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
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SEJ EATON REPORT; COMMENTS ON	

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Lorenzen

paper

15 October 1968

From: NRL Project Officer, Program "C"

To: OP-07TB

OP-92W

Subj: Eaton Report; comments on

*3 Apr 68 he saw CNO for lunch on sigint matters just after we briefed CNO on POPPY*

Ref: (a) Report of F.M. Eaton to DCI, dated Aug 16, 1968

Encl: (1) General comments for internal Navy consideration

(2) Comments for incorporation, as appropriate, in SecNav response to

DepSecDef *(A section only)*

1. At the last meeting of the Cryptologic and Intelligence Coordination Board NRL members were invited to examine and make comment on reference (a).

Perhaps such comments should be confined to technical matters related to Program "C" and within the perview of NRL; however, the NRL personnel concerned have had a close association of over 20 years with Navy and national SIGINT affairs, and hence have taken the liberty of commenting more broadly.

2. Enclosure (1) is addressed to policy and other high-level and/or particularly sensitive aspects of the subject. These comments are intended for consideration by most senior OPNAV and then, as appropriate, DOD personnel to determine their relevance to the proposed DepSecDef response to DCI.

3. Enclosure (2) is intended as technical comment on the Eaton Report to supplement other Navy comments being considered. No particular sensitivity or restriction is ascribed to them.

4. We are available to explain, defend, or amplify any of these comments, if necessary.

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H. O. LORENZEN

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## EATON REPORT COMMENTS

## GENERAL COMMENTS

Note: The following comments are intended to be frank and constructive. It is recognized, however, that their merit and relevance to the immediate purpose cannot be determined at a technical level. Therefore it is requested that they be examined by senior Naval personnel thoroughly familiar with National Security Policy, agency and departmental jurisdiction and politics, and related high-level (including particularly JCS and senior command) intelligence affairs since World War II -- and then be adapted as appropriate after further consultation at a DIA/DOD level.

1. Jurisdiction over SIGINT -- The published version of the Eaton Report does not directly address the adequacy of NSCID 6 (the NSC Intelligence Directive governing SIGINT). For many years there has been a truce-like peace regarding this extremely controversial and important directive. The truce has manifested itself in such ways as the absence of JCS or other National emergency/war plans which provide for the control and utilization of NSA under prescribed conditions. And yet the fundamental nature and purpose of NSA (and SIGINT) vis-a-vis national security are recognized in the NSC designation of the Secretary of Defense as the national executive agent for SIGINT affairs, the incorporation of NSA within DOD, and the designation of an active senior military officer to direct it. The aggregate effect of the Eaton Report recommendations comes close to, if not actually calling for a revision of NSCID '6, particularly as regards ELINT jurisdiction. Perhaps the JCS, the Services, and other elements of DOD should seriously consider further policy changes which would have the objective of making the

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subordination, the direction, and the results of NSA operations more responsive to their basic peace time purpose and, in time, more likely to be capable of effective performance in emergency.

2. Jurisdiction over weapons system intelligence --

In its recognition of the inherent need of military command for responsive ELINT resources, the Eaton Report may provide opportunity to raise a related issue: namely, the need of the Services to share control of that intelligence which defines their threats and their requirements for offensive and defensive capabilities and readiness. Thus Navy needs both increased jurisdiction and resources, for example, to achieve mastery over antiships missile intelligence. (It is now excessively dependent upon the Air Force for air-launched missile intelligence.) Although the problem is admittedly beyond SIGINT in scope, it is treated in enclosure (2) under ELINT resources.

3. Technical-scientific imbalance in national and departmental intelligence --

To an ever-increasing degree the nature and tempo of intelligence (both U.S. and that of major nations) is being influenced by science and technology. Being continually ready with the right people and tools for the right job becomes more and more difficult, costly, and risky. The penalties for not staying in front of the competition are even worse to contemplate. It is our view, from a technical vantage point over the past two decades, that the U.S. is seriously becoming deficient in its harnessing of scientific-technical resources planning and conduct to the many areas of intelligence -- including policy planning, and management as well as the operational functions of collection, processing, and dissemination -- where the potential is most promising.

