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c. Fundamental post launch notification and subsequent activities may be issued providing no reference is made to time of launch, launch vehicle or associated military capability, and reference is made only to the experimental payload.

d. Flight data necessary to give significance to scientific results may be released as unclassified after a minimum amount of time (about 120 days) has elapsed following the flight, providing flight data do not reveal identification, mission, cargo, payload, or operating capability of the military space vehicle that carried the experiment.

e. Orbital data identifiable with a specific experimental payload should be stated in terms of time and path of experiment exposure only, and should not refer to either the event or time of launch or recovery.

f. Information for scientific release and publication will be reviewed and approved by appropriate authority.

4. (UNCLASSIFIED) Navy activities sponsoring scientific experiments are responsible for advising participating scientific organizations of applicable restrictions and procedures for release of information.

By direction

Copy to:
CNIRFO
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Authenticated by:

[redacted]

Captain, U.S. Navy

BYE-TK-057544-1999

Need A Subject

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM Talent-Keyhole ONLY Jointly

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STIC REQUIREMENTS FOR RESULTS

1. NEW SIGNAL TYPES. Particular stress any activity whatsoever in new frequency band, Separate summaries should point up. Discuss "Odd-Balls". For any unusual signal at least hypothesize general area of signal origin as accurately as possible.

2. ABSENCE NEW SIGNAL TYPES. Particularly lack of activity in discreet bands. Givesnumber of missions in which no such activity was noted. This is a most important and little understood aspect of intelligence.

3. Statistical studies of less-well-known radars. For example signals could be statistically studied by pulse rate, antenna scan rate, use by day or night or day of week and broad general deployment, such as Asia versus Europe, appearance in China?, Similar studies on the newer seems justified. ANY LOCATION PROGRAMS should stress such radars first.

4. Consideration of relative power level of signals. How intercepts behave as function of life, altitude, general sensitivity of collector etc. Such conclusions as are possible such as ower of L-band are most important. Even relative estimates of accuracy are useful. We have absolutely no other source of this data from intercept.

5. Unusual activities at certain times. OR LACK THEREOF-equally important
   a. during missile or ABM shots
   b. During particular political events
   c. elated to any unusual peripheral ferret work or other provocative event
   d. During holidays, ay ay etc.

6. RADAR ORDER OF BATTLE. Our need is much less precise than that of SAC or theaters, generally. is very good for our purposes. STRESS AREAS NOT COVERED BY OTHER ACTIVITY, such as
   a. , especially defenses in depth
   b. Deep interior or heartland
   c. BORDER OF CHINA VERSUS MOST IMPORTANT TARGET INDEED
   d. Missile anges
   e. Development centers, Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk
   f. Suspected ABM sites.
   g. Any ballistic missile sites away from borders.

7. Types of adar Used China as Contrasted oviet Bloc. eparate summar

8. Unusual activity at sea, out of area, odd areas such as Comment on lack thereof as well please.

9. Relative activity of signal different areas. For example does there appear to be more L-band in interior Russia than peripheral areas. Do deployment in central indication of ees radars appearing outside of China either in Asia or

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