

1970?

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Memo to 5000

from 5614

Subj: OP-76 attitude toward the NRL PROGRAM "C" effort:

1. It is becoming increasingly apparent that [] is at the bottom of the disenchantment recently exhibited by OP-76 (ADM MORAN) toward this NRL effort. An examination of the history of [] over the past several years, as he has interfaced with PROGRAM "C", might disclose the basis for this bias.

A. NRL/MAYO and Capt Moffit participated in two of the NAVY PSAC panel discussions where the PROGRAM # 749, in its position of being just a proposal, suffered from our advanced demonstrated capability. In the first of these two meetings there was an obvious attempt to keep PROGRAM "C" from being ~~either well~~ prepared and well received. [] was present for the early half of this meeting and made a fine contribution ^(for #749) handling the technical questions from the panel members.

B. Mr. LORENZEN's association with NAVMOL was not necessarily well received by the OP-76 group, in fact, when their program was dropped and ours continued to thrive it must have left some scar tissue.

2: There is a certain cadre of Young Naval Officers who sincerely believe that for the Navy to survive in the SPACE ^{Roll} ~~World~~ they must enter into a vigorous military/Industrial enterprise such as the Air Force has enjoyed over the past ten years...this philosophy is in opposition to the NRL In-House effort exemplified by PROGRAM "C". The Navy Office at AERSPACE area in El Segundo [] probably represent the major proponents of the military/industrial school of thought.

A. The strength of our position in this philosophical difference, lies squarely with our operational performance with the Mission 7106, in spite of the severe paralysis which has set in through an uninspired lack of exploitation by the NSA analysis community. For instance they have convinced the Tasking community that they can analyze only two birds at a time and on each Bird they can not separate adjacent [] so by this severe restraint in tasking we are faced with a ^{built-in limitation to a great} ~~restraint of at least~~ 50% of our potential operational capability, just because NSA won't even try to use the full capability built into these spacecraft ^{guidance and} ~~(with their blessing for~~ ^{about} ~~a period of two years.~~

B. The weakness of the Industrial/Military complex school-of-thought lies in the demonstrated inadequate "Checks and Balances" which assure the development of a Cost Effective solution to the Technical Problems.

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It is rare that we engage in a significant debate concerning our basic Program Philosophy that we do not get agreement on the aspects of:

On the other hand we regularly suffer from the lack of precision Frequency Determination with resolution sufficient for the other programs use, in finding the signals, ^{who's discovery} ~~which~~ we pioneer. This criticism is going to be answered technically with one of the experiments being deployed in the R & D package (#176) where we will be able to ~~do~~ resolve frequency to about 3 or 5 MHz in the bands of type emitters.

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NOTE TO FILE RELATIVE TO THE IMPROVEMENT IN POPPY END-PRODUCT 7 Sept69

1. NSA established dedicated processing teams for each of the three programs (POPPY = K46, P-11= Col COPLEY, and MULTIGROUP = John CONLON) in November 1969. This has had a fair realization of the initial expectations. In the main the shortcomings of this POPPY team are in the senior personnel who lead this team...they have had other loyalties in the past and are often unimaginative in pushing the best POPPY foot forward... in fairness though they may be inhibited from the mid-level management influence above. There has only been one time in the past year in our presence when the K-4 philosophy on POPPY came through in a positive complimentary manner & this was in front of the NRO Comptroller at a time when the Digital System for [] was under debate...

The Dr. SORRELS visit to [] in the dark of night was made with NSA (K-4) knowledge and it is therefore suspected that their loyalties lie much stronger with [] than with POPPY. The truth~~xx~~ of the matter suggests that if NSA had done even half a job exploiting POPPY they would have ^{little} need for []. After all the basic techniques of POPPY are (1) real-time transpond, ([] 3) Digitizer at ground site, (4) Main-beam intercept philosophy and (5) the data analysis computer on-line at data receiving site...these same techniques

[] Therefore one might consider the differences add not the similarities as being the distinguishing considerations:

(1) POPPY is a low-level collector, flying at an altitude of only 500

(2) Spectrum covered by POPPY is []

(3) Location accuracy for POPPY has been given by NSA as []

[] from photo locations. []

(2) Mission Control (Ground) Station must be allowed to publish end-product so that NSA will not paralyze [] low level programs.

(3) DIA personnel to be assigned to []

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What can NSA do that will improve the POPPY image?

COMPETITION: ^{SOI} show the various programs/outputs on Monthly intervals.
Publish the SOI reports of all the programs
Publish the UNKNOWNNS so that others may be able to assess them.

UTILIZE Overseas sites capability for ~~XXXX~~ Real-time mission control so the Targets of Opportunity may be more fully tasked against when they are detected in normal [] search.

How about Weapon-system Analysis procedure which will assure that the Unknown signal is weighed in all aspects for some common parameter with the known elements of the major Weapon Systems.

The major thing that NSA can do in improving POPPY is to work harder. Enhance the site's capability to prioritize the Analysis effort at NSA.

Perhaps Mr. John CONLON could be placed in charge of the POPPY Processing. His 9 year history of experience in this field makes him extremely knowledgeable as opposed to [] who is still learning by trial and error. The Mission Guidance as voiced by NSA for POPPY is being developed by one or perhaps two men at the most with GS grades of GS-13 or GS-14. These in turn go to SORS as the official NSA Position....POPPY must be more important to NSA than this. [] By this very narrow view in developing the POPPY Mission guidance, NSA has exposed a significant attempt to [] fall far short of ~~xxx~~ using the POPPY Mission 7106 to its full capability. They wanted to avoid certain of the data [] because of suspected incompatibility or difficulty in separating them in analysis. The debate for this should have advanced during the design phases for this mission not just prior to launch. Keeping the analysis task comfortable is not the major criteria in the architecture for this mission....

The priority order of importance assigned by SORS to the various collection systems in Mission 7106 may reflect the contemporary importance but the tasking ~~xxxxxx~~ committee must be very careful in using only this guidance or the search for other ~~unknown~~ heretofore unknown elements of these major weapon systems will remain unproductive.