

BYE-61703-92

TS/

DISTRIBUTION INFO

	:	:	Gerald J. Botte	10/1/97
--	---	---	-----------------	---------

[REDACTED]

FINISH FILE

9/21/73

19 Sept 73 Review of SA History preparatory to IRNSA/PME-106/NRL(7000)

1. Background

~~TOP SECRET~~

Even though NSA was [redacted] ner in the POPPY program, their participation was feeble and they failed miserably to exploit the data and the operational tasking of the program. It was a source of considerable embarrassment to them that in the last three years as an example, [redacted] could take the same data that they received and the difference in results were unbelievable...NSA never to this day was able to isolate and locate automatically, any emitter unless it scanned in 360° manner...this eliminates all the SAM and ABM emitters and thus they had to use extensive manual isolation techniques to treat even these highest priority signals. In explanation of this dilemma I can only say that in the late-66 Harry Davis Review of the ABM capability in the overhead programs, NSA must have made a commitment to a system other than POPPY. This is reinforced in two ways: (1) significant development of the POPPY processing effort at the Fort following [redacted] (1966) were not evident and (2) the shift of the their best [redacted] indicated a greater need for this specific talent in a program that was conceived in late '66 or early 1967. Thus one can see that NSA (1) did not exploit POPPY (2) did not aggressively undertake their processing responsibilities, and (3) suffered by the limited success of the overseas POPPY onsite processing. ~~XXXXXXXX~~ There prevails to this day a deliberate ^{NSA} mandate that NRL will not be allowed the opportunity to embarrass NSA by doing well, a job that ~~XXXX~~ ^{NSA} have been unable to do. Thus in the Fall of 1971 NSA [redacted] made the first significant attempts to "Get on-board" the POPPY Processing effort that NRL had deployed to the sites. This effort had many manifestations and some of them were joined by CDR [redacted] and these exchanges are documented by [redacted] They culminated a year later when the SPO under [redacted] took the POPPY "On-Line" software development away from NRL and gave it to [redacted] of the SPO, ^{NSA} ~~this was~~ brutal, premeditated and served to delay the software package by at least six months, even if the plan for development was changed only slightly. This climate of denying NRL any possible software opportunity extends to the present issue of Control Computer where every effort has been made by the SPO [redacted] to pass the responsibility for the entire (Integrated) software effort to the contractor. There is an ever recurring suspicion that the wish of [redacted] is to have the collection and processing job (Hardware design and software design) integrated at the TRW scene and not at the NRL in-house arena. There have been strong indications in this direction for over 6 months since the PDR from various me [redacted] of the SPO.

~~TOP SECRET~~HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

- ~~TOP SECRET~~
2. The events leading to the [] started with the 7-month study, the request by [] to disclose how our technology and that of the P-11 could be adapted to serve ^{not} only Ocean Surveillance but the entire spectrum of Tactical ELINT collection and Processing. From the [] request we broke out an advance portion of our 7-month study, and disclosed it to the Community 5 months ^{early relative to the 7mo} ahead of time and it was known as []. NSA had knowledge of this about a month or two after it was given to []. Our processing plan was not different from POPPY except that we intended to take fullest advantage of the potential for [] a technique that still has received only passing notice by the NSA sponsored Software Studies and by the TRW winner of the competition. This is one of the most significant advantages of the TRIPLET and it is dormant to date.
3. The message from McLucas to Geiger, Herman and Bradburn of 29 Feb 72, set [] into motion....The JOINT PROGRAM PLANNING GROUP under [] had NRL Participation (Pete and Mayo) NSA [] and [] in the background, Aerospace [] Philosophically speaking NSA's participation was inconsistent. They aggressively supported the "Fine Frequency" parameter measurement in 3 bands which finally collapsed of its own stupidity and in support of their recognized Secondary Mission little of substance was done until about ^{October} / December 1972 when the 8 bands were increased to 17. SLM option was raised in answer to the SALT verification issue and not NSA's Secondary Mission. Had this option received even half as much support from NSA in the Joint Prog. Planning Group as they expended on Fine Frequency option, it would have been included in the Mission Technical description.
4. Budget participation by NSA during this Joint Prog. Planning Session which lasted for three months, was limited to a single sheet of paper written in longhand and totaled to about \$36½ Million through FY-78 and had \$18M in FY-74 as an example. The logic supporting this was ROM and was stated by [] that NSA wanted one-third of the Action [] and if it were going to cost [] their share should approach [] Software cost \$X Million this programs software would be close (in cost) to the same amount.
5. Near the end of the 3-month Joint Program Planning period, NSA made a positive step to draw the line of responsibility between NRL and NSA at the receiver output Terminals; thus they were funding the collection system except for the antennas and the receivers. This included ~~telemetry computer~~ [] two already in the POPPY Program @ \$10 Million. \$8 M. for Telemetry and PAPP plus \$6 M. for software. ~~TOP SECRET~~
- ~~TOP SECRET~~ HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY
- Approved for Release: 2024/06/14 C05026406

