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HANDLE VIA **BYEMAN**

CONTROL SYSTEM

ITN 0503  
121217 PP UUU RUXSBAA2099 0842140 00047-XXXX  
ZNY XXXXX UUU ZNM  
P 251800Z

BT  
XXXXX  
DAMP 842, [ ] 184  
DAMP PASS [ ]

DISTRIBUTION		
	A	I
SAFOS		
SAFAL		
SAFUSS		✓
SAFSS		✓
EXEC		
L&A		
P&B	✓	
S&T		✓
SAF/SPE		
TC		
REGISTRY		
COMM		
TRNSA		
RF		

AA-2114  
MM

~~SECRET~~ 251800Z MAR 81 CITE BISON 2303  
PRIORITY [ ] INFO PRIORITY [ ]  
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CHANNELS ONLY

FOR DR. HERMANN. INFO MR. HILL AT [ ]  
FROM: GENERAL KULPA  
SUBJECT: FARRAH I BATTERY LIFE

- REFERENCES:
- A. [ ] 0202, 12 FEB 81
  - B. KWBISON 2423, 4 MAR 81
  - C. [ ] 1854, 12 MAR 81
  - D. [ ] 0371, 19 MAR 81

1. AT THE JANUARY 81 P989 QUARTERLY REVIEW, THE PRIME CONTRACTOR BRIEFED THE PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF A FARRAH-I BATTERY LIFE STUDY. THIS STUDY INDICATED THAT THE TASKING CAPABILITY REQUIRED BY THE FARRAH-I GENERAL SYSTEM SPECIFICATION, TOGETHER WITH THE INCREASE IN PAYLOAD POWER REQUIREMENTS BEYOND THE ORIGINAL PREDICTION, RESULTED IN A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN EXPECTED BATTERY LIFE, WHICH, IN TURN, REDUCED THE OVERALL SYSTEM MMD BELOW THE SPECIFIED 36 MONTHS. THIS PROBLEM IS BEING RESOLVED BY SIGNIFICANTLY LOWERING THE BATTERY OPERATING TEMPERATURES THROUGH THE ADDITION OF OPTICAL SOLAR REFLECTORS AND WHITE PAINT TO VARIOUS VEHICLE SURFACES. WITH THESE MODIFICATIONS THE TAPE RECORDERS WILL REMAIN THE CONTROLLING FACTOR IN THE FARRAH-I MMD. THE FARRAH-I MMD WILL MEET OR EXCEED ITS SPECIFICATION OF 36 MONTHS.

2. FARRAH WILL EXCEED ITS SPECIFICATION FOR BOTH MMD AND TASKING CAPABILITY, I.E., THE 208 MINUTE PER DAY SPECIFICATION TASKING MODEL. HOWEVER, THE EXISTING FARRAH POWER SYSTEM WILL NOT PERMIT FULL EXPLOITATION OF THE VEHICLE'S CAPABILITIES AGAINST CURRENT AND ANTICIPATED FUTURE REQUIREMENTS. DURING PERIODS WHEN THE SPACECRAFT OPERATES IN LESS THAN 100 PERCENT SUN, (ABOUT TWO THIRDS OF THE YEAR), THE POWER AVAILABLE ON CERTAIN PASSES IS INSUFFICIENT TO ACCOMPLISH THE DESIRED TASKING. THIS SITUATION OCCURS PRIMARILY IN PASSES OVER THE CENTRAL SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE WHERE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IS A PRIMARY TASKING OBJECTIVE.

3. BASED ON THESE CONSIDERATIONS WE SHOULD ADD A THIRD BATTERY TO THE FARRAH SPACECRAFT. THIS ADDITION WOULD RELIEVE THE EXISTING POWER CONSTRAINTS AND PROVIDE IMPROVED FLEXIBILITY TO MEET CURRENT AND PREDICTED FUTURE REQUIREMENTS SUCH AS INCREASED TI, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, OCEAN SURVEILLANCE AND SUPPORT OF MULTIPLE VAN OPERATIONS. TODAYS

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PROGRAM 989 SYSTEM PROVIDES A COMBINATION OF ONE RAQUEL AND TWO URSALA VEHICLES TO SATISFY THESE REQUIREMENTS. AFTER 1982 WE MIGHT BE TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON FARRAH-I.

