HAC/GENERAL

QUESTION 4: The DOD's role in space is projected to expand rapidly during the next five years or so, as anti-satellites and various highly classified programs are funded. What lessons have been learned over the years, from the reconnaissance satellite programs as a whole, that may be applied to DOD's overall role in space as that particular role increases. For example:

    - Should significant thought and emphasis be given to "doctrine, tactics and strategy" for a coherent overall space program before large increase of funds are provided?

    - Given limited financial sources, should a few space programs be amply funded rather than many programs be funded at a low rate?

    In other words, do you have any general comments or advise with regard to sound management for a rapidly expanding space programs for DOD?

ANSWER: The basic concepts of how to develop, acquire and operate satellite systems, whether specifically for DOD or for overall reconnaissance purposes, are basically the same. The lessons learned from one are being applied to the other. DOD's role in space may be expanding but it would be incorrect to characterize DOD as not having a vast background in space and space-related programs. One of the primary purposes of the DNRO being an executive within the DOD structure is to draw upon space expertise in DOD and to share NRO expertise with DOD. The selection of the DNRO as the program manager for DRSP is based upon insuring the lessons learned from reconnaissance programs are applied to specific DOD needs.

    The need to provide significant thought to "doctrine, tactics and strategy" is underway. DOD was a major participant in the recent completion of the new National Space Policy and conducted its own DOD Space Policy Study to revise/consolidate DOD Space Policy. Also, the Air Force is in final stages of preparing AFM 1-6 entitled "Space Doctrine."

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The issue of the allocation of scarce resources to a few as opposed
to many programs is a faulty dilemma. The allocation of resources must
be based on prioritized requirements for capabilities coupled with a
timeline for the advent of these capabilities. In some cases a few
programs may require a steep funding curve and in other cases many
programs can be developed simultaneously under basic funding levels.
Each year this process, as you are aware, is reviewed in the DOD PPBS
process in concert with the NFIP process.

HAC/Organization

QUESTION 9A: In the past, this Committee has inquired about this organiza-
tional composition and whether or not one NRP program office would be a more
cost effective and administratively sounder way of conducting the country's
costly satellite reconnaissance efforts. To what extent is the separate pro-
gram offices organization continuing to exist merely because "We have always
done it this way"?

ANSWER: As is frequently the case with any organization, the structure of the

NRO was affected by circumstances which preceded its creation. Prior to 1962,

the CIA had several satellite programs under development and the military

departments were developing potential booster systems (ICBM programs). To

insure the experience and capabilities of the CIA and DOD were properly used,

the NRO was established with several Program Offices. The functions of the

NRO, and its basic organization, have been evaluated numerous times begining

in 1962 by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, in 1965 by the

rewrite of the DOD/CIA Memorandum of Agreement, in 1974 by the NSC, and in

1980 during the transition by the current Administration. The DNRO has been,

with the advice and guidance of the SECDEF and DCI, the overall supervisor of

Program Office activities and has assigned Program Office responsibilities

based on the skills inherent in respective programs and the technology based

in each office. Further, the NRO disestablished the Program D activities when

all aircraft operations were transferred from the NRO to the Air Force.

Therefore, the basic assumption that our structure exists merely because "We

have always done it that way" is not correct. The programs resident in our

offices are not static and not assigned because they are only to be done by a

specific Program Office. Our structure has changed when dictated by the

environment.

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HAC/Organization

QUESTION 9B: What do you perceive to be the advantages and disadvantages of a one program office organization as opposed to the existing three program offices?

ANSWER: The most generally held belief about advantages of an NRO with only one Program Office is that consolidation would produce a more unified, guided program. This, however, presupposes a homogeneous intelligence community with identical intelligence requirements to be met by a single office. It also assumes that a more streamlined method for guidance, control and feedback would result from a consolidation. Neither case is correct.

The intelligence community is an extremely heterogeneous grouping with widely divergent intelligence collection requirements. The basic NRO tenet of maintaining and exploiting the resident skills and technology pursuits from a broad-based set of Program Offices has served well in meeting these divergent requirements. The issue of potentially better guidance and control by a single office is greatly offset by the direct interface between the Program Directors and the DNRO and the overall "cradle to grave" responsibility inherent in each office. This allows a continued responsibility for success or failure of a program and for immediate interface with the Director. On balance we see no major advantage to a single Program Office and perceive a major disadvantage of confusion and disruption that could result from a major reorganization.

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HAC/Organization

QUESTION 10A: The Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)
aggregation of programs includes the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program
(DRSP) as a major function program. The NRO Director serves as the DRSP
program manager. Does the DRSP comprise, in essence, a fourth NRO program
office?

ANSWER: No. DRSP represents an amalgamation of activities and funds managed

separately by the DNRO. The Assistant DNRO for Military Support, ███████████

through the Defense Support Project Office manages the DRSP activities and

funds separate from the NRP. DRSP programs are managed in close coordination

with the DRSP Review Group which consists of flag officer or senior civilian

representatives from each of the military services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director

of Central Intelligence (DCI) Staff. Associate members are drawn from other

defense agencies for meetings that affect their areas of responsibility. The

functions of the Review Group include developing DRSP budget guidance,

providing service and agency coordination of DRSP activities, and facilitating

any special management arrangements necessary for the effective execution of

DRSP activities. The DNRO has the option of using NRO program offices or

service elements for studies, developments, and/or procurements. A proper

security level is established for each DRSP activity based on the technology

involved and the environment in which it is conducted. This approach enables

an optimum application of expertise, resources, technology and security for

each DRSP activity.

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HAC/ORGANIZATION

QUESTION 10B: The Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)
aggregation of programs includes the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program
(DRSP) as a major function program. The NRO Director serves as the DRSP
program manager. Are you satisfied with the DRSP as it is presently
structured? What changes would you recommend to make it more responsive to
both tactical commanders and NRO requirements?

ANSWER: In general the structure of the Defense Suppport Project Office is

sufficient to accomplish its mission today. The staff may need to be

augmented in the future as projects and new capabilities are acquired.

HAC/Organization

QUESTION 11A: The Director, NRO develops special management arrangements
necessary for the effective execution of DRSP programs in conjunction with
participating Departments and Agencies. What specific special management
arrangements have been developed to date?

ANSWER: None. The same management arrangements with which the NRP is

executed are working extremely well for the DRSP.

HAC/ORGANIZATION

QUESTION 12A: Program A (Air Force) and Program B (CIA) can be said to be in competition for new programs and funding. Do you believe the Director of NRO can effectively referee this competition?

ANSWER: The simple answer is yes, the DNRO can and does manage competition

for resources between program offices. Further, the concept of technology

competition provides impetus to seek innovative, workable ideas. The DNRO,

for example, has competed program concepts between Program Offices. One

example was ████████████ and ████████████ and the ████████████

████████ Overall, competition which is correctly channeled and

monitored is healthy in a research and development oriented organization. It

provides the best route to systems which effectively satisfy stated

requirements.

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HAC/Organization

QUESTION 12B: Isn't the Director's staff made up generally of people loaned from the agencies participating in the NRP? Can they be objective in evaluating competing proposals?

ANSWER: The NRO Staff is primarily comprised of Air Force officers assigned

to the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force (81%). Some personnel are

assigned to the NRO Staff from the agencies participating in the NRP to insure

that disciplines resident in those agencies are available to support the DNRO

(i.e., CIA, NSA, DMA, Army and Navy). These individuals bring their host

agency's points of view and expertise to the Staff and very quickly become

completely integrated into a "joint" national effort without parochial

advocacy. Since the NRO cuts across the Departmental structure, the Staff can

be and has been judged to be objective in evaluating competing proposals. Our

performance has been rated by others as consistently outstanding.

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