

~~TOP SECRET~~

OXCART

BYE-2014-66


Copy 1

29 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: INTERDEPARTMENTAL CONTINGENCY
PLANNING COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Proposed PINWHEEL Contingency and
Cover Plan - Revised

Attached hereto is a draft of Subject Plan which contains the revisions agreed upon at the 24 March 1966 meeting of the Interdepartmental Contingency Planning Committee. Please destroy the original draft (same BYE #).


JACK C. LEDFORD
Brigadier General, USAF

WORKING PAPERS

OXCART

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle Via
BYEMAN
Control System Only

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

OX CART

BYE 2014-66

Revised

Page 2

OSA/SS/TACOX/mpr (25 March 1966)

Distribution:

- Copy #1 - Dr. Alexander Flax, D/NRO
- #2 - [redacted], Dept. of State
- #3 - Mr. Peter Jessup, Ex Office of the President
- #4 - [redacted], DIA
- #5 - Gen. Leo Geary, AFRDR
- #6 - Col. Ralph Steakley, JCS
- #7 - Gen. David I. Liebman, C/O Col. R. Steakley, JCS
- #8 - Mr. Louis Mazza, NRO
- #9 - DD/S&T
- #10 - D/OSA
- #11 - SS/OSA
- #12 - Cover/SS/OSA
- #13 - SAL/OSA
- #14 - RB/OSA

(b)(3)

WORKING PAPERS

OX CART

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle Via
BYEMAN
Control System Only

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

OXCART

BYE-2014-66
Revised

D R A F T

INTERDEPARTMENTAL CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR PINWHEEL TRAINING AND

OPERATIONAL FLIGHTS

*See "BLACK SHIELD"
plan - 23 May 1967
Bye 2417-67*

REF: (See BYE-3092-65 Interdepartmental Contingency Plan
for CAROUSEL Deployment)

*destroyed -
Revised 17 May 1967
see BYE 2375-67*

I. MISSION

When authorized to conduct operation through the use
of OXCART vehicles, obtain high resolution photographic
coverage of priority targets in North Vietnam, on the
mainland of China and elsewhere in the Far East and
Southeast Asia. Also to conduct training flights out
of Okinawa.

II. OBJECTIVES

- A. To fly these training and operational missions
with minimal publicity and to protect the true
nature of the mission.
- B. To conceal intelligence community (particularly
CIA) participation in the development and utiliza-
tion of the OXCART (A-12) vehicle.

OXCART

WORKING PAPERS

Handle Via
BYEMAN
Control System Only

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

OXCART

BYE-2014-66
Revised
Page 2

- C. To conceal the existence of the activity at Area 51.

III. GENERAL COVER PLAN

- A. The general cover plan for the presence of the mission aircraft at Kadena is the same as contained in Reference document.
- B. The specific cover story for the pilot in the event of a forced landing in or an ejection over the target country or one of the countries en route will have to be hand-tailored to the particular mission. It is anticipated that the Heads of the Governments of the Philippines, Nationalist China, Thailand and possibly Japan will have been briefed on the OXCART Program prior to initiation of operational missions. Therefore, a landing in or ejection over these countries should pose no great problem. The Commanders of the designated USAF bases in South Korea and South Vietnam will have been previously briefed and an emergency landing in or ejection over one of these countries will be

OXCART

WORKING PAPERS

Handle Via
BYEMAN
Control System Only~~TOP SECRET~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

OXCART

BYE-2014-66
Revised
Page 3

a little more difficult to handle than in Thailand or Nationalist China. However, it is felt that this would not pose too great a problem. An emergency landing in or an ejection over Burma, Laos, Cambodia or Japan would be even more difficult to handle and the possibility can not be overlooked. Therefore, the following guidelines will be followed:

(PILOT REACTION)

1. In the event that the pilot of the mission aircraft is downed over China or North Vietnam, he will admit his CIA involvement and appropriate operations policy instructions (HD 50-1055-24) will apply.
2. In the event of an emergency landing in or ejection over The Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, Nationalist China, S. Vietnam or S. Korea, the mission pilots will seek to be placed in communication with a predesignated senior USAF official in that country thus while not admitting USAF affiliation the implication is drawn.

OXCART

WORKING PAPERS

~~TOP SECRET~~Handle Via
BYEMAN
Control System OnlyGROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

OXCART

BYE-2014-66
Revised
Page 4

3. In the event of an emergency landing in or ejection over Japan, Laos, Cambodia or Burma, the pilot will state that he is a Hughes Aircraft Company test pilot who encountered mechanical and/or navigational difficulties while conducting field tests of the aircraft for the United States Air Force.

IV. POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES (OPERATIONAL MISSION)

- A. In the event of the loss of a mission aircraft over North Vietnam and in light of the current military activity there, all inquiries, press and otherwise, will be referred to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. After appropriate coordination, that office, if pressed, will advise that they have "no comment" to make regarding the incident, and/or it is under investigation.
- B. In the event of the loss of a mission aircraft over South Korea, Japan, South Vietnam, Thailand,

OXCART

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle Via
BYEMAN
Control System Only

WORKING PAPERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

OXCART

BYE-2014-66
Revised
Page 5

Laos or Burma while such aircraft was engaged in an operational mission over the China-North Vietnam border area, all inquiries, press or otherwise, will be referred to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. In the case of an incident involving Cambodia, all inquiries, press or otherwise, will be referred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs when addressed to military officials and to the Dept. of State when addressed to other U. S. officials. After appropriate coordination, the responsible office will issue a statement that the matter is under investigation and no additional comments will be made for the present. If, in the light of the then present circumstances and political climate, it is deemed appropriate to amplify upon the above statement, a suitable amplification will be worked out by the ICPC.

(TRAINING MISSION)

- C. In the event of the loss of mission aircraft on a training mission out of Okinawa, it is proposed that all inquiries, press or otherwise be referred to the

Handle Via
BYEMAN
Control System Only

OXCART

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

OXCART

BYE-2014-66
Revised
Page 6

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. After appropriate coordination, a spokesman for that office will issue a statement similar to that contained in Reference paper, namely that the aircraft in question was an experimental test bed version of a YF-12A and SR-71 family flying out of Okinawa on field tests.

If the accident proves fatal to the pilot and after allowing ample time for the notification of the next of kin, if necessary, a statement may be released by the above mentioned office identifying the pilot and describing him as a test pilot for Hughes Aircraft Company. If the accident is not fatal to the pilot, it is felt that it serves no purpose to identify him at all. In this case, losing a mission aircraft on a training flight out of Okinawa, it is felt appropriate to allow his home base (313th Air Division at Kadena) to issue an identical statement to the one made by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

OXCART

WORKING PAPERS

~~TOP SECRET~~Handle Via
BYEMAN
Control System OnlyGROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

OXCART

BYE-2014-66
Revised
Page 7

D. In the event of the loss of a mission aircraft over the mainland of China all inquiries, press or otherwise, will be referred to the Department of State if directed to diplomatic or civil sources and to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs if directed to military sources. The ICPC will be convened at the earliest possible time subsequent to the incident in order to evaluate the situation and make recommendations as deemed appropriate to higher authority. Through a properly designated spokesman in the State Department, an announcement will be made to the effect that the matter is under investigation and that no further comment will be made for the present. (If need be, his announcement will be followed up by a statement, either at the Secretary of State or Presidential level, that "No Comment" will be made regarding the incident.)

In this, as well as in the above contingencies, the statements issued, including "No Comment" will

Handle Via
BYEMAN
Control System Only

OXCART

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

OX CART

BYE-2014-66
Revised
Page 8

only be made in response to a direct inquiry and never volunteered.

V. COORDINATION

A. Washington, D. C., Area

1. The following named individuals are being furnished a copy of this document for purposes of internal coordination with cleared personnel within their respective departments:

Dr. Alexander Flax - D/NRO

Mr. Peter Jessup - Executive Office of the President

Gen. Jack Ledford - DSA, Central Intelligence Agency

Gen. Leo P. Geary - AFRDR

[redacted] - D/INR, Department of State

Col. Ralph D. Steakley - JCS

[redacted] - DIA

Gen. Eugene LeBailly - SAFOI

Gen. David I. Liebman - Mil. Asst. to the Asst. Sec. of Defense for Public Affairs.

