From: Commander, Sixth Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via:

Subj: Requirement for Location Information on Soviet Mediterranean Units

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Ref: (a) COMSIXTHFLT msg 231350Z May 68
(b) USCINCEUR msg 261821Z Jun 69

1. Problem

Because of inadequate information, exploit current state-of-the-art locating techniques in support of the U.S. Navy Sixth Fleet requirement for ocean surveillance information in the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility.

2. Threat

The threat posed to the Sixth Fleet by a permanent Soviet Navy Mediterranean Force has been well documented and is fully recognized. A key element in any approach to counter the threat posed by this growing force continues to be in the area of ocean surveillance. COMSIXTHFLT and his subordinate commanders, in response to their assigned National tasks against Soviet missile carrying and threat associated platforms, have a continuing requirement for all source location information on SOVMEDRON units. Both references (a) and (b) emphasize this requirement.

3. Facts Bearing on the Problem

a. Sixth Fleet reconnaissance assets are limited and have other priorities.

b. US HF/DF locating information in the Mediterranean and Black Sea is poor.

c. Sixth Fleet relies primarily on Italian HF/DF for location information on Soviet Mediterranean Naval Units.

d. HUMINT resources are poor.

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e. Friendly radar capabilities are limited.

f. systems have the capability to locate Soviet ships at sea.

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g. COMSIXTHFLT have access to all sources of timely surveillance information on Soviet Navy and Merchant ship activities in the Mediterranean-Black Sea area as well as contiguous sea areas.

4. Discussion

a. COMSIXTHFLT reconnaissance assets are not available in sufficient numbers to provide the requisite location information without seriously degrading other essential tasks, i.e., ASW and AAW.

b. HF/DF currently provides the major input on Soviet ship locations. Historically US HF/DF in the Mediterranean has been poor, and COMSIXTHFLT has primarily relied upon Italian HF/DF location information. However, this valuable source of information is only received once daily and there is always the possibility that it might dry up.

The accuracy of U.S. and Italian HF/DF in the Eastern Mediterranean continues to be poor. Unless additional resources are obtained (such as HF/DF capability on Cyprus) location information in this area will remain marginal. Similarly, location information on Soviet units in the Black Sea which might be preparing to transit to the Mediterranean (under false declaration) is generally spotty and undependable. Hopefully, this situation will improve with the establishment of the MEDNORA HF/DF net which will provide more accurate and timely HF/DF in the Mediterranean area. The Soviets, of course, can deny HF/DF information to us at any time by simply not communicating.

c. HUMINT resources in those countries where Soviet Mediterranean units frequently visit, such as Egypt, Syria, and Algeria, are either non-existent or have no means of reporting Soviet ship locations, departures or arrivals in a timely manner. Also, regular reporting channels, such as Lloyds, have been subjected to sporadic curtailment in Egypt. Photography of units in these same ports is similary not available on a timely or regular basis.

d. Friendly radars on Crete and Cyprus have a limited surface search capability and do provide some information on specific areas but not on a regular basis. NATO air and surface efforts also provide some location information on Soviet ships. But again, it is not on a daily basis and is frequently not reported by the fastest means.

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e. An system can complement the sensor systems presently available to the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean area by providing unique information not otherwise available or obtainable. Specifically, this system could provide coverage of limited access areas, such as the Black Sea. The value of this potential source of information is immeasurable in that it indicates impending ship and naval movements from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean.

5. Conclusions

The above collection assets, with the exception of an system, have been brought to bear on the Sixth Fleet's surveillance problem. Measures have also been taken in each case to maximize the take from all assets. However, in spite of all these efforts, essential Soviet naval information is still lacking or unavailable at critical times. It is necessary, therefore, to search for new means or sensors, such as an system to assist in the Mediterranean-Black Sea surveillance problems. The ability of an system to locate Soviet naval ships clearly demonstrates its potential value in filling the collection vacuum now prevalent in the Mediterranean-Black Sea area. Furthermore, recent information reveals that additional system's tasking in the Mediterranean area would not impinge upon or degrade the system's National tasking requirement against ABM and other targets.

