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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

September 8, 1970

NOTE FOR COLONEL SWEENEY

I am attaching for your perusal a copy of a rough draft of comments that Amrom Katz prepared for Mr. Froehke while Katz supposedly was on exclusive consultancy to us. The draft was sent to us for shipment (by pouch) to Amrom on the West Coast, for his final editing.

The pencil markings are mine. I have always suspected that Amrom works both sides of the street simultaneously--by that I mean Amrom is not above exploiting the internal affairs of one agency for his advantage with another agency. His statement on page 2, about the NRO being absorbed under the proposed DSC (DSECC), does nothing to convince me that he is a "true-blue" friend of ours. I readily agree that he has some imaginative and innovative ideas; that he has contributed much down through the years to fundamental thinking about satellite reconnaissance; and that he has a facile way of stripping away the outer glitter of an idea or a proposal and getting down to the very heart of the matter in a common sense sort of way. I am not convinced, however, that he is the sort of person--

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clever and brilliant though he may be--that we want to have around on a continuing, "no-notice" drop-in basis. In particular, I do not favor an open-ended contract with Amrom, as he continues to press for.

Although I have not carefully read and studied the paper he produced for us, a cursory scan of it indicates to me, at least, that it is not worth the [REDACTED] plus we will have paid him for it.

I would appreciate your returning the attached when you have finished with it.

[REDACTED]

Major, USAF

*Pls return.*

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Comments on some portions of the Classified Fitzhugh Panel Report

(Inaudible) are two sets of ready comments. They are divided into comments on organization and comments on substance. This may seem as if I am prejudicing the case by separating substance from organization. The truth is one can make this separation. I do not pretend to have done other than read the report at high speed. I have not studied it. I have clearly chosen to ignore the portions on command and control and national command authority because my competence does not lie in this area. I have a concern over these problems but little competence to discuss them adequately. Conversely, it would be very odd indeed if after about 30 years of being in various levels of government and various activities dealing with reconnaissance intelligence -- it would be odd indeed if I did not have some firmly held ideas by now.

Many of the ideas that occurred to me as I read the report sounded familiar because I think I have anticipated or at least have constructed independently many of these suggestions, emphases, efficiencies and recommendations in that very informal briefing I gave you some weeks on "Squint -- A View into the Future". That briefing by the way is being reduced to writing and will arrive on your desk one of these days under appropriate classification and security. I hope you will find it useful especially in conjunction with the document under consideration at the moment. Let me insert somewhat

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parathetically at this point an incident that happened just a few days ago with direct relevance to the entire subject of personnel structure, management and program. I gave the Squint briefing, of which I am rather proud, to one of the service intelligence agencies here in the building. I had an audience consisting of ten senior Colonels and it was an extraordinary affair. It was as if there was a blank wall between me and the audience. This has happened to me only rarely. Here I was talking about a subject they were professionally concerned with. I was being critical, hostile, barbed. Nothing I did would elicit the slightest sight of interest, emotion, hostility, criticism or anything. What id did was give me an instant headache.

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On the reorganizational aspects of this document, I have little to say, not because I am not interested or because I think it unimportant. But because by and large I am not too competent in that organizational theory. I have a deep-seated and well-rooted feeling that without the people, the right kind of organization makes no difference. If you/<sup>don't</sup> have the right people, organization, reorganization or disorganization can't help these people accomplish their good things. In other words organization is necessary but it is insufficient. But I will raise one question about the proposed reorganization. The proposed DSC (DSECC) as I read it will have NSA, NRO and some other collection activities. The DIPA is intended to replace DIA productions not collection. If the former agency, DSECC, which has as a substantial and integral part of that agency, NSA, and embodies both collection

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and analysis (or production), this would seem to me to be a logical contradiction in that DSECC is contaminated with part of the production job. Am I wrong? Is this a misreading or is this a mislogic at work. This may be the point at which to say something which ostensibly has nothing to do with organization in a very large way. I have long thought and I think can argue fairly well that the DCI should be a different guy altogether from the DC Director of the CIA. The merging of these two functions often results in inevitable confusion and particularly agency bias. It is hard to tell which hat the gentleman is wearing at the time. I've been wanting to say this for a long time and I'm using this format to say it.

There is a fundamental bureaucratic theorem at work in all military and most civilian organizations: If you want more stars you have to have more people under you. The last time I was in, Bob, I think I told you the story of my big invention at Wright field many years ago., which enabled me to get rid of many people, have nobody working for me and meanwhile I got a promotion. Until we arrive at such a condition in the DoD that a guy can get more stars for having less people we're going to be in the inevitable rip of Parkins Law.

Another interesting experience perhaps bears retelling because it makes the identical point. Many years ago -- in 1946 -- I was approached by a senior Air Force Colonel in reconnaissance with the request to assist him in the proposed photography of operation Crossroads, the 1946 atomic bomb test in the Pacific. I told him that I could produce within two weeks

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an operational plan specifying the number of airplanes that would be required, the number of people, the kind of people, time limit to rebuild the airplanes, install cameras, etc. etc. In two weeks I met him in Washington. I was very proud to display the plan involving the use of the two engine C-154 (civilian equivalent of the DC-4). I had drawings showing how we would cut up the left and right sides of these airplanes, install about 30 or 40 cameras of all kinds, automatic high speed, low speed, long focal and short focal, wide angle, narrow angle, color, black and white, etc. etc., and gave him a list of 30 odd people, all colleagues and friends of mine, at Wright Field. At that time or by that time, all of us were at the peak of our efficiency. With respect to the physical endurance, ability of \_\_\_\_\_, of flying in cold airplanes, \_\_\_\_\_, installing and developing film, writing reports, etc. I laid this plan proudly on his desk and says look, Colonel \_\_\_\_\_, look what we can do with only 30 people. We will make the installation, we will fly the equipment, process the film, we'll analyze the film, we'll write the reports, do our own maintenance and won't it be elegant. He patiently explained to me, as if I were the village idiot -- that he didn't want any elegant outfit, he said, I don't want any elegant outfit, I want a big outfit. And he had a big outfit. We had 900 people in that unit as it finally went to work in the mid-Pacific, most of them were stumbling all over each other, causing work for each other and instead of work being put in the out-put side of the operation. I still meet people here in the Pentagon once in a while who claim to have been in that outfit with me.

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I am including these two appendices designed to be read in conjunction with these comments. R Appendix B, The Grammatical Exclusion Principle, and Appendix C, Guide to the Perplexed. I know very well that I

About intelligence requirements, evaluation, validation, etc. etc. this is a can of worms that can't be opened in channel but has to be opened in particular. I am reminded here of an experience I had in Europe some years ago that perhaps bears directly on this problem of intelligence requirements. s You will recognize and agree that a tour of duty of the average GI and young officer, even old officers in Europe, is of the order of two to three years. Yet intelligence requirements which these people handle pre-date the arrival on the scene of these people. There are in no position to question the intelligence requirements which they have been entrusted with. Both age and respect originating by some predecessor's action. I remember going up to a big board in a control room in Wiesbaden and asking what certain targets were for. These were reconnaissance targets I was a marvelous control system I worked. In deed it was very good. They were able to refer to another chart immediately which told them of these targets had to be covered every month. When asked what are these targets they bore serial number such as [REDACTED], They said well we'll go to another encyclopedia and when they did look them up it turned out they were border guard barracks. It was not obbious to me then and it is not obvious

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as high a  
now why it is necessary to cover these on ~~the~~ frequencies as that.  
When asked who originated the requirement I was told this ~~was~~ came from  
the U. S. Army at Heidelberg. And now the entire problem comes into  
sharp focus. It is clear that the air people flying the mission have no  
desire to cut down their flight hours or to put themselves out of business -  
It is a fundamental fact which hardly requires stating that no organization  
voluntarily consigns itself to the ash heap and the requirement itself  
probably passed down by a sergeant who inherited it from a corporal who  
got it from a lieutenant who got at a time when things were hot. It might  
turn out that I am quite wrong in detail about this, even this very example.  
Yet somehow out of the structure of the example emerges a kind of a  
continuous  
pernicious lack of questioning of requirements. Requirements once  
stated are become immortal somehow. They are only added they are never  
subtracted. But it is exactly in problems like this that hard work rests  
must be done and cannot be done by a high level committees or high level  
reorganizations or high level people . You need some dedicated devil  
advocates full time at all levels of the government probing, asking questions,  
playing the other guy, being the mean and bad guy. It turns out that very  
good guys make lousy bad guys. And the kinds of people who are good by  
tempermanent are taking the intelligence offensive are also lousy by temperament  
to play the other fellow. I said that so many times to you and to others and  
Im getting sick of hearing myself say it.

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About security and personal investigations. I think there is a security industry at work deep inside the government which attempts to maximize the number of security investigations, security investigators, the magnitude ~~and importance~~ and importance of this activity. Otherwise how in any kind of a rational frame of mind could one explain that a clearance ~~good~~ obtained at the highest levels of the DoD and in some specialized activities accounts for nothing in a White House staff. That bears separate clearances requires or that a clearance obtained at the highest levels of the DoD is worthless when one goes over to the Arms Control and ~~XXXX~~ Disarmament Agency and that clearance is good in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is not good in the rest of the State Department. No one could believe that this ~~is~~ stupid situation would be permitted to last as long as it has. It's got to be fixed. This is not the conclusion of my remarks but the temporary of them. I've gone on long enough, and I'm trying both your patience and that of your secretary, let me stop now with the option that this could be regarded as a temporary interim report to be revised as needed.

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