B. Outside Washington, D. C.

1. Officials at Lockheed (C. L. Johnson), at Hughes (Gene Peters and Marc Havard) and at Pratt

Handle Via
BYEMAN
Control System Only

OX CART
~~TOP SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

OXCART

BYE-2014-66
Revised
Page 9

& Whitney (William Gorton and Leonard Mallett) have been briefed on this contingency plan and the handling of inquiries should they be made.

2. Commander Detachment D, , has been briefed and furnished a copy of this plan.

(b)(3)

VI. It is recommended that each Agency maintain a list of all cleared personnel within their respective organization who have been briefed on this cover plan.

VII. The Central Intelligence Agency will notify each Agency of any change to this plan and in turn requests that any alterations be coordinated with the CIA prior to implementation:

CIA CONTACT: James A. Cunningham, Jr.

OFFICE TELEPHONE:

CIA CONTROL CENTER: _____

HOME TELEPHONE: _____

(b)(3)

Handle Via
BYEMAN
Control System Only

OXCART

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

HANDLE VIA COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

4 APR 1956


MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX

VIA: ~~General Stewart~~ JS

SUBJECT: 303 Committee/New Membership

I have been advised by CIA/Security, that by direction of the President, Mr. Bill D. Moyer, Presidential Assistant, and Mr. Walt Rostow, formerly of State Department, now of the Executive Offices, have been added to the 303 Committee.

They are receiving security indoctrination into all BYEMAN projects.


Louis P. Mazza
Chief Security Officer
NRO Staff

WORKING PAPERS

HANDLE VIA COMINT CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copies _____ Pages _____
Control No. Internal

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contingency Working/Action Group Meeting

Minutes of meeting held December 16, 1969, Office of the Director, NRO Staff, Room 4C 1000, 1330 hours

Members Present

[redacted], State Department

[redacted], Central Intelligence Agency

[redacted], Def Intelligence Agency

[redacted], Nat'l Reconnaissance Ofc Stf

Lt Colonel Arthur M. Haskins, Jr., Nat'l Recon Ofc Stf

(b)(3)

Others Present

[redacted], Joint Chiefs of Staff, JRC

[redacted], SecAF, Ofc of Information

[redacted], Central Intelligence Agency

On September 12, 1969, the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, addressed a memorandum to members of the Inter-departmental Contingency Planning Committee, wherein, he requested that the below listed contingency plans be immediately updated and that tentative approval of the plans be effected through the CW/AG prior to final review and approval by the ICPC at a later date.

Plans under consideration: SR-71, U-2, 147/154,
and Satellite

On October 24, 1969, the ICPC Secretariat disseminated copies of the revised and updated contingency plans to members of the CW/AG for appropriate comment and/or approval. Response from various members indicated a need for a CW/AG meeting for the purpose of reaching a consensus on certain aspects of the plans prior to their submission to the ICPC (See attached responses).

During the CW/AG meeting it was agreed that:

Re: 147/154 Drone, Reconnaissance Program

a. Paragraph II, MISSION, Lines 6 and 7. Change to read: "Approval for resumption of overflights was granted on October 14, 1969."

b. Paragraph IV, GENERAL, Line 6, Change to read "Laos" vice "Thailand."

c. Paragraph V C. Change to reflect DIA briefing of the DAO.

Re: TAGBOARD Contingency Plan

d. The plan would be updated to exclude the OXCART caveat and to reflect the names of new personnel.

Re: IDEALIST/TACKLE Contingency Plan

e. Change the plan by deleting the section on "U.S. denial of knowledge," and by deleting the phrase in Paragraph V B 2 "dates may be cited if necessary."

Re: SR-71 Contingency Plan

f. Paragraph 9 will be rewritten by [redacted]
and [redacted] and resubmitted to the CW/AG.

g. Paragraph 5 will be rewritten by [redacted]
and [redacted] and resubmitted to the CW/AG.

h. [redacted] will consult with General Steakley
and report back to the CW/AG in regard to sterilization of
drones.

(b)(3)

AMH