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4. Status of Navy in intelligence --

For a number of reasons which need no listing, the Navy has lost much of its influence, resources, and capability in intelligence. Its present posture is viewed as weak in many quarters. It would seem to be at least implied by the Eaton Report that the Services and commands have been excessively degraded and among other things, have lost military effectiveness as a consequence. If the recommendations of the report were to be approved and implemented, the burden of reconstruction and repair would be a heavy one, for so much has been lost, and not just within the Naval Intelligence organization. If some of the opportunities presented by the Eaton work and others recent and forthcoming developments are to be pursued, then the burden and implications become quite profound and call for an effort far beyond the scope of these comments. NIC and DIA must do right by SecDef and the JCS, the DCI and USIB, and by higher authority, but they must also be realistic as regards the state of intelligence as we now know it in DOD.

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## EATON REPORT COMMENTS

## COMMENTS FOR SECNAV RESPONSE TO DCI

## A. General Findings and Recommendations

1. Long range National Intelligence Plan -- The broad purpose of such a plan makes integration of and interfacing with all the various national security sectors a monumental task. In the absence of key comprehensive documents (like a national strategy), the selection of basic reference; and parameters for the NIP could be critical. (The NIP could well turn out to be quite subjective, if the architects so desired) The Navy should actively assist DIA in insuring that SecDef, JCS, command and Service roles, missions, and plans are well supported in the process. To do so effectively would mean more than simply reacting to planning drafts--the Navy should participate in the writing and staffing.

2. "Target Orientation" of guidance -- As with the first recommendation, this one appears to aim at keeping intelligence realistic and responsive to its users--in a truly service and support relationship, and, to the degree possible, in terms of the users' own problems and needs. The problem is a two-way one, and both parties--intelligence and user--should move closer in their collaboration, with DIA taking the lead in DOD.

3, 4. National Intelligence Resources Board, Central Review and Augmentation of staffs--Whatever portion of these recommendations is implemented, the new machinery should include a DOD counterpart for the NIRB and related planning, and Service participation in all functions named. The fundamental subservice of intelligence in the area of national security and its ultimate mission in time of emergency to devote itself completely to the national command authority must be kept foremost in such arrangements.

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5. Authoritative management of SIGINT programs--

a. As technical participants in one of the oldest space collection programs, we observe a management deficiency in lack of guidance input from intelligence production (analysis) into vehicle design and, at a later stage, into collection tasking and data processing. (See also related comments below.)

b. In a more general vein, DIA and the Service intelligence agencies should focus far more than they do on the needs of commands, operational forces, and the RDT&E community in their approaches to SIGINT management and their roles with NSA and USIB.

6, 7. DIRNSA authority over COMINT resources--

a. Except in a technical sense it does not appear consistent with other findings to recommend a strengthening of DIRNSA control--unless it is within the context of stronger, operationally - oriented policy and management guidance from SecDef to DIRNSA. Even so, more active DIA/Service checks are called for.

b. If NSA were to absorb more of the already too-limited military SIGINT talent, the internal capabilities of the Services, commands, forces, and non-NSA elements of DOD--who as consumers of SIGINT define the needs, establish the priorities and levels of effort, and apply the results--would be even further diluted. The proper and most effective place for the non-technical planning and programming of SIGINT is in the DOD management-user environment, not in NSA. The capacity of OSD, DIA, and the Services to do this job should be strengthened, not weakened.

c. If fault has been found with the performance of the SCA's on behalf of NSA, it is also true that the SCA's are unable to satisfy Service needs;

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they seem increasingly oriented to NSA and the higher priority national problems. In time this again translates into reduced Service intelligence and resultant reduced readiness. Perhaps the dichotomy of SCA responsibilities should be recognized and two separate elements be formed, one responsive to DIRNSA, the other to DNC and CNO.

9. Decentralization of ELINT resources-- Strongly concur.

(See also other comments on ELINT below.)

10. Service ELINT resources--

a. The impression has been gained, as noted previously, that the SIGINT requirements and priorities processor have tended to become stereotyped (rather than dynamic) and to gradually drift toward and become bogged down in national-level problem areas. Specifically in Program "C", ELINT tasks such as ROB, EOB, General and Directed Search have not been pursued in a manner or with a vigor to yield results most useful to the operating forces. This kind of deficiency could very well continue where the ELINT project or program concerned was decreed to belong in the national domain, even though it had excess capability of value to a Service.

b. From an ELINT R&D viewpoint it is essential that intelligence collection/production requirements be defined as early as the design stage of the new system and that this collaboration continue during collection and processing operations. The laboratories should be used more in both stages.

11. NSA ELINT resources-- It is demonstrable that ELINT has always been the orphan in the SIGINT family, and as one consequence neither the technical competence nor the level of effort in ELINT at NSA has been commensurate with the importance of the product or the mission of NSA. DIRNSA should be directed

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to take corrective action (under his reduced jurisdiction).

12. NSA Training and support for military ELINT--

a. As noted previously (1) NSA personnel needs have already stripped the Service seriously, and (2) the technical competence of NSA in military ELINT is held in very low regard. It is therefore difficult to understand and accept this recommendation. Navy should suggest the language be modified to limit NSA's role to offering its technical assistance. Under no circumstances should there be accepted a recommendation which makes the Services and commands dependent upon NSA do ELINT training and support.

b. In the case of ELINT systems in space, NSA is at least a couple of years behind the various Service system concepts in being able to even check the products accuracy. It is recommended that (a) the Services recognize that the future of fast processing is in the field digital electronics, rather than the analog approach, and provide a broad base of training at all levels for digital electronics; (b) That software concepts and training be a part of the training for future so the interfaces to computer processing will be understood and appreciated; and (c) That computer training be the ultimate requirement for all levels of Service personnel in this area so they understand the potential and limitations of this type processing. In the future the real fast reaction operational systems will all require computer processing.


c. Highly trained specialists in the Services should be protected from recruitment by or excessive assignment to NSA. They should have career opportunities within the Services which provide advancement based upon the Specialty category. Personnel assignment rotation within this specialty

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should afford opportunity or domestic assignment as well that for overseas duty. The career officer and enlisted personnel within military ELINT specialty . . .

13. Satisfactory state of satellite ELINT--

The management, collection, and processing of satellite ELINT are not satisfactory, as stated. The NRO and NSA are concerning themselves excessively with the highest priority national tasks; namely ABM/AES tasks. The available collectors are capable of detecting enemy trends, indicating new R&D technology, and new equipment installations; however, unless these trends are ABM/AES oriented at present they get scant attention at NSA. Lists of unknown emitters should be carefully compiled and collated with all sources. New requirements for other collection systems should be derived from the satellite experience. NSA processes whatever percentage of the new data from the satellite programs is comfortable for them and no more. In general, unless the collection station has indicated something of interest on a given reel of tape, NSA does not bother to look at it. Also if the site indicates a signal of interest, NSA only looks at this portion of the tape.

14. NSA - NRO assessment of ELINT programs--

NSA is a specialized technical collection processing agency. NRO is a highly sensitive and specialized management and operations staff function. Neither meets the definition of an intelligence agency and neither is integrated to an operating organization comparable to the JCS, a Service, or a major command. If any such ELINT assessment is conducted, it should be directed by USIB, conducted by DIA and CIA with the NSA and the Services participating. NSA and NRO do not have the knowledge of national security problems, The intelligence responsibilities, or broad technical expertise to

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to perform the task described. DOD and Service consumers and Service Laboratories should be consulted as well.

