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OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

REPORT OF A SPECIAL PANEL ON
SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

August 25, 1960

The concept of an artificial satellite orbiting around the earth has been associated, from the outset, with the thought that such a vehicle could be used to maintain a continuous reconnaissance and surveillance over any desired part of the globe. The original plan was to install a kind of television camera in the satellite and to transmit its images by radio techniques to a ground station where the signals would be reassembled into a photograph. With such equipment, a systematic search was to be made of the Eurasian land mass for airfields and other military installations large enough to be detected with the limited resolving power of such a system. By repeated observations it was hoped that changes would be detected with sufficient reliability to provide warning of imminent attack.

The appeal of this fundamentally straightforward approach lies in its relative political unobtrusiveness; in the apparent power of television techniques for making observations almost instantly available; in the prolonged utilization of satellites in their orbits; and in the freedom from the logistic intricacies of recovery techniques. At first sight, this "electronic readout" appears to be the fully modern approach to reconnaissance. It has deserved, and indeed has had the most careful study. As a result, we have now arrived at a clear understanding of the technological problems which remain to be solved. The initial SAMOS development project was aimed at the electronic solution of these problems; we shall shortly discuss the difficulties.

Several years ago, it was realized that orbiting satellites might be used for the detection of ballistic missile attack in a much simpler and more direct method than television or photographic observation. While the hostile missile is being launched, its

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engine is a very powerful source of infrared radiation, and this radiation can be detected, above the atmosphere, from satellites many hundred miles away. The exploitation of this early-warning scheme is going forward as Project MIDAS; it has been separated from the reconnaissance project (SAMOS) and will not be discussed further in this paper. As a consequence of this separate development, the warning function is no longer a primary requirement for SAMOS.

Meanwhile, a much more urgent reconnaissance need has been pointed out by the U. S. Intelligence Board. The overriding intelligence requirement at the present time is information on the operational status of Soviet missile launch sites. This requires photographs of very high resolution--high enough to enable a skilled photo-interpreter to recognize and identify the objects of interest in a missile launch site.

The exact resolution performance required for this purpose need not be discussed here. Its technical specification is complicated and often controversial. One must realize, for example, that a system which will resolve 20 feet on the ground will not permit a photo-interpreter to describe an object 20 feet in length.

Up to now, there has been only one source for high-resolution photographs of the Soviet missile installations, and that source has been eliminated with the grounding of the U-2 aircraft. Can we substitute a satellite as the observing vehicle and obtain comparable results? More specifically, can we look to SAMOS to yield results of the necessary quality within a short time?

Unfortunately, as far as electronic readout is concerned, the answer is NO.

The essence of the problem is that a photograph which contains the amount of detail that is required to know the state of readiness and kind of activity at a missile site must be made up of a fantastically large number of bits of information--a number so large that there is not time enough to transmit all of these bits of information from satellites to earth while the

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satellite is over our own or friendly territory. It is to be expected during the next ten years that the elaboration of satellite technology, the ease of keeping many satellites in orbit, and improvements in our electronic arts, will ultimately make it feasible electrically to transmit detailed information about a given point on the earth. But what we must emphasize here today is that it is not feasible now, and it is not likely to be feasible in time to give our country the kind of reconnaissance it needs at once. Therefore, while we recommend continued research on those electronic readout programs, and the occasional orbital flights which are now planned, we must warn that we cannot rely on the electronic readout approach for military purposes and urge that higher operational priority be given to other Air Force developments which we are about to discuss.

Physical recovery, in the air or in the sea, of a satellite that has completed a number of revolutions in orbit has become feasible. The improvement of recovery techniques is going forward in the DISCOVERER project. One can therefore consider the possibility of using advanced photographic techniques which are capable of very high resolution, and of recovering the exposed photographic film on or near the surface of the earth. The subsequent processing and evaluation of the film can then be performed under the same favorable conditions that are used in the best aerial photography.

While this approach may superficially appear clumsy and pedestrian when compared with electronic readout, a detailed analysis will show its performance to be distinctly superior in providing the kind of detailed information that is required for the study of operational missile sites. In fact, we are convinced that this primary objective of satellite reconnaissance can be realized most promptly and most effectively by the physical recovery of film exposed in a high-resolution convergent stereo camera system. The principles and techniques of this kind of photography are now well understood. Therefore, if timely action is taken, we can expect to have an adequate photographic payload by the time we have mastered the techniques for recovery.

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It will take a year and a half at best to close the present gap in our reconnaissance ability. And we can expect useful performance in 1962 only if we clearly establish high resolution photography as the first goal of the U. S. satellite reconnaissance program.

We are not unmindful of other objectives associated with SAMOS. Photographic surveys of broad areas, in which extensive coverage is obtained at the expense of reduced resolving power, have important uses. The detection and recording of electromagnetic transmissions by means of the proposed "F" payloads will provide valuable information, especially in areas of technical intelligence, of new aspects in communication links, in missile defense systems, in navigational aids.

But we do not consider these objectives comparable in importance to the task of getting, at the earliest possible date, high-resolution photographs that will provide information about the operational status of missile sites, with detail nearly as good as that from the U-2. We therefore recommend a carefully planned program, with simplified management, and with primary emphasis on:

- (a) High-resolution stereo photography
- (b) Recovery techniques

Mindful of the urgency of this need for detailed photography, the Air Force has greatly modified the initial SAMOS development plan. A number of well conceived photographic recovery systems are now under study and evaluation. These designs fall into two distinct categories:

1. A system to achieve maximum coverage with ground resolution adequate to identify missile sites under construction, and
2. A system capable of photographing a large number of selected installations with the higher resolution required for evaluation of the operational status of a missile site.

We are convinced that with straightforward good management in the utilization of components and technology now potentially available, the first of these systems could be placed in operation by late 1962; the higher resolution system becoming operational about one year later. We therefore urge a resolute concentration of effort on these two systems and a clear decision to assign to this task a higher priority than to all other aspects together of the SAMOS program.

Since we must now rely upon the physical retrieval of satellite photographs it is necessary that increased efforts be made to improve the reliability of recovery techniques. Recent achievements in the DISCOVERER program are most encouraging. An alternative procedure, unproven operationally, but most appealing in concept, involves the use of a drag brake mechanism to effect reentry. The applicability of this technique to the SAMOS recovery operation should receive serious consideration.

Until recently, the operational aspects of recovery have been greatly complicated by the obvious requirement for safety to restrict these activities to the ocean areas. As a result of our increased confidence in the precision of the recovery operation, the Air Force is now studying the feasibility of effecting recovery over land. Since this would significantly increase the probability of success of the recovery operation, we heartily recommend the support of AirForce efforts in this area.

PROCESSING AND EVALUATION

The reconnaissance "take" of the proposed systems is recovered as a set of latent images on photographic film. The intelligence yield that will be extracted from these latent images is critically dependent on quality factors in the chemical processing of the film and in the subsequent analysis and interpretation of the finished photographs. We cannot emphasize too strongly that much of the detailed information captured in the latent image can be irretrievably lost unless first-rate work is done in the processing laboratory and in the interpretation center.

In the purely technical domain, we must point out that the achievement of optimum image-quality calls for the closest possible interaction between individuals concerned with emulsion design and manufacture and individuals concerned with processing techniques. If these two activities were to be organized as separate and independent enterprises it is most unlikely, in our view, that the results would be the best obtainable.

A full awareness of these factors led to the special organization of processing and evaluation that was used in the handling of the U-2 films. Our experience with the superior results obtained under that arrangement leads us to recommend firmly that the same pattern be followed in preparing the output of the proposed satellite reconnaissance systems. We further recommend that this output be distributed by a centralized community laboratory.

WEATHER

In aerial photo-reconnaissance operations, the state of the weather over the target has long been a primary consideration. For satellite reconnaissance operations, the sensitivity to weather is in some respects even worse. If the target is obscured by clouds on the first pass, the satellite may have later opportunities to observe the target. But the times of subsequent passes over the target are fixed by the orbit parameters, and the situation is less flexible than the scheduling of aircraft. Moreover, the weather over the great majority of Soviet targets is very bad indeed, and the opportunities for good photography are scarce.

The program outlined in this discussion can succeed only if it is closely integrated with the weather services that will be associated with the TIROS project, with the Air Force's 433-L system, and with other sources of weather data that may come into existence. Because of the short reaction intervals that are necessary here, these arrangements will be difficult to establish, and we recommend early attention to planning.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Our analysis of the investigations already carried out by the Air Force leads us to the conclusion that from the array of important studies a few can now be extracted and integrated into a single simple and powerful program to give us the reconnaissance we need. Therefore, our recommendation is that the following selected components of the AirForce satellite reconnaissance program be now assembled into a program of very high priority.

1. A recoverable satellite-payload for high resolution convergent stereo photography.
2. To be recovered for the time being at sea.
3. To be recovered as soon as feasible on land.
4. To carry in some of the satellites camera and film competent to identify with certainty missile sites both in construction and after completion.
5. To carry in other satellites camera and film competent to study the state of readiness, type of activity, and type of missiles.

We recommend emphasis on the development of more advanced recovery techniques, particularly for land recovery.

We recommend that electronic readout techniques be given lower priority but be continued as a research project and that the extensive program for a ground-based electronic readout system be cut back very substantially and promptly.

