

VERY

intensity

3/16

Col. [unclear]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

Dr Nelson

Low
File
5/2/79

Attached is a paraphrase of NSOM
102 - the SALT II guidance
prepared by the NSC on March 11.
Because of its present sensitivity, I
have agreed not to permit reproduction.
Perhaps Dr McLucas would be interested
in the guidance for his information.
Please return this to SS-5 for
storage.



(H)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

3/16
Kiefer

For your info & staff
city use. Dick Kiefer should
read also, but we should
not reproduce this now.



Kiefer read
3/16

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

March 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSDM 102 - SALT IV Instructions

The following is a paraphrase of NSDM 102, March 11, 1971, which provides directive guidance for the SALT IV Delegation in Vienna for the talks beginning March 15. This information is highly sensitive and is to be closely held.

The August 4 proposal is still valid, modified by the following:

a. The U. S. cannot accept a separate ABM agreement. ABM should be discussed as a priority to stimulate discussion. Pending full discussion of the details, the U. S. is not in a position to choose between zero-level or NCA ABM. Initially, the U. S. stand should be for zero-level as stated earlier in the talks.

b. In private, the Chief of the Delegation should discuss limiting U. S. ABM to a four-site SAFEGUARD system at the NCA and the Soviet ABM to existing Moscow defense.

c. In private, the Chief of the Delegation should discuss the concept of the time-limit of an agreement and the withdrawal clause from an agreement. The Soviets are to be probed as to their desires.

d. The Delegation is authorized to include B-52's in storage if the Soviets include all bombers, no matter how they are configured.

e. The U. S. and the Soviets should agree to a ban on all seabed strategic ballistic missiles.

f. Discussion should be held in an effort to improve reliability and reduce the vulnerability of the Washington - Moscow direct communications link.

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4/1/71

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1. There should be multiple terminals on each side.
2. There should be at least one link independent of 3rd country involvement.
3. There should be discussion aimed at an eventual joint-use U. S. - Soviet communication satellite which would be independent of 3rd countries.

g. The Delegation should discuss informally the following modifications to the August 4 proposal. No commitment should be made until determinations are made as to the nature of the Soviet response and possible trade-offs.

1. Drop the 1710 limit and increase the limit to 2000 offensive strategic systems.

2. Simplify the constraints on silo modifications so that silo diameter and increases in depth are the only modifications prohibited.

3. If agreed procedures are established for dismantling, destruction and consultation, drop the provisions for the advance notification of the following:

- (a) Deployment of new bomber types.
 - (b) Deployment of new types of non-ICBM land mobile ballistic missiles.
 - (c) Deployment of new SAMs.
 - (d) Substitutions of missile launchers or heavy bombers.
4. Drop the requirement for advance notice of AEM R&D tests.

5. Drop the reference in the Joint Commission proposal which allows one party to request "selective" direct observation or inspection.

All of the talks are to be held in privacy with no public announcements permitted. All remarks by the delegation and other government officials should be confined only to those statements made by the President in his March 4 press conference.

Logan
Major, USAF

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