15. Efforts to consolidate overseas bases has in general been an attempt to put the Navy and Army stations out of business while expanding the Air Force hold on the whole ELINT overseas operation. If this trend continues there will only be one service engaged in ELINT namely the Air Force. WHY? The Navy and Army are doing a good job and have demonstrated expertise in their areas of major concern. This could result in no in-house talent in the Army and Navy in ELINT in a very few years if they lost all their stations.

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From: Naval Research Laboratory, Project Officer, Program "C"  
To: OP-07TB  
OP-92W

cy#1

Subj: Eaton Report; comments on

Ref: (a) Report of F.M. Eaton to DCI, dated August 16, 1968

Encl: (1) General comments for internal Navy consideration  
(2) Comments for incorporation, as appropriate, in SecNav response to DepSecDef

1. At the last meeting of the Cryptologic and Intelligence Coordination Board NRL members were invited to examine and make comment on reference (a). Perhaps such comments should be confined to technical matters related to Program "C" and within the purview of NRL; however, the NRL personnel concerned have had a close association of over 20 years with Navy and national SIGINT affairs, and hence have taken the liberty of commenting more broadly.

2. Enclosure (1) is addressed to policy and other high-level and/or particularly sensitive aspects of the subject. These comments are intended for consideration by most senior OPNAV and then, as appropriate, DOD personnel to determine their relevance to the proposed DepSecDef response to DCI.

3. Enclosure (2) is intended as technical comment on the Eaton Report to supplement other Navy comments being considered. No particular sensitivity or restriction is ascribed to them.

4. We are available to explain, defend, or amplify any of these comments, if necessary.

  
H. O. LORENZEN

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WORKING PAPER

EATON REPORT COMMENTS

GENERAL COMMENTS

Note: The following comments are intended to be frank and constructive. It is recognized, however, that their merit and relevance to the immediate purpose cannot be determined at a technical level. Therefore it is requested that they be examined by senior Naval personnel thoroughly familiar with National Security Council (NSC) policy, agency and departmental jurisdictions and politics, and related high-level (including particularly JCS and senior command) intelligence affairs since World War II, and then be adapted as appropriate, perhaps after further consultation at a DIA/DOD level.

1. Jurisdiction over SIGINT -- The published version of the Eaton Report does not directly address the adequacy of NSCID 6 (the NSC Intelligence Directive governing SIGINT). For many years there has been a truce-like peace regarding this extremely controversial and important directive. The truce has manifested itself in such ways as the absence of JCS or other national-level emergency/war plans which provide for the control and utilization of NSA resources under prescribed conditions. And yet the fundamental nature and purpose of NSA (and SIGINT) vis-a-vis national security are recognized in the NSC designation of the Secretary of Defense as the national executive agent for SIGINT affairs, the incorporation of NSA within DOD, and the designation of an active senior military officer to direct it. The aggregate effect of the Eaton Report recommendations comes close to, if not actually calling for a revision of NSCID 6, particularly as regards ELINT jurisdiction. Perhaps the JCS, the Services, and other elements of DOD should seriously consider further policy changes which would have the objective of making the

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subordination, the direction, and the results of NSA operations more responsive to their basic peacetime purpose and, in time, more likely to be capable of effective performance in emergency.

2. Jurisdiction over weapons system intelligence -- In its recognition of the inherent need of military command for responsive ELINT resources, the Eaton Report may provide opportunity to raise a related fundamental issue: namely, the need of the Services to share control of that intelligence which defines their threats and their requirements for offensive and defensive capabilities and readiness. Thus Navy needs both increased jurisdiction and resources, for example, to achieve mastery over antiship missile intelligence. (It is now excessively dependent upon the Air Force for air-launched missile intelligence.) Although the problem is admittedly beyond SIGINT in scope, it is treated in enclosure (2) under ELINT resources.

3. Technical-scientific imbalance in national and departmental intelligence -- To an ever-increasing degree the nature and tempo of intelligence (both U. S. and that of major nations) is being influenced by science and technology. Being continually ready with the right people and tools for the right job becomes more and more difficult, costly, and risky. The penalties for not staying in front of the competition are even worse to contemplate. It is our view, from a technical vantage point over the past two decades, that the U. S. is becoming seriously deficient in its harnessing of scientific-technical capabilities to the many areas of intelligence -- including policy formulation, planning, and management as well as the operational functions of collection, processing, and dissemination -- where the potential is most promising.

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4. Status of Navy in intelligence -- For a number of reasons which need no listing, the Navy has lost much of its influence, resources, and capability in intelligence. Its present posture is viewed as weak in many quarters. It would seem to be at least implied by the Eaton Report that the Services and commands have been excessively degraded and among other things, have lost military effectiveness as a consequence. If the recommendations of the report were to be approved and implemented, the burden of reconstruction and repair would be a heavy one, for so much has been lost -- throughout the Navy and not just within Naval Intelligence. If some of the opportunities presented by the Eaton work and other recent and forthcoming developments are to be pursued, then the burden and implications become quite profound and call for an effort far beyond the scope of these comments. NIC and DIA must do right by SecDef and the JCS, the DCI and USIB, and higher authority, but they must also be realistic as regards the present state of intelligence as we now know it in DOD. Do we understand what is being called for? Do we have the resources and know-how to put the Eaton recommendations into effect? Are there other intelligence deficiencies which should take higher priority?

5. Status of ELINT satellite programs -- As will be noted in enclosure (2), we are not content either with the present status and operation of the ELINT satellite programs or with the Navy participation therein, and have advised senior Navy officials of the situation on a number of occasions. We believe that the findings of the Eaton Report on this subject are strangely inconsistent with most of their other findings, and question both Recommendations 13 and 14.

a. In our view the performance of both the NRO and NSA have been technically and operationally inefficient on too many occasions and have tended

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to be unobjective in the course of their "private club"-like collaboration. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no provision to date by higher authority for a checks-and-balances arrangement with NRO commensurate with the vital importance of the effort and the size of the investment. Under existing conditions U. S. interests would not be well served by implementing Recommendation 14 as written (see also enclosure (2)).

b. Even if the satellite programs could be greatly improved and Navy were offered a partnership role, we are in an extremely poor position to assume such a responsibility. For years we have apparently been unable or unwilling to resolve in-house the question of what capabilities are required in space to carry out the Navy's mission, and to promote the necessary programs. Except for our navigation satellite our limited role in space has been generated by USIB requirements assigned to NRO for collection. National requirements and national funds have made the Navy project possible. In the eight years of this program the Navy has not yet come to recognize and develop a space role.

In conclusion, the Navy has to make up its mind and take action in this area, otherwise not only a favorable SIGINT opportunity but maybe a chance to redefine its strategic role may be lost for some time. In general, the same line of reasoning also holds true for the broad military opportunity: DOD, the JCS, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Services are all offered the opportunity of reasserting their basic military responsibilities and requirements through the media of intelligence products and resources. The JCS peacetime and war plans and the problems of military readiness should be used to help achieve these improvements.

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## EATON REPORT COMMENTS

## COMMENTS FOR SECNAV RESPONSE TO DEPSECDEF

## A. General Findings and Recommendations

1. Long range National Intelligence Plan (NIP) -- The broad purpose of such a plan makes integration of and interfacing with all the various national security sectors a monumental task. In the absence of key comprehensive documents (like a national strategy), the selection of basic references and parameters for the NIP could be critical. (The NIP could well turn out to be quite subjective, if the architects so desired.) The Services should actively assist DIA in insuring that SecDef, JCS, Command and Service roles, missions, and plans are well supported in the process. To do so effectively would mean more than simply reacting to planning drafts--the Services should participate in the writing and staffing.

2. "Target Orientation" of guidance -- As with the first recommendation, this one appears to aim at keeping intelligence realistic and responsive to its users--in a truly service and support relationship and, to the degree possible, in terms of the users' own problems and needs. The problem is a two-way one, and both parties--intelligence and user--should move closer in their collaboration, with DIA taking the lead in DOD and in the community.