Also, the so-called "F" payloads for gathering electromagnetic intelligence should be given lower priority than that assigned to photography.

We further recommend that this program be managed with the directness that the Air Force has used on occasion, with great success, for projects of overriding priority. We suggest that

this can best be accomplished by a direct line of command from the Secretary-of the Air Force to the general officer in operational charge of the whole program, with appropriate boards of scientific advisors to both the secretarial level and to the operational level. The general officer in command would look to associated military boards for support in the execution of his plans. We recommend this extraordinary type of organization to execute the program because we are convinced that the situation presents an unusual combination of urgency and inherent amenability to a direct approach.

In addition, we recommend that the same organization as was used in the handling of the U-2 films be used for chemical processing of the recovered film and that the output be distributed by a central community facility.

We also recommend that this program be closely integrated with the weather services that will be associated with the TIROS project, with USAF's 433-L system and other sources of weather data.

PANEL ON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

Dr. J. R. Killian, Jr.)
Dr. Edwin H. Land) Co-Chairmen
Dr. William O. Baker
Mr. Richard Bissell
Dr. Carl F. J. Overhage
Dr. Edward M. Purcell

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*Return To
Office of ASE Affairs
September 7, 1960*

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance Satellite Program

1. The National Security Council and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the Special NSC Meeting on August 25, 1960, took the following actions:

g. Noted and discussed a joint presentation by the Department of Defense and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, prepared pursuant to letters from the President dated June 10, 1960, on the Reconnaissance Satellite Program, with specific reference to SAMOS, including:

- (1) The development plan and experimental launchings.
- (2) The proposed streamlined management structure for the SAMOS program within the Department of Defense.

h. Noted the President's approval of the following recommendations submitted in the joint presentation:

(1) That the following selected components of the Air Force satellite reconnaissance program be now assembled into a program of very high priority:

(a) A recoverable satellite-payload for high resolution convergent stereo photography.

(b) To be recovered for the time being at sea.

(c) To be recovered as soon as feasible on land.

(d) To carry in some of the satellites camera and film competent to identify with certainty missile sites both in construction and after completion.

(e) To carry in other satellites camera and film competent to study the state of readiness, type of activity, and type of missile.

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(2) That emphasis be placed on the development of more advanced recovery techniques particularly for land recovery.

(3) That electronic read-out techniques be given lower priority but be continued as a research project, and that the extensive program for ground-based electronic read-out system be cut back very substantially and promptly.

(4) That the so-called F payloads for gathering electro-magnetic intelligence should be given lower priority than that assigned to photography.

(5) That this program be managed with the directness that the Air Force has used on occasion, with great success, for projects of overriding priority. This can best be accomplished by a direct line of command from the Secretary of the Air Force to the general officer in operational charge of the whole program, with appropriate boards of scientific advisers to both the secretarial level and to the operational level. The general officer in command would look to associated military boards for support in the execution of his plans.

(6) That the same organization as was used in the handling of the U-2 films be used for chemical processing of the recovered film, and that the output be distributed by a central community facility.

(7) That this program be closely integrated with the weather services that will be associated with the TIROS project, with URAF 433-L system and other sources of weather data.

(8) That the first scheduled experimental launching of SAMS take place during September 1960.

2. The above actions, as approved this date by the President, are transmitted herewith for appropriate implementation of 1-2 thereof.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology.

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12 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

The attached Summary Review of the National Reconnaissance Office, dated 25 February 1963, was prepared by the first Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, Dr. Joseph V. Charyk, at the time of his departure from this position. The review summarizes the history of the NRO from its earliest inception up to the time of Dr. Charyk's departure, including accomplishments as well as problems.

Signed
John L. Martin, Jr.
Colonel, USAF
Director, NRO Staff

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February 25, 1963

A SUMMARY REVIEW OF THE
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

1. INTRODUCTION

This document is intended to summarize the development of the National Reconnaissance Office and to review some of the considerations relative to its establishment, its organizational arrangement, accomplishments, present status and to indicate problem areas that have been encountered. Pertinent recommendations for resolution of such problem areas are also included.

2. ORGANIZATION

a. Background

The essential background of the present National Reconnaissance Office began in June 1960 with a Presidential request for a special review of the satellite reconnaissance program. After numerous meetings and discussions, this effort culminated with a special meeting of the National Security Council on 25 August 1960. As a result of this review, the Department of Defense was directed to re-orient the overt satellite reconnaissance



project known as SAMOS and to establish special management structure and procedures for this project.


As a result, the SAMOS project was removed completely from normal channels. The responsibility for conducting the development and operation was assigned to a General Officer in the field, who, in turn, was assigned directly to the Secretary of the Air Force and reported to the Secretary with no intermediate supervision or review. A small special staff (seven officers) was established within the Office of the Secretary to accomplish all Washington staff work required by the Secretary and the Project Director. In practice, from the outset, the Secretary's responsibilities for the SAMOS Project were delegated to the Under Secretary, who reported directly to the Secretary of Defense concerning the SAMOS Project.

The revised procedures included the stipulation that the SAMOS Project would be responsive only to requirements stated by the United States Intelligence Board. The revised procedure also excluded any overt association of the SAMOS Project with any military operational command, and placed all aspects of the project management and operation within a research and development environment.

Immediately after establishment of the new SAMOS management structure in early September 1960, the Under Secretary of the Air Force placed management of the CORONA and ARGON projects within the special SAMOS management structure, insofar as Air Force actions and authority were concerned. In addition, he established direct liaison with the responsible CIA official, at that time the Deputy Director (Plans), resulting in a greatly improved arrangement for these covert projects.

b. Establishment of the NRO

In the spring of 1961, initial consideration was given to further revisions to the special management structure. The existing structure was effective only for the specific SAMOS, CORONA and ARGON projects; it had no relation to other projects, existing or proposed. Furthermore, the arrangement did not provide for the degree of management effectiveness warranted by the national importance of satellite reconnaissance. The result of discussions extending over the summer of 1960 was the formalizing of the previous arrangement into a national office, with its charter expanded to include not only all satellite mapping, geodesy and intelligence gathering projects, but all aircraft and drone overflight projects as well.



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The resulting National Reconnaissance Office was formally established by the CIA-DOD Agreement of 6 September 1961. In this Agreement, the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Deputy Director (Plans) of the CIA were designated as Co-Directors of the NRO. Their initial steps toward formal office organization were interrupted almost immediately by rejection of the Co-Director provisions of the Agreement by the NSC 5412 Group, on the basis that the reconnaissance program was too important nationally to be conducted under divided management; complete responsibility for management of the entire program should be assigned unequivocally to a single person. Discussions of such revision of the CIA-DOD Agreement were carried out over the next seven months, intermittently interrupted for various reasons. During this period, essentially no progress was possible toward the formal organizing of the NRO; the previous arrangement was continued under the new name, with the Deputy Director (Research) replacing the Deputy Director (Plans) due to internal CIA organizational changes. A new CIA-DOD Agreement was signed on 2 May 1962 establishing a single Director of the NRO, responsible directly to the Director of

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Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense for management of the entire National Reconnaissance Program. Concurrent associated documents provided for the establishment of the National Reconnaissance Office as an operating agency, and designated the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the Director.

c. Organization of the NRO

In May 1962, after the documentation concerning the new Agreement had been issued, the Director of the NRO convened a special two-day conference to discuss the organization and procedures to be established under the new charter. This conference was attended by the Deputy Director (Research), CIA, and several key members of his staff, along with several members of the special staff of the Under Secretary of the Air Force. During this conference, general agreement was reached on the basic organization and method of operation to be followed.

Subsequently, on the basis of this conference, the basic organization of the present NRO was established by memorandum of 23 July 1962 from the Director, NRO to the Program Directors and the Director, NRO Staff. This memorandum established internal NRO structure and responsibilities, consistent with the basic



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NRO charter. The Director also arranged for additional participation within the NRO by the CIA, NPIC, NSA, the Navy and the Army through provision of qualified personnel from these Agencies and Services to serve full time tours on an inter-agency exchange basis. The NRO organization is outlined in the attachment hereto.

d. Modus Operandi

The basic approach followed by the Director in organizing and managing the present NRO has been based upon the following rationale:

(1) The clear intent behind the present NRO is for the Director actually to manage the entire National Reconnaissance Program, not simply to arrange for coordination of the several projects.

(2) To accomplish this task, he has authoritative responsibility for all aspects of the Program, subject only to the basic provisions of the 2 May 1962 CIA-DOD Agreement and associated charter documents, and to guidance he receives from the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense (in addition, of course, to all applicable provisions of public law.)

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In accordance with this rationale, the Director has issued directives and instructions through correspondence on numerous aspects of the NRO and its program. In matters which are somewhat involved, or inclined to be controversial, he has elected to employ several specific written agreements as a basic management procedure.

In regard to the various projects under NRO management, his actions have been based upon the view that all such projects are NRO projects, not CIA or DOD projects, that the NRO should literally fuse the formerly distinct and separate efforts of separate Agencies and Services into a single national program under close and effective management of the Director.

Since the NRO is a classified organization with a sensitive mission, all written directives to field elements of the Department of Defense have been issued through appropriate established Department of Defense channels. For example, during the Cuban crisis, NRO instructions to military units in the field were sent either through the Defense Intelligence Agency or the Joint Reconnaissance Center.



3. ACHIEVEMENTS

a. Management

Before noting achievements of the NRO in the development and operation of specific projects, some accomplishments of the Office should be considered from an over-all management viewpoint.

(1) The management of similar and related satellite projects has been consolidated within a single streamlined, responsive structure. In this process, formerly overlapping and conflicting responsibilities of the several Agencies and Services involved have been replaced with clear, non-conflicting assignment of responsibilities.

(2) The NRO has provided a single, responsible focal point for the national management of all overflight of denied areas, and for effective coordination between all satellite, aircraft and drone matters in this regard.

(3) The NRO has employed management structure and procedures uniquely tailored to the magnitude, importance and special conditions affecting the national task. Management responsibility has been defined clearly and centered in the smallest possible units composed of selected personnel of

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highest qualifications. However, full use has been made of the existing materiel and personnel resources of the several Agencies and Services involved in providing the bulk of the support to the over-all program. By use of streamlined procedures, elimination of all intermediate reviews between the field Program Directors and the Director of the NRO, substitution of personal attention of a few selected individuals for all normally repetitive management documents and reports, and establishment of special communications arrangements, it has been possible to manage effectively a total national program involving approximately three quarters of a billion dollars in FY '63 with an NRO technical staff of approximately fifteen. The management system thus developed has made it possible to carry out this gigantic task under the conditions imposed by special security requirements.

(4) The NRO has provided the initiative and conceptual basis for the establishment of Department of Defense policy and security directives designed to provide the maximum possible protection to the National Reconnaissance Program. By eliminating all mission associated project names, and by eliminating such items as confirmation of the total payload or mission of any

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specific launch, or the total payloads devoted to any specific mission, it has been possible to establish a public information posture from which almost all provocative comment on satellite reconnaissance has disappeared, while at the same time it has not been necessary to withhold any data essential to any of the unclassified projects and experiments within the over-all space program. In addition, this policy has eliminated the serious political embarrassment which the U. S. would face under the previous policy if the Soviet bloc should accidentally recover a satellite reconnaissance film capsule. Under the former policy, the U. S. in stating the mission of each launch in advance, and in some detail, represented the launch as other than reconnaissance mission; under the present policy, while the U.S. continues to admit to the existence of satellite effort directed toward the reconnaissance field, there is never any misrepresentation by statement or implication or process of elimination, since no missions are stated for any launches.

(5) Procedures have been established which permit all Agencies and Services concerned with the results of the National


Reconnaissance Program to make adequate preparation for exploitation of these results while maintaining the necessary security. Technical data essential to the exploitation community has been released from the operational security structure into the exploitation structure by means of specific planning documents and conferences. In addition, focal points have been established within each Service and Agency, with responsibility for exploitation preparation, and with all security clearances and information required for this task.

(6) Direct NRO liaison has been established with the Department of State and with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This arrangement has insured that the U. S. policy in United Nations matters is determined with full consideration of the possible impact on the National Reconnaissance Program, while, at the same time, all potential contributions of this effort to constructive national policy are fully considered.

(7) Previously uncoordinated and duplicatory effort has been consolidated in several important areas:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



(c) A single, consolidated, jointly-staffed R&O satellite operations center has been established in the basement of the Pentagon. This center will replace the several

satellite operations formerly conducted separately and provide for effective centralized control of all such operations under the close supervision of the Director.



b. Projects

In regard to the development and operation of reconnaissance projects, NRO accomplishments include the following:

- (1) Development and operation of the highly successful CORONA-M system.



- (3) Development of the Thrust Augmented TEOR, with option for use with or without strap-on solid rockets, providing significant extension of the capability of TEOR boosted projects and greater flexibility for the National Reconnaissance Program.



(4) Exploitation of the basic SAPOS E-5 camera development into the simpler and less expensive THOR boosted LANYARD project, as an interim, earlier approach toward photography of technical intelligence quality.

(5) Initiation of development of the CORONA-J version of the basic CORONA-M project, successful conclusion of which will provide two photographic missions from one launch of a single camera system. After the first mission has been recovered, the satellite will remain inactive for up to three weeks, after which it will be re-activated, another photographic mission accomplished, and the film recovered in a second recovery capsule.

(6) Development of an interchangeable payload concept for THOR boosted projects, giving much greater potential flexibility to the over-all program.

(7) Development and successful operation of a small Stellar/Index camera of high geometric fidelity which, in addition to serving as an indexing aid for exploitation of reconnaissance photography, offers the potential of making each reconnaissance mission concurrently useful as a mapping and charting mission, with substantial potential savings



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
over the separate development and operating of systems designed exclusively for such purposes.

(8) Development and highly successful operation of Project 417, a secret meteorological satellite in a sun-synchronous orbit positioned so as to provide daily weather coverage of the Soviet Union. This project has and will continue to be extremely valuable in programming and operating all photographic reconnaissance.

(9) Complete re-orientation of the SANDS ATLAS boosted SIGINT effort into a THOR boosted project of considerable flexibility with interchangeable antennas, receivers, etc., and successful operation of this project.



(12) Development of a coordinated national SIGINT satellite program.



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(13) Initiation of such vulnerability measures as appear feasible, to provide reasonable protection of reconnaissance satellites against some possible Soviet counter-measures.


(14) Development of advanced components which are available if required for future use, such as the eight 36" focal length cameras developed under Project 722, now discontinued in view of improvements in the CORONA-M system and the expense involved in completing the development as originally planned.

(15) Initiation of advanced state-of-the-art work in areas vital to future program developments.


circumstances should warrant.

(17) Development of the A-12 aircraft to the flight test phase, through management and supervision by the CIA and support by the Air Force.

(18) Continued employment of U-2 aircraft in successful overflight of denied areas, through Air Force operation over Cuba and CIA operation with Air Force support elsewhere.


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(19) Initiation of development of the AQ-12 drone to provide increased future flexibility and options in covert reconnaissance by aircraft.

(20) Initiated actions to provide increased protection to U-2 aircraft for optional future use against areas defended by surface-to-air missiles.

(21) Initiated organization of NRO Program D for the development of the R-12 on a basis compatible with the security required for the related A-12 project.

(22) Agena-D improvements for both NRO and other space applications.

4. PROBLEMS

A review of the experience to date indicates that there are several outstanding problems which require resolution. It is believed essential to insure that they are resolved in the establishment of the new charter for the organization which is now in preparation. The critical problem areas can be summarized as follows:

a. There appears to have been misunderstanding or misinterpretation in some quarters as to the fundamental nature of the NRO. Specifically, the question is whether the office is an

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operating agency with direct management responsibility for a single national program or whether it's function is as a coordinating office responsible for liaison and coordination between related projects which are the management responsibility of various agencies and departments.

I have operated on the basis that the former arrangement is the correct one. In order for this function to be properly exercised, it is essential that the DNRO have available to him all of the management tools necessary for the accomplishment of the responsibility. A critical missing element has been the direct control over funds for the entire program. Without control over the allocation and redistribution of funds as dictated by program and requirement considerations, it is my judgment that the responsibility cannot be effectively discharged.

It appears clear that the office has always been envisaged as an operating agency. It is clearly reflected in the various DOD charter documents supporting the basic CIA-DOD Agreement of 2 May 1962. It was outlined in detail by the DNRO in the NRO organizational conference in late May 1962 and included in the organization policy statement of 23 July 1962 issued to the NRO program directors and the Director of the NRO Staff. The position

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may be stated as follows:

Within the limits of applicable public law, within the provisions of the CIA-DOD Agreement of 2 May 1962, and subject to the guidance he receives from the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the NRO is responsible for the actual management of all projects of the National Reconnaissance Program and has the authority to carry out this task without the necessity of reaching agreement on each and every aspect of the management actions involved. In the CIA, under the terms of the 2 May Agreement, the responsibility of the Deputy Director (Research) in seeing that the terms of the Agreement are carried out within the CIA obviously includes the responsibility to see that the instructions and directions of the Director of the NRO are carried out. Within the DOD, the authority of the Director is contained in DOD Directive TS 5105.23, dated 14 June 1962.

The agreement reached in the organizational conference in late May 1962 and confirmed in the 23 July 1962 memorandum, clearly spells out that the DNERO has direct management responsibility for all elements of the program. The specific program

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responsibilities are divided between several program directors. In the absence of the DNRO, each of these directors is responsible for decisions in his program area. In every sense, therefore, the program directors are deputy directors of the NRO for their own program areas.

Despite the basic CIA-DOD Agreement, the agreement at the organizational conference and the basic organizational documents, this arrangement has never been accepted by the Deputy Director (Research), CIA. Rather than seeking a resolution of his concern through proper channels and arriving at a new agreement with accompanying revised organizational documents, the apparent procedure has been one of resisting the functioning of the organization along the lines established in the basic Agreement and in the organizational documents. This is a fundamental point which requires clarification.

Effective implementation of decisions affecting Agency activities has been difficult, if not impossible, if the Deputy Director (Research) was not completely sympathetic to the action proposed. The direct management responsibility of the DNRO over CIA activities needs to be re-examined.

It is significant to note that although the DOD elements of the NRO have undergone rather drastic changes, no substantial

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change from pre-NRO procedures has been affected in the CIA except possibly in the writing of security policy and the extension of a few communications links. Completely harmonious and effective inter-actions between the NSA, DIA, Army, Navy and Air Force exist. Efforts to mold the CIA activities into a unified program have been resisted vigorously. The apparent concept has been one of considering the DNRO as a coordinating official but not as one having direct operational authority over CIA programs.

b. USIB-NRO relations. USIB has been quite slow in revising the intelligence requirements against which the NRO must make long lead time decisions. In addition, USIB has attempted on occasion to vary the satellite launching schedule on the short range basis with which it deals with aircraft schedules. Work is now under way on revised statements of longer range requirements and recent NRO efforts to bring USIB to a closer understanding of satellite scheduling are producing better understanding.

c. NRO security policy and reform. Much work remains to make the over-all NRO security policy effective. The clearance billet structure is badly in need of revision. In addition, security reform is needed to reduce the number of individual

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code word clearances which are necessary under the current policy. Work is under way to accomplish these objectives.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

It should be noted that although the problems currently facing the NRO originated some time ago, they have not prevented substantial accomplishment. However, it should be noted also that these problems have become acute only recently, with the impasse reached in late December 1962 and early January 1963. That these difficulties must be resolved promptly in order to prevent serious degradation is evident.

Experience to date would suggest that two steps are required. The basic CIA-DOD Agreement and related NRO charter documents should be revised to clarify the desired nature of the NRO and the responsibility and authority of the Director of the NRO. In addition, measures should be taken to establish and support the internal organizational discipline essential to the repair of the present difficulties and the continuance of a high degree of effectiveness. Each of these steps should include certain specific provisions which are outlined separately below.

a. In regard to the revision, it should be noted that the present Agreement, while indicative of apparent harmony in

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May 1962, has proven inadequate as a charter in little more than half a year. The numerous drafts of proposed agreements which preceded the 2 May 1962 Agreement, the many discussions required to reach this Agreement, the repeated refinement of phraseology which was necessary, and the extended time period required for completion of this process would suggest the presence of semantic masks in the final document; subsequent experience has verified the presence of two types. The first is phraseology sufficiently flexible to cover different points of view, representing agreement not reached in actuality and requiring only a matter of time to produce problems. The additional use of vague and generalized language to describe the responsibilities and infer the authority of the Director also give the status of apparent agreement to matters shown by subsequent experience to be unsettled. It would seem, therefore, that in the process of revision of the Agreement, clarity should be preferred to diplomacy, and the major questions which have arisen in the course of operation under the present Agreement should be dealt with clearly and unequivocally in enough detail to insure understanding by all concerned. In particular, the following points should be included:

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(1) The revised Agreement should reaffirm and clarify that the NRO is intended to be an operating agency, with actual management responsibility for all projects of the National Reconnaissance Program, rather than a mechanism of coordination between agencies separately responsible for parts of this Program.

The National Reconnaissance Planning Group (NRPG), consisting of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, is responsible for providing policy and program guidance and for making final determinations in connection therewith which do not require the exercise of higher authority. The Director of Central Intelligence has agreed that the Secretary of Defense shall act as Executor of the NRPG, responsible for implementing plans and policies developed by the NRPG.

The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense have agreed to delegate responsibility for their respective Agencies' participation in the projects of the National Reconnaissance Program. The Secretary of Defense has delegated the necessary Department of Defense authority to the Director of the NRO. The Director of Central Intelligence has agreed to and made necessary

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arrangements for the Director of the NRO to exercise necessary authority within the CIA. The Director of Central Intelligence, in accepting the (revised) CIA-DOD Agreement establishing the NRO, has agreed to require CIA compliance with the instructions of the Director of the NRO issued in the course of discharging his responsibilities outlined in the terms of the Agreement, and has designated in the Agreement a senior CIA official charged with the explicit responsibility to see that the terms and conditions of the Agreement are carried out within the CIA, including such instructions as may be issued by the Director of the NRO. The Director of the NRO will keep the Director of Central Intelligence informed of all such action, and the Director of Central Intelligence will insure that he is satisfied with the actions taken by the Director of the NRO insofar as the basic responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence are concerned, and will provide all appropriate guidance directly to the Director of the NRO.

The NRO is to accomplish its management task through maximum utilization of applicable existing resources

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and personnel of the CIA and the Department of Defense. Such resources and personnel will be placed under directives of their respective agencies which make them directly responsive to the Director of the NRO or his designated subordinate officials within the NRO. The Director of the NRO will manage all projects of the National Reconnaissance Program by means of streamlined management structure and procedures.

(2) The revised Agreement should state the essential responsibilities and authority of the Director of the NRO as follows: Within the limits of applicable public law, within the provisions of the CIA-DOD Agreement establishing the NRO, and subject to continued instructions and guidance received directly from the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the NRO is responsible for the actual management of all projects assigned to the NRO and has been delegated the authority necessary to carry out this task. His decisions and directives are binding on all applicable CIA and DOD elements unless and until he changes them. In the event that either the Director of Central Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense desire such

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changes, they will inform the Director of the NRO who will issue the necessary instructions to CIA and/or DOD elements. While the Director of the NRO may elect to use specific agreements as management tools in controversial or involved problems, he is not constrained by implication or otherwise to limit his management actions to matters upon which he has been able to reach and/or maintain agreement.

The Director will budget for the entire National Reconnaissance Program and will defend the program before all reviews necessary to secure its approval. Subject to the over-all limitations affecting his authority, described above, he is authorized to transfer funds from one project of the NRO program to another, as may be required to conduct the over-all program within available funds and in accordance with sound management principles, and to take any other action necessary to establish and maintain a strong and effective centralized management of the over-all program.

(3) In the revision of the Agreement, consideration could be given to the addition of a single Deputy Director of the NRO. Under the present organization, the three Program Directors also serve as Deputies, with the Director of the NRO Staff responsible to notify and assist the appropriate Program



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Director in the resolution of any problem in his area which occurs during the absence of the Director of the NRO. Thus, for instance, the Director of Program B (presently the Deputy Director (Research), CIA) is actually Deputy Director for all NRO matters which pertain to the CIA, with the Director, Program A (M/Gen. Greer) and the Director, Program C, (R/Adm. Lowrance) having similar responsibilities for all NRO work under their jurisdiction. This arrangement has worked quite successfully except in the case of Program B.

However, if a Deputy Director of the NRO is established, it is essential to spell out his duties in detail. It would certainly be appropriate that such a Deputy be from the CIA. However, his duties in regard to the NRO should be assigned so as to avoid inadvertent continuance of the CIA-DOD dichotomy. In particular, he should not have the tasks, explicit or implied, of "looking out after the interests of the CIA" or of representing the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of the NRO. The Director of Central Intelligence should hold the Director responsible for keeping him properly informed as well as for response to his guidance.



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It would seem appropriate for the normal NRO duties of the Deputy to be centered on the NRO-USIB interface and on the NRO-exploitation community interface. In addition, in the absence of the Director of the NRO, the Deputy could, of course, act for him on any matter.

In view of the responsibilities assigned to the Director and the obvious effect of a harmonious Director/Deputy Director relationship in the successful carrying out of these responsibilities, it is essential that personnel selection be made on such a basis that they will function as an effective working team rather than as representatives of the DOD and the CIA.

b. Recognition must be given to the fact that revision of the CIA-DOD Agreement is a necessary but insufficient condition to resolve the problems facing the NRO. In addition to a clear charter, effective management of such a joint office requires the continued support of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense in order that the Director of the NRO may establish and maintain essential internal office discipline. Since the Director is from the Department of Defense, the main burden for this support falls upon the Director of Central Intelligence.

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In particular, each of these officials should deal directly with the Director of the NRO for all NRO matters, rather than through intermediate NRO personnel of their respective agencies. This is fundamental to the maintenance of internal NRO organizational discipline.

The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense also should take appropriate action from time to time to support the thesis that the projects of the National Reconnaissance Program are neither CIA nor DOD projects, they are NRO projects, part of a single national program, elements of which are supported by the resources of the CIA and the several Services of the DOD.

c. During the course of revision of the present Agreement, it may be well to give careful consideration to an additional question raised by the CIA during the past year. This question concerns the intent of the Congress in the establishment of CIA privilege, and has been raised during discussions as to the desirability of the CIA holding all covert contracts of the NRO, as intended by the present CIA-DOD Agreement.

The CIA presently holds covert contracts for several projects of the National Reconnaissance Program. The Department

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of Defense elements of the NRO also hold several covert contracts, the most significant of which are those for the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] satellite projects. At the NRO organizational conference, held in late May 1962, agreement was reached to transfer these covert contracts from the DOD elements of the NRO to the CIA. When the agreement was not carried out during the following summer, it was reaffirmed by discussion between the Director of the NRO and the Director of Central Intelligence on 1 October 1962. However, subsequent instructions from the Director of the NRO to the CIA still were not carried out. The Deputy Director (Research), CIA has repeatedly stated, before and after the discussion between the Director of the NRO and the Director of Central Intelligence, that such a course of action was undesirable since it might constitute doubtful use of the basic CIA privilege by involving that privilege in actions which, if not actually illegal, at least might exceed the actual intent of Congress in regard to the proper use of such privilege. This same objection had been stated repeatedly by the Deputy Director (Research) and other CIA personnel during the summer of 1962.

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[REDACTED]

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It is most desirable, of course, that the basic intent of the Congress in establishing the privileges of the CIA be respected in all NRO management arrangements. However, in view of the fact that the CIA has over-all security responsibility for all projects of the National Reconnaissance Program, regardless of the Agency or Service having responsibility for contract administration or technical management, and in view of the fact that the establishment of the National Reconnaissance Office has been reviewed and approved at the highest national level, it is not apparent that there is anything fundamentally wrong with using the CIA to do contracting for NRO projects for which technical management responsibility is assigned to NRO elements of the Department of Defense.

In fact, in the light of prevailing circumstances, such service to the NRO would seem to be the only justification for the CIA to continue to hold the present CIA contracts for satellite reconnaissance projects, insofar as the basic Congressional intent for the use of CIA privilege is concerned. This situation is outlined briefly below.

The CIA contracts for the CORONA satellite reconnaissance project originally were placed for an unquestionably




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covert project, with unimpeachable cover for all publicly observable actions. At that time, the SAMOS and MIDAS projects were acknowledged, funded projects requiring future launches of large numbers of ATLAS boosted AGENA vehicles, and the AGENA was a new, undeveloped vehicle required for these large projects, consequently its development and the perfection of associated techniques aboard the cheaper THOR booster was an entirely credible story for the DISCOVERER project, and perfect cover for CORONA. The ancillary recovery of various lightweight research experiments provided additional diversionary material. However,






covert project, CORONA is today, at best, not a covert but simply a highly classified project, identical in this regard to other satellite reconnaissance projects under contract for several years to DOD elements of the NRO. The same is true of the LANYARD project.

Under these circumstances, it would seem that continued use of CIA contracting for these projects would be highly questionable insofar as the basic Congressional intent for the use of CIA privilege is concerned, were it not for the fact that the CIA performs this action as a service to the NRO.


The revised Agreement should include clear resolution of this fundamental point in order that the several different



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contracting methods now in use within the NRO may be consolidated within a more uniform and secure procedure under the CIA, while still permitting the assignment of technical management responsibility to the most experienced and best qualified elements of the NRO.

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Atch 1 - (3) National Reconnaissance Office

* Being established

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

August 7, 1961

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DEGRADING:
DOD DIR. 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Management of National Reconnaissance Program (TS)

I have proceeded in accordance with your instructions to me in your note of July 28, 1961 relative to the referenced subject. I have had further discussions on this matter with Dr. Killian, Dr. Land, General Taylor, Mr. Vance and Mr. Bissell. The consensus is that we should proceed at the present time to implement what was described as Proposal A in my earlier submission to you.

Accordingly, I have prepared the attached Memorandum of Understanding which would be signed by Mr. Dulles and yourself covering the management aspects of this program. It is understood that Mr. Bissell and I, on the basis of this agreement, are developing a detailed plan of operation.

I also attach for your signature a memorandum providing the delegation of authority insofar as the Department of Defense is concerned.


Joseph W. ...

Atts. 2

1. Memo of Understanding
2. Delegation of Authority

This document consists of 2 pages

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

~~(TS)~~ Management of National Reconnaissance Program

This agreement relates to a National Reconnaissance Program and to the establishment of arrangements between the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency for its management and operation.

1. The National Reconnaissance Program will consist of all satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert. It will include all photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects for electronic signal intelligence and communications intelligence.

2. There is established a National Reconnaissance Office on a covert basis. The Director of this office will be the Deputy Director of Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Deputy Director will be the Under Secretary of the Air Force who will be delegated full authority by the Secretary of Defense in this area. The office will include a small special staff whose personnel will be drawn from the Department of Defense and from the Central Intelligence Agency. This office will have direct control over all elements of the total program. Implementation of decisions will be exercised in the Agency by the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office and in the Department of Defense by the Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office under the special authority delegated to him by the Secretary of Defense. Within the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force will be the operational agency for management and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program, and will conduct this program through use of streamlined special management procedures involving direct control from the office of the Secretary of the Air Force to Reconnaissance System Project Directors in the field, without intervening reviews or approval actions.

3. A Technical Advisory Group for the National Reconnaissance Office will be established.

4. A uniform security control system will be established for the total program by the National Reconnaissance Office. Products from the various programs will be available to all users as designated by the United States Intelligence Board.

Page 1 of 3 pages.
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5. The National Reconnaissance Office will be directly responsive to, and only to, the photographic and electronic signal collection requirements and priorities as established by the United States Intelligence Board.

6. The National Reconnaissance Office will develop suitable cover plans and public information plans, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, to reduce potential political vulnerability of these programs. In regard to satellite systems, it will be necessary to apply the revised public information policy to other non-sensitive satellite projects in order to insure maximum protection.

7. The Director and Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office will establish detailed working procedures to insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense are fully and most effectively utilized in the management and conduct of this program.

8. Management control of the field operations of various elements of the program will be exercised directly, in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency, from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the appropriate field representatives and, in the case of the Department of Defense, from the Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the designated project officers for each program. All program elements and the operations of the National Reconnaissance Office will be reviewed on a regular basis, and as special circumstances require, by the 5412 Policy Control Board.

Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Robert S. McNamara

Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense

1 Att
Chart: Single mgmt for
National Recon Prog (TS)

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

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SPECIAL HANDLING
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR
 NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM(S)

NOTE: The National Reconnaissance Program is restricted only to photographic and signal collection requirements of the USIB (COMAR)

(FIG B) ACTUAL SITUATION

(FIG A) - APPARENT SITUATION



* Director is assigned to Secy AF, maintains field extension office at AFSSD, also serves as Vice Commander, AFSSD.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY


September 5, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The attached is a redraft of a basis of understanding between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense relative to the National Reconnaissance Program. Secretary McNamara signed the original draft but Mr. Dulles felt that certain changes were desirable and also felt that he would prefer to have it in the form of a letter rather than a formal memorandum.

The only substantive change has to do with the designation of Dick Bissell and myself, acting jointly, as responsible for the program rather than the Director-Deputy Director relationship in the original memorandum which Mr. McNamara signed. The other changes were all minor.

Secretary McNamara has requested that you sign the new document, if agreeable. I enclose the original Memorandum of Understanding for reference should you desire to peruse it in detail.



Encls.

1. Orig. Memo of Understanding
2. Proposed ltr to Mr. Dulles
for signature, w/att org. chart

This document consists of 1 pages

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DDC 577

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C.

6 SEP 1961

Re: Management of the National Reconnaissance Program

Dear Mr. Dulles:

This letter confirms our agreement with respect to the setting up of a National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), and the arrangements for dealing both with the management and operation of this program and the handling of the intelligence product of the program on a covert basis.

1. The NRP will consist of all satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert. It will include all photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects for electronic signal intelligence and communications intelligence resulting therefrom.

2. There will be established on a covert basis a National Reconnaissance Office to manage this program. This office will be under the direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Deputy Director (Plans) of the Central Intelligence Agency acting jointly. It will include a small special staff whose personnel will be drawn from the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. This office will have direct control over all elements of the total program.

3. Decisions of the National Reconnaissance Office will be implemented and its management of the National Reconnaissance Program made effective: within the Department of Defense, by the exercise of the authority delegated to the Under Secretary of the Air Force; within the Central Intelligence Agency, by the Deputy Director (Plans) in the performance of his presently assigned duties. The Under Secretary of the Air Force will be designated Special Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense and delegated full authority by me in this area.

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4. Within the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force will be the operational agency for management and conduct of the NRP, and will conduct this program through use of streamlined special management procedures involving direct control from the office of the Secretary of the Air Force to Reconnaissance System Project Directors in the field, without intervening reviews or approvals. The management and conduct of individual projects or elements thereof requiring special covert arrangements may be assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency as the operational agency.

5. A Technical Advisory Group for the National Reconnaissance Office will be established.

6. A uniform security control system will be established for the total program by the National Reconnaissance Office. Products from the various programs will be available to all users as designated by the United States Intelligence Board.

7. The National Reconnaissance Office will be directly responsive to, and only to, the photographic and electronic signal collection requirements and priorities as established by the United States Intelligence Board.

8. The National Reconnaissance Office will develop suitable cover plans and public information plans, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, to reduce potential political vulnerability of these programs. In regard to satellite systems, it will be necessary to apply the revised public information policy to other non-sensitive satellite projects in order to insure maximum protection.

9. The Directors of the National Reconnaissance Office will establish detailed working procedures to insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in this program.

10. Management control of the field operations of various elements of the program will be exercised directly, in the case of the Department of Defense, from the Under Secretary of the Air Force to

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the designated project officers for each program and, in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency, from the Deputy Director (Plans) to appropriate elements of the Central Intelligence Agency. Major program elements and operations of the National Reconnaissance Office will be reviewed on a regular basis and as special circumstances require by the Special Group under NSC 5412.

If the foregoing is in accord with your understanding of our agreement, I would appreciate it if you would kindly sign and return the enclosed copy of this letter.

Signed

Roswell L. Gilpatric
Deputy Secretary of Defense

1 Atch:
Chart "Single Mgmt for
National Reconnaissance
Programs" (TS)

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

6 SEP 1951

C. P. Cahell, General, USAF
Acting Director
Central Intelligence Agency

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SPECIAL HANDLING SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM(S)

(FIG B) - ACTUAL SITUATION ↔ (FIG. A) - APPARENT SITUATION



* Director is assigned to Secy AF, maintains field extension office at AFSSD, also serves as Vice Commander, AFSSD.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON

6 SEP 1961

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE GENERAL COUNSEL**

SUBJECT: (TS) Assistant for Reconnaissance

Reference the attached Agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency entitled "Management of the National Reconnaissance Program."