4. THE COST OF ADDING A THIRD BATTERY TO BOTH FARRAH-I AND FARRAH-II IS \$4.2M. ADDITION OF A THIRD BATTERY TO FARRAH-I, ALONG WITH CURRENT PAYLOAD PROBLEMS, WILL SLIP ITS AVAILABILITY TO DECEMBER 1984. CONFLICTS WITH TEST EQUIPMENT AND OTHER RESOURCES WILL RESULT IN A FARRAH-II AVAILABILITY IN AUGUST 1983. I DESCRIBED THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THESE SLIPS IN REFERENCE B. IF FARRAH-II AVAILABILITY IS SLIPPED TO DECEMBER 1983, WE CAN CREATE A FUND REQUIREMENTS PROFILE WHICH COVERS BOTH FARRAH-I AND II SLIPS AND THE BATTERY ADDITIONS AS FOLLOWS:

FY 82	FY 83	FY 84
2.0	8.3	2.0

FURTHER DELAY OF FARRAH-II WOULD NOT RESULT IN ANY FURTHER SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS AND WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO OUR GOAL OF INCREASING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY.

5. I NEED TO KNOW IF THE FUND REQUIREMENT CAN BE SATISFIED IN ORDER TO DIRECT THE CONTRACTOR TO PROCEED WITH THE BATTERY ADDITION BY 15 APRIL. A BRIEFING ON THE OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF NOT MAKING THE MODIFICATION IS AVAILABLE.

REVW: 25 MAR 2004

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HANDLE VIA ~~BYEMAN~~

CONTROL SYSTEM

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ITN 0390  
 121217 PR UUU RUXPDAA0610 0431855 00000-XXXX--RUXSBAA, RUXEDAA DISTRIBUTION  
 ZNY XXXXX UUU ZNM  
 P R 121854Z  
 BT  
 XXXXX  
 ALLOT 177, [ ] 656  
 ALLOT PASS BISON

AA-1012

	CONTROL SYSTEM	
	1	2
SAFOS		
SAFAL		
SAFBS		✓
SAFSS		✓
EXEC		
L&A		
P&B		✓
S&T	✓	
SAF/SPE		
TC		
REGISTRY		
COMM		
RF		✓

~~SECRET~~ 121854Z FEB 84 CITE [ ] 0202  
 PRIORITY BISON INFO [ ]  
 HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL CHANNELS ONLY

KWBISON FOR GEN KULPA/COL FOLEY; FROM HILL  
 SUBJECT: FARRAH I  
 REFERENCE: A. KWBISON 1259, 092230Z FEB 84  
 B. PROGRAM REVIEW BRIEFINGS ON F-I POWER SUBSYSTEM

STATUS

1. REQUEST YOU DEVELOP A RECOVERY OPTION TO CORRECT THE MAIN BEAM OMNI-P SENSITIVITY ANOMALY DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE A. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, YOU CAN ASSUME A FARRAH I LAUNCH DATE OF MARCH 1982. SCHEDULE AND COST IMPACTS SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS WELL AS A MORE DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE TECHNICAL, MANUFACTURING AND MISSION IMPLICATIONS OF CORRECTING OR NOT CORRECTING THIS ANOMALY. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING OPTIONS AND RATIONALE, A BRIEFING ON THE SUBJECT SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSIST LATER IN EXPLAINING THE ISSUE AND THE RECOMMENDED SOLUTION TO NSA AND THE DCI'S SIGINT COMMITTEE.
2. AT THE RECENT P-989 PROGRAM REVIEW (REFERENCE B), THE PRIME CONTRACTOR DESCRIBED A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS FARRAH I BATTERY/POWER SUBSYSTEM PROBLEM. REQUEST YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THIS PROBLEM AND IF IT IS IN FACT SERIOUS, REQUEST RECOVERY OPTIONS BE DEVELOPED AS FOR THE OMNI-P SENSITIVITY ANOMALY.
3. A COST OPTION, FOR THE ABOVE, SHOULD BE DEVELOPED TO DESCRIBE THE IMPACT OF FARRAH II IF THE ADDITIONAL WORK IS DONE WITHIN THE CURRENT APPROVED PROGRAM.

RVW; 11 FEB 2001

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HANDLE VIA ~~BYEMAN~~  
CONTROL SYSTEM

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ITM 8647  
 424247 RR UUU RUXEDAA4760 0710248 00026-XXXX--RUXPDAA.  
 ZNY XXXXX UUU ZNM  
 R 420248Z  
 BT  
 XXXXX  
 DAMP 996, ALLOT 443, JACKAL 336.  
 DAMP PASS [REDACTED]  
 ALLOT PASS BISON  
 JACKAL PASS FALCON

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN

DISTRIBUTION	
	A I
SAFOS	
SAFAL	✓
SAFUSS	✓
SAFSS	✓
EXEC	
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P&B	✓
S&T	✓
SAF/SPE	
TC	
REGISTRY	
COMM	
RF	✓

AA-

25X1

~~SECRET~~ 420248Z MAR 84 CITE [REDACTED] 4854

[REDACTED] BISON INFO FALCON.

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CHANNELS ONLY

[REDACTED] OPS

[REDACTED] FOR HERMANN/HILL, BISON FOR KULPA/FOLEY, FALCON FOR GOVERNMENT

EYES ONLY: [REDACTED] FROM INMAN

SUBJECT: FARRAH-I PERFORMANCE

REF [REDACTED] 0202, 424854Z FEB 84

1. ~~(S/D)~~ THERE CONTINUES TO BE GREAT RELIANCE ON P-989 FOR MAJOR AND UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS TO OUR SIGINT MISSION. IN PARTICULAR WE HAVE COME TO COUNT ON MULTIPLE P-989 VEHICLE OUTPUTS IN SATISFACTION OF WORLDWIDE SEARCH, OPERATIONAL SIGINT, TI AND COMINT MAPPING FUNCTIONS. WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE GROWING VEHICLE POWER DEMANDS OF THE FARRAH-I PAYLOAD WILL TAX THE PRESENT BATTERY CAPACITY SUCH THAT SEVERELY REDUCED END-OF-LIFE TIMELINES AND IMPAIRED OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY WILL RESULT. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT A RECOVERY OPTION AS SUGGESTED IN REF WHICH WOULD INCORPORATE SUCH ADDITIONAL BATTERY CAPACITY AND POWER SUBSYSTEM REWORK AS WOULD ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM AND SUGGEST WORK BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT SUCH A MODIFICATION CAN BE ACCOMMODATED IN THE LIKELY LAUNCH SCHEDULES, AND WILL BE NEEDED IN ANY EVENT FOR FARRAH-II.

2. ~~(S/D)~~ I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE UNIQUE MAINBEAM TI CAPABILITIES OF THE MISSION 7300 PROGRAM IN THE 42-48 GHZ RANGE ARE SIGNIFICANTLY HAMPERED BY THE FARRAH-I 4Y OMNI DOWNCONVERTER LOSS IN SENSITIVITY. ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THERE IS RISK ASSOCIATED WITH REPAIR ATTEMPTS OF THE PROBABLE CAUSE (INTERMEDIATE FREQUENCY SOLID STATE SWITCH), WE NEVERTHELESS WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS MAINBEAM TI MISSION TO OUR SIGINT NEEDS. IF ANY FIX IS POSSIBLE WITHIN A DEFERRED LAUNCH SCHEDULE (FALL 84/SPRING 82) WE ENCOURAGE THIS DEFICIENCY BE RECTIFIED.

REUW 42 MAR 84

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 HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CHANNELS ONLY  
 CONTROL SYSTEM

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HANDLE VIA **BYEMAN**

CONTROL SYSTEM

ITW 0573  
 424247 RR UUU RUXSBAA4235 0642336 00032-XXXX--RUXPDAA.  
 ZNY XXXXX UUU ZNM  
 R 054500Z  
 BT  
 XXXXX  
 DAMP 735. [ ] 149  
 DAMP PASS

AA-1585  
 DM

~~SECRET~~ 054500Z MAR 84 CITE BISON 2302

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CHANNELS ONLY

FOR DR. HERMANN, INFO MR. HILL AT [ ] INFO FOR DIRNSA,  
 INFO MR. STARK/MR. GENTILE AT [ ] FROM: GENERAL KULPA,  
 SUBJECT: FARRAH-I CAPABILITY LOSS

1. DURING REVIEW OF FINAL FARRAH-I PAYLOAD ACCEPTANCE TEST DATA, AN 8 DB REDUCTION IN GAIN IN ONE OF THE TWO OMNI RECEIVERS WAS DISCOVERED. THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF THESE RECEIVERS IS MAINBEAM TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE. WE HAVE DETERMINED THE FAILURE TO BE IN AN IF SWITCH MODULE AND HAVE TO ASSUME THAT COMPLETE LOSS OF THIS CIRCUIT WILL EVENTUALLY RESULT.

2. THE CONTRACTOR HAS DEVELOPED A REPAIR PLAN WHICH, ON-PAPER, SUPPORTS A DECEMBER OF 1984 LAUNCH. HE DOES NOT RECOMMEND REPAIR HOWEVER. I HAVE ASSESSED THE PROPOSED REPAIR PLAN AND BELIEVE THAT THE TIME ESTIMATED TO REPAIR THE PROBLEM IS OPTIMISTIC. THERE IS A MAJOR RISK TO OTHER SUBSYSTEMS AND PAYLOAD WIRING DURING DISASSEMBLY REPAIR REASSEMBLY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING. THE MOST CRITICAL COMPONENT OF CONCERN IS THE 20-LAYER MOTHERBOARD USED IN THE DATA HANDLER SUBSYSTEM. IT IS A COMPLEX BOARD CONSISTING OF HARD AND FLEXIBLE LAYERS INTERTWINED TO ENABLE A PORTION OF THE BOARD TO BE MOUNTED 90 DEGREES TO THE REMAINDER. THE SUPPLIER HAS BEEN UNABLE TO PRODUCE A SECOND BOARD IN MANY ATTEMPTS. A REDESIGNED BOARD WILL BE USED FOR FARRAH II, UTILIZING A HARD BOARD WITH POINT-TO-POINT WIRING. THERE IS A HIGH PROBABILITY THAT THE FARRAH I BOARD WOULD BE DAMAGED DURING REWORK AND SUBSEQUENT PAYLOAD VIBRATION. I WOULD THEN BE FORCED TO INCORPORATE THE FARRAH II DESIGN INTO FARRAH I REQUIRING FOUR TO SIX MONTHS ADDED EFFORT. THIS WOULD DELAY THE LAUNCH OF FARRAH I WELL BEYOND MARCH 1982. THE MINIMUM COST TO REPAIR IS \$5.4M AND THE RISKS I HAVE DESCRIBED WOULD REQUIRE ANOTHER \$6-7 MILLION TO COVER.

3. WE HAVE ASSESSED THE COLLECTION IMPACT CAUSED BY LOSS OF THIS CIRCUITRY AND BELIEVE THAT THE REDUCTION IN CAPABILITY DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE RISK OF REPAIR. THE REMAINING RECEIVER/ANTENNA CAPABILITIES OVERLAP THE FAILED UNIT CONSIDERABLY. A MESSAGE DESCRIBING DETAILS OF THIS IMPACT HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO INTERESTED ELEMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY. A BRIEFING ON THE SUBJECT IS AVAILABLE TO ASSIST

DISTRIBUTION		
	A	I
SAFOS		✓
SAFAL		✓
SAFUSS		✓
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EXEC		✓
L&A		✓
P&B		✓
S&T	✓	
SAF/SPE		✓
TC		✓
REGISTRY		
COMM		
RF		✓

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CONTROL SYSTEM

YOU IN MAKING A FINAL DETERMINATION ON THIS ISSUE.

REVW 05 MAR 04

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CONTROL SYSTEM

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ITN 0454  
121217 RR YKK RUXSBA4354 0682302 00023-XXXX--RUXPDAA.  
ZNY XXXXX YKK ZNM  
R 041930Z  
BT  
XXXXX  
DAMP 753  
DAMP PASS [ ] LAGOON

AA 1670  
CONTROL SYSTEM

DISTRIBUTION	
SAFOS	0349
SAFAL	
SAFUSS	✓
SAFSSB	✓
EXEC	
L&A	✓
P&B	✓
S&T	✓
SAF/SPE	
TC	
REGISTRY	
COMM	
RF	✓

~~SECRET~~ 041930Z MAR 81 CITE BISON 2423

[ ] INFO LAGOON.  
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CHANNELS ONLY  
[ ] HEXAGON/BUDGET

FOR: J. HILL INFO: R. PAULSON FM: GEN KULPA  
 SUBJECT: P989 TEST PROBLEMS AND LAUNCH DELAY IMPACTS

1. THE P989 PROGRAM IS UNDER A FINANCIAL STRAIN DUE TO DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN THE PAYLOAD AND SYSTEM TEST PHASES, AND THE ANTICIPATED LAUNCH SLIP OF THE H-47 HOST VEHICLE TO FEB/MAR 82.
2. DIFFICULTIES IN PAYLOAD TESTING, AS BRIEFED TO MR HILL ON 17 SEP 80, CAUSED THE FARRAH 4 PAYLOAD DELIVERY TO SHIFT FROM OCT TO LATE DEC 80. FURTHER PROBLEMS IN PAYLOAD COMPATIBILITY TESTS HAVE REQUIRED REWORK OF SELECTED COMPONENTS AND DELAY OF READY FOR MATE STATUS TO JUN 81. THESE DELAYS AND REWORK OPERATIONS HAVE COMBINED TO SEVERELY TAX THE P989 FY 81 PROGRAM. FOR THIS REASON, REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE IN P989'S REQUIREMENT FOR \$4.99M IN FY 81 REPROGRAMMING FOR FARRAH 4 AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. I AM WORKING TO IDENTIFY A SOURCE FOR THIS REPROGRAMMING.
3. AN F-4 LAUNCH DELAY TO EARLY 82 IS IN ALL PROBABILITY THE NEW P989 BASELINE. P989 COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS WERE DETAILED IN ALT 3 OF THE SEP 80 HEXAGON BUDGET REVISION. DUE TO STORAGE AND RETEST OF F-4, AND F1/F2 SYSTEM TEST CONFLICTS, THESE COSTS WERE ESTIMATED AT .4M IN FY 81 AND 7.3M IN FY 82. THESE COST IMPACTS ARE STILL VALID, WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT 3.0M IS NOW FORECAST TO BE NEEDED IN FY 83, THEREBY REDUCING THE FY 82 IMPACT TO 4.3M. REQUEST YOU TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO INCLUDE THE ADDITIONAL \$4.3M IN FY 82 AND \$3.0M IN FY 83 AS THE NEW P989 BASELING PROGRAM.

REVW 04 MAR 81

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HANDLE VIA BYEMAN  
CONTROL SYSTEM

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ITN 0402  
424247 RR UUU RUXSBAA1414 0414720 00052-XXXX--RUXPDAA.  
ZNY XXXXX UUU ZNM  
R 032230Z  
BT  
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[redacted] 079, [redacted] 477, DAMP 604, JACKAL 562  
PASS DEMURE  
DAMP PASS [redacted]  
JACKAL PASS FALCON

*AA/0950/JP*  
*SET/1631/JP*

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18

~~SECRET~~ 032230Z FEB 84 CITE BISON 4259  
[redacted] DEMURE, [redacted] FALCON, [redacted]  
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CHANNELS ONLY

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FOR [redacted]  
[redacted] FROM BISON/FOLEY/  
[redacted]

SUBJECT: PARTIAL LOSS OF MAINBEAM OMNI-P SENSITIVITY ON  
FARRAH I IN BANDS 6-8 (42-48 GHZ).  
1. SUBSEQUENT TO FINAL PAYLOAD TESTING AT MOTOROLA, AN 8DB  
REDUCTION IN OMNI-P SENSITIVITY WAS DISCOVERED DURING A PRE-  
SHIPMENT TEST SIGNAL GENERATOR (TSG) VERIFICATION.  
INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE CAUSE TO BE A FAULTY DOWN-  
CONVERTER IF SWITCH MODULE. I HAVE REVIEWED THE TECHNICAL  
RISK OF REPAIRING THE FAILED UNIT VS ACCEPTING AS IS.  
THE REPAIR REQUIRES REMOVAL OF THE DOWNCONVERTER FROM THE  
"B" BOX, DISASSEMBLY OF THE DOWNCONVERTER, REPAIR AND  
TEST OF THE IF SWITCH MODULE, REASSEMBLY OF THE DOWN-  
CONVERTER, FULL SUBSYSTEM TEST, REINSTALLATION INTO THE  
"B" BOX, FULL ENVIRONMENTAL AND FUNCTIONAL TEST OF THE  
"B" BOX AND REPEAT OF PAYLOAD CALIBRATION.  
2. THE FAULTY OUTPUT IS CONNECTED TO THE OMNI-P (PLUS)  
CW, PULSE, AND TI RECEIVERS. THE LATTER TWO ARE UN-  
AFFECTED SINCE EACH HAS AN AGC WITH AN 8 DB DYNAMIC  
RANGE CAPABLE OF CORRECTING FOR THE LOST SENSITIVITY.  
HOWEVER, THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR COMPLETE IF SWITCH  
MODULE FAILURE IN WHICH CASE ALL THREE SUBSYSTEMS WILL  
BE AFFECTED WHEN CONNECTED TO THE OMNI-P OUTPUT. THERE  
IS AN OMNI-M (MINUS) SUBSYSTEM WHICH IS OPERATING  
CORRECTLY. IN MOST CASES, IT WILL RECEIVE SIGNALS FROM  
THE AREAS NORMALLY COVERED BY THE OMNI-P BUT WITH  
SLIGHTLY LESS SENSITIVITY. THE OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF THE  
CURRENT 8 DB SENSITIVITY LOSS AND FULL SENSITIVITY LOSS  
FOLLOWS.  
3. IF THE FAULTURE REMAINS LIMITED TO THE 8 DB SENSITIVITY  
LOSS IN THE OMNI-P CW RECEIVER CHANNELS. THE IMPACT ON  
MISSION SUCCESS WILL BE SMALL EXCEPT IN THE AREA OF WEAK  
NON-SCANNING CW SIGNAL SEARCH AND TI.  
FOR LOW POWER FIXED BEAM EMITTERS LOCATED IN THE  
NORTHERN HEMISPHERE THAT ARE ORIENTED GENERALLY IN AN  
EASTERLY OR WESTERLY DIRECTION. THE OMNI-M CHANNELS ALONE  
PROVIDES SUFFICIENT COVERAGE. HOWEVER, THE COVERAGE OF  
SOUTNERLY POINTING BEAMS IS RESTRICTED BY THE DEGRADATION



OR LOSS OF SENSITIVITY IN THE OMNI-P CHANNELS WHEN THE COLLECTOR IS BELOW APPROXIMATELY 65 DEGREE N AND 25 DEGREE N. BELOW 25 DEGREE N, THE COVERAGE IS RESTRICTED FROM FIXED BEAMS POINTING IN A ESE OR USW DIRECTIONS. IN CONTRAST, FOR EMITTERS EMPLOYING A LARGE SCAN VOLUME OR CIRCULAR SCAN THE DECREASED FIELD-OF-VIEW AND RESTRICTED COLLECTION GEOMETRY IS EXPECTED TO ONLY CAUSE A REDUCTION IN THE AVERAGE INTERCEPT DURATION BUT NOT IN THE PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT, UNLESS THE EMITTER HAS A RELATIVELY SHORT ON-TIME.

FOR SIGNALS THAT NORMALLY EXCEED THE SYSTEM THRESHOLD BY MORE THAN 40 DB, THERE WILL BE ESSENTIALLY NO LOSS IN NUMBERS OF SIGNALS DETECTED, BUT LESS DATA WILL BE GATHERED DURING THE AVERAGE INTERCEPT.

IF COMPLETE FAILURE OCCURS, ALL THREE RECEIVERS CONNECTED TO THE OMNI-P CHANNELS WILL BE AFFECTED, HOWEVER, THE OMNI-M ANTENNA GAIN IN THE REGION NORMALLY COVERED BY THE OMNI-P CHANNEL ANTENNA IS NOMINALLY ONLY ABOUT 12 DB DOWN FROM THE PEAK GAIN OVER MOST OF THE POTENTIAL ANGLES OF ARRIVAL (THOUGH THIS VALUE AT A SPECIFIC ANGLE OF ARRIVAL IS QUITE DEPENDENT ON POLARIZATION). THIS ALLOWS THE OMNI-M ANTENNA TO PROVIDE FAIRLY GOOD SYSTEM SENSITIVITY AT NEARLY ALL RECEIVE ANGLES OF ARRIVAL, AND PROVIDE FAIR TO GOOD SYSTEM SENSITIVITY OVER MOST OF THE RECEIVE ANGLES OF ARRIVAL TYPICALLY EXPECTED FOR THE EMITTERS OF INTEREST.

4. CONSIDERING THE MISSION IMPACT AS STATED ABOVE AND THE RISK TO UNRELATED CRITICAL SYSTEMS (SUCH AS THE DATA HANDLER) DURING REPAIR AND RETEST, IT IS MY INTENT TO ACCEPT THE SYSTEM OPERATION AS IS. I WILL DISCUSS THE ISSUE IN DEPTH, IF DESIRED, AT YOUR CONVENIENCE.

REUW 03 FEB 04

SECRET

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#1446

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NO FORN DISSEM  
EXCEPT BY AUTHORITY  
OF THE SECRETARY OF  
DEFENSE