3, 4. National Intelligence Resources Board, Central Review and augmentation of staffs-- Whatever portion of these recommendations is implemented, the new machinery should include a DOD counterpart for the NIRB and related planning, and Service participation in all functions named. The fundamental subservience of intelligence in the area of national security and its ultimate mission in time of emergency to devote itself completely to the national command authority must be kept foremost in such arrangements.

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5. Authoritative management of SIGINT programs--

a. As technical participants in one of the oldest space collection programs, we observe a management deficiency in terms of lack of guidance input from intelligence production (analysis) into vehicle design and, at a later stage, into collection tasking and data processing. (See also related comments below.)

b. In a more general vein, DIA and the Service intelligence agencies should focus far more than they do on the needs of commands, operational forces, and the RDT&E community in their approaches to SIGINT management and their roles with NSA and USIB.

6, 7. DIRNSA authority over COMINT resources--

a. Except in a technical sense it does not appear consistent with other findings to recommend a strengthening of DIRNSA control--unless it is within the context of stronger, operationally-oriented policy and management guidance from SecDef to DIRNSA. Even so, more active DIA/Service and other consumer checks are called for.

b. If NSA were to absorb more of the already too-limited military SIGINT talent, the internal capabilities of the Services, commands, forces, and non-NSA elements of DOD--who as consumers of SIGINT define the needs, establish the priorities and levels of effort, and apply the results--would be even further diluted. The proper and most effective place for the non-technical planning and programming of SIGINT is in the DOD management-user environment, not in NSA. The capacity of OSD, DIA, and the Services to do this job should be strengthened, not weakened.

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c. If fault has been found with the performance of the SCA's on behalf of NSA, it is also true that the SCA's are unable to satisfy Service needs; they seem increasingly oriented to NSA and the higher priority national problems. In time this again translates into reduced Service intelligence capabilities and resultant reduced readiness. Perhaps the dichotomy of SCA responsibilities should be recognized and two separate elements be formed, one responsive to DIRNSA, the other to DNC and CNO.

8. No comment.

9. Decentralization of ELINT resources--Strongly concur.

(See also other comments on ELINT below.)

10. Service ELINT resources--

a. The impression has been gained, as noted previously, that the SIGINT requirements and priorities processes have tended to become stereotyped (rather than dynamic) and to gradually drift toward and become bogged down in national-level problem areas. Specifically in Program "C", ELINT tasks such as ROB, EOB, General and Directed Search have not been pursued in a manner or with a vigor to yield results most useful to the operating forces. This kind of deficiency can very well continue where the ELINT project or program concerned was decreed to belong in the national domain, even though it had excess capability of value to a Service.

b. From an ELINT R&D viewpoint it is essential that intelligence collection/production requirements be defined as early as the design stage of the new system and that this collaboration continue during collection and processing operations. The laboratories should be used more in both stages.

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11. NSA ELINT resources-- It is demonstrable that ELINT has always been the orphan in the SIGINT family at NSA, and as one consequence neither the technical competence nor the level of effort in ELINT at NSA has been commensurate with the importance of the product or the mission of NSA. DIRNSA should be directed to take corrective action (under his reduced jurisdiction).

12. NSA training and support for military ELINT--

a. As noted previously, (1) NSA personnel needs have already stripped the Service SCA's seriously, and (2) the technical competence of NSA in military ELINT is held in very low regard. It is therefore difficult to understand and accept this recommendation. Navy should suggest the language be modified to limit NSA's role to offering its technical assistance. Under no circumstances should there be accepted a recommendation which makes the Services and Commands dependent upon NSA for ELINT training and support.

b. In the case of ELINT systems in space, NSA is at least a couple of years behind the various Service system concepts in quality control and field processing for operational support. It is recommended that (1) NSA and the Services recognize that the future of fast processing is in digital electronics, rather than the analog approach, and provide a broad base of training at all levels for digital electronics; (2) that software concepts and training be a part of the training for future so the interfaces to computer processing will be understood and appreciated; and (3) that computer training be the ultimate requirement for all levels of NSA and Service personnel in this area so they understand the potential and limitations of this type of processing. In the future the real fast reaction operational systems will all require computer processing.

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c. Highly trained specialists in the Services should be protected from excessive assignment to or recruitment by NSA. They should have career opportunities within the Services which provide advancement based upon the specialty category. Personnel assignment rotation within this specialty should afford opportunity for domestic assignment as well that for overseas duty. The career officer and enlisted personnel in the military ELINT specialties should have domestic tours in their specialty as well as those overseas. Advanced educational programs should be provided to improve their job capability and to serve as reenlistment incentives. A career officer curriculum should include more space-oriented study. Emphasis on technical development should weigh heavily in career evaluation.

13. Satisfactory state of satellite ELINT--The management, collection, and processing of satellite ELINT are not satisfactory, as is stated in the Report. The NRO and NSA are concerning themselves excessively with the highest priority national tasks: namely, ABM/AES tasks. The available collectors are capable of detecting enemy trends, indicating new foreign R&D technology, and new equipment installations; however, unless these trends are ABM/AES-oriented at present they get scant attention at NSA. Lists of unknown emitters should be carefully compiled and collated with all sources. New requirements for other collection systems should be derived from the satellite experience. NSA processes whatever percentage of the new data from the satellite programs is comfortable for them and no more. In general, unless the collection station has indicated something of interest on a given reel of tape, NSA does not bother to look at it. Also if the site indicates a signal of interest, NSA only looks at this portion of the tape.

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14. NSA-NRO assessment of ELINT programs--NSA is a specialized technical collection and processing agency. NRO is a highly sensitive and specialized management and operations staff function. Neither meets the definition of an intelligence agency and neither is integrated into an operating organization comparable to the JCS, a Service, or a major command. If any such ELINT assessment is conducted, it should be directed by USIB, conducted by DIA and CIA with the NSA, NRO, and the Services participating. NSA and NRO do not have the knowledge of national security problems, the intelligence responsibilities, or broad technical expertise to perform the task described. DOD and Service consumers and Service Laboratories should be consulted as well.

15. Efforts to consolidate overseas bases have in general been an attempt to put the Navy and Army stations out of business while expanding the Air Force hold on the whole ELINT overseas operation. If this trend continues there will only be one service engaged in ELINT, namely, the Air Force. Why? The Navy and Army are doing a good job and have demonstrated expertise in their areas of major concern. This could result in no in-house talent in the Army and Navy in ELINT within a very few years if they lost all their stations.

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B. Specific Subjects in Main Body

1. Under headings for "General Comments" and "Program Guidance" it would have seemed in order to recognize the increasing impact of science and technology upon the substance, equipment, and the operations of the intelligence business. Some issue is taken with the generally favorable tone of the report; specifically, we question the overall satisfaction of the U. S. R&D community with intelligence and express our concern at the lack of appropriate representation of scientific-technical and operational interests in the planning, direction, and assessment of intelligence organization and activity.

2. Comments on "National Intelligence Resources Board" (NIRB) and "Central Review and Coordination" are set forth elsewhere in this enclosure (see paragraph A. 3, 4).

3. Comments pertaining to "Management of the Crypto Community" and "NSA Staff Organization" are contained in paragraphs A. 5 and A. 6, 7 above. We concur also in the need for major improvement in the national security education of NSA--both operational and technical.

4. Under "COMINT, Telemetry, and ELINT Resources" the recognition of the inherent operational support character of ELINT is refreshing, as is the acknowledged close relationship (to ELINT) of electronic warfare and passive ECM resources. It is recommended that DIA and the Joint Staff, assisted by the Services and NSA, undertake to define and better relate the military functions and resources involved in this combined area and recommend appropriate command and/or management actions to insure their effective employment.

a. As regards telemetry, remembering the controversy and reasoning which underlie the present policy, we would oppose prescribing COMINT security for

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all telemetry; however, we do recognize the possible need for exceptions to the present rule. Perhaps a survey to define and analyze the problem qualitatively and quantitatively would pave the way to some improvement. Timeliness and adequacy of telemetry analysis and reporting should be included in such a survey.

b. The section on ELINT resources suggests that those ELINT resources involved in the planning or conduct of combat operations should be assigned to the Services free of management control by NSA. This section should go further and assign to the Services responsibility for developing or helping to develop the intelligence for each foreign weapon system that represents a threat to its combatants: i.e., for Air Force, those threats to its aircraft; for Navy, threats to its ships, submarines, aircraft, landing craft, etc.; for Army, the threats to its aircraft, ground forces, etc. This would squarely place the responsibility for developing intelligence collection requirements to fill the gaps in known systems as well as to provide the missing elements of system components. It would stimulate the Services not only to develop improved collectors to gather the ELINT, but also to collate the data to give the most rapid and accurate identification of the foreign system concepts. Countermeasures for the hostile system could be formulated as early as possible, and our technology updated to obtain the highest operational efficiency possible. With the advent of supersonic weaponry the need to provide electronic detection, identification, data processing, and defensive countermeasures must be completely automated if the defense of the intended victims is to be effective. The days of shooting down a missile with another missile and any other "one for one" concepts are antiquated. Modern electronic warfare

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concepts must be capable of reorientation quickly to meet new enemy techniques or concepts, including sudden changes in tactical modes of weapons.

5. "National Reconnaissance Office" (NRO)--ELINT tasking of NRO by USIB has restricted itself primarily to ABM/AES targets; however, the satellite collectors are capable of many other tasks. As an example, during the Czechoslovakian crisis and occupation no attempt (known to Navy) was made to obtain indication of deployment of potential attacking forces. No correlation of emitter groups to identify specific forces by EOB/ROB was performed. No special tasking was attempted to identify any special new systems which might have been present. USIB should on a regular basis solicit the collection equipment specialists regarding new requirements and goals for collection in support of all ELINT and electronic warfare functions. The general attitude of the USIB group seems to be that its NSA, DIA, NRO, etc. membership has built-in all the expertise needed to visualize the future requirements and tasking for satellite collection. They apparently have completely ignored the possibility of satellite collection to identify the missing elements needed by U. S. electronic warfare systems designers to perfect U. S. defenses for attacks by strategic and tactical weapon systems, to say nothing of our countermeasure needs to penetrate enemy defensive systems.

6. Identification and location of strategic missile sites and ABM/AES-type targets in the Soviet Bloc having been the principal objectives of the NRO effort for some time, USIB has sponsored collection programs primarily tailored to these needs. Unfortunately these systems provide little or no data about the details and subtleties of these targets' electronic design (or many of the types of ELINT required to satisfy other military requirements),

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thereby necessitating other special satellites be flown to collect the basic system parameters after the location is determined. This policy has greatly increased the cost of the satellite program and encouraged a "Black Box" concept rather than a systems approach. R&D satellites to improve future U. S. ELINT capabilities are not actively encouraged or sponsored by NRO. What has been said may apply also to the other types of satellites and, more important, to the technical and operational coordination of the different sensor systems. A wedding of photography and ELINT capabilities, for example, is particularly in order.

7. For comments on "Overseas Bases" see paragraph A. 15 above.

8. With respect to "The Future," it might be observed that the overall capability and feasibility of SIGINT in relation to the national security needs of the 1970's and beyond is not readily predictable, particularly if one is dissatisfied with the present SIGINT posture and performance and does not wish to use it as a base from which to project such a forecast. The Eaton Report has performed a singular service in reminding high authority of some of the serious dislocations and imbalances in the current SIGINT situation, and in at least hinting at what its fundamental orientation should be. It would seem that either the NSC or SecDef/JCS should now take up this basic question (of SIGINT orientation and effectiveness) and pursue it thoroughly before many decisions are made regarding its future.

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