NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 1 OCTOBER 2012 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

REPLY TO AFCIN

SUBJECT: (S) National Reconnaissance Office

24 January 1963

- TO: Secretary Zuckert and General LeMay
 - 1. References
 - a. DOD Directive TS5105.23, same subject, 14 June 1962.
 - b. Specially controlled documents supporting reference (a).
 - 2. The attachment depicts NRO organizational and functional relationships; the graphic portrayal is necessarily oversimplified. The charter documents referenced above are complicated and spell out various channels for technical management, financial management, security, operations, format, and engineering analysis; most of the complexity comes from wording which preserves CIA prerogatives as Executive Agent under NRO for programs CIA was managing at the time of the agreement.
 - 3. The key features:
 - a. The National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) includes all overt and covert satellite and air vehicle overflight projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping photography, and electronic signal collection.
 - b. Director NRO answers directly to SecDef and DCI for management and conduct of the NRP.
 - c. The NRO is to respond to -- and only to -- photo and elint collection requirements established by the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB). (The COMOR Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance is a subpanel of USIB which staffs requirements for USIB approval.)
 - d. NRO has mission scheduling responsibility for all NRP efforts but must coordinate with CIA on "covert projects for which it is Executive Agent."
 - e. The Deputy Director (Research) of CIA is responsible for CIA's participation in the agreement. (Dr. Herbert (Pete) Scoville is the incumbent.)
 - 4. A few personal observations may be of use:

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

- a. An officer in NRO, formerly in AFCIN, advises me that six months were spent getting Pentagon facilities ready to accommodate operational elements of CIA which were to be melded into the NRO staff; ten days ago CIA balked at making the move as scheduled.
- b. As I review the charter it seems clear that Mr. McCone has two -possibly three -- votes to Mr. McNamara's one. The DCI shares with SecDef direct supervisory authority; wearing his CIA hat, he has control through the various provisos requiring coordination with CIA; and wearing his hat as USIB Chairman he can effectively control establishment of requirements and priorities.
- c. Many of the programs you mentioned this morning and explicitly the "O" program - are under CIA as Executive Agent. This cuts NRO out of direct supervision of technical management, funding, and engineering analysis -- and requires NRO to get CIA coordination even on mission scheduling.
- d. In my opinion, the horse got out of the barn from a USAF viewpoint when the charter and agreements of May-June 1962 superseded the arrangements of September 1961. The latter had clearly stipulated use of the USAF both as management and operational Executive Agent for DOD; the new charter doesn't even mention the USAF. In fact, the more I study the 1962 documents the more I think DOD itself ended up splitting with CIA the proverbial horse-and-rabbit stew while agreeing to furnish the horse.

Major General, USAF

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

l Atch Organizational Chart (TS)

, EYES ONLY

