

NSAM 156 COMMITTEE

(H)

- o. Formed in May 1962 by President Kennedy to form a U.S. Position on National Reconnaissance which avoids dangers of restricting ourselves in international negotiations on disarmament and peaceful uses of outer space, compromising highly classified programs, or providing assistance of significant military value to Soviet Union.

- MEMBERS: Johnson - State
Nitze - OSD
Charyk - DNRO
Seamans - NASA
Wiesner - White House
Kaysen - White House
Scoville - CIA
Fisher - ACDA
- NSCA 2454 issued in July 1962 with 18 points of policy vis-a-vis U.S. Reconnaissance Programs which would:
 - Maintain freedom of action unilaterally to conduct reconnaissance satellite operations.
 - Prevent foreign political or physical interference with operations.
 - Prevent accidental or forced disclosure of details of program.
 - Avoid situation in the context of reconnaissance program which would be embarrassing.
 - Facilitate resolution of conflicts which arise between technical and security requirements and international commitments and foreign policy objectives.

Atk 4 5 1962
McA U.S.

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- o In February 1963 studied disclosure policy on U.S. satellite reconnaissance capability pursuant to NSAM 216.

- MEMBERS: Johnson - State
Thompson - State
Cline - CIA
Witze - OSD
Byroade - ACDA
Clay - JCS
Charyk - DNRO
Hilsman - State

- Recommend against disclosure since it is of doubtful and declining value in crises.

- o In January 1964 studied possible disclosure of satellite reconnaissance.

- MEMBERS: Johnson - State
McMillan - NRO
Scoville - ACDA
Wheelon - CIA
Cline - CIA
Thompson - State
Chayes - State
Hughes - State

- REPORTED TO: Rusk - State
McNamara - OSD
McCone - CIA
Fisher - ACDA
Bundy - White House
Wiesner - White House
Welsh - White House
Johnson - White House
Webb - NASA
Morrow - USIA

- Concluded that no additional action to disseminate more knowledge of the program beyond the level already disseminated in summer of 1962, e.g., all NATO heads of government, Foreign Ministers, and NAC Permreps were told officially of the reconnaissance satellite program... the fact that we had it, that it was developing well and

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was directly benefiting the alliance, and finally that the U.S. must maintain it at all costs.

- o In July 1966 studied political and security aspects of non-military application of satellite earth-sensing -- requested by OMB and OST.

- MEMBERS: Johnson - State
McNaughton - OSD
Flax - DNRO
Fisher - ACDA
Sheldon - CIA
Keeny - White House
Johnson - White House
Welsh - White House
Seamans - NASA

- Concluded that 1962 policy valid. Also recommended that the U.S. should:

- Continue to protect NRP
- Consider a major political initiative advancing concept of advancing economic betterment through space activities
- Allow NASA to proceed with tentative experimental program subject to limitations established between NASA and NRO.
- Encourage NASA to consider relative merits of aircraft over satellites.
- Ask USIB to review compartmentation.
- Permit non-military programs to profit from achievements of NRP.

- o In September 1968 through May 1969 studied disarmament aspects of satellite disclosure policy.

- MEMBERS: Bohlen - State
Warnke - OSD
Flax - DNRO
Fisher - ACDA
Duckett - CIA
Keeny - White House

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Johnson - White House
 Welsh - White House
 Paine - NASA
 Hughes - State

- Draft paper advocated declassification of fact of and forthright discussions with Russians - State.
 - ACDA supported this view seeing it a necessary step.
 - Final position stated that term "national means of verification" only should be used in the negotiations with no public statements or press announcements to amplify and that Washington should guide.
 - This paper was forwarded to NSSM 28 Committee, e.g., the progenitor of the Verification Panel. This position was adopted for SALT I.
- o In September 1971 studied SKYLAB earth terrain camera use -- request of NASA.
- MEMBERS: Johnson - STATE
 Farley - ACDA
 Helms - CIA
 Packard - OSD
 McLucas - NRO
 Low - NASA
 David - White House
 Kissinger - White House
 - Approved 190-B camera for use as an exception to guidelines established 1966 and subject to final review prior to mission.
 - Subcommittee reviewing on-going mission at request of 40 Committee.
- o In January - April 1972 studied impact of SALT ratification on NRP security -- request of NRO.

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- MEMBERS: Johnson - State
Farley - ACDA
Helms - CIA
Rush - OSD
McLucas - NRO
Fletcher - NASA
David - White House
Kissinger - White House

- Similar disputes on need to disclose as seen in May 1969 paper on guidance.
- Disclosure question turned over to Verification Panel. In spite of sentiments about the imperative to disclose, Kissinger decided that it wasn't necessary. This decision proved sound.

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