(early 1972)

Thus the NSA #364M initial estimate bears little resemblance to today's truth as we know it. ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] as inflated to reach one-third of the overall program and then expanded area of responsibility to give credence to this excessive claim for cost. Truth has filtered into NSA cost estimates by many mechanisms unknown to me but Dr. Hall was one of them I'm sure. Accompanying this reduction in cost estimates for NSA's share of [redacted] there has been a retrenchment in their/accepted responsibility...no longer does their claim extend to the "Receiver Output Termina~~33~~" so we have an area of responsibility that is not funded. Realistically I believe that the initial NSA claim to it was invalid and without significant precedent but my voice would not carry-the-day in the arguments which occurred over this in May and June of 1972. [redacted] finally granted that NRL would design the collection system for the sites and build a Prototype....thus we kept our team in the ball game, accepting NSA's wish to fund this portion of the effort as well as the more reasonable Processing part. I'm sure that [redacted] has many precedents to draw from in accepting this logic in the first budget submission for [redacted] but Cost sharing Plans evidently were not honored or inadequate for the need.

6. Some of the Basic Fundamental Goals [redacted] have seemingly been eroded away over the last 1½ years: ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ (1) "make it a Ford NOT a Cadillac" and (2) "Make fullest use of Existing Resources from POPPY."

In addition to these concerns there is one that challenges the heavy emphasis on NRL supporting 4-Plane system when only the 2-Plane system is approved. So far we have agreed only to (1) spending SPO \$ on CSC contractor effort to (2) take what ever documentation exists without changing our prioritization and build a Bid Package again with CSC. On the ~~contrary~~ contrary, we have not hired any new personnel nor employed existing personnel in any significant way to support the 4-Plane system. Not that we do not believe in it, but because it is not approved. Perhaps SPO overemphasized their point here and we fell back too far to counter their seeming lack of First and Highest concern for Design and Development of the 01-series. We are committed to a schedule and a Budget for 01 and we will not dilute this for what might happen in X-com in November.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

History

Lee

9/21/73
HR visit bulletinI POPPY

1. Analysis - NSA's lack of work or recognition of SA-6, similar on TRIAD

2. Processing

a. NSA's-6600 system in 6 years has produced little.

b. NSA has had 170 odd people working on the POPPY effort with little development and few reports

~~3. Analysis~~

3. Overseas field sites - Poor NSA support over the years, fought NRL's developing 810 - , 810, PDE, 86 software.

4. Through power politics took over 86 development from NRL ~~instead~~ (HRB contract) and herein project ~~the~~ (the NSA take over) made minor additions to base plans and software and are now phasing down much of the effort. Now a non-integrated system.

4. Let General Search requirements die, hence, no national system covering 1.53 - 35 GHz is now even ~~being~~ ^{being} planned.

~~TOP SECRET~~BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ II P.M.-16 O.S. study

1. NSA antagonized P.M. 76/NRL
2. Intechical review inserted strong disclaimers to a ~~POPPY~~ POPPY,
3. Major political horrange

III~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA.
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

Page Denied

~~TOP SECRET~~~~Funding Trend~~

	<u>73</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>75</u>
CONCERT 101630Z NOV 72	4.0	19.25	9.15
122127Z JAN 73			
(Reflects OSD cuts/deferrals)		13.0	12.65
0111922Z AUG 73		10.25	

Funding Problems

1. 2.8 vice 4.0 received in FY 73 and not received when needed.
2. FY 74 funds not available to meet project budget requirements.
Minimum schedule set up to accomodate: \$3.5 received in late July,
\$2.6 requested by 1 October (receipt of this now looks doubtful)
3. \$2.0 reduction in NSA commitment received in August. (Remove backup recording function previously supported).
4. Current intent IAW cost sharing discussions with SPO to reduce FY 75 and FY 76 funds by \$925K.
5. Expansion of secondary mission thus increasing the overall value of the system to NSA while not supporting any of space segment and reducing other "agreed to" support.

Technical Direction Problems

1. Design by message.
2. Using funds to influence design (Remove backup recording)
3. Unilateral direction - not coordinated with other principals
(Secondary mission)
4. Inconsistent with basic program requirements.
(Deploy less than required to meet EXCOM decision)

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY