



NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

Office of Inspector General
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715



1 February 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

[redacted]
DIRECTOR, OFFICE of EQUALITY AND INCLUSION, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

(b)(3)

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

DIRECTOR, [redacted]
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

(b)(3)

SUBJECT: (U) Report of Investigation: Misuse of United States Government Computer System (Case Number 2018-0021-I)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated an investigation based on allegations of misuse of a United States Government (USG) computer system by [redacted] is an NRO [redacted]

[redacted] employee currently assigned to the NRO's Office of Human Resources (OHR) as an analyst. The attached Report of Investigation (ROI) details the investigation results.

(b)(3)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section declined to prosecute the case in favor of administrative action. The OIG requests that the Executive Director, NRO [redacted] provide a written response to the NRO OIG by 18 March 2019, indicating what action has been taken on this matter. Please address your response to [redacted]

OIG, NRO. The OIG also requests that the Director, Office of Security and Counterintelligence, NRO place a copy of this report in [redacted] security file.

(b)(3)

(U//~~FOUO~~) You may share information contained within this report with those individuals you deem necessary to complete the requested actions. If there are other persons who you believe require access to this ROI as part of their official duties, please let us know, and we will promptly review your request.

[redacted]

(b)(3)

SUBJECT: (U) Report of Investigation: Misuse of United States
Government Computer System (Case Number 2018-0021-I)

(U//~~FOUO~~) Additional relevant documents not otherwise contained
in the ROI may be available for review upon request. If you have any
questions concerning this report, please contact [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(3)



Susan S. Gibson
Inspector General

Attachment:

(U) ROI (Case Number 18-0021-I)

SUBJECT: (U) Report of Investigation: Misuse of United States
Government Computer System (Case Number 2018-0021-I)

OIG/[redacted]/1 February 2019

(b)(3)

DISTRIBUTION:

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

[redacted]
DIRECTOR, OFFICE of EQUALITY AND INCLUSION, NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

(b)(3)

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES, NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE,
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

DIRECTOR, [redacted]
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

OIG Official Record [redacted]

(b)(3)

*(U) National Reconnaissance Office
Office of Inspector General*

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(U) REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

(U) (18-0021-I)

1 February 2019

(U) Section A – Subject:

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Full name: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Grade: [Redacted]

(b)(3)

Current Position: Office of Human Resources, Analyst

Previous Positions: [Redacted] OEEO&DM, EEO

Investigator-Counselor, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(U) Section B – Predication:

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 4 March 2018, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received an allegation that [redacted] had misused her accesses on the NRO Office of Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity Management (OEEO&DM)¹ [redacted]² As the [redacted] OEEO&DM's [redacted] [redacted] was the sole system administrator for the [redacted] with exclusive authority over, among other things, system user accounts and privileges. [redacted] is an employee of the NRO's [redacted] and has worked in the NRO OEEO&DM since 2004. She was serving as the [redacted] until April 2018, when she was reassigned to the Office of Human Resources (OHR) as an analyst.⁴

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3. (U//~~FOUO~~) During the course of the investigation, the OIG developed information that [redacted] may have exceeded her authorized access on other U.S. Government computer systems when she searched records that had no apparent nexus to an ongoing Intelligence Community (IC) Office of Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity (OEEOD) investigation to which she was recused. The OIG also developed information that [redacted] may have accessed a federal [redacted] while assigned to OHR. [redacted] actions potentially violated 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 1030, *Fraud and related activity in connection with computers*.

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(U) Section C – Potential Violations:

4. (U) 18 U.S.C. § 1030, (a),(2) *Fraud and related activity in connection with computers* makes it unlawful for anyone to intentionally access a computer without authorization or exceed authorized access, and thereby obtain information from any department or agency of the United States or information from any protected computer.

(U) Section D – Investigative Findings:

(U//~~FOUO~~) Finding: The OIG found no evidence that [redacted] misused the OEEO&DM's [redacted]

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¹ (U) Effective 23 July 2018, the OEEO&DM was renamed the Office of Equality and Inclusion (OE&I). For the purposes of this report, the OE&I is referenced by its former name, the OEEO&DM when referencing activities prior to 23 July 2018.

² (U) [redacted]

(b)(3)

³ (U) [redacted]

⁴ (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] reassignment to OHR was pursuant to a mutual agreement between her and NRO officials relative to [redacted]

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[redacted] The reassignment was initially on a temporary basis, but in her interview with the OIG, [redacted] stated the move had become permanent.

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
(U) Section E – Conclusion:

40. (U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG developed sufficient credible evidence to support the following conclusions:

a. The allegations pertaining to [redacted] misuse of [redacted] were not substantiated. (b)(3)

b. [redacted] inappropriately conducted searches of U.S. Government computer systems unrelated to an [redacted] case. The OIG determined that [redacted] searched for and viewed correspondence of NRO officials with no apparent nexus to the [redacted] investigation. In addition, [redacted] searched for and viewed correspondence of NRO officials outside the relevant timeframe requested by [redacted]. (b)(3)

c. [redacted] inappropriately accessed the [redacted] database and viewed documents on NRO [redacted] cases on at least three occasions after being reassigned to OHR, when she no longer had any [redacted] duties or responsibilities. [redacted] (b)(3)



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