CURRENT U.S. INFORMATION NEEDS DERIVABLE FROM NRP SYSTEMS

1. Political

The information and execution of U.S. foreign policy requires information which will support the negotiation of cease-fires, treaties, and other agreements and compliance with their provisions; information related to the production and distribution of illegal drugs destined for the U.S.; and information on armed conflict not involving U.S. forces.

2. Military

The formulation and execution of U.S. military policy requires information which will provide warning of attack involving the U.S.; the size, disposition, and capabilities of opposing military strategic and tactical forces and their support facilities; the military production capacity and output of opposing countries; and the production of maps and strategic target locations

3. Science and Technology

Formulation of U.S. military, education, economic, and energy policy requires information on the technical/scientific characteristics of existing and prospective opposing military systems, and on the status of foreign nuclear and other applied science. Among other purposes, such information is needed for policy formulation to prevent technological surprise which could adversely impact any facet of modern life.

4. Economic

The formulation and execution of U.S. economic policy requires the monitoring of agricultural, manufacturing, trade, exploration, and business trends worldwide.

NATIONAL VS. TACTICAL

I. Introduction

A. Purpose

Define the basic difference and similarities between National Intelligence and the Military Tactical Intelligence. Further identify the key issues arising from these differences and similarities and their impact on current NRP planning.

B. Approach

Develop a strawman definition of the terms "National" and "Tactical", define the basic issues involved beginning with the high level policy and terminating with issues relative to existing or planned NRP systems.

II. Development of Definitions

A. Current U.S. Information Needs Derivable From NRP Systems:

The current U.S. information needs fall characteristically within four broad categories: political, military, science/technology, and economic. These are described within Tab A.

B. Formulation of Definition

From the description of the U.S. information needs, one could define a National and a Tactical role for the NRP as:

1. National Role

The support of U.S. national security policy (foreign policy + military policy) in such areas as indications and warning/crisis monitoring; monitoring international agreements and compliance with their provisions; development of economic assessments; monitor changing military posture, force strength, and introduction of new weapons systems.

2. Tactical Role

The support of U.S. military operations requiring timely indications and warning of attack; the size, disposition, and capabilities of opposing strategic and tactical forces and their support facilities; and the production of maps for military purposes.

III. Discussion of Policy Issues

A. National Policy-Level Issues

Within the context of the defined role of National and Tactical as provided above, there exists no difference between the tactical or national intelligence data but only in the basic application. Within this context, the following key issues must be addressed:

1. Vulnerability and Survivability

Satellite systems may be more or less survivable than the terrestrial alternatives, depending on scenario, but are vulnerable to a technically sophisticated enemy. The NRP,

as the National Means of verification, [redacted]

upon the level of conflict to be supported, it may be possible to sufficiently increase NRP survivability within programmatic realities. The space system threat environment should be established for the level of conflict under consideration. A reassessment of National Policy would then be required, specifically a revision of NSDM 242, which states:

> "To insure that nuclear forces are responsive to the National Command Authorities. . .planning should provide for. . .adequate support for decision-making and flexible use of nuclear forces in attempts to control escalation in local conflicts. Employment planning for this function may assume that... associated sensors supporting the National Command Authorities are not subject to direct attack."

The key to the process will be a clear statement from the services of realistic vulnerability and survivability requirements.

2. Military Tactical Usage

With the advent of near-real-time intelligence satellite capabilities, U.S. military forces will begin receiving valuable intelligence to support military operations.

The availability of such information under wartime conditions could also provide extremely valuable tactical intelligence. However, in this instance, U.S. forces may not be guaranteed a flow of information because of the vulnerability

of current and planned intelligence satellite systems. This is dependent upon the military scenario considered, for example, it would be highly doubtful that actions would be taken against satellites supporting a non-nuclear tactical conflict such as South East Asia or a limited NATO conflict. A rational plan is required to assert the dependence or non-dependence of U.S. military forces upon national intelligence satellites for war fighting capabilities.

The consequences of a decision for the combined use of NRP satellite data in conjunction with tactical commanders organic capabilities would pose certain issues. The political consequence of such a direction and its impact upon our current National means of verification would need to be reassessed. Current fiscal directions at both the national executive and congressional level would tend to force trade-offs between organic tactical intelligence assets and the new policy of dependency upon national satellite intelligence resources. The military war plans would need to be developed using the most effective balance of organic and National resources. Ultimately, a key issue would tend to revolve around the question of relative ability and capability of the National system to provide such a flow of information to U.S. military forces as compared to organic forces. The importance of this issue and its resolution to the entire future planning of our national

program can not be minimized. It is also a key element of the current national/tactical intelligence interface dialogue.

3. Crisis Management/Indications and Warning.

The area of primary overlap between the National role and the Tactical role occurs within crisis management/ indication and warning. The National Command authority, the CINCs and the military field commander are all vitally interested in these data. The action taken by each level may be different but the basic information needs are common. It is this area of commonality which also raises basic issues, such as; who will control the satellite tasking and under what crisis condition. The DIA is presently developing a central DOD tasking capability whereas the present systems are being designed for tasking through the National mechanism. The compatibility of these two approaches may well be an area of future Congressional criticism.

4. Transition to Space Transportation System (Space Shuttle)

As tactical dependence and international political and military strategy become more dependent on the availability of real-time intelligence, the operational capabilities of the Space Shuttle become a key factor. The potential disruption of worldwide satellite coverage, due to technical problems or concern for crew safety during launch operations or hostilities, could be

of extreme importance to the Nation's posture during crisis. The fundamental decision must be made as to whether the U.S. can accept the potential loss of satellite intelligence on a calculated risk basis and whether a backup launch capability is to be maintained beyond the period of transition to the Space Shuttle.

B. NRP Issues

The NRP has in the past directed little effort toward direct military support. However, it has expended considerable effort in crisis monitoring, which is of equal interest nationally and tactically. Recently, the NRP has been greatly influenced by the tactical needs and this has resulted in the rising expectations of the services. This can be seen from the following:

1. [redacted]

[redacted]

2. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. NRP Support of Tactical Military Exercises

The NRP systems have supported military exercises [redacted] in order to develop expertise in Army, Navy, and Air Force tactical units for the development of tactical doctrine of employment of NRP systems in support of tactical forces. There are presently operational concept inadequacies due to the lack of developed tactical doctrine. The reaction to these exercises by the military field commanders is very favorable. The potential application to their immediate problems is evident to them. The result is a growing pressure for the expanded use of the National systems in support of tactical operations.

6. Non-NRP Intelligence Collectors

Within the so called "white" Air Force there exists other intelligence collectors such as the DSP, early warning system; and DMSP, the military meterological satellite. The DSP is truely national in its mission and is in fact [redacted] The DMSP satellite is both National and Tactical in character. It provides the basic weather data for programming our NRP imaging system and at the same time transmits directly to the tactical field commanders. These non-NRP systems along with other collectors such as the SR-71 and U-2 support both a National and a Tactical role and must be considered in any overview of the total National vs Tactical issue.

IV. Summary

To the degree that satellite systems can support tactical intelligence, it should be funded and developed within the NRP. For this reason, the NRP is actively moving toward a posture of providing support to the tactical community. In meeting the needs as defined by the National role, the NRP system can meet many of the tactical commanders' needs with the exception of timeliness and frequency. Within the context of the defined National role, timeliness is not as critical a parameter in comparison to data quality, as driven by a science and technology mission to identify new weapon systems.

The basic issue yet to be squarely addressed by the Community is -- What degree should the NRP modify its current and projected efforts in support of tactical requirements, and what would be the resultant organizational and funding implications?

Attachment