The Under Secretary of the Air Force is hereby designated my Assistant for Reconnaissance, and is delegated full authority for management of this program. In this regard, he will act as my direct representative both within and outside the Department of Defense. He will be given any support that he requires from normal staff elements, although these staff elements will not participate in program matters except as he specifically requests. He will, however, keep pertinent key officials informed on a regular basis on the status of these programs.

Because of the extreme sensitivity of the projects involved in the National Reconnaissance Program, particular care must be taken to protect the security of the arrangements described herein. The existence of the referenced Agreement, its contents, and the organizational implementation employed for its execution are all classified TOP SECRET. This information will not be disclosed to anyone to whom such disclosure is not mandatory in order to carry out actions required by the terms of the referenced Agreement or by my Assistant for Reconnaissance in carrying out his responsibilities in the National Reconnaissance Program.

All Department of Defense satellite or overflight photographic reconnaissance, mapping, geodesy, and electronic signal collection programs will be handled in accordance with the referenced Agreement,

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~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~

and existing project assignments will be brought into conformity and present directives will be revised at the earliest date that such action can be taken with plausible overt appearance.

A new public relations policy for satellite launches will be announced as a separate action to minimize political vulnerability of these programs.

1 Att.
Agreement

Signed
Robert S. McNamara

Page 2 of 2 pages
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~~TOP SECRET~~
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

December 12, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN McCONE

SUBJECT: National Reconnaissance Office

Attached are the two memoranda, prepared by Dr. Charyk, that I mentioned to you over the phone this morning. These memoranda set forth a plan of action for the functioning of NRO which Dr. Charyk recommends and which Mr. McNamara and I would like to have you consider.

One of the principal elements in the plan would be the assignment to the Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense of the technical management of all national reconnaissance projects (overt and covert). In view of what you told me this morning, the timing of such a change may not be as urgent as might otherwise have been the case. In any event, we believe that our two agencies should review the present functioning of NRO before the subject is brought up again either before the Special Group, on whose agenda it is being held by General Taylor pending further word from us, or the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which postponed consideration of the subject until its next meeting.

Will you let me know when you are ready to talk about these enclosures.

2 Enclosures

cc: Dr Charyk

SPECIAL HANDLING

*in the dep sec def office
25 May 62
S.*

SPECIAL HANDLING

5 December 1961

Functions and Responsibilities
of the
National Reconnaissance Office (TS)

References:

- (a) Secretary of Defense TOP SECRET memorandum, subject:
(TS) Assistant for Reconnaissance, dated September 6, 1961,
with attached Department of Defense-Central Intelligence
Agency Agreement.
- (b) Deputy Secretary of Defense TOP SECRET memorandum,
subject: Space Vehicle Electronics Intelligence Program,
dated October 20, 1961, with attachment.

Definitions:

- NRO - National Reconnaissance Office, as established by
reference (a).
- NRP - National Reconnaissance Program, as defined by reference
(a) to consist of all overt and covert overflight projects
for intelligence, geodesy, and mapping photography and
electronic signal collection.
- DOD/AR - Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense,
established and delegated to the Under Secretary of the
Air Force by reference (a); Director of the Department of
Defense part of the NRO.

- SECRET
- DDP/A - Deputy Director (Plans) of the Central Intelligence Agency;
Director of the Agency part of the NRO.
- STC - Satellite Test Center - Air Force operations center at
Sunnyvale, California for the on-orbit control of satellites.
- AOC - Aircraft Operations Center - Air Force operations office within
the Pentagon for control of special aircraft operations.
- MOG - Mission Operations Group - A part of the NRO in the
Pentagon which plans specific missions, determines targets
to be covered by specific missions, and exercises NRO operational
control during missions, through the STC or AOC.

Policy:

The following plan outlines basic policy for the establishment of functions and responsibilities within the National Reconnaissance Office to insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in the establishment, management and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program.

1. Management.

a. The technical management responsibility for all NRP projects (overt and covert) is assigned to the DOD/AR.

(1) To provide for full use of available capabilities and resources, and to provide for interface with data exploitation equipment development by agencies outside the NRO, Navy and Army representatives will be assigned, on a full-time basis, to appropriate positions within the NRO under the DOD/AR. They will be technically qualified in electronic

signal collection work and in mapping and geodesy, respectively, and have NRO project responsibilities in these areas.

(2) A firm liaison channel between the NRO and NSA will be established as an adjunct to the technical management structure of signal collection projects, and the conduct of such projects carried out in accordance with the NSA responsibilities described in reference (b). Planning will encompass maximum utilization of the Navy technical resources to support the electronic signal collection programs.

b. Financial management



(2) With respect to contracts, all NRP project contracts will be the responsibility of DOD/AR, as a necessary corollary to the assignment of technical management responsibility to DOD/AR. However, covert ("black") contracts which provide cover for or enhance the security of specific projects may be the responsibility of the DDP/A when the DOD/AR and the DDP/A agree that such action offers a preferable route. This includes establishment of dummy corporations, etc., to provide cover for covert operations, and any other contractual action which is necessary for the NRP and which can be provided in a preferred manner by the Agency.

2. Security. The DDP/A will be responsible for the overall security policy for the National Reconnaissance Program. Under this overall policy, security of the NRP will be administered for DOD by DOD/AR, through control officers in the JCS, Army, Air Force, and Navy staffs, the DIA and the NSA.

For the collection programs, final need-to-know validation authority will be the responsibility of DOD/AR.

3. Operations:

a. Scheduling. The mission schedule for all NRP efforts will be the sole responsibility of DOD/AR, including the obtaining of appropriate clearances where required.

b. Mission Operations:

(1) A member of the DOD/AR office will be designated as Chairman of a Mission Operations Group (MOG) which will have Tri-Service, NSA and CIA representation on a full-time basis. The MOG will have available the complete schedules and technical capabilities of all of the sensor systems of all NRP projects, and accounts of the complete coverage obtained by all sensor systems of these projects, on a continuous basis. This group will establish the pre-launch targeting selection for all reconnaissance projects of the NRP, and will transmit this information to a secure operations control room at the STC for satellite missions, and to the AOC for aircraft missions. The operations control room at the STC will control all satellite missions, responding to operational decisions from the MOG in Washington, and engineering decisions from the project director at the STC.

(2) The officer in charge of the operations control room at the STC or AOC will be sole responsible agent to DOD/AR to assure necessary actions with the mission vehicle as well as with the ground environment to maximize the probability of carrying out the mission in conformance with instructions of the MOG. Any required functions relating to vehicle and

payload operation during a mission, such as piggy-backs, orbit or route changes, filters, etc., will be the sole responsibility of the officer in charge of the STC or AOC control room.

(3) To provide a basis for the continuous operation of the MOG, there will be in the Pentagon a comprehensive display so that the MOG can monitor each mission and make decisions based on all factors involved, such as weather, target coverage, change in mission situation, political situation, or new intelligence data. The initial decision as to which targets to cover with each specific mission will be made by the MOG and will be based on information from this display. The MOG will make all targeting decisions during satellite missions, and give appropriate instructions to the project director at the STC in this regard. Decisions based on engineering factors will be provided by the project director at the STC or AOC and will override conflicting instructions from the MOG. Responsibility for all functions of the MOG will rest with the DOD/AR, who will provide the chairman of the MOG.

c. Formatting. The DOD/AR will be responsible for the formatting of the collected NRP product as follows:

(1) Photographic formatting will include the initial chemical processing, titling, production and delivery to the users as specified by the USIB.

(2) Electronic signal data formatting will include the demodulation, conversion, technical correction and reconstruction of the collected signal data to yield a usable collection product. DOD/AR will deliver the formatted collection product, together with associated data

necessary for exploitation, to the NSA or other user as specified by the USIB.

d. Engineering Analysis. The DOD/AR will be responsible for engineering analysis of all collection systems to correct the problems that exist on the operating system as well as to provide information for new systems.

4. The primary responsibility for advanced plans (post CY 1962) for all NRP projects is assigned to the DOD/AR.

5. The USIB will establish or validate all requirements for the NRP and establish broad project and overall target priorities. However, they will not determine schedules, or determine targets for particular missions. COMOR will not be involved with the NRO or NRP, except as required to advise USIB in the determination of NRP requirements and broad priorities. Selection of targets for specific missions and target decisions during conduct of missions will be made by the NRO by means of the MOG previously described, using USIB requirements, priorities and target lists.

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Discussion of National Reconnaissance Office
Basic Policy

Reference: TBSH paper entitled Functions and Responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance Office (TS), dated December 5, 1961

Objectives:

The basic objective leading to the establishment of the NRO has been to formally organize certain elements of the DOD and the CIA in a manner which will insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within these two organizations will be fully and most effectively utilized in the establishment, management and conduct of the NRP. The objective of the paper referenced above is to establish basic policy concerning the functions and responsibilities within the NRO, to assure that the functioning of the Office is based upon the assignment of clear and specific responsibilities; it provides for joint participation but avoids assignment of split project responsibilities.

Plan:

The plan of action contemplated is to establish the basic policy which is descriptive of the eventual functioning of the NRO, without regard to previously established specific projects which, at present, may not conform to this policy. Following this, it is proposed that the individual projects not presently in conformance with this policy be examined separately and decisions made in each case concerning the transition from the present organization and responsibilities to those set forth in the referenced policy paper, or to exceptions which may be permitted for various reasons. Accordingly, the basic policy is discussed

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in the following paragraph, followed by a discussion of the transition period and exceptions which affect specific projects.

Basic Policy:

The basic policy described by the referenced paper represents an eventual assignment of functions and responsibilities based upon the inherent capabilities of the CIA and DOD. It is also based on consideration of present capability of the DOD in regard to streamlined management of highly sensitive activities, including the necessary contractual ability to conduct such sensitive projects under special security. It includes consideration of experience gained by DOD personnel while assisting the Agency in the conduct of projects initiated prior to establishment of these DOD capabilities.

The basic policy envisions that the technical management responsibility should be assigned specifically to the DOD/AR. The Agency should not be involved in the research and development of projects within the NRP or in the technical management of these projects. Since technical management includes control of funds and contracts, the responsibility for these is also assigned to the DOD/AR. Provision is made within the basic policy for some contractual action by the Agency which provides cover for or enhances the security of specific projects, when the joint directors of the NRO agree that such action offers a preferable route. In this manner, the basic policy provides for the inclusion in the NRP of any action that is possible under the authorities of the two agencies concerned, while establishing specific assignment of project responsibility for the NRP, consistent with the inherent capabilities and experience of the CIA and the DOD.

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The DDP/A will be responsible for the establishment of overall security for the entire NRP. This will insure that full advantage is taken of Agency experience in covert and sensitive work.

The Agency and various elements of the DOD will all be involved in the operations of the NRP; however, since these operations will involve for the most part DOD personnel, resources, and DOD experience in the planning and carrying out of operational missions, the specific NRO responsibility for operations will be assigned to the DOD/AR. The basic policy provides for the establishment of a Missions Operations Group with membership from the interested agencies under the chairmanship of a member of the DOD part of the NRO. This arrangement insures joint participation while retaining clear and specific assignment of responsibility.

Exceptions, and Transition of Specific Projects:

The following comments pertain to the transition period for certain projects to bring them into conformity with the basic policy, and to some exceptions which should be made in the case of others:

1. Appropriate directives will be prepared to transfer the total technical responsibility for the ARGON, MURAL and CANES (Navy) programs to the DOD/AR. To provide for continuity, and to provide for interface with data exploitation equipment development by agencies outside the NRO, Navy and Army representatives will be assigned, on a full-time basis, to appropriate positions within the NRO under the DOD/AR. They will be technically qualified in electronic signal collection work and in mapping and geodesy, respectively, and have NRO project responsibilities in these areas.

2. Following transfer of technical management responsibilities for the CANES program, as mentioned above, this program will be managed by the NRO using the same Navy technical resources presently engaged in this program. Contract administration for the CANES program will be delegated to and remain with the Navy through CY 1962 and formatting responsibility will remain with NSA and the Navy through the end of CY 62, by which time this program, as a separate entity, will be completed.

3. In regard to security, the need-to-know responsibility for CORONA, ARGON, MURAL AND CANES will remain as currently constituted until detailed phasing program from the existing security system can be worked out on a project-by-project basis by the security personnel of the NRO.

4. The existing ARGON data exploitation fund requirement will be eliminated as an item of the NRP: The ARGON exploitation equipment and mission will be transferred from the present contractor to Army Map Service, under the operational control of DIA.

5. Since the CORONA program is nearly completed, (two flights remaining) it is excepted from the basic policy and no change will be made in the present arrangements in effect for this program.

6. All other existing projects of the NRP will be transitioned into conformance with the basic policy, at the earliest practicable date, on an individual project-by-project basis, with the pace and details of the transition determined by the Directors of the NRO.

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

(TS) Management of National Reconnaissance Program

I. PURPOSE.

This agreement relates to the establishment of a National Reconnaissance Program and to the establishment of arrangements within and between the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency for its management and operation in a manner which will insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within these two organizations will be fully and most effectively utilized in this effort.

II. DEFINITIONS.

A. NRP - National Reconnaissance Program, consisting of all overt and covert overflight projects for intelligence, geodesy, and mapping photography and electronic signal collection.

B. NRO - National Reconnaissance Office, as established herein for the purpose of managing the NRP.

C. DOD/AR - Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense, established by the attached DOD Directive No. _____; Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.

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D. DDP/A - Deputy Director (Plans) of the Central Intelligence Agency; Deputy Director of the NRO.

E. DSR - Director of Satellite Reconnaissance (TS); the general officer responsible directly to the Director of the NRO for all field management and operation of satellite reconnaissance projects. The DSR is overtly known as the Director of Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, for security reasons.

F. DAR - Director of Aircraft Reconnaissance, a covert position held by the general officer responsible directly to the NRO for all field management (excluding operation) of aircraft and drone overflight reconnaissance projects. The Director of Aircraft Reconnaissance will have a suitable overt title as required by the security of his projects.

G. MPG - Mission Planning Group, a part of the NRO which plans all specific overflight reconnaissance missions and determines targets to be covered by each specific mission.

H. STC - Satellite Test Center, Air Force Operations Center at Sunnyvale, California, for the on-orbit control of satellites.

J. AOC - Aircraft Operations Central, a part of the NRO which exercises NRO operational control of all aircraft overflight reconnaissance missions.

III. BASIC POLICY.

A. National Reconnaissance Program. The National Reconnaissance Program will consist of all satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert. It will include all photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping purposes, and all electronic signal collection projects for electronic signal intelligence and communications intelligence.

B. National Reconnaissance Office. There will be established on a covert basis a National Reconnaissance Office to manage this Program. The Director of the NRO will be the Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense, and overt (SECRET) position established by the attached DOD Directive No. _____. The Deputy Director of the NRO will be the Deputy Director (Plans) of the Central Intelligence Agency. The office will include a small special staff whose personnel will be drawn from the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. This office will have direct control of all elements of the total program.

C. Responsibility. In order to assure that the functioning of the NRO and the conduct of the NRP is based upon the assignment of clear and specific responsibilities, the total responsibility for the National

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Reconnaissance Program is hereby delegated by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. He will in turn delegate specific responsibilities to the Central Intelligence Agency and elsewhere as required to carry out the terms of this agreement. Initial delegation of responsibilities of projects presently underway is specified under part IV of this agreement.

D. Authority. Decisions of the National Reconnaissance Office will be implemented and its management of the National Reconnaissance Program made effective within the Department of Defense by the exercise of the authority delegated to the Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense, and within the Central Intelligence Agency by the authority delegated to the Deputy Director (Plans).

E. Operational Agency. Within the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force will be the operational agency for management and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program, and will conduct this program through use of streamlined special management procedures involving direct control from the office of the Secretary of the Air Force to Reconnaissance Project Directors in the field, without intervening reviews or approvals. The management and conduct of individual projects or elements thereof requiring special covert arrangements may be

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assigned by the NRO to the Central Intelligence Agency as the operational agency.

F. Technical Advisory Group. A Technical Advisory Group for the National Reconnaissance Office will be established under appropriate security.

G. Security. A uniform security control system will be established by the total program by the National Reconnaissance Office. Products from the various programs will be available to all users as designated by the United States Intelligence Board.

H. Requirements. The National Reconnaissance Office will be directly responsive to, and only to, the photographic and electronic signal collection requirements and priorities as established by the United States Intelligence Board.

I. Public Information. The National Reconnaissance Office will develop suitable cover plans and public information plans in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, to reduce potential political vulnerability of these programs and to enhance security of program operations.


J. Program Review. Major program elements and operations of the National Reconnaissance Office will be reviewed on a regular basis and as special circumstances require by the Special Group under NSC 5412.

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
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K. Management.

L. Technical Management. The major portion of technical management of NRP projects will be carried out by the Director of Satellite Reconnaissance and the Director of Aircraft Reconnaissance, reporting directly to the National Reconnaissance Office. Technical management of specific parts of projects, such as certain payloads for instance, will be delegated to the Central Intelligence Agency and carried out under technical personnel assigned to the CIA part of the NRO. To provide for full use of available capabilities and resources, and to provide for interface with data exploitation equipment developed by agencies outside the NRO, Navy and Army representatives will be assigned, on a full-time basis, to appropriate positions within the NRO. They will be technically qualified in electronic signal collection work and in mapping and geodesy, respectively, and have NRO project responsibilities in these areas. A firm liaison channel between the NRO and NSA will be established as an adjunct to the technical management structure of signal collection projects.



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L. Operations.

1. Mission Planning. A Mission Planning Group (MPG) will be established within the NRO to plan all specific missions of this program and to determine targets to be covered by each mission. The MPG will have Tri-Service, NSA AND CIA representation on a full-time basis, and will be chaired by a member of the CIA directly responsible to the DDP/A. The MPG will have available the complete schedules and technical capabilities of all of the sensor systems of all NRP projects, and accounts of the complete coverage obtained by all sensor systems of these projects, on a continuous basis. This Group will establish the pre-launch targeting selection for all reconnaissance projects of the NRP, and will transmit this information to the Satellite Operations Central (SOC) for satellite missions, and to the Aircraft Operations Central (AOC) for aircraft missions.

2. Satellite Operations. A Satellite Operations Central (SOC) will be established as a part of the NRO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The SOC will be headed by the Air Force member of the NRO who will have operational control over all satellite reconnaissance missions throughout the conduct of such missions. The Head of the SOC will be directly responsible to the Director of Satellite Reconnaissance. The SOC will include appropriate CIA personnel.

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3. Aircraft Operations. An Aircraft Operations Control (AOC) will be established at an appropriate location under necessary security arrangements. The AOC will be headed by a CIA member of the NRO who will have operational control over all aircraft and drone overflight reconnaissance missions throughout the conduct of such missions. The Head of the AOC will be directly responsible to the DDP/A. The AOC will include appropriate Air Force personnel.

IV. PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES. The Director of the NRO is responsible for all aspects of all projects of the NRP. In carrying out this responsibility, he will delegate specific aspects to the CIA and elsewhere, as appropriate. In this regard, the following initial delegation applies to the major projects presently under way.


A. CORONA/MURAL/ARGON: The Air Force has primary responsibility for: (1) launch scheduling and launching; (2) orbit and recovery operations; (3) development and procurement of boosters, orbiting vehicles, and elint payloads. CIA has primary responsibility for (1) development and procurement of photographic payloads and nose cones, and (2) project security. In addition, the CIA will provide the chairman of the MPG which will plan all missions of these projects, and will have membership in the SOC which will be headed by an Air Force member of the NRO and which will have operational control of these missions

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during flight.

B. SAMOS. The Air Force has primary responsibility for SAMOS, with the CIA in a supporting role in regard to project security. In addition, the CIA and the Air Force have the same mission planning and operations roles described in A above.



D. EXCART. The Air Force will assume responsibility for the technical management of the EXCART project, with the CIA remaining responsible for the reconnaissance payloads, project security, and conduct of operations. Missions will be planned by the CIA-chaired MPG and conducted by the CIA-headed AOC, responsible directly to the DDP/A. The Air Force will establish an office of the Director of Aircraft Reconnaissance (DAR) to concurrently manage the development of EXCART and all variations of this development. The DAR will be established with care to provide maximum security for this effort and will be manned with highly qualified personnel whose experience, aptitude and ability make them especially well suited for this task. Normal Air Force and DOD development and management practices will not apply to this project, and the DAR will carry out his entire responsibilities

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under special management procedures appropriate to the nature of this project and the security required for its accomplishment, subject only to approval by the Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense.

E. CANES. Technical management responsibility for this project is delegated to the Navy, subject to overall review and approval by the Director of the NRO. Mission planning will be accomplished by the MPG as for all other satellite projects of the NRP.

V. IMPLEMENTATION. This agreement is effective immediately within the Department of Defense and the CIA, and supersedes all previous directives in each agency on the subjects discussed herein. All such superseded directives will be revised to conform with these provisions at the earliest date.

John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense

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Date _____

Number _____

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE

SUBJECT: (S) Assistant for Reconnaissance

In order to consolidate the management of closely related projects to provide for more effective management of this important area, the responsibility for development of all aircraft, drone, and satellite reconnaissance, mapping and geodasy systems, both photographic and electronic signal collection, is assigned to the Department of the Air Force. These projects will be managed within the special structure already established within the office of the Secretary of the Air Force.

The Under Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Joseph V. Charyk, is hereby designated my (S) Assistant for Reconnaissance, and is delegated full authority for management of these projects. In this regard, he will act as my direct representative both within and outside the Department of Defense and, in regard to these projects, will be responsible only to me. He will be given any support that he requires from normal staff elements, although these staff elements will not participate in these project matters except as he specifically requests,

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and none of these projects will be subject to any Department of Defense staff review. He will, however, keep the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering personally informed on a regular basis on the status of these projects, and will similarly inform other Department of Defense personnel as I may personally direct or as he may determine necessary in the course of carrying out specific project matters.

Because of the sensitivity of the projects involved, the existence of the office of (S) Assistant for Reconnaissance is classified SECRET.

This directive is effective immediately and supersedes all previous directives on the subject projects. These directives will be revised to conform with the above direction at the earliest.

Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense

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March 30, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VANCE
General Counsel, DOD

I attach a copy of the proposed CIA version of the Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency relative to management of the National Reconnaissance Program. As we discussed, this appears to be different in a fundamental fashion from the draft which Secretary Gilpatric forwarded to Mr. McCone on January 17th. We should discuss the matter with Secretary Gilpatric when he returns next week to determine what steps should be taken next.

~~signed~~

Joseph V. Charyk

Att. Cy of Proposed Agreement

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27 March 1962

AGREEMENT

Management of the National Reconnaissance Program

This paper outlines the agreement between the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency for establishing a National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), and for dealing both with the management and operation of this program and the handling of the intelligence product of the program on a covert basis.

1. The NRP will consist of all denied area overflight and satellite reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert. It will include all such efforts as photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects for electronic signal intelligence and communications intelligence resulting therefrom.

2. There will be established on a covert basis a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to manage this program. This office shall be under the direction of a Director and Deputy Director, one being appointed by the Department of Defense and the other by the Central Intelligence Agency. The Department of Defense representative shall be the Under Secretary of the Air Force, and the Deputy Director (Research) (DD/R) shall act for the Central Intelligence Agency. The NRO will include a small special staff whose personnel will be drawn from the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency and assigned on a full-time basis to appropriate positions within the office.

3. The NRO will have responsibility for the planning, development, and monitoring of all elements and phases of the National Reconnaissance Program. Within this program prime responsibility and authority for the over-all aspects of each individual project will be specifically assigned to either the Department of Defense or the Central Intelligence Agency by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence acting jointly upon recommendation of the Director and Deputy Director, NRO. Responsibility for various subtasks will likewise be assigned to a specific agency on an individual project basis. All advance planning and new projects will be coordinated with both the Director and Deputy Director of the NRO.

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4. Decisions of the National Reconnaissance Office will be implemented and its management of the National Reconnaissance Program made effective: within the Department of Defense, by the exercise of the authority delegated to the Under Secretary of the Air Force; within the Central Intelligence Agency, by the Deputy Director (Research) in the performance of his presently assigned duties. The Under Secretary of the Air Force will be designated Special Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense and delegated full authority in this area.

5. Within the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force will be the operational agency for management and conduct of those projects assigned by the NRO to the DOD, and will conduct these projects through the use of streamlined special management procedures involving direct control from the office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force to Reconnaissance System Project Directors in the field, without intervening reviews or approvals.

6. Within the Central Intelligence Agency the Deputy Director (Research) will be the operational element responsible for management and conduct of those projects assigned by the NRO to the CIA. The DD/R will conduct this program through the use of special Agency procedures and will utilize whatever elements of the Agency are required for its successful prosecution.

7. A Technical Advisory Group for the NRO will be established.

8. A uniform security control system will be established for the total program by the NRO. The Central Intelligence Agency shall define security policy, procedures, and responsibilities for the National Reconnaissance Office. Products from the various programs will be available to all users designated by the United States Intelligence Board.

9. The NRO will be directly responsive to, and only to, the photographic and electronic signal (Sigint) collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board and will develop the over-all reconnaissance program to satisfy these requirements. The National Security Agency will review USIB electronic signal (COMINT and ELINT) requirements and will recommend to the NRO those which, in NSA's opinion, can best be fulfilled by means of overhead reconnaissance.

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10. The National Security Agency will be solely responsible for the research, development, planning, and operations for processing of electronic signal data (COMINT and ELINT) collected from space vehicle sources, taking into consideration the effective utilization of all processing resources available to the U. S. Government. The processing will include technical feedback to the NRO as well as extraction of intelligence data, but technical feedback from other sources may be provided.

11. The NRO will develop suitable cover plans and public information plans, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, to reduce potential political vulnerability of these programs. In regard to satellite systems, it will be necessary to apply the revised public information policy to other non-sensitive satellite projects in order to insure maximum protection.

12. The Director and Deputy Director of the NRO will establish detailed working procedures to insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in this program.

13. Management control of the field operations of various elements of the program will be exercised directly, in the case of the Department of Defense, from the Under Secretary of the Air Force to the designated project officers for each program and, in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency, from the Deputy Director (Research) to the designated project officers for each program. Major program elements and operations of the NRO will be reviewed on a regular basis and as special circumstances require by the Special Group under NSC 5412.

14. This agreement hereby rescinds 6 September 1961 agreement entitled "Management of the National Reconnaissance Program", signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Acting Director of Central Intelligence.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director of Central Intelligence

ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK
Deputy Secretary of Defense

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2 May 1962

Agreement Between
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence

ON

Responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance Office (TS)

Definitions:

NRO - National Reconnaissance Office

NRP - National Reconnaissance Program, to consist of all overt and covert satellite and overflight projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping photography and electronic signal collection.

DNRO - Director, National Reconnaissance Office

Policy:

The following plan outlines basic policy for the establishment of functions and responsibilities within the National Reconnaissance Office to insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized in the establishment, management and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program. The DNRO will be designated by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, and will be responsible directly to them for the management and conduct of the NRP.

1. Requirements and Priorities:

The NRO will be directly responsive to, and only to, the photographic and electronic signal (SIGINT) collection requirements and

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