TOP SECRET • EYES ONLY

3 September 1959

Mr. Roy W. Jehnson Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency Department of Defense Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Johnson

Recent information which I have received about the Argon
Project compels me to urge you to review at the earliest possible
date the satellite mapping program to determine whether the present
objectives are adequate to meet urgent military requirements and
whether the technical approach is capable of achieving these objectives.

Breadly speaking, Argon embraces a program of accurately mapping the world through the establishment of a new controlled grid of the earth's surface. As you know, however, the Air Force is faced with the problem of linking the Soviet target complex to known geodetic control points for our ballistic missile systems. In order to make both the IRBM and ICBM fully operational weapon systems, these data are needed new. It is important that Argon be conducted in a way which will most these specific missile targeting objectives. I believe that the SAMOS mapping sub-system (Z-4) offers a solution to the missile targeting problem and would be a desirable adjunct to the Argon Project.

There are two additional factors which bear on this program. The first is security central. The fact that Argon will introduce four new firings in the Discoverer series while at the same time the four known SAMOS flights are new cancelled complicates the cover plan for the sensitive phases of Discoverer. The second factor is the possible interference with the proposed Corona shots that are due to be launched in 1960. The data from the Corona series is vital to the IRBM and ICBM targeting problem. Any adverse effect on the Corona program should be avoided.

An early massive deterrent capability will be possible only if an adequate satellite mapping program is able to meet our time-wise

TOP SECRET

14 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCHRIEVER

SUBJECT: Proposed Discussion Items for Today's Meeting with Roy Johnson

- 1. Based on the 3 September letter which you sent to Mr. Johnson, the following items are considered the principal or essential ones.
- a. We are apprehensive about "A" being able to accomplish the ballistic missile targeting objectives in time to meet Air Force needs.
- b. From a general management point of view, a minimum number of organisations involved in the program will eliminate complications (we can't see why it is necessary to have the Army involved in data acquisition.)
- c. To maintain maximum security, it is also essential to keep the number of organizations to a minimum. Example -- "C" program.
- d. SAMOS sub-system E-4 was designed to accomplish the tie-in of missile targets to known control points. E-4 could also assist the overall Argon objectives.
- e. Will the proposed launches of Argon conflict with Discoverer?
- 2. I consider these to be the five main points of discussion. In view of the time limitations of your schedule, I recommend that you call Dr. Charyk and Mr. Johnson and urge that the luncheon group be limited to Johnson, Charyk, Billings, Bissell and yourself, to permit a general discussion to take place. At this meeting you might then suggest that a working level meeting be convened immediately after lunch to attempt to resolve a, d, and e. I have the group from BMD on stand-by for this purpose.
- 3. I don't believe we are on solid enough ground yet to point by point question the technical aspects of Argon. This is what Dick Leghorn is now working on.

4. Also I would like to remind you that Dr. Charyk believes that Argon may achieve Air Force Missile Targeting objectives and that it is "politically inexpedient" to object to the Argon project per se.

