

~~TOP SECRET~~ *existing*

NOTE TO THE FILE. . . . . 9 April 1968.

3 April <sup>1968</sup> prior to Adm. Moorer's luncheon with [ ]

[ ] HOLorenzen &amp; Mayo Briefed the Admiral and his aid Capt King.

~~TOP SECRET~~ Capt. Frank Murphy was also in attendance for the first 15 minutes when [ ] the Admiral had [ ] part to the JCS on urgent matters.... His return preceded the arrival [ ] for the luncheon and in a very informal fashion we had about ten more minutes around his desk to deal with the capabilities of the system:

Adm Moorer (CNO) indicated that the "people" at the White House had [ ] that the AF Satellite must take a picture, recover it and analyze it and disseminate the intelligence to the Fleet commander who only then could provide fire control or deterrent action...a process which would take several days or ~~a~~ week<sup>s</sup>. The question then posed was "How could this program respond?"....My answer while not a direct response tried to point out the limitations and factors which determine (1) Locatability i.e. length of illumination and Data Density, Simultaneity of illumination. and relative location to the nadir path. (2) Processability i.e. uniqueness of target emitter against the data background, stability of parameters, requirement for real-time ephemeris

~~TOP SECRET~~HANDLE VIA BYEMAN  
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY