

~~TOP SECRET~~HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM~~15~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.**OXCART**

THE NRO STAFF

May 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ~~FLAX~~ *AMF*VIA: GENERAL BERG AND MR. REBER *RR*SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Contingency Plan for Black  
Shield Operations

Gen Bacalis has disseminated the attached contingency plan for the CIA/A-12 North Vietnam reconnaissance overflights to ICPC membership for early consideration. I contacted committee members yesterday on your behalf and asked that they respond as soon as possible (hopefully by COB today) in one of the following three manners:

1. Concur to plan as written.
2. Concur to plan with certain minor indicated changes.
3. Non-concur on major grounds - recommend that D/NRO call meeting of ICPC at earliest convenience.

The vote so far reflects that CIA, AFRDR, SAFOI and JRC concur with plan as written. The votes of the State Department, White House and DIA representatives are still outstanding.

The plan is simple in that with exception of response to inquiry at Kadena, emergency landing at an alternate base, immediate response to all inquiry is either a disclaimer or no comment, leaving to 303 Committee to decide upon the official U.S. Government position following full examination of the facts. If the plan is weak it is probably in that it does not provide sufficient guidance to 303 Committee. For example the plan makes no differentiation between loss of aircraft in either Communist China, North Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia. I have attached a set of guidelines wherein I have attempted to differentiate between these countries. The plan

*ICPC Admin*  
**WORKING PAPERS****OXCART**HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM~~TOP SECRET~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING  
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLYCONTROL NO. INTERNALCOPY 1 OF 2 COPIESPAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

**OXCART**

further infers that it may be necessary for the U.S. Government to acknowledge the fact of CIA involvement.

RECOMMENDATION:

Regardless of the results of the currently pending ICPC voice vote, I recommend that this matter is of sufficient import to convene a meeting of the committee as soon as possible; with the members requested to voice their positions with respect to the following:

1. Does the plan as written provide that the U.S. would be in the most favored position, following an incident, to continue with the operation?

2. Should the countries defined in plan as "Communist Bloc" (Communist China, North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) be considered separately rather than in common, resulting hopefully in more definitive guidance to higher authorities?

3. Should not public acknowledgement of the matter of CIA participation be reserved for only the most extreme circumstances?

With your concurrence I will arrange such a meeting.



LOUIS F. MAZZA  
Assistant for Security  
NRO Staff

**OXCART**

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING  
DDG DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

WORKING PAPERS

CONTROL NO. INTERNAL  
COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES  
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

*Intentional delay*

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

**OXCART**

THE NRO STAFF

May 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ~~FLAX~~ *BNF*

VIA: GENERAL BERG AND MR. REBER

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Contingency Plan for Black  
Shield Operations

*Oked*  
CIA has disseminated a revised contingency plan (TAB A) for BLACK SHIELD, which incorporates some small changes suggested by State Department on page 2, Section IV Possible Contingencies, A and B. All votes of ICPC members are in and favorable except that Mr. Jessup of White House (he is checking plan with Mr. Rostow) has not responded nor have you as ICPC Chairman indicated your agreement. CIA feels they are compelled to initiate instructions to the field today looking to possible first mission Monday.

My personal criticism of the plan is as previously stated, that it does not provide 303 Committee with sufficient guidance to react to an emergency situation. It is the consensus of the staff that Section IV, subsection C would better read as in the attached TAB B.

If you concur with suggested revisions, TAB C is recommended as an appropriate message to state the position of D/NRO.

*Louis F. Mazza*  
LOUIS F. MAZZA  
Assistant for Security  
NRO Staff

*ICPC Admin  
Action*

**OXCART**

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

**WORKING PAPERS**

CONTROL NO. INTERNAL  
COPY \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES  
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING  
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~IS~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

May 31, 1967

*[Handwritten signature]*  
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX  
VIA: GENERAL BERG AND MR. REBER *[Handwritten initials]*  
SUBJECT: BLACK SHIELD Contingency Plan

This is to advise that all representatives of ICPC on 27 May 1967 verbally concurred in the changes suggested by D/NRO to the BLACK SHIELD contingency plan. The plan as revised is to be implemented.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
LOUIS F. MAZZA  
Assistant for Security  
NRO Staff

*ICPC Admin  
Section*

**WORKING PAPERS**

HANDLE VIA  
**BYEMAN**  
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING  
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

CONTROL NO. INTERNAL  
COPY \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES  
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES