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BACKGROUND PAPER

ON

P-989 PROBLEMS

I. There are two major closely related P-989 problems which require immediate attention

- A. RAQUEL II Development Decision
- B. Major cutback in  funding

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II. RAQUEL II Development Decision

A. Background

1. RAQUEL II definition study completed in Feb 75; proposal for development submitted
2. Because of high cost, development decision deferred to July EXCOM
3. Small sustaining contract continued to maintain core of development team
4. EXCOM failed to resolve RAQUEL II issue, referred further action to Hall and Allen
5. Apparent deadlock between members of SORS and SIGINT Committees between proceeding with RAQUEL II and developing another RAQUEL I in its place
6. Gen Allen has personally intervened to work the problem and has now apparently gotten agreement from the SIGINT Committee for RAQUEL II

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## B. Problems

1. Sustaining contract runs out 29 Aug. Final decision on proceeding on RAQUEL II may still be weeks or months away because of opposition on Hall's and Colby's staffs to RAQUEL II. Should sustaining effort be continued?

2. Until the problem of funding for the  is resolved, there are serious risks that would be taken by proceeding with RAQUEL II *RTA*

III. Major Cutback in  Funding

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## A. Background

1. Over the years as the P-989 satellites have become more sophisticated and able to collect ever increasing amounts of emitter data, the ground data processing has kept pace to exploit the full potential of the satellites. This has increased the sophistication of the data processing and the number of people required to support it.

2. By the end of CY74, the  equivalent men, primarily to support the simultaneous development of two URSALA spacecraft (URSALAs III and IV) and RAQUEL I and the on-orbit support of five spacecraft (URSALA I, URSALA II, MABELI, TOPHAT, and, in Nov 74, RAQUEL I).

3. Some of this manning was being carried at the end of the year in anticipation of a RAQUEL II development go-ahead. At that time,  made the decision that all future software development would be procured on the P-989 hardware contract and not the  contract.

4. The  budget prepared in Nov - Dec 74 was based, therefore,

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on only the [ ] O&M function. The O&M manning assumed for budget purposes was [ ] The budget projections made at that time were as follows (assume 10% escalation in FY77 and 7% thereafter):

	FY	<u>76</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>81</u>
<u>NSA Share</u>							
P-989 Ops		6.4	1.6	7.0	7.6	8.3	8.8
[ ]							
SIGINT Analysis (100%)		1.9	0.40	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.2

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NRO Share

P-989 Ops 4.00 1.20 4.5 4.7 5.1 5.6 6.0

Non-P-989 Support [ ]

[ ]

Total

[ ]

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NSA Share

NRO Share

5. In April 75, an in-depth [ ] manpower review was conducted. Findings were that the manpower level was about right to do the job we felt we had been asked to do; that by and large the [ ] operation was efficient and cost-effective. A 7% cut in manpower was taken to make sure all "slop" in operation was removed. The period from Jul to Dec was to be used to evaluate whether this revised

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manning level [ ] was appropriate.

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6. ASD(I) has felt for two or three years that the overall SIGINT program would be more cost effective if the P-989 resources and functions were consolidated [ ]. To stress their point, they have deferred \$4.6M in FY76 NSA funds for the [ ] and have totally eliminated \$5.6M in FY77 funds from the NSA budget.

7. [ ] has undertaken a consolidation study to be completed by the end of the year with a preliminary output at the end of September.

#### B. Problems

1. Because the NRO matches funds with NSA (40:60), the ASD(I) deferral/deletion really amounts to the following funding reductions:

FY76 - \$7.6M

FY77 - \$9.3M

Reductions of these amounts, if they stand, obviously terminate the P-989 program as it now exists.

2. NSA is convinced the funding will not be restored and has indicated that immediate remedial action must be taken. Among the alternatives they are considering are (1) terminating the P-989 program, (2) drastically reducing the [ ] data processing, and (3) moving the P-989 processing operation to NSA as soon as possible.

3. The [ ] problem affects the RAQUEL II decision in many ways:

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a. If the data processing operations for P-989 are to be drastically curtailed, it does not appear reasonable to build the RAQUEL II processing system now planned. In turn, any significantly

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less capable processing system will not fully exploit the sophistication of the RAQUEL II spacecraft and brings into question why such a sophisticated satellite should be built

b. The computer support for the RAQUEL II development was to be provided GFE from the [ ] contract. If the [ ] contract is drastically reduced, it cannot support the RAQUEL II software development

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c. NSA may decide that they want to do RAQUEL II processing development instead of having SP do it. This will greatly complicate working the interface between the collection system and the data processing system and substantially increase the cost of RAQUEL II spacecraft development and extend the development schedule.

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