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WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

November 6, 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY McNAMARA

The following represents my personal observations relative to intelligence data collection and exploitation as highlighted by the Cuban experience.

1. The most striking weakness is the serious inadequacy of the panel and committee structure as a means for establishing intelligence requirements. It appears to me that the whole USIB structure, including the various committees and subcommittees, is a most unsatisfactory mechanism for the generation of appropriate requirements. This is attested to by the fact that the requirements list developed by these groups as recently as October 8th failed to list as targets points later found to be the sites of the actual missile installations. Rather than having a list of intelligence requirements be generated by subcommittees of lower level people with limited information, it appears to me fundamental that the overall guidance must come from the top echelon having in their possession all of the information necessary to make the best possible judgment insofar as intelligence objectives are concerned. In view of this experience, reliance on a set of specific target requirements as determined by a committee structure is likely to be a highly unreliable and dangerous course to follow.

2. No adequate mechanism appears to exist for the effective pulling together and evaluation of all collateral intelligence information. In retrospect, it is clear that fairly hard information did exist relative to missile activities but for a variety of reasons this was never translated through the requirements process into an effective intelligence collection program. This is a most serious deficiency and if the system proved to be ineffective in the case of Cuba only 90 miles from our coast, it poses a rather serious question as to its effectiveness in

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other more remote areas of the world.

3. Even with the availability of thorough, adequate and properly evaluated collateral data, complete and repetitive aerial coverage appears to be the only solution for a high confidence level in the adequacy of our intelligence data. If the coverage is to be effective, overflight is essential. This must be by aircraft, drones or satellites. It should be emphasized that

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5. Serious attention needs to be given to penetrability and survivability of surveillance systems. Such questions as effective electronic countermeasures, radar cross section diminution, decoys, tactics, etc., need to be considered. There needs to be a focal point for all such considerations which will have at its disposal, not only a complete knowledge of all of our resources, but all of the intelligence relative to enemy capabilities in order to insure the maximum effectiveness of our surveillance systems.

6. The Cuban experience revealed numerous deficiencies. These include such things as the availability in the total

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country of only one laboratory model of a jammer effective against the Fruit Set C-band system. Practically the universal assumption was that the SAM-2 installations in Cuba were of the S-band type. Another example was the discovery in Cuba of the radar directed anti-aircraft installations using the FIRE CAN radar. Again the assumption was made that this system would not be employed in Cuba and no jamming capability against this radar was present in any of our reconnaissance systems. Another example was the lack of the best camera equipment in the RF-101 and, in particular, an inability to accomplish proper image motion compensation at the very low altitudes necessary to minimize danger from radar directed anti-aircraft fire. It was found in all of these cases that fixes could be accomplished through the use of extraordinary measures but they emphasize the need for a focal point which can continuously evaluate the effectiveness of our systems in light of the enemy capability in different portions of the world. This must be accomplished in full knowledge of the very best intelligence on such technical capabilities and the distribution of these capabilities.

7. Separation between peripheral and overflight reconnaissance has been shown to be completely artificial. The two must be completely integrated to be effective. For example, failure to acquire appropriate SIGINT data relative to the U-2 which was lost was due in part to non-compatible mission paths. Furthermore, equipment must be compatible so that the proper kind of information can be monitored and interpreted. In the absence of a strong coupling of information concerning available technical resources, technical requirements of intelligence gathering systems and basic intelligence data, rapid response to changing situations becomes difficult if not impossible.

8. Better means are required for the acquisition of knowledge on shipping. This requires a full exploitation of photographic, SIGINT and other techniques, access to multi-source information and complete interaction. This does not appear to be a theatre responsibility except as a localized sub-division of the overall problem.

On a more general basis, the following observations stand out:

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(a) The CIA-DOD-NSA interaction is highly confused. The responsibilities are so divided and the communications channels so complicated that the effective, prompt response to solid well founded requirements, even if formulated, is not easily achieved. In addition, our total resources are not always configured for use in a fashion that can best accomplish the task and the instruction and command channels are uncertain and not well understood.

(b) It is fundamental that the Defense Intelligence Agency has available, directly under its own supervision, adequate processing and interpretation capabilities in the Washington area necessary to meet its military needs. Adequate processing facilities do not exist and although the National Photographic Interpretation Center is well run and effective, its objectives are not, in all cases, compatible with the military requirement. It affords the complimentary means for data exploitation and interpretation but needs to be augmented by a DIA data exploitation center.

(c) The DOD should be responsible for the development and for the operational control of all reconnaissance activities except possibly for those that are truly covert in nature. Decision making and efficiency can be streamlined if desired Agency participation in these activities, even to the extent of real time following of operational missions, is eliminated. The DOD programs, of course, must be formulated in the complete context of all requirements, including the Agency requirements, and all of the appropriate data and results should, of course, be made available to the Agency. However, the active participation in development and in operations leads only to unnecessary confusion and complications. The existence of such criteria would have eliminated the controversy relative to the operational responsibility for the U-2 missions over Cuba. The satellite reconnaissance picture would be simplified by a clear-cut assignment of responsibilities along the lines indicated. Under these rules, the Agency might continue to be responsible for the development of the Oxcart vehicle and the AQ-12 drone and, of course, would retain responsibility for the operation of U-2 aircraft in parts of the world where military operations are unacceptable.

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
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(d) A single focal point should exist for operational responsibility for aircraft reconnaissance operations. The relative responsibilities between JRC, TAC, CINCLANT, SAC, CIA, DIA and NRO relative to mission planning, mission execution and product transportation, processing and interpretation, are not clearly defined or understood.



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Director
National Reconnaissance Office

cc: Depy SecDef

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