

NSG CITE NR 73

DATE 07 NOV 1969

TO NRL

PASS TO MR. MAYO

THE FOLLOWING IS THE ENTIRE OF TEXT OF [] 042030Z NOV 69

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ONE OF TWO

VISIT OF DR. COOK AND DDR&E REPS

1. THE POPPY BRIEFING BEGAN AT 1315 AND TERMINATED AT 1930 LOCAL ON 31 OCT WITH DR. COOK, [] AND MR. FISHER PRESENT FOR THE ENTIRE 6 HRS. BRIEFING BEGAN WITH A WALK-THROUGH OF OPERATING SPACES AND INCLUDED AND EXPLANATION OF EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONS PROCEDURES. VISITORS HAD OPPORTUNITY TO DIRECT THEIR QUESTIONS TO WATCH OPERATORS AND ENLISTED FUNCTION HEADS. LIVE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE PROVIDED FOR INTERROGATION AND COLLECTION OF A MISSION 7106 PASS, FOR OFF-LINE ANALOG ANALYSIS AND FOR DIGITAL PROCESSING, INCLUDING LOCATION OF A RADAR. VISITORS EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR DEDICATION, AND PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITY OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO POPPY OPS.

2. FOLLOWING THE WALKTHROUGH, VISITORS WERE GIVEN A FORMAL BRIEFING WHICH INCLUDED:

(A) POPPY ORGANIZATION: INCLUDING THE ROLES OF NRO, NIC, NSG, NRL, NSA AND THE [] (AT THIS POINT DR COOK EXPLAINED THE ROLE OF SORS IN THE USIB ORGANIZATION AND STATED THAT, WITH REGARD TO POPPY, SORS EVALUATED REQUIREMENTS AND PASSED APPROPRIATE TASKING GUIDANCE TO NRO.)

(B) ORBITAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PAYLOAD CAPABILITIES: INCLUDING A COMPARISON OF MISSIONS 7105 AND 7106.

(C) CAPABILITIES, ASSIGNMENTS AND PRODUCTION RESULTS FOR EACH OF []

(D) DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF TASKING TO SOI AND LOCATION TARGETS.

(E) PROJECT ORGANIZATION AND INCREASED DATA HANDLING RESPONSIBILITIES IMPOSED BY LAUNCH OF MISSION 7106.

3. DURING AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE FORMAL BRIEFING THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS/DISCUSSIONS WERE NOTED AS ITEMS OF INTEREST:

(A) THE LACK OF CLEAR CORRELATION BETWEEN POPPY TASKING AND DR COOK'S VIEW OF THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR OVERHEAD SIGINT:

(B) THE APPARENT PRACTICE OF TASKING ONLY 50 PERCENT OF PAYLOAD CAPABILITY AS EVIDENT FROM PRODUCTIVITY FIGURES PROVIDED FOR MISSION 7105.

(C) DR COOK AND [] QUESTIONED REQUIREMENT FOR SITE PROCESSING AND SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE MORE ADVANTAGEOUS AND ECONOMICAL TO SIMPLY COLLECT AND FORWARD ALL DATA TO NSA. THERE FOLLOWED AN DISCUSSION REGARDING BENEFITS OF SITE PROCESSING, INCLUDING REDUCED MAG TAPE CONSUMPTION THROUGH FIELD SITE SCREENING SOI'S, QUALITY CONTROL OF BOTH ANALOG AND DIGITAL RECORDINGS, TIMELY PROCESSING OF HIGH INTEREST RADARS AND THOSE CARRIED ON MOBILE PLATFORMS, AND DEVELOPMENT OF A RAPID PROCESSING CAPABILITY WHICH COULD BE INVALUABLE DURING TIMES OF CRISIS. MR WHITT STATED THAT THESE CONSIDERATIONS WERE VERY RELEVANT TO FORTHCOMING STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

(D) AFTER QUESTIONING NSA FEEDBACK AND DISTRIBUTION POLICY, MR. FISHER WAS CONCERNED THAT LOCATION FEEDBACK INCLUDES ONLY NSA RESULTS AGAINST [] A DISCUSSION FOLLOWED CONCERNING THE RELATIVE MERITS OF WEST-BEND BATCH PROCESSING AND THE SITE TECHNIQUE OF ISOLATIONS AND PROCESSING SPECIFIC HIGH INTEREST RADARS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN INTERCEPTED DURING A SPECIFIC MISSION BY BOTH SATELLITES [] EMPHASIS WAS GIVEN TO SITE FLEXIBILITY PROVIDED BY MANUAL INTERFACES AND PROCESSING APPROACHES TAILORED TO THE CHARACTER SITES OF DIFFERENT, HIGH INTEREST RADARS. PRESENT FIELD SITES PROCESSING DESCRIBED AS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH NSA GOALS.

(E) VISITORS EXPRESSED UNANIMOUS CONCERN REGARDING POTENTIAL SOVIET CAPABILITY EXPLOIT UNENCIPHERED POPPY DATA.

(F) DR COOK QUESTIONED CRITERIA WHICH DIFFERENTIATE SOI'S FROM OTHER SOVIET RADARS AND WANTED TO KNOW WHEN SOI ASSIGNMENTS WERE LAST UPDATED. FIELD SITE VIEW WAS GIVEN AS FOLLOWS: SOI'S ARE THOSE RADARS STILL UNDER-
GOING []

[] LAST SOI UPDATE WAS SEPT 68.

(G) [] EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE CAPABILITY TO LOCATE SOVIET [] REGARDING LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY TASKING AND DATA DENSITY IN WIDE POPPY [] TARGETING. POSSIBILITY FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SPECIFIC COLLECTION CAPABILITY POINTED OUT.

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(H) DR COOK QUESTIONED WHY LOCATION TARGETS WERE NOT IDENTICAL TO SOI'S AND QUERIED THE RATIONALE BEHIND SELECTION OF LOCATION TARGETS/PRIORITIES. REPLIED THAT LOCATION TARGETS WERE CONNECTED WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ALSO STRESSED THE POPPY MISSION/CAPABILITY FOR GENERAL SEARCH AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF [REDACTED] AS FIRST PRIORITY.

(I) DR COOK WAS CONCERNED THAT SITES HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFIC ACQUISITION GOALS RELATED TO TASKING OF GIVEN ORBITS.

(J) ALL THREE VISITORS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN FIELD SITE FLEXIBILITY TO RESPOND TO TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY, BUT AGREED THAT THE PRESENT MECHANISM DOES NOT LEND ITSELF TO QUICK RESPONSE.

(K) DR COOK INDICATED THAT HIS COMMITTEE WELCOMED SUBMISSION OF REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL TASKING AND THAT REQUESTS COULD BE ACCOMMODATED WITHIN CURRENT NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. HE ALSO STATED THAT EXCESSIVE LEAD TIMES WERE UNNECESSARY.

(L) [REDACTED] WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED REGARDING FAILURE OF ALL SYSTEMS TO INTERCEPT CERTAIN HIGH INTEREST RADARS, SPECIFICALLY THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE SUCH RADARS HAD BEEN COLLECTED BY POPPY BUT REMACDPUNIDENTIFIED DUE POSSIBILITY PARAMETERS WHICH FIT WITHIN RANGES ESTABLISHED FOR KNOWN THREAT OR FRIENDLY RADARS.

4. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE BRIEFING DR COOK AND [REDACTED] REQUESTED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING PROGRAM EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY. RESPONSE WAS:

(A) DEFINE REQUIREMENTS IN PRIORITY ORDER:

(B) TAILOR TASKING TO REQUIREMENTS, THE TARGET SIGNAL ENVIRONMENT FOR EACH FIELD SITE AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS:

(C) DEVELOP A QUICK RESPONSE CAPABILITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF POPPY CAPABILITY AGAINST HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS;

(D) ELIMINATE OR REDUCE ALL SYSTEM ERRORS TO ENSURE PRECISE LOCATION CAPABILITY.

5. DR COOK AND [REDACTED] REQUESTED COPIES VISUAL AIDS AND BRIEF SYNOPSIS FOR EACH VIEWGRAPH. Q33HREE SETS WILL BE FORWARDED TO COMNAVSECGRU VIA 13 NOV COURIER.

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

14 NOV 1969

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Mr. Howard O. Lorenzen
Superintendent, Electronic
Warfare Division
Naval Research Laboratory
Washington, D. C. 20390

Dear Howard:

I appreciated the talk we had last Friday and have checked into the points you raised.

The read-out materials from [] have been addressed for some time now to CINCUSNAVEUR and this practice will continue. I am concerned by a remark attributed to USNAVEUR personnel that the results are not of particular use but this may be inaccurate. In any event addressing to USNAVEUR will continue. Your suggestion that [] be given greater freedom in search and exploitation of given blocks of the spectrum is a good one. It will be put into action.

I am informed that CCP funds cover the operations at [] which are focused in three areas:

- 1) Policing the quiet zone,
- 2) SIGINT research projects,
- 3) Such operational tasks as are mutually agreed.

It appears that the working level agreements and exchanges to develop tasking have been amicable and constructive. We shall ensure that proper attention is given to all three tasks. I also plan to look into the possibility of transferring to another site part or all of the present and future budgeted CCP funds now allocated for [] SIGINT operations. This might, as you suggested, permit accomplishment of 3), and 2) as required with no disturbance to 1).

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With respect to the question of release of tapes for study in connection with [] development - NSA has always promptly made required tapes available once they were identified and naturally will continue to do so. NAVSTIC is also involved in this area and has been invited to send out competent personnel to select specific essential tapes. We extend the same invitation to NRL. In order to minimize duplication and reduce our work load, I suggest that your personnel and those from NAVSTIC should coordinate their requests so that we need do the selection and duplication only once. Possibly the tapes already at NAVSTIC are sufficient also for your needs.

Your offer of competent people to assist in the evaluation of the NSA POPPY computer programming is welcomed. By now Mr. Potts already has been in touch with your office to arrange for same. Further attention is also being given to the make-up of the NSA team in charge of our tasking and the processing of POPPY materials.

The question of the future of [] is more complex. It does not appear cost effective or possible to continue surface ELINT operations there. This may put a disproportionately heavy burden on the POPPY operation, particularly if the station is continued in its present configuration minus only the surface ELINT personnel and overhead. Various alternatives including the move of the POPPY personnel onto the civilian economy, or perhaps even the move of the operation to a suitable other site will be considered. This problem is complicated by REDCOSTE and BALPA considerations. Anyway, I have no intention of replacing the [] POPPY interrogation site with no site at all.

Warm regards,

/s/ NOEL GAYLER

NOEL GAYLER
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Director

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