6. Recommendation

All of the hardware, operating and processing techniques developed in the program are known to be applicable in providing the Sixth Fleet with an additional sensor in the Mediterranean and Black Sea area. It is recommended, therefore, that this critical source of information be provided the Sixth Fleet and that the sensor be tasked to cover the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility on an operational basis.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING SYSTEM SUPPORT ACTIVITY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

IN REPLY REFER TO

19 September 1969

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Dear George:

As you may know, when Emory Sourbeer returned from the SIXTHFLT, he was tasked by Admiral Richardson to prepare a requirement stating the need for TK information in the SIXTHFLT area of responsibility. The Admiral's interest in this potential source of information stems from a briefing given by Howard Lorenzen of NRL during a visit to the SIXTHFLT last spring.

Since Emory's return to NFOIO, we have worked up the attached draft requirement which lays out the need for this information in some detail. The following information, together with the draft requirement, should provide you with the necessary support to generate a SIXTHFLT requirement. These papers have been thoroughly checked by NRL, Bill Moffit (NIC-2) and his people who are responsible for staffing TK requirements, and others who have an interest in this area. Also, Tom Dwyer has seen these papers and was asked to speak to you about the subject during his recent visit to the SIXTHFLT.

The necessity to document SIXTHFLT's need for this source of information stems from the very stringent control exercised over this sensor by National authorities. Briefly, the Navy developed and operates the sensor, and a special SIGINT Overhead Requirements Subcommittee (SORS) controls its tasking. To date, the Navy's share of the take has been limited by SORS and is on a not to interfere basis with the system's National tasking requirements. Nevertheless, the system has displayed a very promising naval application after a very modest amount of exploitation.

For example, tests reveal that this system can passively detect and locate radar emitting ships at sea. This includes the capability to recognize and measure parameters of a good portion of all known radar types carried on Soviet naval ships. Correlation of this information with available information derived from currently operational sensor systems

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All of the hardware, operating and processing techniques developed fo[redacted] system are applicable in providing the SIXTHFLT with an additional sensor in the Mediterranean and Black Sea area. This can be accomplished at no sacrifice to current National tasking and requires no additional funding of equipment. Furthermore, it has been proved that field sites can accomplish a high degree of fixing accuracy by on-site processing.

It is essential, therefore, that we document the Navy's Ocean Surveillance National responsibilities in this area in a positive manner. Accordingly, a strong requirement from the SIXTHFLT will provide CNO with the lever necessary to get SORS to recognize the Navy's needs.

The limited amount of naval information derived to date from this sensor has been automated by NIPSSA and correlated with other sources. NFOIO is receiving it via our SI data link, and later we will send it via SI data link to LANT. NAVEUR is currently info addressee for the original unautomated messages.

NIPSSA and NRL have prepared charts of the Mediterranean area displaying this information and briefings have been given to Admiral Moorer. He is extremely interesting in its potential and has encouraged us to get on with the job. We realize that this information in its present form will not solve all of your problems, but we cannot begin to exploit it until we receive it on a continuing operational basis.

Once we get the ball rolling, we plan to follow your requirement with one from CINCLANT. PAC should follow as the capabilities of the system are expanded.

We will be pleased to provide more detailed information and even on the spot briefings if you so request. [redacted] was briefed on these developments during the recent N2 conference. He suggested that the requirement come from NAVEUR, but it is our collective opinion that it would have more force emanating at the Fleet level with a NAVEUR endorsement. I am writing to [redacted] advising him of this.

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Emory is now home from the hospital and making a good recovery. He looks well and is many pounds lighter. It will be another month at the least before he is allowed to return to his office duties. He and Sue have moved into nice quarters at Fort Meade and are right next door to Admiral Gaylor.

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My best r [redacted] to you and your family, and I hope you all are finding life pleasant in Italy.

Sincerely,

Ed

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