(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D C.

THE NRO STAFF

2 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR SS-3

SUBJECT: Reevaluation of ▮▮▮▮▮▮ Compartmentation

▮▮▮▮▮▮ TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Guide attached to your memo of 13 May graphically shows that a majority of the information, with certain notable exceptions, concerning the overhead collection programs is available in either the ▮▮▮▮▮▮ TALENT-KEYHOLE systems. It is our opinion that this ▮▮▮▮▮ onalty should be eliminated and with the exception of the NRO detailed organization, advanced technical performance/configurations, codewords, nicknames, funding, program number association, CIA participation and contractual relationships, the remaining items should be confined strictly within the TALENT-KEYHOLE compartmentation. This approach would greatly facilitate conversations and the timely flow of data between the data users, operations personnel and planners; while at the same time restricting the ▮▮▮▮ NRO organizational structure and program contractual arrangements, which are not directly concerned with the intelligence product, to the absolute minimum number of personnel. It is currently possible for two persons, one cleared ▮▮▮▮▮ and the other TALENT-KEYHOLE, to have knowledge of the ▮▮▮▮▮ information but not be able to talk to each other. This appears to be a self defeating situation.

The specific answers to your query are as follows:

1. The NRO detailed organization and interagency CIA Program Office participation should be retained within the ▮▮▮▮▮ system to preclude wide dissemination of the overall aspects of the management structure and the fact of CIA involvement.

2. The codewords, nicknames and connection with overt program numbers should be kept within the ▮▮▮▮▮ system as they do not affect the intelligence product but are of administrative use within the various projects.

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3. The contractual █████████ships and program funding should remain within th█████████ystem to securely maintain the development and tech█████████ta and to minimize exposure as they have no direct bearing on the use of the intelligence data produced.

4. The advanced subsystem designs and configurations, which show how it is possible to achieve the performance re██████d by our various systems, should be confined to the █████████compartmentation as knowledge of them is not required in order to use the resultant product data.

5. The remaining █████████nly items listed in the Security Guide have no valid rea█████, in our opinion, for not being included in the TALENT-KEYHOLE compartmentation. Most of the details of these items can be inferred from other data already releasable in the TALENT-KEYHOLE system.

Colonel, USAF