CROSS REFERENCE

2.

NRL SPECIAL PROJECTS CONTROL NUMBER

BYE-000221-74

8/14

~~TOP SECRET~~ - HANDLE VIA BYEMAN TALENT KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM JOINTLY

ORIGINATOR		SERIAL NO. BYE 59,874-74	DATE 19JUL74
[illegible] (PROGRAM C)			ENCLOSURES (1) [illegible] (2) LIST OF ATTENDEES (3) MINIMUM DAILY VOLTAGE PLOT (4) COLLECTION HIGHLIGHTS
DATE REC'D [illegible]	TICKLER DATE	COPY NO. 8	RECEIPT NO. WA 00,609
SUBJECT: POPPY TECHNICAL OPERATIONS GROUP (TOG) MEETING REPORT			DIST INFO

☐ BASIC DOCUMENT ON R/S

☐ BASIC DOCUMENT NOT HELD. DESTROY.

ROUTE TO	*	CY NO.	W/ ENCL	SIGNATURE	DATE OUT	DATE RETURN
1000						
7000						
7030		8	ALL			
1220		7				
7032				[signature]	8/15	
7033				[signature]	8/15	
Frankovic				[signature]	9/3/74	
Lawton				TL	9/23/	
Pettit				[signature]	8/27	
				[signature]	9/23/74	

CODES HAVING PRIMARY INTEREST CHECK ONE

☐ RETAIN INDEFINITELY. (REFERENCE VALUE).

☐ RETAIN ______ MONTHS. (INFO MATERIAL HAVING ONLY TEMPORARY REFERENCE VALUE).

☐ DESTROY AFTER ROUTING. (NO FURTHER REFERENCE OR INFORMATION VALUE).

DESTRUCTION REPORT NO.

FINISH FILE 7.2

NRL INCOMING DOCUMENT

B221-74

8

BYE-59874-74

Transferred 8-21-05

*A-ACTION
I-INFORMATION
C-COMMENT
R-RETAIN
E-EVALUATION

RETURN THIS ROUTE SLIP TO NRL SPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICE, ROOM 222, BLDG. 43.
DO NOT ROUTE TO OTHER SECTION OR BRANCH.

ACTION TAKEN BY

NRL CONTROL RECORD NDW-NRL-5216/1005 (REV. 3-72)

ENCLOSURE (3) to BYE No. 59,874-74

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTROL NO. Byc 59874/74
cy 8

REFERRED TO OFFICE	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY	
	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	NAME & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE
NRL (7030)							

(OVER)

Handle Via Indicated Controls

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE

Access to this document will be restricted to those persons cleared for the specific projects;

EARPOP

....

....

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Systems.

NRL B-TK-000221-74

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONTROL SYSTEM

NAVY SPACE PROJECT OFFICE
~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE, PROGRAM C
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

PME-106-541/sjw
JUL 19 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OP-955)
DIRECTOR, NRO STAFF (SS4, SS4A and SS7)
COMMANDER, NAVAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND
DIRECTOR, NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY (1000 and 7030)
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (R244, W24, W34 and A81)
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (OSI)

Subj: POPPY Technical Operations Group (TOG) Meeting; report of

Encl: (1) Agenda
(2) List of Attendees
(3) Minumum Daily Voltage Plot
(4) Collection Highlights

Ref: (a) CONQUER 171738Z Jun 74 CITE Ø229
(b) CONQUER 181205Z Jun 74 CITE Ø23Ø

1. The POPPY Technical Operations Group (TOG) met at the NSA at 0930 on 20 June 1974. The Agenda and a list of attendees are forwarded as enclosures (1) and (2).

2. The following specific items were discussed:

a. System Status: (NRL)

System health remains good despite an extended period of low sun exposure. Today's reading is 69%. The voltage readings have remained in the safe region except for one occasion each on 7107A and 7107D (days 158 and 163 respectively) when timer problems caused the voltages to drop (see enclosure (3)). The timer on 7107A is running 16 to 17 minutes for each 20 minute increment. This will be checked at the engineering evaluation in [redacted] in July.

[redacted]

Because of the extended low sunlight, there has been a large number of occurrences of malfunctioning options. These will be checked at the engineering evaluation in July.

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CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Warning Notice - Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

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CONTROL SYSTEM

CLASSIFIED BY BYEMAN; 1 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 582 DECLASSIFY ON IMP DET.

~~TOP SECRET~~ EARPOP ARF

B-221-74

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PME-106-541/sjw

Subj: POPPY Technical Operations Group (TOG) Meeting; report of

b. Collection Highlights. (NSG)

Because of the POPPY [redacted] Operations Seminar 1974 that begins today at Naval Security Group Headquarters, no NSG representatives were able to attend the meeting. It was pointed out to attendees that information provided at the TOG Meetings is available in REINDEER 41 and REINDEER 78 message reports transmitted weekly by CNSG. References (a) and (b) were cited as the latest in this series. The REINDEER 41 provides system status as seen by the collection sites; and the REINDEER 78 contains Collection Summaries.

It was also pointed out that the Seminar is an extremely interesting and informative forum for the exchange of information with field site representatives.

Enclosure (4) was submitted to the SPO for inclusion in these minutes by NSG representatives on 27 June 1974.

c. Processing Highlights. (NSA)

The NSA representatives provided the following:

(1) [redacted] was apparently intercepted by [redacted] on 15 June 1974. This Soviet radar satellite system was previously reported by [redacted] and the likelihood of another POPPY intercept was considered extremely remote.

(2) SOCOMM installations, as of 1000 on 19 June 1974, have provided W2, W3 analysts with an OPSCOMM capability to the POPPY sites. It is planned that this terminal will be manned from 0700-1300 local daily (working days) for analytic exchange with the sites. Procedures are being established to take advantage of this new capability. Possible transmission errors and some remedies were discussed. It was requested that NSA provide a status update on the use of this circuit at the next TOG meeting.

(3) The 2826 MHz Unidentified Signal presented at the last TOG meeting has been identified as an [redacted] The ident information provided by PEC was as follows:

On 27 February, 1 March, 21 March and 8 April 1974 a collector in the Sea of Japan intercepted and visually correlated an [redacted] to [redacted] Parameters for this Emitter were:

RF	2821-2828	MHz
PRF	579-584	PPS
PD	0.8-1.2	USEC
SCAN	5.5-5.7 and 11.2	SPR

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Subj: POPPY Technical Operations Group (TOG) Meeting; report of

These parameters will be altered again with parameters obtained from other overhead collectors.

An EPL change will be forthcoming.
Field Sites will be notified of the new parameters.

(4) 17-218

On 02 June [redacted] intercepted an unidentified signal operating simultaneously in E/I Band in PRF SYNC. The Signal was geopositioned to 41-32N, 044-32E (6X13 nm 061 deg) TBILISI SAM SITE USSR. Parameters were as follows:

RF 2680-2930 MHz
9400-9600 MHz

PRF 1249.4 PPS (TRUE)

SCAN IRREG SECTOR WITH AVG TIME OF 9 SECONDS

A review of mission 7338 reports revealed that the I Band portion of the signal had been intercepted several times and geopositioned to TBILISI and YEREVAN (40-02N, 044-37E) USSR. Two intercepts were collected of the E/I Band Signal in PRF SYNC and positioned to the previously mentioned areas.

Correspondence between W345 and NSD (CALF) was initiated for the purpose of reporting the essential SCAN information derived from the POPPY intercept. NSD was in the process of preparing and ELT that would have postulated an association between the E/I Band Signal and WHIFF. The ELT will be published and contain the POPPY intercept data.

(5) [redacted] the alleged ionospheric research radar constructed near Kharkov, has been the subject of a study effort by Project DEPARTURE personnel for W group, and a briefing on the results and conclusions was presented at the TOG meeting. POPPY intercepts from [redacted] recorded in October, 1973 and January, 1974 were used. The DEPARTURE results clarify the [redacted] analyses (17-244) and reinforce the assessment that this radar is used for benign ionospheric measurements (similar to known Thompson backscatter devices) of electron densities.

d. Engineering Evaluation. (NRL)

Phase VII of this program is scheduled to be conducted at [redacted] 10-12 July 1974. Approval has been received and coordination with the site and with CNSG is proceeding.

PME-106-541/sjw

Subj: POPPY Technical Operations Group (TOG) Meeting: report of

e. On-Orbit Calibration. (NSA)

It is currently planned that NSA personnel positioned at [redacted] and at [redacted] will collect data for an on-orbit calibration of the 7107 satellites on 22 July. Close coordination will begin on 10 July.

(NOTE: Information provided on 25 June by NSA representatives indicates that this engineering evaluation will probably not be conducted as scheduled above.)

3. The next TOG Meeting is scheduled to be hosted by the NRL on 25 July 1974.

R. K. GEIGER

AGENDA

Status

Collection Highlights

Processing Highlights

Engineering Evaluation

On-Orbit Calibration

ENCLOSURE (1) to BYE No. 59,874-74

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PME-106-541/sjw

LIST OF ATTENDEES

NSA: [redacted]
Mr. K. J. Gallagher
[redacted]

NRL: Mr. Lawton
Mr. Frankovic

Enclosure (2) to

~~TOP SECRET~~ EARP

Enclosure 3. Minimum Daily Voltage Plot



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ENCLOSURE (3) to BYE No. 59,874-71

OCEAN SURVEILLANCE

Since the last TOG meeting, there have been 5379 [redacted] locations. 782 of these were equated to specific ships. 991 intercepts were major combatant associated, but could not be correlated to a particular ship. 99 intercepts of [redacted] emitters were received since the last TOG, including 7 out of area intercepts; two in the Med, one in the North Pacific, one in the Iberian Basin, one East of Hokaido, one in the Norwegian Sea, and one in the North Sea. 3507 intercepts of merchant associated radars were reported.

[redacted] monitored the following:

1. The Norwegian Sea exercise and return transit to the NORFLT.

2. The return of the KRIVAK DDGSP B' DITELNYJ from the North Sea to the Baltic.

3. The transit of the SVERDLOV CL SVERDLOV and KTOLIN DDG NASTOICHIVY from the Med to the English Channel where they made a port call in France.

4. The MOSKVA CHG LENINGRAD, the KASHIN DLG SKORYY, and the AOR BORIS CHILIKIN as they exited the Med and headed Southward in Atlantic, possibably to Conakry.

[redacted] monitored the following:

1. The KARA NIKOLAVE returning to the Black Sea from the Med.

2. The KASHIN DLG SOOBRAZITELNYY entering the Med from the Black Sea, and returning to the Black Sea.

3. The return of the AGI KAVKAZ to the Black Sea from the Eastern Med.

4. The transit of the MOSKVA CHG LENINGARD and KASHIN DLG SKORYY from the Black Sea to the Med.

5. The KASHIN DLG KRASNY KAVKAZ and KYNDA CLGM GROZNYY on their transit from the Black Sea to the Med.

[redacted] monitored the following:

1. The return to the Med of the KOTLIN DDG NAKHODCHIVYY from the Conakry area.

2. The two KRIVAK DDGSP's BODRYY and SILNYY on their return to the Med from the Caribbean.

3. The AGI ZAKARPATE off the U. S. East Coast and return to the NORFLT.

[redacted] monitored the following:

1. The exercise East of Hokaido and return transit to the Sea of Japan.

2. The transit of the KRESTA II VOROSHILOV from the Indian Ocean to the Sea of Japan. Activity in the Sea of Japan/Pacific area has been light since the last exercise.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE AND EOB

PROJECT FLAVOR: 55 intercepts were reported in support of task. 45 locations of target emitters were reported from [redacted] and 10 from [redacted]. During the month, SLM data were collected four times on target emitter B399Z and twice on [redacted]

SA-X-8 activity remains at a high level with intercepts reflected from Emba, Sovetsk, Smolensk, and the Kaliningrad area. New modes of operation were reflected for signal [redacted] New PRF's, an 8 and 10 position PRI stagger, and circular scan with superimposed complex scan were some of the modes reported. The [redacted] A emitter was reflected twice with a two position pulsed stagger. This is not a confirmed mode of operation for the emitter. The SA-1 target tracking radar YO YO was intercepted once in the 3600-4050 MHz band. This is 200 MHz higher than previously listed operation. Also, the SA-2 [redacted] was intercepted operating in an RF band approx 200 MHz higher than normal. During period the [redacted] radar was intercepted from [redacted] Baku, USSR, and Taytruka, USSR. The intercept from Taytruka is the first reflection of a [redacted] at that location. Two intercepts of Signal 1020Z were reported on 12 June. Intercepts displayed apparent double pulsing or dual beam operation with one beam pulse utilizing a constant PRI and the second displaying PFM. PRF drifted from 77.066 to 77.061 during one intercept. Probable location of emitter is Karkov.

SECRET NOFORN