagency coordination and the maintenance of a notification process that informs those organizations that have sensitive facilities at sites that may be subject to SAVs.

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4. The treaty established a Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), comprising the START signatory nations, to facilitate implementation and address possible compliance issues and concerns. The JCIC has negotiated and adopted a host of implementing agreements on such issues as the provision of equipment for the playback of telemetry tapes from ballistic missile flight tests and access to ICBM silo training launchers for inspection.

D. IMPACT TO THE NRO.

1. The START provides an intelligence collection opportunity for START signatories from the former Soviet Union. Per the treaty, all NRO facilities are exempt from START inspection, unless the SAV provision of the treaty is enforced.



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2. The START data update inspections (inspections designed to verify strategic force data exchanges) have occurred at

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E. IMPLEMENTATION. In addition to the responsibilities listed in NRO Directive (NROD) 16-1b, the following implementation guidance applies.

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1. The NRO will comply with START; and, at the same time, individual program managers will protect national security assets for which they have responsibility. The OSL will maintain an NRO site compliance plan, in coordination with the program manager(s), Directorate of Administration (DA)/Office of Policy, the Program Security PSO, the DA/Office of Security, the DA/Office of Counterintelligence.

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

The OSL will develop a similar plan for CCAFS if needed in the future.

2. The OSL will include all applicable NRO programs in a START contingency plan. The contingency plan will address payload timelines and operations during an on-site inspection and comply with the VAFB START compliance plan. The National Reconnaissance Operations Center (NROC) will provide direct notification for each START inspection to OSL.

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4. The NROC will notify launch base NRO detachments of potential inspection.

F. SOURCES. The following sources or their subsequent versions apply.

1. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) to include all Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Joint Agreements and Statements. Signed 31 July 1991 and entered into force on 5 December 1994.

2. The Lisbon Protocol to START, 23 May 1992.

3. The Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) START BYEMAN Operations Plan, 1 August 1996.

4. NROD 16-1b, Arms Control Compliance and Protection of NRO Equities.

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G. WAIVER. This instruction implements the guidance set forth in NROD-16-1b; and as such, any deviation from that guidance requires the written approval of the Director, NRO or designee.



Michael E. Brennan
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